Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
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|
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause
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*
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|
* Copyright (c) 2019 Netflix Inc.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
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|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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|
|
|
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
|
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|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
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|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
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|
|
|
#include <sys/counter.h>
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|
|
#include <sys/endian.h>
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|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
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|
|
#include <sys/ktls.h>
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|
|
|
#include <sys/lock.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/module.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mutex.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/uio.h>
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <vm/pmap.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm_param.h>
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <opencrypto/ktls.h>
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session {
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_session_t sid;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_session_t mac_sid;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
struct mtx lock;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int mac_len;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
bool implicit_iv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only used for TLS 1.0 with the implicit IV. */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
bool in_progress;
|
|
|
|
uint64_t next_seqno;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct ocf_operation {
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
bool done;
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_KTLS_OCF, "ktls_ocf", "OCF KTLS");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DECL(_kern_ipc_tls);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DECL(_kern_ipc_tls_stats);
|
|
|
|
|
2020-02-26 14:26:36 +00:00
|
|
|
static SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_ipc_tls_stats, OID_AUTO, ocf,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
"Kernel TLS offload via OCF stats");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls10_cbc_encrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls10_cbc_encrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls10_cbc_encrypts,
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.0 CBC encryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls11_cbc_encrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls11_cbc_encrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls11_cbc_encrypts,
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.1/1.2 CBC encryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls12_gcm_decrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls12_gcm_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls12_gcm_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.2 GCM decryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls12_gcm_encrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls12_gcm_encrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls12_gcm_encrypts,
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.2 GCM encryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls12_chacha20_decrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls12_chacha20_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls12_chacha20_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.2 Chacha20-Poly1305 decryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls12_chacha20_encrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls12_chacha20_encrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls12_chacha20_encrypts,
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.2 Chacha20-Poly1305 encryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-12-14 19:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_gcm_decrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_gcm_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_gcm_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 GCM decryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_gcm_encrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypts,
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 GCM encryption operations");
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-12-14 19:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_chacha20_decrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_chacha20_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_chacha20_decrypts,
|
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 Chacha20-Poly1305 decryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_tls13_chacha20_encrypts);
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, tls13_chacha20_encrypts,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_tls13_chacha20_encrypts,
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF TLS 1.3 Chacha20-Poly1305 encryption operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-08 14:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_inplace);
|
2020-06-04 20:12:34 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, inplace,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_inplace,
|
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF in-place operations");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-08 14:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_separate_output);
|
2020-06-04 20:12:34 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, separate_output,
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RD, &ocf_separate_output,
|
|
|
|
"Total number of OCF operations with a separate output buffer");
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-08 14:18:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static COUNTER_U64_DEFINE_EARLY(ocf_retries);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_COUNTER_U64(_kern_ipc_tls_stats_ocf, OID_AUTO, retries, CTLFLAG_RD,
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
&ocf_retries,
|
|
|
|
"Number of OCF encryption operation retries");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2021-02-08 14:19:27 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_callback_sync(struct cryptop *crp __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_callback_async(struct cryptop *crp)
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ocf_operation *oo;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
oo = crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&oo->os->lock);
|
|
|
|
oo->done = true;
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&oo->os->lock);
