freebsd-dev/sys/netinet/tcp_output.c

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/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1995
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)tcp_output.c 8.4 (Berkeley) 5/24/95
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*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#include "opt_inet.h"
#include "opt_inet6.h"
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#include "opt_kern_tls.h"
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#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/arb.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#ifdef TCP_HHOOK
#include <sys/hhook.h>
#endif
#include <sys/kernel.h>
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
#include <sys/ktls.h>
#endif
#include <sys/lock.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/qmath.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/stats.h>
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#include <net/if.h>
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#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/route/nhop.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_kdtrace.h>
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#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <netinet/ip_options.h>
#ifdef INET6
#include <netinet6/in6_pcb.h>
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#define TCPOUTFLAGS
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#include <netinet/tcp_fsm.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_seq.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_log_buf.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_syncache.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_timer.h>
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#include <netinet/tcpip.h>
#include <netinet/cc/cc.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_fastopen.h>
There are times when it would be really nice to have a record of the last few packets and/or state transitions from each TCP socket. That would help with narrowing down certain problems we see in the field that are hard to reproduce without understanding the history of how we got into a certain state. This change provides just that. It saves copies of the last N packets in a list in the tcpcb. When the tcpcb is destroyed, the list is freed. I thought this was likely to be more performance-friendly than saving copies of the tcpcb. Plus, with the packets, you should be able to reverse-engineer what happened to the tcpcb. To enable the feature, you will need to compile a kernel with the TCPPCAP option. Even then, the feature defaults to being deactivated. You can activate it by setting a positive value for the number of captured packets. You can do that on either a global basis or on a per-socket basis (via a setsockopt call). There is no way to get the packets out of the kernel other than using kmem or getting a coredump. I thought that would help some of the legal/privacy concerns regarding such a feature. However, it should be possible to add a future effort to export them in PCAP format. I tested this at low scale, and found that there were no mbuf leaks and the peak mbuf usage appeared to be unchanged with and without the feature. The main performance concern I can envision is the number of mbufs that would be used on systems with a large number of sockets. If you save five packets per direction per socket and have 3,000 sockets, that will consume at least 30,000 mbufs just to keep these packets. I tried to reduce the concerns associated with this by limiting the number of clusters (not mbufs) that could be used for this feature. Again, in my testing, that appears to work correctly. Differential Revision: D3100 Submitted by: Jonathan Looney <jlooney at juniper dot net> Reviewed by: gnn, hiren
2015-10-14 00:35:37 +00:00
#ifdef TCPPCAP
#include <netinet/tcp_pcap.h>
#endif
#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
#include <netinet/tcp_offload.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/tcp_ecn.h>
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Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#include <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
#include <netinet/udp.h>
#include <netinet/udp_var.h>
#include <machine/in_cksum.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
VNET_DEFINE(int, path_mtu_discovery) = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, path_mtu_discovery, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
Build on Jeff Roberson's linker-set based dynamic per-CPU allocator (DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables. Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet region with the help of a the kernel linker. Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided. This change restores static initialization for network stack global variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS. Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING. Portions submitted by: bz Reviewed by: bz, zec Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam Suggested by: peter Approved by: re (kensmith)
2009-07-14 22:48:30 +00:00
&VNET_NAME(path_mtu_discovery), 1,
"Enable Path MTU Discovery");
VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_do_tso) = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, tso, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
Build on Jeff Roberson's linker-set based dynamic per-CPU allocator (DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables. Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet region with the help of a the kernel linker. Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided. This change restores static initialization for network stack global variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS. Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING. Portions submitted by: bz Reviewed by: bz, zec Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam Suggested by: peter Approved by: re (kensmith)
2009-07-14 22:48:30 +00:00
&VNET_NAME(tcp_do_tso), 0,
"Enable TCP Segmentation Offload");
VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_sendspace) = 1024*32;
#define V_tcp_sendspace VNET(tcp_sendspace)
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, TCPCTL_SENDSPACE, sendspace, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
&VNET_NAME(tcp_sendspace), 0, "Initial send socket buffer size");
VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_do_autosndbuf) = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, sendbuf_auto, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
Build on Jeff Roberson's linker-set based dynamic per-CPU allocator (DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables. Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet region with the help of a the kernel linker. Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided. This change restores static initialization for network stack global variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS. Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING. Portions submitted by: bz Reviewed by: bz, zec Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam Suggested by: peter Approved by: re (kensmith)
2009-07-14 22:48:30 +00:00
&VNET_NAME(tcp_do_autosndbuf), 0,
"Enable automatic send buffer sizing");
VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_autosndbuf_inc) = 8*1024;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, sendbuf_inc, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
Build on Jeff Roberson's linker-set based dynamic per-CPU allocator (DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables. Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet region with the help of a the kernel linker. Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided. This change restores static initialization for network stack global variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS. Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING. Portions submitted by: bz Reviewed by: bz, zec Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam Suggested by: peter Approved by: re (kensmith)
2009-07-14 22:48:30 +00:00
&VNET_NAME(tcp_autosndbuf_inc), 0,
"Incrementor step size of automatic send buffer");
VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_autosndbuf_max) = 2*1024*1024;
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, sendbuf_max, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
Build on Jeff Roberson's linker-set based dynamic per-CPU allocator (DPCPU), as suggested by Peter Wemm, and implement a new per-virtual network stack memory allocator. Modify vnet to use the allocator instead of monolithic global container structures (vinet, ...). This change solves many binary compatibility problems associated with VIMAGE, and restores ELF symbols for virtualized global variables. Each virtualized global variable exists as a "reference copy", and also once per virtual network stack. Virtualized global variables are tagged at compile-time, placing the in a special linker set, which is loaded into a contiguous region of kernel memory. Virtualized global variables in the base kernel are linked as normal, but those in modules are copied and relocated to a reserved portion of the kernel's vnet region with the help of a the kernel linker. Virtualized global variables exist in per-vnet memory set up when the network stack instance is created, and are initialized statically from the reference copy. Run-time access occurs via an accessor macro, which converts from the current vnet and requested symbol to a per-vnet address. When "options VIMAGE" is not compiled into the kernel, normal global ELF symbols will be used instead and indirection is avoided. This change restores static initialization for network stack global variables, restores support for non-global symbols and types, eliminates the need for many subsystem constructors, eliminates large per-subsystem structures that caused many binary compatibility issues both for monitoring applications (netstat) and kernel modules, removes the per-function INIT_VNET_*() macros throughout the stack, eliminates the need for vnet_symmap ksym(2) munging, and eliminates duplicate definitions of virtualized globals under VIMAGE_GLOBALS. Bump __FreeBSD_version and update UPDATING. Portions submitted by: bz Reviewed by: bz, zec Discussed with: gnn, jamie, jeff, jhb, julian, sam Suggested by: peter Approved by: re (kensmith)
2009-07-14 22:48:30 +00:00
&VNET_NAME(tcp_autosndbuf_max), 0,
"Max size of automatic send buffer");
VNET_DEFINE(int, tcp_sendbuf_auto_lowat) = 0;
#define V_tcp_sendbuf_auto_lowat VNET(tcp_sendbuf_auto_lowat)
SYSCTL_INT(_net_inet_tcp, OID_AUTO, sendbuf_auto_lowat, CTLFLAG_VNET | CTLFLAG_RW,
&VNET_NAME(tcp_sendbuf_auto_lowat), 0,
"Modify threshold for auto send buffer growth to account for SO_SNDLOWAT");
/*
* Make sure that either retransmit or persist timer is set for SYN, FIN and
* non-ACK.
*/
#define TCP_XMIT_TIMER_ASSERT(tp, len, th_flags) \
KASSERT(((len) == 0 && ((th_flags) & (TH_SYN | TH_FIN)) == 0) ||\
tcp_timer_active((tp), TT_REXMT) || \
tcp_timer_active((tp), TT_PERSIST), \
("neither rexmt nor persist timer is set"))
#ifdef TCP_HHOOK
/*
2012-11-07 07:00:59 +00:00
* Wrapper for the TCP established output helper hook.
