freebsd-dev/sys/kern/kern_proc.c

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/*
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)kern_proc.c 8.7 (Berkeley) 2/14/95
1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
* $FreeBSD$
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*/
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
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#include <sys/tty.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include <vm/vm_map.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
VM level code cleanups. 1) Start using TSM. Struct procs continue to point to upages structure, after being freed. Struct vmspace continues to point to pte object and kva space for kstack. u_map is now superfluous. 2) vm_map's don't need to be reference counted. They always exist either in the kernel or in a vmspace. The vmspaces are managed by reference counts. 3) Remove the "wired" vm_map nonsense. 4) No need to keep a cache of kernel stack kva's. 5) Get rid of strange looking ++var, and change to var++. 6) Change more data structures to use our "zone" allocator. Added struct proc, struct vmspace and struct vnode. This saves a significant amount of kva space and physical memory. Additionally, this enables TSM for the zone managed memory. 7) Keep ioopt disabled for now. 8) Remove the now bogus "single use" map concept. 9) Use generation counts or id's for data structures residing in TSM, where it allows us to avoid unneeded restart overhead during traversals, where blocking might occur. 10) Account better for memory deficits, so the pageout daemon will be able to make enough memory available (experimental.) 11) Fix some vnode locking problems. (From Tor, I think.) 12) Add a check in ufs_lookup, to avoid lots of unneeded calls to bcmp. (experimental.) 13) Significantly shrink, cleanup, and make slightly faster the vm_fault.c code. Use generation counts, get rid of unneded collpase operations, and clean up the cluster code. 14) Make vm_zone more suitable for TSM. This commit is partially as a result of discussions and contributions from other people, including DG, Tor Egge, PHK, and probably others that I have forgotten to attribute (so let me know, if I forgot.) This is not the infamous, final cleanup of the vnode stuff, but a necessary step. Vnode mgmt should be correct, but things might still change, and there is still some missing stuff (like ioopt, and physical backing of non-merged cache files, debugging of layering concepts.)
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#include <vm/vm_zone.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
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static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PGRP, "pgrp", "process group header");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SESSION, "session", "session header");
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_PROC, "proc", "Proc structures");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_SUBPROC, "subproc", "Proc sub-structures");
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
int ps_showallprocs = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_kern, OID_AUTO, ps_showallprocs, CTLFLAG_RW,
&ps_showallprocs, 0, "");
static void pgdelete __P((struct pgrp *));
static void orphanpg __P((struct pgrp *pg));
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/*
* Other process lists
*/
struct pidhashhead *pidhashtbl;
u_long pidhash;
struct pgrphashhead *pgrphashtbl;
u_long pgrphash;
struct proclist allproc;
struct proclist zombproc;
struct lock allproc_lock;
struct lock proctree_lock;
VM level code cleanups. 1) Start using TSM. Struct procs continue to point to upages structure, after being freed. Struct vmspace continues to point to pte object and kva space for kstack. u_map is now superfluous. 2) vm_map's don't need to be reference counted. They always exist either in the kernel or in a vmspace. The vmspaces are managed by reference counts. 3) Remove the "wired" vm_map nonsense. 4) No need to keep a cache of kernel stack kva's. 5) Get rid of strange looking ++var, and change to var++. 6) Change more data structures to use our "zone" allocator. Added struct proc, struct vmspace and struct vnode. This saves a significant amount of kva space and physical memory. Additionally, this enables TSM for the zone managed memory. 7) Keep ioopt disabled for now. 8) Remove the now bogus "single use" map concept. 9) Use generation counts or id's for data structures residing in TSM, where it allows us to avoid unneeded restart overhead during traversals, where blocking might occur. 10) Account better for memory deficits, so the pageout daemon will be able to make enough memory available (experimental.) 11) Fix some vnode locking problems. (From Tor, I think.) 12) Add a check in ufs_lookup, to avoid lots of unneeded calls to bcmp. (experimental.) 13) Significantly shrink, cleanup, and make slightly faster the vm_fault.c code. Use generation counts, get rid of unneded collpase operations, and clean up the cluster code. 14) Make vm_zone more suitable for TSM. This commit is partially as a result of discussions and contributions from other people, including DG, Tor Egge, PHK, and probably others that I have forgotten to attribute (so let me know, if I forgot.) This is not the infamous, final cleanup of the vnode stuff, but a necessary step. Vnode mgmt should be correct, but things might still change, and there is still some missing stuff (like ioopt, and physical backing of non-merged cache files, debugging of layering concepts.)