|
|
|
|
wakeup(oo);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-23 21:43:06 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_dispatch(struct ktls_ocf_session *os, struct cryptop *crp)
|
2020-07-23 21:43:06 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ocf_operation oo;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
2021-02-08 14:19:27 +00:00
|
|
|
bool async;
|
2020-07-23 21:43:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
oo.os = os;
|
|
|
|
oo.done = false;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = &oo;
|
|
|
|
for (;;) {
|
2021-02-08 14:19:27 +00:00
|
|
|
async = !CRYPTO_SESS_SYNC(crp->crp_session);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_callback = async ? ktls_ocf_callback_async :
|
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_callback_sync;
|
|
|
|
|
2020-07-23 21:43:06 +00:00
|
|
|
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
|
|
if (error)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2021-02-08 14:19:27 +00:00
|
|
|
if (async) {
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
while (!oo.done)
|
|
|
|
mtx_sleep(&oo, &os->lock, 0, "ocfktls", 0);
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-07-23 21:43:06 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype != EAGAIN) {
|
|
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_etype = 0;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_flags &= ~CRYPTO_F_DONE;
|
|
|
|
oo.done = false;
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_retries, 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_dispatch_async_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
state = crp->crp_opaque;
|
|
|
|
if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) {
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_etype = 0;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_flags &= ~CRYPTO_F_DONE;
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_retries, 1);
|
|
|
|
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0) {
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
|
|
|
ktls_encrypt_cb(state, error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error = crp->crp_etype;
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
|
|
|
ktls_encrypt_cb(state, error);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_dispatch_async(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state,
|
|
|
|
struct cryptop *crp)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_opaque = state;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_callback = ktls_ocf_dispatch_async_cb;
|
|
|
|
error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
|
|
|
|
if (error != 0)
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_tls_cbc_encrypt(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state,
|
|
|
|
struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, struct iovec *outiov,
|
|
|
|
int outiovcnt)
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
struct uio *uio;
|
|
|
|
struct tls_mac_data *ad;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
struct iovec iov[m->m_epg_npgs + 2];
|
|
|
|
u_int pgoff;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int i, error;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t tls_comp_len;
|
|
|
|
uint8_t pad;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
MPASS(outiovcnt + 1 <= nitems(iov));
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
os = tls->ocf_session;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
hdr = (const struct tls_record_layer *)m->m_epg_hdr;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp = &state->crp;
|
|
|
|
uio = &state->uio;
|
|
|
|
MPASS(tls->sync_dispatch);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
if (os->implicit_iv) {
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(!os->in_progress,
|
|
|
|
("concurrent implicit IV encryptions"));
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (os->next_seqno != m->m_epg_seqno) {
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("KTLS CBC: TLS records out of order. "
|
|
|
|
"Expected %ju, got %ju\n",
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
(uintmax_t)os->next_seqno,
|
|
|
|
(uintmax_t)m->m_epg_seqno);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os->in_progress = true;
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Payload length. */
|
|
|
|
tls_comp_len = m->m_len - (m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the AAD. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ad = &state->mac;
|
|
|
|
ad->seq = htobe64(m->m_epg_seqno);
|
|
|
|
ad->type = hdr->tls_type;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_length = htons(tls_comp_len);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First, compute the MAC. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
iov[0].iov_base = ad;
|
|
|
|
iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(*ad);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
pgoff = m->m_epg_1st_off;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < m->m_epg_npgs; i++, pgoff = 0) {
|
|
|
|
iov[i + 1].iov_base = (void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(m->m_epg_pa[i] +
|
|
|
|
pgoff);
|
|
|
|
iov[i + 1].iov_len = m_epg_pagelen(m, i, pgoff);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
iov[m->m_epg_npgs + 1].iov_base = m->m_epg_trail;
|
|
|
|
iov[m->m_epg_npgs + 1].iov_len = os->mac_len;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uio->uio_iov = iov;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iovcnt = m->m_epg_npgs + 2;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_td = curthread;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_resid = sizeof(*ad) + tls_comp_len + os->mac_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_initreq(crp, os->mac_sid);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_start = 0;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length = sizeof(*ad) + tls_comp_len;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_digest_start = crp->crp_payload_length;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM;
|
|
|
|
crypto_use_uio(crp, uio);
|
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, crp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
if (os->implicit_iv) {
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
os->in_progress = false;
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Second, add the padding. */
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
pad = m->m_epg_trllen - os->mac_len - 1;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < pad + 1; i++)
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
m->m_epg_trail[os->mac_len + i] = pad;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, encrypt the record. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_initreq(crp, os->sid);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_start = m->m_epg_hdrlen;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length = tls_comp_len + m->m_epg_trllen;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(crp->crp_payload_length % AES_BLOCK_LEN == 0,
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
("invalid encryption size"));
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_use_single_mbuf(crp, m);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (os->implicit_iv)