*/
void
hhook_run_tcp_est_out(struct tcpcb *tp, struct tcphdr *th,
struct tcpopt *to, uint32_t len, int tso)
{
struct tcp_hhook_data hhook_data;
if (V_tcp_hhh[HHOOK_TCP_EST_OUT]->hhh_nhooks > 0) {
hhook_data.tp = tp;
hhook_data.th = th;
hhook_data.to = to;
hhook_data.len = len;
hhook_data.tso = tso;
hhook_run_hooks(V_tcp_hhh[HHOOK_TCP_EST_OUT], &hhook_data,
tcp: embed inpcb into tcpcb For the TCP protocol inpcb storage specify allocation size that would provide space to most of the data a TCP connection needs, embedding into struct tcpcb several structures, that previously were allocated separately. The most import one is the inpcb itself. With embedding we can provide strong guarantee that with a valid TCP inpcb the tcpcb is always valid and vice versa. Also we reduce number of allocs/frees per connection. The embedded inpcb is placed in the beginning of the struct tcpcb, since in_pcballoc() requires that. However, later we may want to move it around for cache line efficiency, and this can be done with a little effort. The new intotcpcb() macro is ready for such move. The congestion algorithm data, the TCP timers and osd(9) data are also embedded into tcpcb, and temprorary struct tcpcb_mem goes away. There was no extra allocation here, but we went through extra pointer every time we accessed this data. One interesting side effect is that now TCP data is allocated from SMR-protected zone. Potentially this allows the TCP stacks or other TCP related modules to utilize that for their own synchronization. Large part of the change was done with sed script: s/tp->ccv->/tp->t_ccv./g s/tp->ccv/\&tp->t_ccv/g s/tp->cc_algo/tp->t_cc/g s/tp->t_timers->tt_/tp->tt_/g s/CCV\(ccv, osd\)/\&CCV(ccv, t_osd)/g Dependency side effect is that code that needs to know struct tcpcb should also know struct inpcb, that added several <netinet/in_pcb.h>. Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37127
2022-12-07 17:00:48 +00:00
&tp->t_osd);
}
}
#endif
This commit marks the first formal contribution of the "Five New TCP Congestion Control Algorithms for FreeBSD" FreeBSD Foundation funded project. More details about the project are available at: http://caia.swin.edu.au/freebsd/5cc/ - Add a KPI and supporting infrastructure to allow modular congestion control algorithms to be used in the net stack. Algorithms can maintain per-connection state if required, and connections maintain their own algorithm pointer, which allows different connections to concurrently use different algorithms. The TCP_CONGESTION socket option can be used with getsockopt()/setsockopt() to programmatically query or change the congestion control algorithm respectively from within an application at runtime. - Integrate the framework with the TCP stack in as least intrusive a manner as possible. Care was also taken to develop the framework in a way that should allow integration with other congestion aware transport protocols (e.g. SCTP) in the future. The hope is that we will one day be able to share a single set of congestion control algorithm modules between all congestion aware transport protocols. - Introduce a new congestion recovery (TF_CONGRECOVERY) state into the TCP stack and use it to decouple the meaning of recovery from a congestion event and recovery from packet loss (TF_FASTRECOVERY) a la RFC2581. ECN and delay based congestion control protocols don't generally need to recover from packet loss and need a different way to note a congestion recovery episode within the stack. - Remove the net.inet.tcp.newreno sysctl, which simplifies some portions of code and ensures the stack always uses the appropriate mechanisms for recovering from packet loss during a congestion recovery episode. - Extract the NewReno congestion control algorithm from the TCP stack and massage it into module form. NewReno is always built into the kernel and will remain the default algorithm for the forseeable future. Implementations of additional different algorithms will become available in the near future. - Bump __FreeBSD_version to 900025 and note in UPDATING that rebuilding code that relies on the size of "struct tcpcb" is required. Many thanks go to the Cisco University Research Program Fund at Community Foundation Silicon Valley and the FreeBSD Foundation. Their support of our work at the Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne University of Technology is greatly appreciated. In collaboration with: David Hayes <dahayes at swin edu au> and Grenville Armitage <garmitage at swin edu au> Sponsored by: Cisco URP, FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: rpaulo Tested by: David Hayes (and many others over the years) MFC after: 3 months
2010-11-12 06:41:55 +00:00
/*
* CC wrapper hook functions
*/
void
This commit marks the first formal contribution of the "Five New TCP Congestion Control Algorithms for FreeBSD" FreeBSD Foundation funded project. More details about the project are available at: http://caia.swin.edu.au/freebsd/5cc/ - Add a KPI and supporting infrastructure to allow modular congestion control algorithms to be used in the net stack. Algorithms can maintain per-connection state if required, and connections maintain their own algorithm pointer, which allows different connections to concurrently use different algorithms. The TCP_CONGESTION socket option can be used with getsockopt()/setsockopt() to programmatically query or change the congestion control algorithm respectively from within an application at runtime. - Integrate the framework with the TCP stack in as least intrusive a manner as possible. Care was also taken to develop the framework in a way that should allow integration with other congestion aware transport protocols (e.g. SCTP) in the future. The hope is that we will one day be able to share a single set of congestion control algorithm modules between all congestion aware transport protocols. - Introduce a new congestion recovery (TF_CONGRECOVERY) state into the TCP stack and use it to decouple the meaning of recovery from a congestion event and recovery from packet loss (TF_FASTRECOVERY) a la RFC2581. ECN and delay based congestion control protocols don't generally need to recover from packet loss and need a different way to note a congestion recovery episode within the stack. - Remove the net.inet.tcp.newreno sysctl, which simplifies some portions of code and ensures the stack always uses the appropriate mechanisms for recovering from packet loss during a congestion recovery episode. - Extract the NewReno congestion control algorithm from the TCP stack and massage it into module form. NewReno is always built into the kernel and will remain the default algorithm for the forseeable future. Implementations of additional different algorithms will become available in the near future. - Bump __FreeBSD_version to 900025 and note in UPDATING that rebuilding code that relies on the size of "struct tcpcb" is required. Many thanks go to the Cisco University Research Program Fund at Community Foundation Silicon Valley and the FreeBSD Foundation. Their support of our work at the Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne University of Technology is greatly appreciated. In collaboration with: David Hayes <dahayes at swin edu au> and Grenville Armitage <garmitage at swin edu au> Sponsored by: Cisco URP, FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: rpaulo Tested by: David Hayes (and many others over the years) MFC after: 3 months
2010-11-12 06:41:55 +00:00
cc_after_idle(struct tcpcb *tp)
{
INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(tptoinpcb(tp));