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vm_zone_t proc_zone;
vm_zone_t ithread_zone;
/*
* Initialize global process hashing structures.
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*/
void
procinit()
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{
lockinit(&allproc_lock, PZERO, "allproc", 0, 0);
lockinit(&proctree_lock, PZERO, "proctree", 0, 0);
LIST_INIT(&allproc);
LIST_INIT(&zombproc);
pidhashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pidhash);
pgrphashtbl = hashinit(maxproc / 4, M_PROC, &pgrphash);
VM level code cleanups. 1) Start using TSM. Struct procs continue to point to upages structure, after being freed. Struct vmspace continues to point to pte object and kva space for kstack. u_map is now superfluous. 2) vm_map's don't need to be reference counted. They always exist either in the kernel or in a vmspace. The vmspaces are managed by reference counts. 3) Remove the "wired" vm_map nonsense. 4) No need to keep a cache of kernel stack kva's. 5) Get rid of strange looking ++var, and change to var++. 6) Change more data structures to use our "zone" allocator. Added struct proc, struct vmspace and struct vnode. This saves a significant amount of kva space and physical memory. Additionally, this enables TSM for the zone managed memory. 7) Keep ioopt disabled for now. 8) Remove the now bogus "single use" map concept. 9) Use generation counts or id's for data structures residing in TSM, where it allows us to avoid unneeded restart overhead during traversals, where blocking might occur. 10) Account better for memory deficits, so the pageout daemon will be able to make enough memory available (experimental.) 11) Fix some vnode locking problems. (From Tor, I think.) 12) Add a check in ufs_lookup, to avoid lots of unneeded calls to bcmp. (experimental.) 13) Significantly shrink, cleanup, and make slightly faster the vm_fault.c code. Use generation counts, get rid of unneded collpase operations, and clean up the cluster code. 14) Make vm_zone more suitable for TSM. This commit is partially as a result of discussions and contributions from other people, including DG, Tor Egge, PHK, and probably others that I have forgotten to attribute (so let me know, if I forgot.) This is not the infamous, final cleanup of the vnode stuff, but a necessary step. Vnode mgmt should be correct, but things might still change, and there is still some missing stuff (like ioopt, and physical backing of non-merged cache files, debugging of layering concepts.)
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proc_zone = zinit("PROC", sizeof (struct proc), 0, 0, 5);
uihashinit();
/*
* This should really be a compile time warning, but I do
* not know of any way to do that...
*/
if (sizeof(struct kinfo_proc) != KINFO_PROC_SIZE)
printf("WARNING: size of kinfo_proc (%ld) should be %d!!!\n",
(long)sizeof(struct kinfo_proc), KINFO_PROC_SIZE);
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}
/*
* Is p an inferior of the current process?
*/
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int
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inferior(p)
register struct proc *p;
{
int rval = 1;
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PROCTREE_LOCK(PT_SHARED);
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for (; p != curproc; p = p->p_pptr)
if (p->p_pid == 0) {
rval = 0;
break;
}
PROCTREE_LOCK(PT_RELEASE);
return (rval);
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}
/*
* Locate a process by number
*/
struct proc *
pfind(pid)
register pid_t pid;
{
register struct proc *p;
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_SHARED);
LIST_FOREACH(p, PIDHASH(pid), p_hash)
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if (p->p_pid == pid)
break;
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_RELEASE);
return (p);
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}
/*
* Locate a process group by number
*/
struct pgrp *
pgfind(pgid)
register pid_t pgid;
{
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, PGRPHASH(pgid), pg_hash)
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if (pgrp->pg_id == pgid)
return (pgrp);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Move p to a new or existing process group (and session)
*/
int
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enterpgrp(p, pgid, mksess)
register struct proc *p;
pid_t pgid;
int mksess;
{
register struct pgrp *pgrp = pgfind(pgid);
struct pgrp *savegrp;
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KASSERT(pgrp == NULL || !mksess,
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("enterpgrp: setsid into non-empty pgrp"));
KASSERT(!SESS_LEADER(p),
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("enterpgrp: session leader attempted setpgrp"));
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if (pgrp == NULL) {
pid_t savepid = p->p_pid;
struct proc *np;
/*
* new process group
*/
KASSERT(p->p_pid == pgid,
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("enterpgrp: new pgrp and pid != pgid"));
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MALLOC(pgrp, struct pgrp *, sizeof(struct pgrp), M_PGRP,
M_WAITOK);
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if ((np = pfind(savepid)) == NULL || np != p)