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crp->crp_iv, os->iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crp->crp_iv, hdr + 1, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (outiov != NULL) {
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
uio->uio_iov = outiov;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iovcnt = outiovcnt;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_td = curthread;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_resid = crp->crp_payload_length;
|
|
|
|
crypto_use_output_uio(crp, uio);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (os->implicit_iv)
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls10_cbc_encrypts, 1);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls11_cbc_encrypts, 1);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outiov != NULL)
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_separate_output, 1);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_inplace, 1);
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, crp);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (os->implicit_iv) {
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(os->mac_len + pad + 1 >= AES_BLOCK_LEN,
|
|
|
|
("trailer too short to read IV"));
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(os->iv, m->m_epg_trail + m->m_epg_trllen - AES_BLOCK_LEN,
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
AES_BLOCK_LEN);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
mtx_lock(&os->lock);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
os->next_seqno = m->m_epg_seqno + 1;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
os->in_progress = false;
|
|
|
|
mtx_unlock(&os->lock);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_encrypt(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state,
|
|
|
|
struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, struct iovec *outiov,
|
|
|
|
int outiovcnt)
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
struct uio *uio;
|
|
|
|
struct tls_aead_data *ad;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
uint16_t tls_comp_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
os = tls->ocf_session;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
hdr = (const struct tls_record_layer *)m->m_epg_hdr;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp = &state->crp;
|
|
|
|
uio = &state->uio;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_initreq(crp, os->sid);
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the IV. */
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16) {
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crp->crp_iv, tls->params.iv, TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(crp->crp_iv + TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN, hdr + 1,
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Chacha20-Poly1305 constructs the IV for TLS 1.2
|
|
|
|
* identically to constructing the IV for AEAD in TLS
|
|
|
|
* 1.3.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crp->crp_iv, tls->params.iv, tls->params.iv_len);
|
|
|
|
*(uint64_t *)(crp->crp_iv + 4) ^= htobe64(m->m_epg_seqno);
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the AAD. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ad = &state->aead;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
tls_comp_len = m->m_len - (m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen);
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ad->seq = htobe64(m->m_epg_seqno);
|
|
|
|
ad->type = hdr->tls_type;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_length = htons(tls_comp_len);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_aad = ad;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_aad_length = sizeof(*ad);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Set fields for input payload. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_use_single_mbuf(crp, m);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_start = m->m_epg_hdrlen;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length = tls_comp_len;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outiov != NULL) {
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_digest_start = crp->crp_payload_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iov = outiov;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iovcnt = outiovcnt;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_td = curthread;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_resid = crp->crp_payload_length + tls->params.tls_tlen;
|
|
|
|
crypto_use_output_uio(crp, uio);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_digest_start = crp->crp_payload_start +
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls12_gcm_encrypts, 1);
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls12_chacha20_encrypts, 1);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outiov != NULL)
|
2020-06-04 20:12:34 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_separate_output, 1);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_inplace, 1);
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->sync_dispatch) {
|
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, crp);
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch_async(state, crp);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_decrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct tls_record_layer *hdr, struct mbuf *m, uint64_t seqno,
|
|
|
|
int *trailer_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tls_aead_data ad;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptop crp;
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t tls_comp_len;
|
|
|
|
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
os = tls->ocf_session;
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_initreq(&crp, os->sid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the IV. */
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16) {
|
|
|
|
memcpy(crp.crp_iv, tls->params.iv, TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(crp.crp_iv + TLS_AEAD_GCM_LEN, hdr + 1,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Chacha20-Poly1305 constructs the IV for TLS 1.2
|
|
|
|
* identically to constructing the IV for AEAD in TLS
|
|
|
|
* 1.3.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
memcpy(crp.crp_iv, tls->params.iv, tls->params.iv_len);
|
|
|
|
*(uint64_t *)(crp.crp_iv + 4) ^= htobe64(seqno);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the AAD. */
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
|
|
|
|
tls_comp_len = ntohs(hdr->tls_length) -
|
|
|
|
(AES_GMAC_HASH_LEN + sizeof(uint64_t));
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tls_comp_len = ntohs(hdr->tls_length) - POLY1305_HASH_LEN;
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ad.seq = htobe64(seqno);
|
|
|
|
ad.type = hdr->tls_type;
|
|
|
|
ad.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
|
|
|
|
ad.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
|
|
|
|
ad.tls_length = htons(tls_comp_len);
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_aad = &ad;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_payload_start = tls->params.tls_hlen;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_payload_length = tls_comp_len;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_digest_start = crp.crp_payload_start + crp.crp_payload_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