This commit marks the first formal contribution of the "Five New TCP Congestion Control Algorithms for FreeBSD" FreeBSD Foundation funded project. More details about the project are available at: http://caia.swin.edu.au/freebsd/5cc/ - Add a KPI and supporting infrastructure to allow modular congestion control algorithms to be used in the net stack. Algorithms can maintain per-connection state if required, and connections maintain their own algorithm pointer, which allows different connections to concurrently use different algorithms. The TCP_CONGESTION socket option can be used with getsockopt()/setsockopt() to programmatically query or change the congestion control algorithm respectively from within an application at runtime. - Integrate the framework with the TCP stack in as least intrusive a manner as possible. Care was also taken to develop the framework in a way that should allow integration with other congestion aware transport protocols (e.g. SCTP) in the future. The hope is that we will one day be able to share a single set of congestion control algorithm modules between all congestion aware transport protocols. - Introduce a new congestion recovery (TF_CONGRECOVERY) state into the TCP stack and use it to decouple the meaning of recovery from a congestion event and recovery from packet loss (TF_FASTRECOVERY) a la RFC2581. ECN and delay based congestion control protocols don't generally need to recover from packet loss and need a different way to note a congestion recovery episode within the stack. - Remove the net.inet.tcp.newreno sysctl, which simplifies some portions of code and ensures the stack always uses the appropriate mechanisms for recovering from packet loss during a congestion recovery episode. - Extract the NewReno congestion control algorithm from the TCP stack and massage it into module form. NewReno is always built into the kernel and will remain the default algorithm for the forseeable future. Implementations of additional different algorithms will become available in the near future. - Bump __FreeBSD_version to 900025 and note in UPDATING that rebuilding code that relies on the size of "struct tcpcb" is required. Many thanks go to the Cisco University Research Program Fund at Community Foundation Silicon Valley and the FreeBSD Foundation. Their support of our work at the Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne University of Technology is greatly appreciated. In collaboration with: David Hayes <dahayes at swin edu au> and Grenville Armitage <garmitage at swin edu au> Sponsored by: Cisco URP, FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: rpaulo Tested by: David Hayes (and many others over the years) MFC after: 3 months
2010-11-12 06:41:55 +00:00
if (CC_ALGO(tp)->after_idle != NULL)
tcp: embed inpcb into tcpcb For the TCP protocol inpcb storage specify allocation size that would provide space to most of the data a TCP connection needs, embedding into struct tcpcb several structures, that previously were allocated separately. The most import one is the inpcb itself. With embedding we can provide strong guarantee that with a valid TCP inpcb the tcpcb is always valid and vice versa. Also we reduce number of allocs/frees per connection. The embedded inpcb is placed in the beginning of the struct tcpcb, since in_pcballoc() requires that. However, later we may want to move it around for cache line efficiency, and this can be done with a little effort. The new intotcpcb() macro is ready for such move. The congestion algorithm data, the TCP timers and osd(9) data are also embedded into tcpcb, and temprorary struct tcpcb_mem goes away. There was no extra allocation here, but we went through extra pointer every time we accessed this data. One interesting side effect is that now TCP data is allocated from SMR-protected zone. Potentially this allows the TCP stacks or other TCP related modules to utilize that for their own synchronization. Large part of the change was done with sed script: s/tp->ccv->/tp->t_ccv./g s/tp->ccv/\&tp->t_ccv/g s/tp->cc_algo/tp->t_cc/g s/tp->t_timers->tt_/tp->tt_/g s/CCV\(ccv, osd\)/\&CCV(ccv, t_osd)/g Dependency side effect is that code that needs to know struct tcpcb should also know struct inpcb, that added several <netinet/in_pcb.h>. Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37127
2022-12-07 17:00:48 +00:00
CC_ALGO(tp)->after_idle(&tp->t_ccv);
This commit marks the first formal contribution of the "Five New TCP Congestion Control Algorithms for FreeBSD" FreeBSD Foundation funded project. More details about the project are available at: http://caia.swin.edu.au/freebsd/5cc/ - Add a KPI and supporting infrastructure to allow modular congestion control algorithms to be used in the net stack. Algorithms can maintain per-connection state if required, and connections maintain their own algorithm pointer, which allows different connections to concurrently use different algorithms. The TCP_CONGESTION socket option can be used with getsockopt()/setsockopt() to programmatically query or change the congestion control algorithm respectively from within an application at runtime. - Integrate the framework with the TCP stack in as least intrusive a manner as possible. Care was also taken to develop the framework in a way that should allow integration with other congestion aware transport protocols (e.g. SCTP) in the future. The hope is that we will one day be able to share a single set of congestion control algorithm modules between all congestion aware transport protocols. - Introduce a new congestion recovery (TF_CONGRECOVERY) state into the TCP stack and use it to decouple the meaning of recovery from a congestion event and recovery from packet loss (TF_FASTRECOVERY) a la RFC2581. ECN and delay based congestion control protocols don't generally need to recover from packet loss and need a different way to note a congestion recovery episode within the stack. - Remove the net.inet.tcp.newreno sysctl, which simplifies some portions of code and ensures the stack always uses the appropriate mechanisms for recovering from packet loss during a congestion recovery episode. - Extract the NewReno congestion control algorithm from the TCP stack and massage it into module form. NewReno is always built into the kernel and will remain the default algorithm for the forseeable future. Implementations of additional different algorithms will become available in the near future. - Bump __FreeBSD_version to 900025 and note in UPDATING that rebuilding code that relies on the size of "struct tcpcb" is required. Many thanks go to the Cisco University Research Program Fund at Community Foundation Silicon Valley and the FreeBSD Foundation. Their support of our work at the Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne University of Technology is greatly appreciated. In collaboration with: David Hayes <dahayes at swin edu au> and Grenville Armitage <garmitage at swin edu au> Sponsored by: Cisco URP, FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: rpaulo Tested by: David Hayes (and many others over the years) MFC after: 3 months
2010-11-12 06:41:55 +00:00
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Tcp output routine: figure out what should be sent and send it.
*/
int
tcp_default_output(struct tcpcb *tp)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
struct socket *so = tptosocket(tp);
struct inpcb *inp = tptoinpcb(tp);
int32_t len;
uint32_t recwin, sendwin;
uint16_t flags;
int off, error = 0; /* Keep compiler happy */
u_int if_hw_tsomaxsegcount = 0;
u_int if_hw_tsomaxsegsize = 0;
struct mbuf *m;
struct ip *ip = NULL;
struct tcphdr *th;
u_char opt[TCP_MAXOLEN];
unsigned ipoptlen, optlen, hdrlen, ulen;
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
unsigned ipsec_optlen = 0;
#endif
int idle, sendalot, curticks;
int sack_rxmit, sack_bytes_rxmt;
struct sackhole *p;
int tso, mtu;
struct tcpopt to;
struct udphdr *udp = NULL;
struct tcp_log_buffer *lgb;
unsigned int wanted_cookie = 0;
unsigned int dont_sendalot = 0;
#if 0
int maxburst = TCP_MAXBURST;
#endif
#ifdef INET6
struct ip6_hdr *ip6 = NULL;
const bool isipv6 = (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6) != 0;
#endif
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
const bool hw_tls = tp->t_nic_ktls_xmit != 0;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#else
const bool hw_tls = false;
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
NET_EPOCH_ASSERT();
INP_WLOCK_ASSERT(inp);
#ifdef TCP_OFFLOAD
if (tp->t_flags & TF_TOE)
return (tcp_offload_output(tp));
#endif
/*
* For TFO connections in SYN_SENT or SYN_RECEIVED,
* only allow the initial SYN or SYN|ACK and those sent
* by the retransmit timer.
*/
if (IS_FASTOPEN(tp->t_flags) &&
((tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_SENT) ||
(tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED)) &&
SEQ_GT(tp->snd_max, tp->snd_una) && /* initial SYN or SYN|ACK sent */
(tp->snd_nxt != tp->snd_una)) /* not a retransmit */
return (0);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Determine length of data that should be transmitted,
* and flags that will be used.
* If there is some data or critical controls (SYN, RST)
* to send, then transmit; otherwise, investigate further.
*/
idle = (tp->t_flags & TF_LASTIDLE) || (tp->snd_max == tp->snd_una);
if (idle && (((ticks - tp->t_rcvtime) >= tp->t_rxtcur) ||
(tp->t_sndtime && ((ticks - tp->t_sndtime) >= tp->t_rxtcur))))
cc_after_idle(tp);
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_LASTIDLE;
if (idle) {
if (tp->t_flags & TF_MORETOCOME) {
tp->t_flags |= TF_LASTIDLE;
idle = 0;
}
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
again:
/*
* If we've recently taken a timeout, snd_max will be greater than
* snd_nxt. There may be SACK information that allows us to avoid
* resending already delivered data. Adjust snd_nxt accordingly.
