1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* This product includes software developed by the University of
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* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
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* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
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* @(#)kern_proc.c 8.7 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
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1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
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* $FreeBSD$
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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*/
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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1999-11-16 20:31:58 +00:00
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#include <sys/proc.h>
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1998-11-11 10:56:07 +00:00
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#include <sys/filedesc.h>
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1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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#include <sys/tty.h>
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1994-09-25 19:34:02 +00:00
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#include <sys/signalvar.h>
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1995-12-07 12:48:31 +00:00
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#include <vm/vm.h>
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1997-02-10 02:22:35 +00:00
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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1995-12-07 12:48:31 +00:00
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#include <vm/pmap.h>
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#include <vm/vm_map.h>
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#include <sys/user.h>
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VM level code cleanups.
1) Start using TSM.
Struct procs continue to point to upages structure, after being freed.
Struct vmspace continues to point to pte object and kva space for kstack.
u_map is now superfluous.
2) vm_map's don't need to be reference counted. They always exist either
in the kernel or in a vmspace. The vmspaces are managed by reference
counts.
3) Remove the "wired" vm_map nonsense.
4) No need to keep a cache of kernel stack kva's.
5) Get rid of strange looking ++var, and change to var++.
6) Change more data structures to use our "zone" allocator. Added
struct proc, struct vmspace and struct vnode. This saves a significant
amount of kva space and physical memory. Additionally, this enables
TSM for the zone managed memory.
7) Keep ioopt disabled for now.
8) Remove the now bogus "single use" map concept.
9) Use generation counts or id's for data structures residing in TSM, where
it allows us to avoid unneeded restart overhead during traversals, where
blocking might occur.
10) Account better for memory deficits, so the pageout daemon will be able
to make enough memory available (experimental.)
11) Fix some vnode locking problems. (From Tor, I think.)
12) Add a check in ufs_lookup, to avoid lots of unneeded calls to bcmp.
(experimental.)
13) Significantly shrink, cleanup, and make slightly faster the vm_fault.c
code. Use generation counts, get rid of unneded collpase operations,
and clean up the cluster code.
14) Make vm_zone more suitable for TSM.
This commit is partially as a result of discussions and contributions from
other people, including DG, Tor Egge, PHK, and probably others that I
have forgotten to attribute (so let me know, if I forgot.)
This is not the infamous, final cleanup of the vnode stuff, but a necessary
step. Vnode mgmt should be correct, but things might still change, and
there is still some missing stuff (like ioopt, and physical backing of
non-merged cache files, debugging of layering concepts.)
1998-01-22 17:30:44 +00:00
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#include <vm/vm_zone.h>
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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1997-10-12 20:26:33 +00:00
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static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PGRP, "pgrp", "process group header");
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MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SESSION, "session", "session header");
|
1998-02-20 13:52:15 +00:00
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static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PROC, "proc", "Proc structures");
|
1997-10-12 20:26:33 +00:00
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MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SUBPROC, "subproc", "Proc sub-structures");
|
1997-10-11 18:31:40 +00:00
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|
|
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
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|
int ps_showallprocs = 1;
|
2000-08-23 21:41:25 +00:00
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|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, ps_showallprocs, CTLFLAG_RW,
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|
|
&ps_showallprocs, 0, "");
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|
|
|
|
1995-12-14 08:32:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static void pgdelete __P((struct pgrp *));
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
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|
1995-12-02 18:58:56 +00:00
|
|
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static void orphanpg __P((struct pgrp *pg));
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|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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|
|
/*
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
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|
|
* Other process lists
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|
|
|
*/
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|
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|
|
struct pidhashhead *pidhashtbl;
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|
|
|
u_long pidhash;
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|
|
|
struct pgrphashhead *pgrphashtbl;
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|
|
|
u_long pgrphash;
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|
|
|
|
struct proclist allproc;
|
|
|
|
|
struct proclist zombproc;
|
VM level code cleanups.
1) Start using TSM.
Struct procs continue to point to upages structure, after being freed.
Struct vmspace continues to point to pte object and kva space for kstack.
u_map is now superfluous.
2) vm_map's don't need to be reference counted. They always exist either
in the kernel or in a vmspace. The vmspaces are managed by reference
counts.