return (ESRCH);
if (mksess) {
register struct session *sess;
/*
* new session
*/
MALLOC(sess, struct session *, sizeof(struct session),
M_SESSION, M_WAITOK);
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sess->s_leader = p;
sess->s_sid = p->p_pid;
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sess->s_count = 1;
sess->s_ttyvp = NULL;
sess->s_ttyp = NULL;
bcopy(p->p_session->s_login, sess->s_login,
sizeof(sess->s_login));
PROC_LOCK(p);
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p->p_flag &= ~P_CONTROLT;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
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pgrp->pg_session = sess;
KASSERT(p == curproc,
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("enterpgrp: mksession and p != curproc"));
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} else {
pgrp->pg_session = p->p_session;
pgrp->pg_session->s_count++;
}
pgrp->pg_id = pgid;
LIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_members);
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(PGRPHASH(pgid), pgrp, pg_hash);
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pgrp->pg_jobc = 0;
SLIST_INIT(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
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} else if (pgrp == p->p_pgrp)
return (0);
/*
* Adjust eligibility of affected pgrps to participate in job control.
* Increment eligibility counts before decrementing, otherwise we
* could reach 0 spuriously during the first call.
*/
fixjobc(p, pgrp, 1);
fixjobc(p, p->p_pgrp, 0);
PROC_LOCK(p);
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
savegrp = p->p_pgrp;
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p->p_pgrp = pgrp;
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&pgrp->pg_members, p, p_pglist);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (LIST_EMPTY(&savegrp->pg_members))
pgdelete(savegrp);
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return (0);
}
/*
* remove process from process group
*/
int
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leavepgrp(p)
register struct proc *p;
{
struct pgrp *savegrp;
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PROC_LOCK(p);
LIST_REMOVE(p, p_pglist);
savegrp = p->p_pgrp;
p->p_pgrp = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (LIST_EMPTY(&savegrp->pg_members))
pgdelete(savegrp);
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return (0);
}
/*
* delete a process group
*/
static void
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pgdelete(pgrp)
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
{
/*
* Reset any sigio structures pointing to us as a result of
* F_SETOWN with our pgid.
*/
funsetownlst(&pgrp->pg_sigiolst);
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if (pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp != NULL &&
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pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp->t_pgrp == pgrp)
pgrp->pg_session->s_ttyp->t_pgrp = NULL;
LIST_REMOVE(pgrp, pg_hash);
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if (--pgrp->pg_session->s_count == 0)
FREE(pgrp->pg_session, M_SESSION);
FREE(pgrp, M_PGRP);
}
/*
* Adjust pgrp jobc counters when specified process changes process group.
* We count the number of processes in each process group that "qualify"
* the group for terminal job control (those with a parent in a different
* process group of the same session). If that count reaches zero, the
* process group becomes orphaned. Check both the specified process'
* process group and that of its children.
* entering == 0 => p is leaving specified group.
* entering == 1 => p is entering specified group.
*/
void
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fixjobc(p, pgrp, entering)
register struct proc *p;
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
int entering;
{
register struct pgrp *hispgrp;
register struct session *mysession = pgrp->pg_session;
/*
* Check p's parent to see whether p qualifies its own process
* group; if so, adjust count for p's process group.
*/
PROCTREE_LOCK(PT_SHARED);
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if ((hispgrp = p->p_pptr->p_pgrp) != pgrp &&
hispgrp->pg_session == mysession) {
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if (entering)
pgrp->pg_jobc++;
else if (--pgrp->pg_jobc == 0)
orphanpg(pgrp);
}
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/*
* Check this process' children to see whether they qualify
* their process groups; if so, adjust counts for children's
* process groups.
*/
LIST_FOREACH(p, &p->p_children, p_sibling)
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if ((hispgrp = p->p_pgrp) != pgrp &&
hispgrp->pg_session == mysession &&
p->p_stat != SZOMB) {
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if (entering)
hispgrp->pg_jobc++;
else if (--hispgrp->pg_jobc == 0)
orphanpg(hispgrp);
}
PROCTREE_LOCK(PT_RELEASE);
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}
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/*
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* A process group has become orphaned;
* if there are any stopped processes in the group,
* hang-up all process in that group.