|
|
|
|
crypto_use_mbuf(&crp, m);
|
|
|
|
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls12_gcm_decrypts, 1);
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls12_chacha20_decrypts, 1);
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, &crp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(&crp);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:18 +00:00
|
|
|
*trailer_len = tls->params.tls_tlen;
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_tls13_aead_encrypt(struct ktls_ocf_encrypt_state *state,
|
|
|
|
struct ktls_session *tls, struct mbuf *m, struct iovec *outiov,
|
|
|
|
int outiovcnt)
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
const struct tls_record_layer *hdr;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
struct uio *uio;
|
|
|
|
struct tls_aead_data_13 *ad;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptop *crp;
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
char nonce[12];
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int error;
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
os = tls->ocf_session;
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
hdr = (const struct tls_record_layer *)m->m_epg_hdr;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp = &state->crp;
|
|
|
|
uio = &state->uio;
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_initreq(crp, os->sid);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the nonce. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(nonce, tls->params.iv, tls->params.iv_len);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
*(uint64_t *)(nonce + 4) ^= htobe64(m->m_epg_seqno);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the AAD. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
ad = &state->aead13;
|
|
|
|
ad->type = hdr->tls_type;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
|
|
|
|
ad->tls_length = hdr->tls_length;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_aad = ad;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_aad_length = sizeof(*ad);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Set fields for input payload. */
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_use_single_mbuf(crp, m);
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_start = m->m_epg_hdrlen;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length = m->m_len -
|
|
|
|
(m->m_epg_hdrlen + m->m_epg_trllen);
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-06-23 00:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Store the record type as the first byte of the trailer. */
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
m->m_epg_trail[0] = m->m_epg_record_type;
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length++;
|
2020-06-23 00:02:28 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outiov != NULL) {
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_digest_start = crp->crp_payload_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iov = outiov;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_iovcnt = outiovcnt;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_offset = 0;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_segflg = UIO_SYSSPACE;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_td = curthread;
|
|
|
|
uio->uio_resid = m->m_len - m->m_epg_hdrlen;
|
|
|
|
crypto_use_output_uio(crp, uio);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
} else
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_digest_start = crp->crp_payload_start +
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_payload_length;
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
memcpy(crp->crp_iv, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
|
2019-12-18 01:37:00 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_gcm_encrypts, 1);
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-11-16 17:58:52 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_chacha20_encrypts, 1);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (outiov != NULL)
|
2020-06-04 20:12:34 +00:00
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_separate_output, 1);
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_inplace, 1);
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->sync_dispatch) {
|
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, crp);
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(crp);
|
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch_async(state, crp);
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-12-14 19:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_tls13_aead_decrypt(struct ktls_session *tls,
|
|
|
|
const struct tls_record_layer *hdr, struct mbuf *m, uint64_t seqno,
|
|
|
|
int *trailer_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct tls_aead_data_13 ad;
|
|
|
|
struct cryptop crp;
|
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
u_int tag_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
os = tls->ocf_session;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tag_len = tls->params.tls_tlen - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Payload must contain at least one byte for the record type. */
|
|
|
|
if (ntohs(hdr->tls_length) < tag_len + 1)
|
|
|
|
return (EBADMSG);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_initreq(&crp, os->sid);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the nonce. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(crp.crp_iv, tls->params.iv, tls->params.iv_len);
|
|
|
|
*(uint64_t *)(crp.crp_iv + 4) ^= htobe64(seqno);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the AAD. */
|
|
|
|
ad.type = hdr->tls_type;
|
|
|
|
ad.tls_vmajor = hdr->tls_vmajor;
|
|
|
|
ad.tls_vminor = hdr->tls_vminor;
|
|
|
|
ad.tls_length = hdr->tls_length;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_aad = &ad;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_aad_length = sizeof(ad);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_payload_start = tls->params.tls_hlen;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_payload_length = ntohs(hdr->tls_length) - tag_len;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_digest_start = crp.crp_payload_start + crp.crp_payload_length;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_DECRYPT | CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
crp.crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIMM | CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE;
|
|
|
|
crypto_use_mbuf(&crp, m);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16)
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_gcm_decrypts, 1);
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
counter_u64_add(ocf_tls13_chacha20_decrypts, 1);
|
|
|
|
error = ktls_ocf_dispatch(os, &crp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_destroyreq(&crp);
|
|
|
|
*trailer_len = tag_len;
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
void
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_free(struct ktls_session *tls)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
os = tls->ocf_session;
|
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto).