*/
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_SACK_PERMIT) &&
SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max))
tcp_sack_adjust(tp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
sendalot = 0;
tso = 0;
mtu = 0;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
off = tp->snd_nxt - tp->snd_una;
sendwin = min(tp->snd_wnd, tp->snd_cwnd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
flags = tcp_outflags[tp->t_state];
/*
* Send any SACK-generated retransmissions. If we're explicitly trying
* to send out new data (when sendalot is 1), bypass this function.
* If we retransmit in fast recovery mode, decrement snd_cwnd, since
* we're replacing a (future) new transmission with a retransmission
* now, and we previously incremented snd_cwnd in tcp_input().
*/
/*
* Still in sack recovery , reset rxmit flag to zero.
*/
sack_rxmit = 0;
sack_bytes_rxmt = 0;
len = 0;
p = NULL;
This commit marks the first formal contribution of the "Five New TCP Congestion Control Algorithms for FreeBSD" FreeBSD Foundation funded project. More details about the project are available at: http://caia.swin.edu.au/freebsd/5cc/ - Add a KPI and supporting infrastructure to allow modular congestion control algorithms to be used in the net stack. Algorithms can maintain per-connection state if required, and connections maintain their own algorithm pointer, which allows different connections to concurrently use different algorithms. The TCP_CONGESTION socket option can be used with getsockopt()/setsockopt() to programmatically query or change the congestion control algorithm respectively from within an application at runtime. - Integrate the framework with the TCP stack in as least intrusive a manner as possible. Care was also taken to develop the framework in a way that should allow integration with other congestion aware transport protocols (e.g. SCTP) in the future. The hope is that we will one day be able to share a single set of congestion control algorithm modules between all congestion aware transport protocols. - Introduce a new congestion recovery (TF_CONGRECOVERY) state into the TCP stack and use it to decouple the meaning of recovery from a congestion event and recovery from packet loss (TF_FASTRECOVERY) a la RFC2581. ECN and delay based congestion control protocols don't generally need to recover from packet loss and need a different way to note a congestion recovery episode within the stack. - Remove the net.inet.tcp.newreno sysctl, which simplifies some portions of code and ensures the stack always uses the appropriate mechanisms for recovering from packet loss during a congestion recovery episode. - Extract the NewReno congestion control algorithm from the TCP stack and massage it into module form. NewReno is always built into the kernel and will remain the default algorithm for the forseeable future. Implementations of additional different algorithms will become available in the near future. - Bump __FreeBSD_version to 900025 and note in UPDATING that rebuilding code that relies on the size of "struct tcpcb" is required. Many thanks go to the Cisco University Research Program Fund at Community Foundation Silicon Valley and the FreeBSD Foundation. Their support of our work at the Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne University of Technology is greatly appreciated. In collaboration with: David Hayes <dahayes at swin edu au> and Grenville Armitage <garmitage at swin edu au> Sponsored by: Cisco URP, FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: rpaulo Tested by: David Hayes (and many others over the years) MFC after: 3 months
2010-11-12 06:41:55 +00:00
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_SACK_PERMIT) && IN_FASTRECOVERY(tp->t_flags) &&
(p = tcp_sack_output(tp, &sack_bytes_rxmt))) {
uint32_t cwin;
cwin =
imax(min(tp->snd_wnd, tp->snd_cwnd) - sack_bytes_rxmt, 0);
/* Do not retransmit SACK segments beyond snd_recover */
if (SEQ_GT(p->end, tp->snd_recover)) {
/*
* (At least) part of sack hole extends beyond
* snd_recover. Check to see if we can rexmit data
* for this hole.
*/
if (SEQ_GEQ(p->rxmit, tp->snd_recover)) {
/*
* Can't rexmit any more data for this hole.
* That data will be rexmitted in the next
* sack recovery episode, when snd_recover
* moves past p->rxmit.
*/
p = NULL;
goto after_sack_rexmit;
} else {
/* Can rexmit part of the current hole */
len = ((int32_t)ulmin(cwin,
SEQ_SUB(tp->snd_recover, p->rxmit)));
}
} else {
len = ((int32_t)ulmin(cwin,
SEQ_SUB(p->end, p->rxmit)));
}
if (len > 0) {
off = SEQ_SUB(p->rxmit, tp->snd_una);
KASSERT(off >= 0,("%s: sack block to the left of una : %d",
__func__, off));
sack_rxmit = 1;
sendalot = 1;
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sack_rexmits);
TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_sack_rexmit_bytes,
min(len, tcp_maxseg(tp)));
}
}
after_sack_rexmit:
/*
* Get standard flags, and add SYN or FIN if requested by 'hidden'
* state flags.
*/
if (tp->t_flags & TF_NEEDFIN)
flags |= TH_FIN;
if (tp->t_flags & TF_NEEDSYN)
flags |= TH_SYN;
SOCKBUF_LOCK(&so->so_snd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* If in persist timeout with window of 0, send 1 byte.
* Otherwise, if window is small but nonzero
* and timer expired, we will send what we can
* and go to transmit state.
*/
if (tp->t_flags & TF_FORCEDATA) {
if (sendwin == 0) {
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* If we still have some data to send, then
* clear the FIN bit. Usually this would
* happen below when it realizes that we
* aren't sending all the data. However,
* if we have exactly 1 byte of unsent data,
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* then it won't clear the FIN bit below,
* and if we are in persist state, we wind
* up sending the packet without recording
* that we sent the FIN bit.
*
* We can't just blindly clear the FIN bit,
* because if we don't have any more data
* to send then the probe will be the FIN
* itself.
*/
if (off < sbused(&so->so_snd))
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
flags &= ~TH_FIN;
sendwin = 1;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
} else {
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_PERSIST, 0);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tp->t_rxtshift = 0;
}
}
/*
* If snd_nxt == snd_max and we have transmitted a FIN, the
* offset will be > 0 even if so_snd.sb_cc is 0, resulting in
* a negative length. This can also occur when TCP opens up
* its congestion window while receiving additional duplicate
* acks after fast-retransmit because TCP will reset snd_nxt
* to snd_max after the fast-retransmit.
*
* In the normal retransmit-FIN-only case, however, snd_nxt will
* be set to snd_una, the offset will be 0, and the length may
* wind up 0.
*
* If sack_rxmit is true we are retransmitting from the scoreboard
* in which case len is already set.
*/
if (sack_rxmit == 0) {
if (sack_bytes_rxmt == 0)
len = ((int32_t)min(sbavail(&so->so_snd), sendwin) -
off);
else {
int32_t cwin;
/*
* We are inside of a SACK recovery episode and are
* sending new data, having retransmitted all the
* data possible in the scoreboard.
*/
len = ((int32_t)min(sbavail(&so->so_snd), tp->snd_wnd) -
off);
/*
* Don't remove this (len > 0) check !
* We explicitly check for len > 0 here (although it
* isn't really necessary), to work around a gcc
* optimization issue - to force gcc to compute
* len above. Without this check, the computation
* of len is bungled by the optimizer.
*/
if (len > 0) {
cwin = tp->snd_cwnd - imax(0, (int32_t)
(tp->snd_nxt - tp->snd_recover)) -
sack_bytes_rxmt;
if (cwin < 0)
cwin = 0;
len = imin(len, cwin);
}
}
}
/*
* Lop off SYN bit if it has already been sent. However, if this
* is SYN-SENT state and if segment contains data and if we don't
* know that foreign host supports TAO, suppress sending segment.
*/
if ((flags & TH_SYN) && SEQ_GT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_una)) {
if (tp->t_state != TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED)
flags &= ~TH_SYN;
/*
* When sending additional segments following a TFO SYN|ACK,
* do not include the SYN bit.
*/
if (IS_FASTOPEN(tp->t_flags) &&
(tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED))
flags &= ~TH_SYN;
off--, len++;
}
/*
* Be careful not to send data and/or FIN on SYN segments.