*/
static void
orphanpg(pg)
struct pgrp *pg;
{
register struct proc *p;
mtx_lock_spin(&sched_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
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if (p->p_stat == SSTOP) {
mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pg->pg_members, p_pglist) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
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psignal(p, SIGHUP);
psignal(p, SIGCONT);
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
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}
return;
}
}
mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock);
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}
#include "opt_ddb.h"
#ifdef DDB
#include <ddb/ddb.h>
DB_SHOW_COMMAND(pgrpdump, pgrpdump)
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{
register struct pgrp *pgrp;
register struct proc *p;
register int i;
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for (i = 0; i <= pgrphash; i++) {
if (!LIST_EMPTY(&pgrphashtbl[i])) {
printf("\tindx %d\n", i);
LIST_FOREACH(pgrp, &pgrphashtbl[i], pg_hash) {
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printf(
"\tpgrp %p, pgid %ld, sess %p, sesscnt %d, mem %p\n",
(void *)pgrp, (long)pgrp->pg_id,
(void *)pgrp->pg_session,
pgrp->pg_session->s_count,
(void *)LIST_FIRST(&pgrp->pg_members));
LIST_FOREACH(p, &pgrp->pg_members, p_pglist) {
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printf("\t\tpid %ld addr %p pgrp %p\n",
(long)p->p_pid, (void *)p,
(void *)p->p_pgrp);
}
}
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}
}
}
#endif /* DDB */
/*
* Fill in an kinfo_proc structure for the specified process.
*/
void
fill_kinfo_proc(p, kp)
struct proc *p;
struct kinfo_proc *kp;
{
struct tty *tp;
struct session *sp;
bzero(kp, sizeof(*kp));
kp->ki_structsize = sizeof(*kp);
kp->ki_paddr = p;
PROC_LOCK(p);
kp->ki_addr = p->p_addr;
kp->ki_args = p->p_args;
kp->ki_tracep = p->p_tracep;
kp->ki_textvp = p->p_textvp;
kp->ki_fd = p->p_fd;
kp->ki_vmspace = p->p_vmspace;
if (p->p_cred) {
kp->ki_uid = p->p_cred->pc_ucred->cr_uid;
kp->ki_ruid = p->p_cred->p_ruid;
kp->ki_svuid = p->p_cred->p_svuid;
kp->ki_ngroups = p->p_cred->pc_ucred->cr_ngroups;
bcopy(p->p_cred->pc_ucred->cr_groups, kp->ki_groups,
NGROUPS * sizeof(gid_t));
kp->ki_rgid = p->p_cred->p_rgid;
kp->ki_svgid = p->p_cred->p_svgid;
}
if (p->p_procsig) {
kp->ki_sigignore = p->p_procsig->ps_sigignore;
kp->ki_sigcatch = p->p_procsig->ps_sigcatch;
}
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_lock_spin(&sched_lock);
if (p->p_stat != SIDL && p->p_stat != SZOMB && p->p_vmspace != NULL) {
struct vmspace *vm = p->p_vmspace;
kp->ki_size = vm->vm_map.size;
kp->ki_rssize = vmspace_resident_count(vm); /*XXX*/
kp->ki_swrss = vm->vm_swrss;
kp->ki_tsize = vm->vm_tsize;
kp->ki_dsize = vm->vm_dsize;
kp->ki_ssize = vm->vm_ssize;
}
if ((p->p_sflag & PS_INMEM) && p->p_stats) {
kp->ki_start = p->p_stats->p_start;
kp->ki_rusage = p->p_stats->p_ru;
kp->ki_childtime.tv_sec = p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_utime.tv_sec +
p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_stime.tv_sec;
kp->ki_childtime.tv_usec = p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_utime.tv_usec +
p->p_stats->p_cru.ru_stime.tv_usec;
}
if (p->p_wmesg) {
strncpy(kp->ki_wmesg, p->p_wmesg, WMESGLEN);
kp->ki_wmesg[WMESGLEN] = 0;
}
if (p->p_stat == SMTX) {
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_MTXBLOCK;
strncpy(kp->ki_mtxname, p->p_mtxname, MTXNAMELEN);
kp->ki_mtxname[MTXNAMELEN] = 0;
}
kp->ki_stat = p->p_stat;
kp->ki_sflag = p->p_sflag;
kp->ki_pctcpu = p->p_pctcpu;
kp->ki_estcpu = p->p_estcpu;
kp->ki_slptime = p->p_slptime;
kp->ki_swtime = p->p_swtime;
kp->ki_wchan = p->p_wchan;
kp->ki_traceflag = p->p_traceflag;
