2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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2005-01-07 01:45:51 +00:00
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/*-
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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* Copyright (c) 2008 Michael J. Silbersack.
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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* notice unmodified, this list of conditions, and the following
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* disclaimer.
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
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* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
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* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
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* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
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* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
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* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
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* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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/*
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* IP ID generation is a fascinating topic.
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*
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* In order to avoid ID collisions during packet reassembly, common sense
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* dictates that the period between reuse of IDs be as large as possible.
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* This leads to the classic implementation of a system-wide counter, thereby
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* ensuring that IDs repeat only once every 2^16 packets.
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*
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* Subsequent security researchers have pointed out that using a global
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* counter makes ID values predictable. This predictability allows traffic
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* analysis, idle scanning, and even packet injection in specific cases.
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* These results suggest that IP IDs should be as random as possible.
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*
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* The "searchable queues" algorithm used in this IP ID implementation was
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* proposed by Amit Klein. It is a compromise between the above two
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* viewpoints that has provable behavior that can be tuned to the user's
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* requirements.
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*
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* The basic concept is that we supplement a standard random number generator
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* with a queue of the last L IDs that we have handed out to ensure that all
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* IDs have a period of at least L.
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*
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* To efficiently implement this idea, we keep two data structures: a
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* circular array of IDs of size L and a bitstring of 65536 bits.
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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*
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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* To start, we ask the RNG for a new ID. A quick index into the bitstring
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* is used to determine if this is a recently used value. The process is
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* repeated until a value is returned that is not in the bitstring.
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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*
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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* Having found a usable ID, we remove the ID stored at the current position
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* in the queue from the bitstring and replace it with our new ID. Our new
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* ID is then added to the bitstring and the queue pointer is incremented.
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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*
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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* The lower limit of 512 was chosen because there doesn't seem to be much
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* point to having a smaller value. The upper limit of 32768 was chosen for
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* two reasons. First, every step above 32768 decreases the entropy. Taken
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* to an extreme, 65533 would offer 1 bit of entropy. Second, the number of
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* attempts it takes the algorithm to find an unused ID drastically
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* increases, killing performance. The default value of 8192 was chosen
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* because it provides a good tradeoff between randomness and non-repetition.
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*
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* With L=8192, the queue will use 16K of memory. The bitstring always
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* uses 8K of memory. No memory is allocated until the use of random ids is
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* enabled.
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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*/
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/time.h>
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#include <sys/kernel.h>
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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#include <sys/libkern.h>
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#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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#include <sys/random.h>
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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#include <sys/systm.h>
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#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
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#include <sys/bitstring.h>
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static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_IPID, "ipid", "randomized ip id state");
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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static uint16_t *id_array;
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static bitstr_t *id_bits;
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static int array_ptr;
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static int array_size;
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static int random_id_collisions;
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static int random_id_total;
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2013-05-06 16:42:18 +00:00
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static struct mtx ip_id_mtx;
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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static void ip_initid(int);
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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static int sysctl_ip_id_change(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS);
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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static void ip_sysinitid(void);
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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2008-12-02 21:37:28 +00:00
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SYSCTL_DECL(_net_inet_ip);
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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SYSCTL_PROC(_net_inet_ip, OID_AUTO, random_id_period, CTLTYPE_INT|CTLFLAG_RW,
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&array_size, 0, sysctl_ip_id_change, "IU", "IP ID Array size");
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ip, OID_AUTO, random_id_collisions, CTLFLAG_RD,
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&random_id_collisions, 0, "Count of IP ID collisions");
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SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_ip, OID_AUTO, random_id_total, CTLFLAG_RD,
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&random_id_total, 0, "Count of IP IDs created");
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static int
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sysctl_ip_id_change(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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{
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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int error, new;
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new = array_size;
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error = sysctl_handle_int(oidp, &new, 0, req);
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if (error == 0 && req->newptr) {
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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if (new >= 512 && new <= 32768)
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ip_initid(new);
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else
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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error = EINVAL;
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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}
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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return (error);
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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}
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2004-08-16 18:32:07 +00:00
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static void
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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ip_initid(int new_size)
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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{
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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uint16_t *new_array;
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bitstr_t *new_bits;
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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new_array = malloc(new_size * sizeof(uint16_t), M_IPID,
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M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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new_bits = malloc(bitstr_size(65536), M_IPID, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO);
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2004-08-16 18:32:07 +00:00
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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mtx_lock(&ip_id_mtx);
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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if (id_array != NULL) {
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free(id_array, M_IPID);
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free(id_bits, M_IPID);
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}
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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id_array = new_array;
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id_bits = new_bits;
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array_size = new_size;
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array_ptr = 0;
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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random_id_collisions = 0;
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random_id_total = 0;
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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mtx_unlock(&ip_id_mtx);
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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}
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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uint16_t
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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ip_randomid(void)
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{
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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uint16_t new_id;
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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2008-02-06 15:40:30 +00:00
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mtx_lock(&ip_id_mtx);
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/*
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* To avoid a conflict with the zeros that the array is initially
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* filled with, we never hand out an id of zero.
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*/
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new_id = 0;
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do {
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if (new_id != 0)
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random_id_collisions++;
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arc4rand(&new_id, sizeof(new_id), 0);
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} while (bit_test(id_bits, new_id) || new_id == 0);
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bit_clear(id_bits, id_array[array_ptr]);
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bit_set(id_bits, new_id);
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id_array[array_ptr] = new_id;
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array_ptr++;
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if (array_ptr == array_size)
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array_ptr = 0;
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random_id_total++;
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mtx_unlock(&ip_id_mtx);
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return (new_id);
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2001-06-01 10:02:28 +00:00
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}
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2015-03-28 16:06:46 +00:00
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static void
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ip_sysinitid(void)
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{
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mtx_init(&ip_id_mtx, "ip_id_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
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ip_initid(8192);
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}
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SYSINIT(ip_id, SI_SUB_PROTO_DOMAIN, SI_ORDER_ANY, ip_sysinitid, NULL);
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