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
|
|
|
crypto_freesession(os->sid);
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_destroy(&os->lock);
|
2020-06-25 20:17:34 +00:00
|
|
|
zfree(os, M_KTLS_OCF);
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2021-05-25 23:59:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
ktls_ocf_try(struct socket *so, struct ktls_session *tls, int direction)
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
struct crypto_session_params csp, mac_csp;
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
struct ktls_ocf_session *os;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
int error, mac_len;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto).
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(&csp, 0, sizeof(csp));
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
memset(&mac_csp, 0, sizeof(mac_csp));
|
|
|
|
mac_csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_NONE;
|
|
|
|
mac_len = 0;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (tls->params.cipher_algorithm) {
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16:
|
|
|
|
switch (tls->params.cipher_key_len) {
|
|
|
|
case 128 / 8:
|
|
|
|
case 256 / 8:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only TLS 1.2 and 1.3 are supported. */
|
|
|
|
if (tls->params.tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
|
|
|
|
return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT | CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD;
|
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto).
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
|
|
|
csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_AEAD;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_alg = CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_key = tls->params.cipher_key;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_klen = tls->params.cipher_key_len;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_ivlen = AES_GCM_IV_LEN;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
|
|
|
|
switch (tls->params.cipher_key_len) {
|
|
|
|
case 128 / 8:
|
|
|
|
case 256 / 8:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
switch (tls->params.auth_algorithm) {
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
|
|
|
|
mac_len = SHA1_HASH_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
|
|
|
|
mac_len = SHA2_256_HASH_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
|
|
|
|
mac_len = SHA2_384_HASH_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only TLS 1.0-1.2 are supported. */
|
|
|
|
if (tls->params.tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO)
|
|
|
|
return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* AES-CBC is not supported for receive. */
|
|
|
|
if (direction == KTLS_RX)
|
|
|
|
return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_CIPHER;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_alg = CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_key = tls->params.cipher_key;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_klen = tls->params.cipher_key_len;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_ivlen = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
mac_csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT;
|
|
|
|
mac_csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_DIGEST;
|
|
|
|
mac_csp.csp_auth_alg = tls->params.auth_algorithm;
|
|
|
|
mac_csp.csp_auth_key = tls->params.auth_key;
|
|
|
|
mac_csp.csp_auth_klen = tls->params.auth_key_len;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
case CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
|
|
|
|
switch (tls->params.cipher_key_len) {
|
|
|
|
case 256 / 8:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only TLS 1.2 and 1.3 are supported. */
|
|
|
|
if (tls->params.tls_vmajor != TLS_MAJOR_VER_ONE ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.tls_vminor < TLS_MINOR_VER_TWO ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.tls_vminor > TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
|
|
|
|
return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_flags |= CSP_F_SEPARATE_OUTPUT | CSP_F_SEPARATE_AAD;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_mode = CSP_MODE_AEAD;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_alg = CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_key = tls->params.cipher_key;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_cipher_klen = tls->params.cipher_key_len;
|
|
|
|
csp.csp_ivlen = CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_LEN;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EPROTONOSUPPORT);
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
os = malloc(sizeof(*os), M_KTLS_OCF, M_NOWAIT | M_ZERO);
|
|
|
|
if (os == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return (ENOMEM);
|
|
|
|
|
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto).
- The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session
initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct
crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define
how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes
include:
- COMPRESS (for compression/decompression)
- CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption)
- DIGEST (computing and verifying digests)
- AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM)
- ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate)
Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to
support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode
for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.)