* This measure is needed to prevent interoperability problems
* with not fully conformant TCP implementations.
*/
if ((flags & TH_SYN) && (tp->t_flags & TF_NOOPT)) {
len = 0;
flags &= ~TH_FIN;
}
/*
* On TFO sockets, ensure no data is sent in the following cases:
*
* - When retransmitting SYN|ACK on a passively-created socket
*
* - When retransmitting SYN on an actively created socket
*
* - When sending a zero-length cookie (cookie request) on an
* actively created socket
*
* - When the socket is in the CLOSED state (RST is being sent)
*/
if (IS_FASTOPEN(tp->t_flags) &&
(((flags & TH_SYN) && (tp->t_rxtshift > 0)) ||
((tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_SENT) &&
(tp->t_tfo_client_cookie_len == 0)) ||
(flags & TH_RST)))
len = 0;
if (len <= 0) {
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* If FIN has been sent but not acked,
* but we haven't been called to retransmit,
* len will be < 0. Otherwise, window shrank
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* after we sent into it. If window shrank to 0,
* cancel pending retransmit, pull snd_nxt back
* to (closed) window, and set the persist timer
* if it isn't already going. If the window didn't
* close completely, just wait for an ACK.
*
* We also do a general check here to ensure that
* we will set the persist timer when we have data
* to send, but a 0-byte window. This makes sure
* the persist timer is set even if the packet
* hits one of the "goto send" lines below.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
len = 0;
if ((sendwin == 0) && (TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state)) &&
(off < (int) sbavail(&so->so_snd)) &&
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) {
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_REXMT, 0);
tp->t_rxtshift = 0;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tp->snd_nxt = tp->snd_una;
if (!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST))
tcp_setpersist(tp);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
}
/* len will be >= 0 after this point. */
KASSERT(len >= 0, ("[%s:%d]: len < 0", __func__, __LINE__));
tcp_sndbuf_autoscale(tp, so, sendwin);
/*
* Decide if we can use TCP Segmentation Offloading (if supported by
* hardware).
*
* TSO may only be used if we are in a pure bulk sending state. The
* presence of TCP-MD5, SACK retransmits, SACK advertizements and
* IP options prevent using TSO. With TSO the TCP header is the same
* (except for the sequence number) for all generated packets. This
* makes it impossible to transmit any options which vary per generated
* segment or packet.
*
* IPv4 handling has a clear separation of ip options and ip header
* flags while IPv6 combines both in in6p_outputopts. ip6_optlen() does
* the right thing below to provide length of just ip options and thus
* checking for ipoptlen is enough to decide if ip options are present.
*/
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
/*
* Pre-calculate here as we save another lookup into the darknesses
* of IPsec that way and can actually decide if TSO is ok.
*/
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6 && IPSEC_ENABLED(ipv6))
ipsec_optlen = IPSEC_HDRSIZE(ipv6, inp);
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#ifdef INET
else
#endif
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#endif /* INET6 */
#ifdef INET
if (IPSEC_ENABLED(ipv4))
ipsec_optlen = IPSEC_HDRSIZE(ipv4, inp);
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#endif /* INET */
#endif /* IPSEC */
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6)
ipoptlen = ip6_optlen(inp);
else
#endif
if (inp->inp_options)
ipoptlen = inp->inp_options->m_len -
offsetof(struct ipoption, ipopt_list);
else
ipoptlen = 0;
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
ipoptlen += ipsec_optlen;
#endif
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_TSO) && V_tcp_do_tso && len > tp->t_maxseg &&
(tp->t_port == 0) &&
((tp->t_flags & TF_SIGNATURE) == 0) &&
tp->rcv_numsacks == 0 && sack_rxmit == 0 &&
ipoptlen == 0 && !(flags & TH_SYN))
tso = 1;
if (sack_rxmit) {
if (SEQ_LT(p->rxmit + len, tp->snd_una + sbused(&so->so_snd)))
flags &= ~TH_FIN;
} else {
if (SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt + len, tp->snd_una +
sbused(&so->so_snd)))
flags &= ~TH_FIN;
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
recwin = lmin(lmax(sbspace(&so->so_rcv), 0),
(long)TCP_MAXWIN << tp->rcv_scale);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Sender silly window avoidance. We transmit under the following
* conditions when len is non-zero:
*
* - We have a full segment (or more with TSO)
2001-12-13 04:02:31 +00:00
* - This is the last buffer in a write()/send() and we are
* either idle or running NODELAY
* - we've timed out (e.g. persist timer)
* - we have more then 1/2 the maximum send window's worth of
* data (receiver may be limited the window size)
* - we need to retransmit
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (len) {
if (len >= tp->t_maxseg)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
/*
* As the TCP header options are now
* considered when setting up the initial
* window, we would not send the last segment
* if we skip considering the option length here.
* Note: this may not work when tcp headers change
* very dynamically in the future.
*/
if ((((tp->t_flags & TF_SIGNATURE) ?
PADTCPOLEN(TCPOLEN_SIGNATURE) : 0) +
((tp->t_flags & TF_RCVD_TSTMP) ?
PADTCPOLEN(TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP) : 0) +
len) >= tp->t_maxseg)
goto send;
/*
* NOTE! on localhost connections an 'ack' from the remote
* end may occur synchronously with the output and cause
* us to flush a buffer queued with moretocome. XXX
*
* note: the len + off check is almost certainly unnecessary.
*/
2001-12-13 04:02:31 +00:00
if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_MORETOCOME) && /* normal case */
(idle || (tp->t_flags & TF_NODELAY)) &&
(uint32_t)len + (uint32_t)off >= sbavail(&so->so_snd) &&
(tp->t_flags & TF_NOPUSH) == 0) {
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
}
if (tp->t_flags & TF_FORCEDATA) /* typ. timeout case */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
if (len >= tp->max_sndwnd / 2 && tp->max_sndwnd > 0)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
if (SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max)) /* retransmit case */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
if (sack_rxmit)
goto send;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
/*
* Sending of standalone window updates.
*
* Window updates are important when we close our window due to a
* full socket buffer and are opening it again after the application
* reads data from it. Once the window has opened again and the
* remote end starts to send again the ACK clock takes over and
* provides the most current window information.
*
* We must avoid the silly window syndrome whereas every read
* from the receive buffer, no matter how small, causes a window
* update to be sent. We also should avoid sending a flurry of
* window updates when the socket buffer had queued a lot of data
* and the application is doing small reads.
*
* Prevent a flurry of pointless window updates by only sending
* an update when we can increase the advertized window by more
* than 1/4th of the socket buffer capacity. When the buffer is
* getting full or is very small be more aggressive and send an
* update whenever we can increase by two mss sized segments.
* In all other situations the ACK's to new incoming data will
* carry further window increases.
*
* Don't send an independent window update if a delayed
* ACK is pending (it will get piggy-backed on it) or the
* remote side already has done a half-close and won't send
* more data. Skip this if the connection is in T/TCP
* half-open state.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (recwin > 0 && !(tp->t_flags & TF_NEEDSYN) &&
!(tp->t_flags & TF_DELACK) &&
!TCPS_HAVERCVDFIN(tp->t_state)) {
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
/*
* "adv" is the amount we could increase the window,
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* taking into account that we are limited by
* TCP_MAXWIN << tp->rcv_scale.
*/
int32_t adv;
int oldwin;
adv = recwin;
if (SEQ_GT(tp->rcv_adv, tp->rcv_nxt)) {
oldwin = (tp->rcv_adv - tp->rcv_nxt);
if (adv > oldwin)
adv -= oldwin;
else
adv = 0;
} else
oldwin = 0;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* If the new window size ends up being the same as or less
* than the old size when it is scaled, then don't force
* a window update.