3) Remove the "wired" vm_map nonsense.
4) No need to keep a cache of kernel stack kva's.
5) Get rid of strange looking ++var, and change to var++.
6) Change more data structures to use our "zone" allocator. Added
struct proc, struct vmspace and struct vnode. This saves a significant
amount of kva space and physical memory. Additionally, this enables
TSM for the zone managed memory.
7) Keep ioopt disabled for now.
8) Remove the now bogus "single use" map concept.
9) Use generation counts or id's for data structures residing in TSM, where
it allows us to avoid unneeded restart overhead during traversals, where
blocking might occur.
10) Account better for memory deficits, so the pageout daemon will be able
to make enough memory available (experimental.)
11) Fix some vnode locking problems. (From Tor, I think.)
12) Add a check in ufs_lookup, to avoid lots of unneeded calls to bcmp.
(experimental.)
13) Significantly shrink, cleanup, and make slightly faster the vm_fault.c
code. Use generation counts, get rid of unneded collpase operations,
and clean up the cluster code.
14) Make vm_zone more suitable for TSM.
This commit is partially as a result of discussions and contributions from
other people, including DG, Tor Egge, PHK, and probably others that I
have forgotten to attribute (so let me know, if I forgot.)
This is not the infamous, final cleanup of the vnode stuff, but a necessary
step. Vnode mgmt should be correct, but things might still change, and
there is still some missing stuff (like ioopt, and physical backing of
non-merged cache files, debugging of layering concepts.)
1998-01-22 17:30:44 +00:00
|
|
|
vm_zone_t proc_zone;
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
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|
|
/*
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|
|
* Initialize global process hashing structures.
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
void
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
procinit()
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
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|
|
|
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|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_INIT(&allproc);
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|
|
LIST_INIT(&zombproc);
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|
|
|
pidhashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pidhash);
|
|
|
|
|
pgrphashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pgrphash);
|
VM level code cleanups.
1) Start using TSM.
Struct procs continue to point to upages structure, after being freed.
Struct vmspace continues to point to pte object and kva space for kstack.
u_map is now superfluous.
2) vm_map's don't need to be reference counted. They always exist either
in the kernel or in a vmspace. The vmspaces are managed by reference
counts.
3) Remove the "wired" vm_map nonsense.
4) No need to keep a cache of kernel stack kva's.
5) Get rid of strange looking ++var, and change to var++.
6) Change more data structures to use our "zone" allocator. Added
struct proc, struct vmspace and struct vnode. This saves a significant
amount of kva space and physical memory. Additionally, this enables
TSM for the zone managed memory.
7) Keep ioopt disabled for now.
8) Remove the now bogus "single use" map concept.
9) Use generation counts or id's for data structures residing in TSM, where
it allows us to avoid unneeded restart overhead during traversals, where
blocking might occur.
10) Account better for memory deficits, so the pageout daemon will be able
to make enough memory available (experimental.)
11) Fix some vnode locking problems. (From Tor, I think.)
12) Add a check in ufs_lookup, to avoid lots of unneeded calls to bcmp.
(experimental.)
13) Significantly shrink, cleanup, and make slightly faster the vm_fault.c
code. Use generation counts, get rid of unneded collpase operations,
and clean up the cluster code.
14) Make vm_zone more suitable for TSM.
This commit is partially as a result of discussions and contributions from
other people, including DG, Tor Egge, PHK, and probably others that I
have forgotten to attribute (so let me know, if I forgot.)
This is not the infamous, final cleanup of the vnode stuff, but a necessary
step. Vnode mgmt should be correct, but things might still change, and
there is still some missing stuff (like ioopt, and physical backing of
non-merged cache files, debugging of layering concepts.)
1998-01-22 17:30:44 +00:00
|
|
|
proc_zone = zinit("PROC", sizeof (struct proc), 0, 0, 5);
|
2000-09-05 22:11:13 +00:00
|
|
|
uihashinit();
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
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|
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/*
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* Is p an inferior of the current process?