Implement a unified run queue and adjust priority levels accordingly. - All processes go into the same array of queues, with different scheduling classes using different portions of the array. This allows user processes to have their priorities propogated up into interrupt thread range if need be. - I chose 64 run queues as an arbitrary number that is greater than 32. We used to have 4 separate arrays of 32 queues each, so this may not be optimal. The new run queue code was written with this in mind; changing the number of run queues only requires changing constants in runq.h and adjusting the priority levels. - The new run queue code takes the run queue as a parameter. This is intended to be used to create per-cpu run queues. Implement wrappers for compatibility with the old interface which pass in the global run queue structure. - Group the priority level, user priority, native priority (before propogation) and the scheduling class into a struct priority. - Change any hard coded priority levels that I found to use symbolic constants (TTIPRI and TTOPRI). - Remove the curpriority global variable and use that of curproc. This was used to detect when a process' priority had lowered and it should yield. We now effectively yield on every interrupt. - Activate propogate_priority(). It should now have the desired effect without needing to also propogate the scheduling class. - Temporarily comment out the call to vm_page_zero_idle() in the idle loop. It interfered with propogate_priority() because the idle process needed to do a non-blocking acquire of Giant and then other processes would try to propogate their priority onto it. The idle process should not do anything except idle. vm_page_zero_idle() will return in the form of an idle priority kernel thread which is woken up at apprioriate times by the vm system. - Update struct kinfo_proc to the new priority interface. Deliberately change its size by adjusting the spare fields. It remained the same size, but the layout has changed, so userland processes that use it would parse the data incorrectly. The size constraint should really be changed to an arbitrary version number. Also add a debug.sizeof sysctl node for struct kinfo_proc.
2001-02-12 00:20:08 +00:00
kp->ki_pri = p->p_pri;
kp->ki_nice = p->p_nice;
kp->ki_runtime = p->p_runtime;
kp->ki_pid = p->p_pid;
kp->ki_rqindex = p->p_rqindex;
kp->ki_oncpu = p->p_oncpu;
kp->ki_lastcpu = p->p_lastcpu;
Change and clean the mutex lock interface. mtx_enter(lock, type) becomes: mtx_lock(lock) for sleep locks (MTX_DEF-initialized locks) mtx_lock_spin(lock) for spin locks (MTX_SPIN-initialized) similarily, for releasing a lock, we now have: mtx_unlock(lock) for MTX_DEF and mtx_unlock_spin(lock) for MTX_SPIN. We change the caller interface for the two different types of locks because the semantics are entirely different for each case, and this makes it explicitly clear and, at the same time, it rids us of the extra `type' argument. The enter->lock and exit->unlock change has been made with the idea that we're "locking data" and not "entering locked code" in mind. Further, remove all additional "flags" previously passed to the lock acquire/release routines with the exception of two: MTX_QUIET and MTX_NOSWITCH The functionality of these flags is preserved and they can be passed to the lock/unlock routines by calling the corresponding wrappers: mtx_{lock, unlock}_flags(lock, flag(s)) and mtx_{lock, unlock}_spin_flags(lock, flag(s)) for MTX_DEF and MTX_SPIN locks, respectively. Re-inline some lock acq/rel code; in the sleep lock case, we only inline the _obtain_lock()s in order to ensure that the inlined code fits into a cache line. In the spin lock case, we inline recursion and actually only perform a function call if we need to spin. This change has been made with the idea that we generally tend to avoid spin locks and that also the spin locks that we do have and are heavily used (i.e. sched_lock) do recurse, and therefore in