*/
if (oldwin >> tp->rcv_scale >= (adv + oldwin) >> tp->rcv_scale)
goto dontupdate;
if (adv >= (int32_t)(2 * tp->t_maxseg) &&
(adv >= (int32_t)(so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / 4) ||
recwin <= (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / 8) ||
so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat <= 8 * tp->t_maxseg ||
adv >= TCP_MAXWIN << tp->rcv_scale))
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
if (2 * adv >= (int32_t)so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat)
goto send;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
dontupdate:
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Send if we owe the peer an ACK, RST, SYN, or urgent data. ACKNOW
* is also a catch-all for the retransmit timer timeout case.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (tp->t_flags & TF_ACKNOW)
goto send;
if ((flags & TH_RST) ||
((flags & TH_SYN) && (tp->t_flags & TF_NEEDSYN) == 0))
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto send;
if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_up, tp->snd_una))
goto send;
/*
* If our state indicates that FIN should be sent
* and we have not yet done so, then we need to send.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (flags & TH_FIN &&
((tp->t_flags & TF_SENTFIN) == 0 || tp->snd_nxt == tp->snd_una))
goto send;
/*
* In SACK, it is possible for tcp_output to fail to send a segment
* after the retransmission timer has been turned off. Make sure
* that the retransmission timer is set.
*/
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_SACK_PERMIT) &&
SEQ_GT(tp->snd_max, tp->snd_una) &&
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_REXMT) &&
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) {
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_REXMT, TP_RXTCUR(tp));
goto just_return;
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* TCP window updates are not reliable, rather a polling protocol
* using ``persist'' packets is used to insure receipt of window
* updates. The three ``states'' for the output side are:
* idle not doing retransmits or persists
* persisting to move a small or zero window
* (re)transmitting and thereby not persisting
*
* tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)
* is true when we are in persist state.
* (tp->t_flags & TF_FORCEDATA)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* is set when we are called to send a persist packet.
* tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_REXMT)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
* is set when we are retransmitting
* The output side is idle when both timers are zero.
*
* If send window is too small, there is data to transmit, and no
* retransmit or persist is pending, then go to persist state.
* If nothing happens soon, send when timer expires:
* if window is nonzero, transmit what we can,
* otherwise force out a byte.
*/
if (sbavail(&so->so_snd) && !tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_REXMT) &&
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) {
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tp->t_rxtshift = 0;
tcp_setpersist(tp);
}
/*
* No reason to send a segment, just return.
*/
just_return:
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (0);
send:
SOCKBUF_LOCK_ASSERT(&so->so_snd);
if (len > 0) {
if (len >= tp->t_maxseg)
tp->t_flags2 |= TF2_PLPMTU_MAXSEGSNT;
else
tp->t_flags2 &= ~TF2_PLPMTU_MAXSEGSNT;
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Before ESTABLISHED, force sending of initial options
* unless TCP set not to do any options.
* NOTE: we assume that the IP/TCP header plus TCP options
* always fit in a single mbuf, leaving room for a maximum
* link header, i.e.
* max_linkhdr + sizeof (struct tcpiphdr) + optlen <= MCLBYTES
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
optlen = 0;
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6)
hdrlen = sizeof (struct ip6_hdr) + sizeof (struct tcphdr);
else
#endif
hdrlen = sizeof (struct tcpiphdr);
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
if (flags & TH_SYN) {
tp->snd_nxt = tp->iss;
}
/*
* Compute options for segment.
* We only have to care about SYN and established connection
* segments. Options for SYN-ACK segments are handled in TCP
* syncache.
*/
to.to_flags = 0;
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_NOOPT) == 0) {
/* Maximum segment size. */
if (flags & TH_SYN) {
to.to_mss = tcp_mssopt(&inp->inp_inc);
if (tp->t_port)
to.to_mss -= V_tcp_udp_tunneling_overhead;
to.to_flags |= TOF_MSS;
/*
* On SYN or SYN|ACK transmits on TFO connections,
* only include the TFO option if it is not a
* retransmit, as the presence of the TFO option may
* have caused the original SYN or SYN|ACK to have
* been dropped by a middlebox.
*/
if (IS_FASTOPEN(tp->t_flags) &&
(tp->t_rxtshift == 0)) {
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED) {
to.to_tfo_len = TCP_FASTOPEN_COOKIE_LEN;
to.to_tfo_cookie =
(u_int8_t *)&tp->t_tfo_cookie.server;
to.to_flags |= TOF_FASTOPEN;
wanted_cookie = 1;
} else if (tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_SENT) {
to.to_tfo_len =
tp->t_tfo_client_cookie_len;
to.to_tfo_cookie =
tp->t_tfo_cookie.client;
to.to_flags |= TOF_FASTOPEN;
wanted_cookie = 1;
/*
* If we wind up having more data to
* send with the SYN than can fit in
* one segment, don't send any more
* until the SYN|ACK comes back from
* the other end.
*/
dont_sendalot = 1;
}
}
}
/* Window scaling. */
if ((flags & TH_SYN) && (tp->t_flags & TF_REQ_SCALE)) {
to.to_wscale = tp->request_r_scale;
to.to_flags |= TOF_SCALE;
}
/* Timestamps. */
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_RCVD_TSTMP) ||
((flags & TH_SYN) && (tp->t_flags & TF_REQ_TSTMP))) {
curticks = tcp_ts_getticks();
to.to_tsval = curticks + tp->ts_offset;
to.to_tsecr = tp->ts_recent;
to.to_flags |= TOF_TS;
if (tp->t_rxtshift == 1)
tp->t_badrxtwin = curticks;
}
/* Set receive buffer autosizing timestamp. */
if (tp->rfbuf_ts == 0 &&
(so->so_rcv.sb_flags & SB_AUTOSIZE))
tp->rfbuf_ts = tcp_ts_getticks();
/* Selective ACK's. */
if (tp->t_flags & TF_SACK_PERMIT) {
if (flags & TH_SYN)
to.to_flags |= TOF_SACKPERM;
else if (TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state) &&
tp->rcv_numsacks > 0) {
to.to_flags |= TOF_SACK;
to.to_nsacks = tp->rcv_numsacks;
to.to_sacks = (u_char *)tp->sackblks;
}
}
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
/* TCP-MD5 (RFC2385). */
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
/*
* Check that TCP_MD5SIG is enabled in tcpcb to
* account the size needed to set this TCP option.
*/
if (tp->t_flags & TF_SIGNATURE)
to.to_flags |= TOF_SIGNATURE;
#endif /* TCP_SIGNATURE */
/* Processing the options. */
hdrlen += optlen = tcp_addoptions(&to, opt);
/*
* If we wanted a TFO option to be added, but it was unable
* to fit, ensure no data is sent.
*/
if (IS_FASTOPEN(tp->t_flags) && wanted_cookie &&
!(to.to_flags & TOF_FASTOPEN))
len = 0;
}
if (tp->t_port) {
if (V_tcp_udp_tunneling_port == 0) {
/* The port was removed?? */
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
return (EHOSTUNREACH);
}
hdrlen += sizeof(struct udphdr);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Adjust data length if insertion of options will
* bump the packet length beyond the t_maxseg length.