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*/
|
2000-06-23 07:10:34 +00:00
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int
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
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inferior(p)
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register struct proc *p;
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{
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for (; p != curproc; p = p->p_pptr)
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if (p->p_pid == 0)
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return (0);
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return (1);
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|
}
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|
|
/*
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|
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* Locate a process by number
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|
|
|
*/
|
|
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|
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struct proc *
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pfind(pid)
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|
|
register pid_t pid;
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|
|
{
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|
|
register struct proc *p;
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|
|
|
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(p, PIDHASH(pid), p_hash)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_pid == pid)
|
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|
|
return (p);
|
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|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
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|
|
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|
|
/*
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|
|
|
|
* Locate a process group by number
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
struct pgrp *
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|
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pgfind(pgid)
|
|
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|
|
register pid_t pgid;
|
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|
|
|
{
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|
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|
|
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, PGRPHASH(pgid), pg_hash)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pgrp->pg_id == pgid)
|
|
|
|
|
return (pgrp);
|
|
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
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|
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|
|
* Move p to a new or existing process group (and session)
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
enterpgrp(p, pgid, mksess)
|
|
|
|
|
register struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
pid_t pgid;
|
|
|
|
|
int mksess;
|
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|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
register struct pgrp *pgrp = pgfind(pgid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-01-08 17:31:30 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(pgrp == NULL || !mksess,
|
1999-01-10 01:58:29 +00:00
|
|
|
("enterpgrp: setsid into non-empty pgrp"));
|
1999-01-08 17:31:30 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(!SESS_LEADER(p),
|
1999-01-10 01:58:29 +00:00
|
|
|
("enterpgrp: session leader attempted setpgrp"));
|
|
|
|
|
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pgrp == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
pid_t savepid = p->p_pid;
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *np;
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* new process group
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-01-08 17:31:30 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(p->p_pid == pgid,
|
1999-01-10 01:58:29 +00:00
|
|
|
("enterpgrp: new pgrp and pid != pgid"));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
MALLOC(pgrp, struct pgrp *, sizeof(struct pgrp), M_PGRP,
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
M_WAITOK);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((np = pfind(savepid)) == NULL || np != p)
|
|
|
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
|
|
|
if (mksess) {
|
|
|
|
|
register struct session *sess;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* new session
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
MALLOC(sess, struct session *, sizeof(struct session),
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
M_SESSION, M_WAITOK);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
sess->s_leader = p;
|
1998-11-09 15:08:04 +00:00
|
|
|
sess->s_sid = p->p_pid;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
sess->s_count = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
sess->s_ttyvp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
sess->s_ttyp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
bcopy(p->p_session->s_login, sess->s_login,
|
|
|
|
|
sizeof(sess->s_login));
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_flag &= ~P_CONTROLT;
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_session = sess;
|
1999-01-08 17:31:30 +00:00
|
|
|
KASSERT(p == curproc,
|
1999-01-10 01:58:29 +00:00
|
|
|
("enterpgrp: mksession and p != curproc"));
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_session = p->p_session;
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_session->s_count++;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_id = pgid;
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_members);
|
|
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(PGRPHASH(pgid), pgrp, pg_hash);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_jobc = 0;
|
Installed the second patch attached to kern/7899 with some changes suggested
by bde, a few other tweaks to get the patch to apply cleanly again and
some improvements to the comments.
This change closes some fairly minor security holes associated with
F_SETOWN, fixes a few bugs, and removes some limitations that F_SETOWN
had on tty devices. For more details, see the description on the PR.
Because this patch increases the size of the proc and pgrp structures,
it is necessary to re-install the includes and recompile libkvm,
the vinum lkm, fstat, gcore, gdb, ipfilter, ps, top, and w.
PR: kern/7899
Reviewed by: bde, elvind
1998-11-11 10:04:13 +00:00
|
|
|
SLIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
} else if (pgrp == p->p_pgrp)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Adjust eligibility of affected pgrps to participate in job control.
|
|
|
|
|
* Increment eligibility counts before decrementing, otherwise we
|
|
|
|
|
* could reach 0 spuriously during the first call.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
fixjobc(p, pgrp, 1);
|
|
|
|
|
fixjobc(p, p->p_pgrp, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (LIST_EMPTY(&p->p_pgrp->pg_members))
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
pgdelete(p->p_pgrp);
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_pgrp = pgrp;
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&pgrp->pg_members, p, p_pglist);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* remove process from process group
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
leavepgrp(p)
|
|
|
|
|
register struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (LIST_EMPTY(&p->p_pgrp->pg_members))
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
pgdelete(p->p_pgrp);
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_pgrp = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* delete a process group
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1995-12-14 08:32:45 +00:00
|
|
|
static void
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
pgdelete(pgrp)
|
|
|
|
|
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
Installed the second patch attached to kern/7899 with some changes suggested
by bde, a few other tweaks to get the patch to apply cleanly again and
some improvements to the comments.