The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as
before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and
switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs
encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth
keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression
algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.)
- Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This
doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might
support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined
for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been
added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This
method returns a negative value on success (similar to how
device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick
the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware
(e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software
(cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this
is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session,
you will no longer get a session using accelerated software.
Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software
crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software.
Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before.
- Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop'
structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed.
A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer
in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add
more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for
zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate
input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this).
Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane:
- CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv'
member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the
IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset.
- CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated
and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it
can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in
the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set
CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE.
The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop.
crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD.
Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range,
but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext
(and they had to be adjacent).
crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of
the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation
(COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the
AAD region empty.
If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting
location is marked by crp_digest_start.
Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction
of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the
operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest
mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the
request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed
digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode
requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires
this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own
authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do
this, though there are no in-tree consumers.
To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session
cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer
set crp_sesssion directly.
- Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via
crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the
crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a
driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight.
- crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and
crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the
first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier
to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as
separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver
writers to use.
- bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer.
This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that
use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types.
- Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD
and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers.
- Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in
device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session
is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the
session.
- GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher
key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used.
- For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process'
callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This
function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it
simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in
'process'.
It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there
is some duplication.
- I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC
as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it.
- Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA
mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored.
This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but
the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST
flag.
- I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for
sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well
as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support
all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM.
- I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages
of which many are written from scratch.
- I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified
that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested
the following drivers:
- cryptosoft
- aesni (AES only)
- blake2
- ccr
and the following consumers:
- cryptodev
- IPsec
- ktls_ocf
- GELI (lightly)
I have not tested the following:
- ccp
- aesni with sha
- hifn
- kgssapi_krb5
- ubsec
- padlock
- safe
- armv8_crypto (aarch64)
- glxsb (i386)
- sec (ppc)
- cesa (armv7)
- cryptocteon (mips64)
- nlmsec (mips64)
Discussed with: cem
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
|
|
|
error = crypto_newsession(&os->sid, &csp,
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
CRYPTO_FLAG_HARDWARE | CRYPTO_FLAG_SOFTWARE);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
free(os, M_KTLS_OCF);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (mac_csp.csp_mode != CSP_MODE_NONE) {
|
|
|
|
error = crypto_newsession(&os->mac_sid, &mac_csp,
|
|
|
|
CRYPTO_FLAG_HARDWARE | CRYPTO_FLAG_SOFTWARE);
|
|
|
|
if (error) {
|
|
|
|
crypto_freesession(os->sid);
|
|
|
|
free(os, M_KTLS_OCF);
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
os->mac_len = mac_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
mtx_init(&os->lock, "ktls_ocf", NULL, MTX_DEF);
|
2021-10-21 16:36:53 +00:00
|
|
|
tls->ocf_session = os;
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305) {
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
if (direction == KTLS_TX) {
|
|
|
|
if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
tls->sw_encrypt = ktls_ocf_tls13_aead_encrypt;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
else
|
2021-02-18 17:24:26 +00:00
|
|
|
tls->sw_encrypt = ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_encrypt;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2021-12-14 19:01:05 +00:00
|
|
|
if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_THREE)
|
|
|
|
tls->sw_decrypt = ktls_ocf_tls13_aead_decrypt;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
tls->sw_decrypt = ktls_ocf_tls12_aead_decrypt;
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
tls->sw_encrypt = ktls_ocf_tls_cbc_encrypt;
|
|
|
|
if (tls->params.tls_vminor == TLS_MINOR_VER_ZERO) {
|
|
|
|
os->implicit_iv = true;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(os->iv, tls->params.iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
|
2021-10-27 23:35:56 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef INVARIANTS
|
|
|
|
os->next_seqno = tls->next_seqno;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2020-10-13 18:04:19 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
Add support for KTLS RX via software decryption.