an effort to reduce function call overhead for some architectures (such as alpha), we inline recursion for this case. Create a new malloc type for the witness code and retire from using the M_DEV type. The new type is called M_WITNESS and is only declared if WITNESS is enabled. Begin cleaning up some machdep/mutex.h code - specifically updated the "optimized" inlined code in alpha/mutex.h and wrote MTX_LOCK_SPIN and MTX_UNLOCK_SPIN asm macros for the i386/mutex.h as we presently need those. Finally, caught up to the interface changes in all sys code. Contributors: jake, jhb, jasone (in no particular order)
2001-02-09 06:11:45 +00:00
mtx_unlock_spin(&sched_lock);
sp = NULL;
if (p->p_pgrp) {
kp->ki_pgid = p->p_pgrp->pg_id;
kp->ki_jobc = p->p_pgrp->pg_jobc;
sp = p->p_pgrp->pg_session;
if (sp != NULL) {
kp->ki_sid = sp->s_sid;
bcopy(sp->s_login, kp->ki_login, sizeof(kp->ki_login));
if (sp->s_ttyvp)
kp->ki_kiflag = KI_CTTY;
if (SESS_LEADER(p))
kp->ki_kiflag |= KI_SLEADER;
}
}
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) && sp && ((tp = sp->s_ttyp) != NULL)) {
kp->ki_tdev = dev2udev(tp->t_dev);
kp->ki_tpgid = tp->t_pgrp ? tp->t_pgrp->pg_id : NO_PID;
if (tp->t_session)
kp->ki_tsid = tp->t_session->s_sid;
} else
kp->ki_tdev = NOUDEV;
if (p->p_comm[0] != 0) {
strncpy(kp->ki_comm, p->p_comm, MAXCOMLEN);
kp->ki_comm[MAXCOMLEN] = 0;
}
kp->ki_siglist = p->p_siglist;
kp->ki_sigmask = p->p_sigmask;
kp->ki_xstat = p->p_xstat;
kp->ki_acflag = p->p_acflag;
kp->ki_flag = p->p_flag;
/* If jailed(p->p_ucred), emulate the old P_JAILED flag. */
if (jailed(p->p_ucred))
kp->ki_flag |= P_JAILED;
kp->ki_lock = p->p_lock;
if (p->p_pptr)
kp->ki_ppid = p->p_pptr->p_pid;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
}
/*
* Locate a zombie process by number
*/
struct proc *
zpfind(pid_t pid)
{
struct proc *p;
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_SHARED);
LIST_FOREACH(p, &zombproc, p_list)
if (p->p_pid == pid)
break;
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_RELEASE);
return (p);
}
static int
sysctl_out_proc(struct proc *p, struct sysctl_req *req, int doingzomb)
{
struct kinfo_proc kinfo_proc;
int error;
pid_t pid = p->p_pid;
fill_kinfo_proc(p, &kinfo_proc);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, (caddr_t)&kinfo_proc, sizeof(kinfo_proc));
if (error)
return (error);
if (!doingzomb && pid && (pfind(pid) != p))
return EAGAIN;
if (doingzomb && zpfind(pid) != p)
return EAGAIN;
return (0);
}
static int
sysctl_kern_proc(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int*) arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
int doingzomb;
int error = 0;
if (oidp->oid_number == KERN_PROC_PID) {
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
p = pfind((pid_t)name[0]);
if (!p)
return (0);
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
if (p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
return (0);
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, 0);
return (error);
}
if (oidp->oid_number == KERN_PROC_ALL && !namelen)
;
else if (oidp->oid_number != KERN_PROC_ALL && namelen == 1)
;
else
return (EINVAL);
if (!req->oldptr) {
/* overestimate by 5 procs */
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, 0, sizeof (struct kinfo_proc) * 5);
if (error)
return (error);
}
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_SHARED);
for (doingzomb=0 ; doingzomb < 2 ; doingzomb++) {
if (!doingzomb)
p = LIST_FIRST(&allproc);
else
p = LIST_FIRST(&zombproc);
for (; p != 0; p = LIST_NEXT(p, p_list)) {
/*
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
* Show a user only appropriate processes.
*/
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
if (p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
continue;
/*
* Skip embryonic processes.
*/
if (p->p_stat == SIDL)
continue;
/*
* TODO - make more efficient (see notes below).
* do by session.