This change closes some fairly minor security holes associated with
F_SETOWN, fixes a few bugs, and removes some limitations that F_SETOWN
had on tty devices. For more details, see the description on the PR.
Because this patch increases the size of the proc and pgrp structures,
it is necessary to re-install the includes and recompile libkvm,
the vinum lkm, fstat, gcore, gdb, ipfilter, ps, top, and w.
PR: kern/7899
Reviewed by: bde, elvind
1998-11-11 10:04:13 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Reset any sigio structures pointing to us as a result of
|
|
|
|
|
* F_SETOWN with our pgid.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
funsetownlst(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
|
|
|
if (pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp != NULL &&
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp->t_pgrp == pgrp)
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp->t_pgrp = NULL;
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_REMOVE(pgrp, pg_hash);
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (--pgrp->pg_session->s_count == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
FREE(pgrp->pg_session, M_SESSION);
|
|
|
|
|
FREE(pgrp, M_PGRP);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Adjust pgrp jobc counters when specified process changes process group.
|
|
|
|
|
* We count the number of processes in each process group that "qualify"
|
|
|
|
|
* the group for terminal job control (those with a parent in a different
|
|
|
|
|
* process group of the same session). If that count reaches zero, the
|
|
|
|
|
* process group becomes orphaned. Check both the specified process'
|
|
|
|
|
* process group and that of its children.
|
|
|
|
|
* entering == 0 => p is leaving specified group.
|
|
|
|
|
* entering == 1 => p is entering specified group.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1994-05-25 09:21:21 +00:00
|
|
|
void
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
fixjobc(p, pgrp, entering)
|
|
|
|
|
register struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
|
|
|
|
|
int entering;
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
register struct pgrp *hispgrp;
|
|
|
|
|
register struct session *mysession = pgrp->pg_session;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Check p's parent to see whether p qualifies its own process
|
|
|
|
|
* group; if so, adjust count for p's process group.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if ((hispgrp = p->p_pptr->p_pgrp) != pgrp &&
|
1999-05-06 18:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
hispgrp->pg_session == mysession) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entering)
|
|
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_jobc++;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (--pgrp->pg_jobc == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
orphanpg(pgrp);
|
1999-05-06 18:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Check this process' children to see whether they qualify
|
|
|
|
|
* their process groups; if so, adjust counts for children's
|
|
|
|
|
* process groups.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(p, &p->p_children, p_sibling)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((hispgrp = p->p_pgrp) != pgrp &&
|
|
|
|
|
hispgrp->pg_session == mysession &&
|
1999-05-06 18:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
p->p_stat != SZOMB) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (entering)
|
|
|
|
|
hispgrp->pg_jobc++;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (--hispgrp->pg_jobc == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
orphanpg(hispgrp);
|
1999-05-06 18:13:11 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
* A process group has become orphaned;
|
|
|
|
|
* if there are any stopped processes in the group,
|
|
|
|
|
* hang-up all process in that group.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
|
orphanpg(pg)
|
|
|
|
|
struct pgrp *pg;
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
register struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_stat == SSTOP) {
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
psignal(p, SIGHUP);
|
|
|
|
|
psignal(p, SIGCONT);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996-09-14 10:53:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "opt_ddb.h"
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DDB
|
|
|
|
|
#include <ddb/ddb.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DB_SHOW_COMMAND(pgrpdump, pgrpdump)
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
|
|
|
|
|
register struct proc *p;
|
1998-02-20 13:52:15 +00:00
|
|
|
register int i;
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i <= pgrphash; i++) {
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pgrphashtbl[i])) {
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("\tindx %d\n", i);
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, &pgrphashtbl[i], pg_hash) {
|
1998-07-11 07:46:16 +00:00
|
|
|
printf(
|
|
|
|
|
"\tpgrp %p, pgid %ld, sess %p, sesscnt %d, mem %p\n",
|
|
|
|
|
(void *)pgrp, (long)pgrp->pg_id,
|
|
|
|
|
(void *)pgrp->pg_session,
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
pgrp->pg_session->s_count,
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
(void *)LIST_FIRST(&pgrp->pg_members));
|
|
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pgrp->pg_members, p_pglist) {
|
1998-07-11 07:46:16 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("\t\tpid %ld addr %p pgrp %p\n",
|
|
|
|
|
(long)p->p_pid, (void *)p,
|
|
|
|
|
(void *)p->p_pgrp);
|
1996-03-11 06:05:03 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1996-09-14 10:53:48 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif /* DDB */