Allow TLS records to be decrypted in the kernel after being received
by a NIC. At a high level this is somewhat similar to software KTLS
for the transmit path except in reverse. Protocols enqueue mbufs
containing encrypted TLS records (or portions of records) into the
tail of a socket buffer and the KTLS layer decrypts those records
before returning them to userland applications. However, there is an
important difference:
- In the transmit case, the socket buffer is always a single "record"
holding a chain of mbufs. Not-yet-encrypted mbufs are marked not
ready (M_NOTREADY) and released to protocols for transmit by marking
mbufs ready once their data is encrypted.
- In the receive case, incoming (encrypted) data appended to the
socket buffer is still a single stream of data from the protocol,
but decrypted TLS records are stored as separate records in the
socket buffer and read individually via recvmsg().
Initially I tried to make this work by marking incoming mbufs as
M_NOTREADY, but there didn't seemed to be a non-gross way to deal with
picking a portion of the mbuf chain and turning it into a new record
in the socket buffer after decrypting the TLS record it contained
(along with prepending a control message). Also, such mbufs would
also need to be "pinned" in some way while they are being decrypted
such that a concurrent sbcut() wouldn't free them out from under the
thread performing decryption.
As such, I settled on the following solution:
- Socket buffers now contain an additional chain of mbufs (sb_mtls,
sb_mtlstail, and sb_tlscc) containing encrypted mbufs appended by
the protocol layer. These mbufs are still marked M_NOTREADY, but
soreceive*() generally don't know about them (except that they will
block waiting for data to be decrypted for a blocking read).
- Each time a new mbuf is appended to this TLS mbuf chain, the socket
buffer peeks at the TLS record header at the head of the chain to
determine the encrypted record's length. If enough data is queued
for the TLS record, the socket is placed on a per-CPU TLS workqueue
(reusing the existing KTLS workqueues and worker threads).
- The worker thread loops over the TLS mbuf chain decrypting records
until it runs out of data. Each record is detached from the TLS
mbuf chain while it is being decrypted to keep the mbufs "pinned".
However, a new sb_dtlscc field tracks the character count of the
detached record and sbcut()/sbdrop() is updated to account for the
detached record. After the record is decrypted, the worker thread
first checks to see if sbcut() dropped the record. If so, it is
freed (can happen when a socket is closed with pending data).
Otherwise, the header and trailer are stripped from the original
mbufs, a control message is created holding the decrypted TLS
header, and the decrypted TLS record is appended to the "normal"
socket buffer chain.
(Side note: the SBCHECK() infrastucture was very useful as I was
able to add assertions there about the TLS chain that caught several
bugs during development.)
Tested by: rmacklem (various versions)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24628
2020-07-23 23:48:18 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2021-08-30 20:11:52 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* AES-CBC is always synchronous currently. Asynchronous
|
|
|
|
* operation would require multiple callbacks and an additional
|
|
|
|
* iovec array in ktls_ocf_encrypt_state.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
tls->sync_dispatch = CRYPTO_SESS_SYNC(os->sid) ||
|
|
|
|
tls->params.cipher_algorithm == CRYPTO_AES_CBC;
|
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS.
KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport
Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports
offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be
performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a
connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE
socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is
placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys.
Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2),
or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS
frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent
with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new
control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type.
At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework
should support rekeying.
KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS
frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single
ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS
record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to
the associated TLS session.
KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software
TLS and ifnet TLS.
Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via
M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is
added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then
called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of
sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving
the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other
writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the
PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking
ktls_enqueue().
A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS
frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily
mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption
backend to perform the actual encryption.
(Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if
someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct
map.)
KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally,
Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes
a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's
OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As
a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use
of hardware crypto accelerators.
Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked
ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as
regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs.
ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP
segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS)
is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated
with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are
not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The
ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply
send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS
record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged
with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device
driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them
for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound
interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet
is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send
tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated,
the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated,
however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send
tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a
Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As
the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were
allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being
dropped.)
ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces
via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported
across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with
flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled.
Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a
new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket
option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes.
In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls.
This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead
of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to
switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS.
Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls
sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to
enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must
also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS.
KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option.
This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks
including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and
implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the
use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records
awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends;
and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload.
Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs
Obtained from: Netflix
Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|