*/
switch (oidp->oid_number) {
case KERN_PROC_PGRP:
/* could do this by traversing pgrp */
if (p->p_pgrp == NULL ||
p->p_pgrp->pg_id != (pid_t)name[0])
continue;
break;
case KERN_PROC_TTY:
if ((p->p_flag & P_CONTROLT) == 0 ||
p->p_session == NULL ||
p->p_session->s_ttyp == NULL ||
dev2udev(p->p_session->s_ttyp->t_dev) !=
(udev_t)name[0])
continue;
break;
case KERN_PROC_UID:
if (p->p_ucred == NULL ||
p->p_ucred->cr_uid != (uid_t)name[0])
continue;
break;
case KERN_PROC_RUID:
if (p->p_ucred == NULL ||
p->p_cred->p_ruid != (uid_t)name[0])
continue;
break;
}
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
if (p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
This Implements the mumbled about "Jail" feature. This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do. For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers". Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own hostname. Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is that each customer can run their own particular version of apache and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors. It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail still takes a little knowledge. A few notes: I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them. The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces. mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable. /proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for jailed processes. Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison. There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging. Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!) If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome! Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome. Have fun... Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/ Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1999-04-28 11:38:52 +00:00
continue;
error = sysctl_out_proc(p, req, doingzomb);
if (error) {
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_RELEASE);
return (error);
}
}
}
ALLPROC_LOCK(AP_RELEASE);
return (0);
}
/*
* This sysctl allows a process to retrieve the argument list or process
* title for another process without groping around in the address space
* of the other process. It also allow a process to set its own "process
* title to a string of its own choice.
*/
static int
sysctl_kern_proc_args(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
int *name = (int*) arg1;
u_int namelen = arg2;
struct proc *p;
struct pargs *pa;
int error = 0;
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
p = pfind((pid_t)name[0]);
if (!p)
return (0);
o Centralize inter-process access control, introducing: int p_can(p1, p2, operation, privused) which allows specification of subject process, object process, inter-process operation, and an optional call-by-reference privused flag, allowing the caller to determine if privilege was required for the call to succeed. This allows jail, kern.ps_showallprocs and regular credential-based interaction checks to occur in one block of code. Possible operations are P_CAN_SEE, P_CAN_SCHED, P_CAN_KILL, and P_CAN_DEBUG. p_can currently breaks out as a wrapper to a series of static function checks in kern_prot, which should not be invoked directly. o Commented out capabilities entries are included for some checks. o Update most inter-process authorization to make use of p_can() instead of manual checks, PRISON_CHECK(), P_TRESPASS(), and kern.ps_showallprocs. o Modify suser{,_xxx} to use const arguments, as it no longer modifies process flags due to the disabling of ASU. o Modify some checks/errors in procfs so that ENOENT is returned instead of ESRCH, further improving concealment of processes that should not be visible to other processes. Also introduce new access checks to improve hiding of processes for procfs_lookup(), procfs_getattr(), procfs_readdir(). Correct a bug reported by bp concerning not handling the CREATE case in procfs_lookup(). Remove volatile flag in procfs that caused apparently spurious qualifier warnigns (approved by bde). o Add comment noting that ktrace() has not been updated, as its access control checks are different from ptrace(), whereas they should probably be the same. Further discussion should happen on this topic. Reviewed by: bde, green, phk, freebsd-security, others Approved by: bde Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2000-08-30 04:49:09 +00:00
if ((!ps_argsopen) && p_can(curproc, p, P_CAN_SEE, NULL))
return (0);
if (req->newptr && curproc != p)
return (EPERM);
if (req->oldptr && p->p_args != NULL)
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, p->p_args->ar_args, p->p_args->ar_length);
if (req->newptr == NULL)
return (error);
if (p->p_args && --p->p_args->ar_ref == 0)
FREE(p->p_args, M_PARGS);
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_args = NULL;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
if (req->newlen + sizeof(struct pargs) > ps_arg_cache_limit)
return (error);
MALLOC(pa, struct pargs *, sizeof(struct pargs) + req->newlen,
M_PARGS, M_WAITOK);
pa->ar_ref = 1;
pa->ar_length = req->newlen;
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, pa->ar_args, req->newlen);
if (!error) {
PROC_LOCK(p);
p->p_args = pa;
PROC_UNLOCK(p);
} else
FREE(pa, M_PARGS);
return (error);
}
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern, KERN_PROC, proc, CTLFLAG_RD, 0, "Process table");
SYSCTL_PROC(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ALL, all, CTLFLAG_RD|CTLTYPE_STRUCT,
0, 0, sysctl_kern_proc, "S,proc", "Return entire process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PGRP, pgrp, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_TTY, tty, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_UID, uid, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_RUID, ruid, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_PID, pid, CTLFLAG_RD,
sysctl_kern_proc, "Process table");
SYSCTL_NODE(_kern_proc, KERN_PROC_ARGS, args, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_ANYBODY,
sysctl_kern_proc_args, "Process argument list");