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Fill in an eproc structure for the specified process.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
|
fill_eproc(p, ep)
|
|
|
|
|
register struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
register struct eproc *ep;
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
register struct tty *tp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
bzero(ep, sizeof(*ep));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_paddr = p;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_cred) {
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_pcred = *p->p_cred;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_ucred)
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_ucred = *p->p_ucred;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-17 12:49:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_procsig) {
|
1999-01-13 03:11:43 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->e_procsig = *p->p_procsig;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_stat != SIDL && p->p_stat != SZOMB && p->p_vmspace != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
|
register struct vmspace *vm = p->p_vmspace;
|
1999-02-19 14:25:37 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->e_vm = *vm;
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_vm.vm_rssize = vmspace_resident_count(vm); /*XXX*/
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1999-11-17 12:49:22 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((p->p_flag & P_INMEM) && p->p_stats)
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_stats = *p->p_stats;
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_pptr)
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_ppid = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_pgrp) {
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_pgid = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_jobc = p->p_pgrp->pg_jobc;
|
1996-05-30 01:21:50 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->e_sess = p->p_pgrp->pg_session;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ep->e_sess) {
|
|
|
|
|
bcopy(ep->e_sess->s_login, ep->e_login, sizeof(ep->e_login));
|
|
|
|
|
if (ep->e_sess->s_ttyvp)
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_flag = EPROC_CTTY;
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_session && SESS_LEADER(p))
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_flag |= EPROC_SLEADER;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) &&
|
|
|
|
|
(ep->e_sess != NULL) &&
|
|
|
|
|
((tp = ep->e_sess->s_ttyp) != NULL)) {
|
1999-05-17 13:28:35 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->e_tdev = dev2udev(tp->t_dev);
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->e_tpgid = tp->t_pgrp ? tp->t_pgrp->pg_id : NO_PID;
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_tsess = tp->t_session;
|
|
|
|
|
} else
|
1999-05-17 13:50:24 +00:00
|
|
|
ep->e_tdev = NOUDEV;
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_wmesg) {
|
|
|
|
|
strncpy(ep->e_wmesg, p->p_wmesg, WMESGLEN);
|
|
|
|
|
ep->e_wmesg[WMESGLEN] = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct proc *
|
|
|
|
|
zpfind(pid_t pid)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
LIST_FOREACH(p, &zombproc, p_list)
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p->p_pid == pid)
|
|
|
|
|
return (p);
|
|
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl_out_proc(struct proc *p, struct sysctl_req *req, int doingzomb)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
struct eproc eproc;
|
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
pid_t pid = p->p_pid;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
fill_eproc(p, &eproc);
|
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req,(caddr_t)p, sizeof(struct proc));
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req,(caddr_t)&eproc, sizeof(eproc));
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!doingzomb && pid && (pfind(pid) != p))
|
|
|
|
|
return EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
|
if (doingzomb && zpfind(pid) != p)
|
|
|
|
|
return EAGAIN;
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2000-07-04 11:25:35 +00:00
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int *name = (int*) arg1;
|
|
|
|
|
u_int namelen = arg2;
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
int doingzomb;
|
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
if (oidp->oid_number == KERN_PROC_PID) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (namelen != 1)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
p = pfind((pid_t)name[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
if (oidp->oid_number == KERN_PROC_ALL && !namelen)
|
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
|
else if (oidp->oid_number != KERN_PROC_ALL && namelen == 1)
|
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!req->oldptr) {
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/* overestimate by 5 procs */
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, 0, sizeof (struct kinfo_proc) * 5);
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
for (doingzomb=0 ; doingzomb < 2 ; doingzomb++) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (!doingzomb)
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
p = LIST_FIRST(&allproc);
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
1999-11-16 16:28:58 +00:00
|
|
|
p = LIST_FIRST(&zombproc);
|
|
|
|
|
for (; p != 0; p = LIST_NEXT(p, p_list)) {
|
2000-08-23 21:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
|
|
|
* Show a user only appropriate processes.