* Clear the FIN bit because we cut off the tail of
* the segment.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (len + optlen + ipoptlen > tp->t_maxseg) {
flags &= ~TH_FIN;
if (tso) {
u_int if_hw_tsomax;
u_int moff;
int max_len;
/* extract TSO information */
if_hw_tsomax = tp->t_tsomax;
if_hw_tsomaxsegcount = tp->t_tsomaxsegcount;
if_hw_tsomaxsegsize = tp->t_tsomaxsegsize;
/*
* Limit a TSO burst to prevent it from
* overflowing or exceeding the maximum length
* allowed by the network interface:
*/
KASSERT(ipoptlen == 0,
("%s: TSO can't do IP options", __func__));
/*
* Check if we should limit by maximum payload
* length:
*/
if (if_hw_tsomax != 0) {
/* compute maximum TSO length */
Update TSO limits to include all headers. To make driver programming easier the TSO limits are changed to reflect the values used in the BUSDMA tag a network adapter driver is using. The TCP/IP network stack will subtract space for all linklevel and protocol level headers and ensure that the full mbuf chain passed to the network adapter fits within the given limits. Implementation notes: If a network adapter driver needs to fixup the first mbuf in order to support VLAN tag insertion, the size of the VLAN tag should be subtracted from the TSO limit. Else not. Network adapters which typically inline the complete header mbuf could technically transmit one more segment. This patch does not implement a mechanism to recover the last segment for data transmission. It is believed when sufficiently large mbuf clusters are used, the segment limit will not be reached and recovering the last segment will not have any effect. The current TSO algorithm tries to send MTU-sized packets, where the MTU typically is 1500 bytes, which gives 1448 bytes of TCP data payload per packet for IPv4. That means if the TSO length limitiation is set to 65536 bytes, there will be a data payload remainder of (65536 - 1500) mod 1448 bytes which is equal to 324 bytes. Trying to recover total TSO length due to inlining mbuf header data will not have any effect, because adding or removing the ETH/IP/TCP headers to or from 324 bytes will not cause more or less TCP payload to be TSO'ed. Existing network adapter limits will be updated separately. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3458 Reviewed by: rmacklem MFC after: 2 weeks
2015-09-14 08:36:22 +00:00
max_len = (if_hw_tsomax - hdrlen -
max_linkhdr);
if (max_len <= 0) {
len = 0;
} else if (len > max_len) {
sendalot = 1;
len = max_len;
}
}
/*
* Prevent the last segment from being
* fractional unless the send sockbuf can be
* emptied:
*/
max_len = (tp->t_maxseg - optlen);
if (((uint32_t)off + (uint32_t)len) <
sbavail(&so->so_snd)) {
moff = len % max_len;
if (moff != 0) {
len -= moff;
sendalot = 1;
}
}
/*
* In case there are too many small fragments
* don't use TSO:
*/
if (len <= max_len) {
len = max_len;
sendalot = 1;
tso = 0;
}
/*
* Send the FIN in a separate segment
* after the bulk sending is done.
* We don't trust the TSO implementations
* to clear the FIN flag on all but the
* last segment.
*/
if (tp->t_flags & TF_NEEDFIN)
sendalot = 1;
} else {
if (optlen + ipoptlen >= tp->t_maxseg) {
/*
* Since we don't have enough space to put
* the IP header chain and the TCP header in
* one packet as required by RFC 7112, don't
* send it. Also ensure that at least one
* byte of the payload can be put into the
* TCP segment.
*/
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
error = EMSGSIZE;
sack_rxmit = 0;
goto out;
}
len = tp->t_maxseg - optlen - ipoptlen;
sendalot = 1;
if (dont_sendalot)
sendalot = 0;
}
} else
tso = 0;
KASSERT(len + hdrlen + ipoptlen <= IP_MAXPACKET,
("%s: len > IP_MAXPACKET", __func__));
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC*/
#ifdef INET6
if (max_linkhdr + hdrlen > MCLBYTES)
#else
if (max_linkhdr + hdrlen > MHLEN)
#endif
panic("tcphdr too big");
/*#endif*/
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* This KASSERT is here to catch edge cases at a well defined place.
* Before, those had triggered (random) panic conditions further down.
*/
KASSERT(len >= 0, ("[%s:%d]: len < 0", __func__, __LINE__));
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Grab a header mbuf, attaching a copy of data to
* be transmitted, and initialize the header from
* the template for sends on this connection.
*/
if (len) {
struct mbuf *mb;
struct sockbuf *msb;
u_int moff;
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_FORCEDATA) && len == 1) {
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndprobe);
#ifdef STATS
if (SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max))
stats_voi_update_abs_u32(tp->t_stats,
VOI_TCP_RETXPB, len);
else
stats_voi_update_abs_u64(tp->t_stats,
VOI_TCP_TXPB, len);
#endif /* STATS */
} else if (SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max) || sack_rxmit) {
tp->t_sndrexmitpack++;
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndrexmitpack);
TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_sndrexmitbyte, len);
#ifdef STATS
stats_voi_update_abs_u32(tp->t_stats, VOI_TCP_RETXPB,
len);
#endif /* STATS */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
} else {
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndpack);
TCPSTAT_ADD(tcps_sndbyte, len);
#ifdef STATS
stats_voi_update_abs_u64(tp->t_stats, VOI_TCP_TXPB,
len);
#endif /* STATS */
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
#ifdef INET6
if (MHLEN < hdrlen + max_linkhdr)
m = m_getcl(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA, M_PKTHDR);
else
#endif
m = m_gethdr(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (m == NULL) {
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
error = ENOBUFS;
sack_rxmit = 0;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto out;
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
m->m_len = hdrlen;
/*
* Start the m_copy functions from the closest mbuf
* to the offset in the socket buffer chain.
*/
mb = sbsndptr_noadv(&so->so_snd, off, &moff);
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
if (len <= MHLEN - hdrlen - max_linkhdr && !hw_tls) {
m_copydata(mb, moff, len,
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
mtod(m, caddr_t) + hdrlen);
if (SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max))
sbsndptr_adv(&so->so_snd, mb, len);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
m->m_len += len;
} else {
if (SEQ_LT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max))
msb = NULL;
else
msb = &so->so_snd;
m->m_next = tcp_m_copym(mb, moff,
&len, if_hw_tsomaxsegcount,
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
if_hw_tsomaxsegsize, msb, hw_tls);
if (len <= (tp->t_maxseg - optlen)) {
/*
* Must have ran out of mbufs for the copy
* shorten it to no longer need tso. Lets
* not put on sendalot since we are low on
* mbufs.
*/
tso = 0;
}
if (m->m_next == NULL) {
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
(void) m_free(m);
error = ENOBUFS;
sack_rxmit = 0;
goto out;
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* If we're sending everything we've got, set PUSH.
* (This will keep happy those implementations which only
* give data to the user when a buffer fills or
* a PUSH comes in.)
*/
if (((uint32_t)off + (uint32_t)len == sbused(&so->so_snd)) &&
!(flags & TH_SYN))
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
flags |= TH_PUSH;
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
} else {
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK(&so->so_snd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (tp->t_flags & TF_ACKNOW)
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndacks);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
else if (flags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN|TH_RST))
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndctrl);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
else if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_up, tp->snd_una))
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndurg);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
else
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndwinup);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
m = m_gethdr(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (m == NULL) {
error = ENOBUFS;
sack_rxmit = 0;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto out;
}
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6 && (MHLEN < hdrlen + max_linkhdr) &&
MHLEN >= hdrlen) {
M_ALIGN(m, hdrlen);
} else
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
m->m_len = hdrlen;
}
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(&so->so_snd);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = (struct ifnet *)0;
#ifdef MAC
mac_inpcb_create_mbuf(inp, m);
#endif
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6) {
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
if (tp->t_port) {
udp = (struct udphdr *)((caddr_t)ip6 + sizeof(struct ip6_hdr));
udp->uh_sport = htons(V_tcp_udp_tunneling_port);
udp->uh_dport = tp->t_port;
ulen = hdrlen + len - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
udp->uh_ulen = htons(ulen);
th = (struct tcphdr *)(udp + 1);
} else {
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip6 + 1);
}
tcpip_fillheaders(inp, tp->t_port, ip6, th);
} else
#endif /* INET6 */
{
ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
if (tp->t_port) {
udp = (struct udphdr *)((caddr_t)ip + sizeof(struct ip));
udp->uh_sport = htons(V_tcp_udp_tunneling_port);
udp->uh_dport = tp->t_port;
ulen = hdrlen + len - sizeof(struct ip);
udp->uh_ulen = htons(ulen);
th = (struct tcphdr *)(udp + 1);
} else
th = (struct tcphdr *)(ip + 1);
tcpip_fillheaders(inp, tp->t_port, ip, th);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Fill in fields, remembering maximum advertised
* window for use in delaying messages about window sizes.
