1998-08-21 03:17:42 +00:00
|
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|
/*-
|
|
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* Copyright (c) 1998 Michael Smith <msmith@freebsd.org>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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|
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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|
2003-08-25 23:28:32 +00:00
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|
|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
|
|
|
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
|
|
|
|
|
1998-08-21 03:17:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <stand.h>
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/reboot.h>
|
1998-10-09 23:24:55 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <sys/linker.h>
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <machine/bootinfo.h>
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#include <machine/metadata.h>
|
1998-08-21 03:17:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "bootstrap.h"
|
2022-09-16 15:08:42 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "modinfo.h"
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
#include "libi386.h"
|
|
|
|
#include "btxv86.h"
|
1998-08-21 03:17:42 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef LOADER_GELI_SUPPORT
|
|
|
|
#include "geliboot.h"
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
2022-09-16 15:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct bootinfo *bi;
|
1998-08-21 03:17:42 +00:00
|
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|
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
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|
|
|
* Load the information expected by an i386 kernel.
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|
|
*
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|
|
|
* - The 'boothowto' argument is constructed
|
2000-08-03 09:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
* - The 'bootdev' argument is constructed
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* - The 'bootinfo' struct is constructed, and copied into the kernel space.
|
|
|
|
* - The kernel environment is copied into kernel space.
|
|
|
|
* - Module metadata are formatted and placed in kernel space.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
bi_load32(char *args, int *howtop, int *bootdevp, vm_offset_t *bip, vm_offset_t *modulep, vm_offset_t *kernendp)
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct preloaded_file *xp, *kfp;
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
struct i386_devdesc *rootdev;
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
struct file_metadata *md;
|
2000-08-03 09:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
vm_offset_t addr;
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
vm_offset_t kernend;
|
|
|
|
vm_offset_t envp;
|
|
|
|
vm_offset_t size;
|
|
|
|
vm_offset_t ssym, esym;
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
char *rootdevname;
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
int bootdevnr, i, howto;
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
char *kernelname;
|
1998-10-06 07:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
const char *kernelpath;
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
howto = bi_getboothowto(args);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Allow the environment variable 'rootdev' to override the supplied device
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* This should perhaps go to MI code and/or have $rootdev tested/set by
|
|
|
|
* MI code before launching the kernel.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
rootdevname = getenv("rootdev");
|
|
|
|
i386_getdev((void **)(&rootdev), rootdevname, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (rootdev == NULL) { /* bad $rootdev/$currdev */
|
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|
|
printf("can't determine root device\n");
|
|
|
|
return(EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-11-13 23:40:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1999-07-21 00:08:54 +00:00
|
|
|
/* Try reading the /etc/fstab file to select the root device */
|
2022-08-11 15:09:03 +00:00
|
|
|
getrootmount(devformat(&rootdev->dd));
|
1999-07-21 00:08:54 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do legacy rootdev guessing */
|
2000-08-03 09:14:02 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - use a default bootdev of 0. Is this ok??? */
|
|
|
|
bootdevnr = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2022-09-16 15:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
bi = calloc(sizeof(*bi), 1);
|
2018-03-12 21:39:59 +00:00
|
|
|
switch(rootdev->dd.d_dev->dv_type) {
|
2001-11-05 18:58:33 +00:00
|
|
|
case DEVT_CD:
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
case DEVT_DISK:
|
|
|
|
/* pass in the BIOS device number of the current disk */
|
2022-09-16 15:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
bi->bi_bios_dev = bd_unit2bios(rootdev);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
bootdevnr = bd_getdev(rootdev);
|
2001-11-05 18:58:33 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
2000-04-08 01:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
case DEVT_NET:
|
Update ZFS from version 6 to 13 and bring some FreeBSD-specific changes.
This bring huge amount of changes, I'll enumerate only user-visible changes:
- Delegated Administration
Allows regular users to perform ZFS operations, like file system
creation, snapshot creation, etc.
- L2ARC
Level 2 cache for ZFS - allows to use additional disks for cache.
Huge performance improvements mostly for random read of mostly
static content.
- slog
Allow to use additional disks for ZFS Intent Log to speed up
operations like fsync(2).
- vfs.zfs.super_owner
Allows regular users to perform privileged operations on files stored
on ZFS file systems owned by him. Very careful with this one.
- chflags(2)
Not all the flags are supported. This still needs work.
- ZFSBoot
Support to boot off of ZFS pool. Not finished, AFAIK.
Submitted by: dfr
- Snapshot properties
- New failure modes
Before if write requested failed, system paniced. Now one
can select from one of three failure modes:
- panic - panic on write error
- wait - wait for disk to reappear
- continue - serve read requests if possible, block write requests
- Refquota, refreservation properties
Just quota and reservation properties, but don't count space consumed
by children file systems, clones and snapshots.
- Sparse volumes
ZVOLs that don't reserve space in the pool.
- External attributes
Compatible with extattr(2).
- NFSv4-ACLs
Not sure about the status, might not be complete yet.