|
2000-08-23 21:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
|
2000-08-23 21:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Skip embryonic processes.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_stat == SIDL)
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* TODO - make more efficient (see notes below).
|
|
|
|
|
* do by session.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
switch (oidp->oid_number) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KERN_PROC_PGRP:
|
|
|
|
|
/* could do this by traversing pgrp */
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_pgrp == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_pgrp->pg_id != (pid_t)name[0])
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KERN_PROC_TTY:
|
|
|
|
|
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) == 0 ||
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_session == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_session->s_ttyp == NULL ||
|
1999-07-17 20:29:10 +00:00
|
|
|
dev2udev(p->p_session->s_ttyp->t_dev) !=
|
|
|
|
|
(udev_t)name[0])
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KERN_PROC_UID:
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_ucred == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_ucred->cr_uid != (uid_t)name[0])
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case KERN_PROC_RUID:
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_ucred == NULL ||
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_cred->p_ruid != (uid_t)name[0])
|
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
|
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if (p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
|
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, doingzomb);
|
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
1999-11-16 20:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve the argument list or process
|
|
|
|
|
* title for another process without groping around in the address space
|
|
|
|
|
* of the other process. It also allow a process to set its own "process
|
|
|
|
|
* title to a string of its own choice.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2000-07-04 11:25:35 +00:00
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc_args(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
|
1999-11-16 20:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
int *name = (int*) arg1;
|
|
|
|
|
u_int namelen = arg2;
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *p;
|
|
|
|
|
struct pargs *pa;
|
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (namelen != 1)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
p = pfind((pid_t)name[0]);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!p)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing:
int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused)
which allows specification of subject process, object process,
inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused
flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required
for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and
regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of
code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL,
and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a
series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not
be invoked directly.
o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks.
o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead
of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and
kern.ps_showallprocs.
o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies
process flags due to the disabling of ASU.
o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead
of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not
be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to
improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(),
procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not
handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in
procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by
bde).
o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access
control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should
probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic.
Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others
Approved by: bde
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
|
|
|
if ((!ps_argsopen) && p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
|
1999-11-16 20:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req->newptr && curproc != p)
|
|
|
|
|
return (EPERM);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req->oldptr && p->p_args != NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, p->p_args->ar_args, p->p_args->ar_length);
|
|
|
|
|
if (req->newptr == NULL)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (p->p_args && --p->p_args->ar_ref == 0)
|
|
|
|
|
FREE(p->p_args, M_PARGS);
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_args = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (req->newlen + sizeof(struct pargs) > ps_arg_cache_limit)
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MALLOC(pa, struct pargs *, sizeof(struct pargs) + req->newlen,
|
|
|
|
|
M_PARGS, M_WAITOK);
|
|
|
|
|
pa->ar_ref = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
pa->ar_length = req->newlen;
|
|
|
|
|
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, pa->ar_args, req->newlen);
|
|
|
|
|
if (!error)
|
|
|
|
|
p->p_args = pa;
|
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
|
FREE(pa, M_PARGS);
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern, KERN_PROC, proc, CTLFLAG_RD, 0, "Process table");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ALL, all, CTLFLAG_RD|CTLTYPE_STRUCT,
|
1999-05-03 23:57:32 +00:00
|
|
|
0, 0, sysctl_kern_proc, "S,proc", "Return entire process table");
|
1996-06-06 17:19:21 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PGRP, pgrp, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_TTY, tty, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_UID, uid, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_RUID, ruid, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PID, pid, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
1995-11-14 09:16:27 +00:00
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
|
1999-11-16 20:31:58 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2000-02-08 19:54:15 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ARGS, args, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_ANYBODY,
|
|
|
|
|
sysctl_kern_proc_args, "Process argument list");
|