Submitted by: trasz
- Creation-time properties
- Regression tests for zpool(8) command.
Obtained from: OpenSolaris
2008-11-17 20:49:29 +00:00
|
|
|
case DEVT_ZFS:
|
2000-04-08 01:22:14 +00:00
|
|
|
break;
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
default:
|
2018-03-12 21:39:59 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("WARNING - don't know how to boot from device type %d\n",
|
|
|
|
rootdev->dd.d_dev->dv_type);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
2001-11-05 18:58:33 +00:00
|
|
|
if (bootdevnr == -1) {
|
2022-08-11 15:09:03 +00:00
|
|
|
printf("root device %s invalid\n", devformat(&rootdev->dd));
|
2001-11-05 18:58:33 +00:00
|
|
|
return (EINVAL);
|
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
free(rootdev);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* find the last module in the chain */
|
1998-10-15 17:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
addr = 0;
|
2000-05-01 17:41:25 +00:00
|
|
|
for (xp = file_findfile(NULL, NULL); xp != NULL; xp = xp->f_next) {
|
|
|
|
if (addr < (xp->f_addr + xp->f_size))
|
|
|
|
addr = xp->f_addr + xp->f_size;
|
1998-10-15 17:06:36 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/* pad to a page boundary */
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
addr = roundup(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2020-12-21 05:31:16 +00:00
|
|
|
addr = build_font_module(addr);
|
|
|
|
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
/* copy our environment */
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
envp = addr;
|
2022-09-16 15:08:57 +00:00
|
|
|
addr = md_copyenv(addr);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* pad to a page boundary */
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
addr = roundup(addr, PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
|
2003-05-01 04:31:33 +00:00
|
|
|
kfp = file_findfile(NULL, "elf kernel");
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
if (kfp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
kfp = file_findfile(NULL, "elf32 kernel");
|
|
|
|
if (kfp == NULL)
|
|
|
|
panic("can't find kernel file");
|
|
|
|
kernend = 0; /* fill it in later */
|
|
|
|
file_addmetadata(kfp, MODINFOMD_HOWTO, sizeof howto, &howto);
|
|
|
|
file_addmetadata(kfp, MODINFOMD_ENVP, sizeof envp, &envp);
|
|
|
|
file_addmetadata(kfp, MODINFOMD_KERNEND, sizeof kernend, &kernend);
|
|
|
|
bios_addsmapdata(kfp);
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#ifdef LOADER_GELI_SUPPORT
|
2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
|
|
|
geli_export_key_metadata(kfp);
|
Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2020-12-21 05:31:16 +00:00
|
|
|
bi_load_vbe_data(kfp);
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out the size and location of the metadata */
|
|
|
|
*modulep = addr;
|
2022-09-16 15:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
size = md_copymodules(0, false);
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
kernend = roundup(addr + size, PAGE_SIZE);
|
|
|
|
*kernendp = kernend;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* patch MODINFOMD_KERNEND */
|
|
|
|
md = file_findmetadata(kfp, MODINFOMD_KERNEND);
|
|
|
|
bcopy(&kernend, md->md_data, sizeof kernend);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/* copy module list and metadata */
|
2022-09-16 15:08:47 +00:00
|
|
|
(void)md_copymodules(addr, false);
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ssym = esym = 0;
|
|
|
|
md = file_findmetadata(kfp, MODINFOMD_SSYM);
|
|
|
|
if (md != NULL)
|
|
|
|
ssym = *((vm_offset_t *)&(md->md_data));
|
|
|
|
md = file_findmetadata(kfp, MODINFOMD_ESYM);
|
|
|
|
if (md != NULL)
|
|
|
|
esym = *((vm_offset_t *)&(md->md_data));
|
|
|
|
if (ssym == 0 || esym == 0)
|
|
|
|
ssym = esym = 0; /* sanity */
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
/* legacy bootinfo structure */
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
kernelname = getenv("kernelname");
|
1998-10-06 07:27:05 +00:00
|
|
|
i386_getdev(NULL, kernelname, &kernelpath);
|
2022-09-16 15:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
bi->bi_version = BOOTINFO_VERSION;
|
2022-09-17 21:15:51 +00:00
|
|
|
bi->bi_size = sizeof(*bi);
|
2022-09-16 15:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
bi->bi_memsizes_valid = 1;
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_basemem = bios_basemem / 1024;
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_extmem = bios_extmem / 1024;
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_envp = envp;
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_modulep = *modulep;
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_kernend = kernend;
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_kernelname = VTOP(kernelpath);
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_symtab = ssym; /* XXX this is only the primary kernel symtab */
|
|
|
|
bi->bi_esymtab = esym;
|
2003-05-01 03:56:30 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* legacy boot arguments */
|
|
|
|
*howtop = howto | RB_BOOTINFO;
|
|
|
|
*bootdevp = bootdevnr;
|
2022-09-16 15:09:41 +00:00
|
|
|
*bip = VTOP(bi);
|
1998-10-02 20:53:17 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|