* If resending a FIN, be sure not to use a new sequence number.
*/
1995-05-30 08:16:23 +00:00
if (flags & TH_FIN && tp->t_flags & TF_SENTFIN &&
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tp->snd_nxt == tp->snd_max)
tp->snd_nxt--;
/*
* If we are starting a connection, send ECN setup
* SYN packet. If we are on a retransmit, we may
* resend those bits a number of times as per
* RFC 3168.
*/
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_SENT && V_tcp_do_ecn) {
flags |= tcp_ecn_output_syn_sent(tp);
}
/* Also handle parallel SYN for ECN */
if ((TCPS_HAVERCVDSYN(tp->t_state)) &&
(tp->t_flags2 & (TF2_ECN_PERMIT | TF2_ACE_PERMIT))) {
int ect = tcp_ecn_output_established(tp, &flags, len, sack_rxmit);
if ((tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED) &&
(tp->t_flags2 & TF2_ECN_SND_ECE))
tp->t_flags2 &= ~TF2_ECN_SND_ECE;
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6) {
ip6->ip6_flow &= ~htonl(IPTOS_ECN_MASK << IPV6_FLOWLABEL_LEN);
ip6->ip6_flow |= htonl(ect << IPV6_FLOWLABEL_LEN);
}
else
#endif
{
ip->ip_tos &= ~IPTOS_ECN_MASK;
ip->ip_tos |= ect;
}
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* If we are doing retransmissions, then snd_nxt will
* not reflect the first unsent octet. For ACK only
* packets, we do not want the sequence number of the
* retransmitted packet, we want the sequence number
* of the next unsent octet. So, if there is no data
* (and no SYN or FIN), use snd_max instead of snd_nxt
* when filling in ti_seq. But if we are in persist
* state, snd_max might reflect one byte beyond the
* right edge of the window, so use snd_nxt in that
* case, since we know we aren't doing a retransmission.
* (retransmit and persist are mutually exclusive...)
*/
if (sack_rxmit == 0) {
if (len || (flags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN)) ||
tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST))
th->th_seq = htonl(tp->snd_nxt);
else
th->th_seq = htonl(tp->snd_max);
} else {
th->th_seq = htonl(p->rxmit);
p->rxmit += len;
/*
* Lost Retransmission Detection
* trigger resending of a (then
* still existing) hole, when
* fack acks recoverypoint.
*/
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_LRD) && SEQ_GEQ(p->rxmit, p->end))
p->rxmit = tp->snd_recover;
tp->sackhint.sack_bytes_rexmit += len;
}
if (IN_RECOVERY(tp->t_flags)) {
/*
* Account all bytes transmitted while
* IN_RECOVERY, simplifying PRR and
* Lost Retransmit Detection
*/
tp->sackhint.prr_out += len;
}
th->th_ack = htonl(tp->rcv_nxt);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (optlen) {
bcopy(opt, th + 1, optlen);
th->th_off = (sizeof (struct tcphdr) + optlen) >> 2;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
tcp_set_flags(th, flags);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Calculate receive window. Don't shrink window,
* but avoid silly window syndrome.
* If a RST segment is sent, advertise a window of zero.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
if (flags & TH_RST) {
recwin = 0;
} else {
if (recwin < (so->so_rcv.sb_hiwat / 4) &&
recwin < tp->t_maxseg)
recwin = 0;
if (SEQ_GT(tp->rcv_adv, tp->rcv_nxt) &&
recwin < (tp->rcv_adv - tp->rcv_nxt))
recwin = (tp->rcv_adv - tp->rcv_nxt);
}
/*
* According to RFC1323 the window field in a SYN (i.e., a <SYN>
* or <SYN,ACK>) segment itself is never scaled. The <SYN,ACK>
* case is handled in syncache.
*/
if (flags & TH_SYN)
th->th_win = htons((u_short)
(min(sbspace(&so->so_rcv), TCP_MAXWIN)));
else {
/* Avoid shrinking window with window scaling. */
recwin = roundup2(recwin, 1 << tp->rcv_scale);
th->th_win = htons((u_short)(recwin >> tp->rcv_scale));
}
/*
* Adjust the RXWIN0SENT flag - indicate that we have advertised
* a 0 window. This may cause the remote transmitter to stall. This
* flag tells soreceive() to disable delayed acknowledgements when
* draining the buffer. This can occur if the receiver is attempting
2008-07-15 10:32:35 +00:00
* to read more data than can be buffered prior to transmitting on
* the connection.
*/
if (th->th_win == 0) {
tp->t_sndzerowin++;
tp->t_flags |= TF_RXWIN0SENT;
} else
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_RXWIN0SENT;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_up, tp->snd_nxt)) {
th->th_urp = htons((u_short)(tp->snd_up - tp->snd_nxt));
th->th_flags |= TH_URG;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
} else
/*
* If no urgent pointer to send, then we pull
* the urgent pointer to the left edge of the send window
* so that it doesn't drift into the send window on sequence
* number wraparound.
*/
tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una; /* drag it along */
/*
* Put TCP length in extended header, and then
* checksum extended header and data.
*/
m->m_pkthdr.len = hdrlen + len; /* in6_cksum() need this */
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT) || defined(TCP_SIGNATURE)
if (to.to_flags & TOF_SIGNATURE) {
/*
* Calculate MD5 signature and put it into the place
* determined before.
* NOTE: since TCP options buffer doesn't point into
* mbuf's data, calculate offset and use it.
*/
if (!TCPMD5_ENABLED() || (error = TCPMD5_OUTPUT(m, th,
(u_char *)(th + 1) + (to.to_signature - opt))) != 0) {
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
/*
* Do not send segment if the calculation of MD5
* digest has failed.
*/
m_freem(m);
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
goto out;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6) {
/*
* There is no need to fill in ip6_plen right now.
* It will be filled later by ip6_output.
*/
if (tp->t_port) {
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_UDP_IPV6;
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct udphdr, uh_sum);
udp->uh_sum = in6_cksum_pseudo(ip6, ulen, IPPROTO_UDP, 0);
th->th_sum = htons(0);
UDPSTAT_INC(udps_opackets);
} else {
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_TCP_IPV6;
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct tcphdr, th_sum);
th->th_sum = in6_cksum_pseudo(ip6,
sizeof(struct tcphdr) + optlen + len, IPPROTO_TCP,
0);
}
}
#endif
#if defined(INET6) && defined(INET)
else
#endif
#ifdef INET
{
if (tp->t_port) {
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_UDP;
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct udphdr, uh_sum);
udp->uh_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr,
ip->ip_dst.s_addr, htons(ulen + IPPROTO_UDP));
th->th_sum = htons(0);
UDPSTAT_INC(udps_opackets);
} else {
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags = CSUM_TCP;
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = offsetof(struct tcphdr, th_sum);
th->th_sum = in_pseudo(ip->ip_src.s_addr,
ip->ip_dst.s_addr, htons(sizeof(struct tcphdr) +
IPPROTO_TCP + len + optlen));
}
/* IP version must be set here for ipv4/ipv6 checking later */
KASSERT(ip->ip_v == IPVERSION,
("%s: IP version incorrect: %d", __func__, ip->ip_v));
}
#endif
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Enable TSO and specify the size of the segments.
* The TCP pseudo header checksum is always provided.
*/
if (tso) {
KASSERT(len > tp->t_maxseg - optlen,
("%s: len <= tso_segsz", __func__));
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= CSUM_TSO;
m->m_pkthdr.tso_segsz = tp->t_maxseg - optlen;
}
KASSERT(len + hdrlen == m_length(m, NULL),
("%s: mbuf chain shorter than expected: %d + %u != %u",
__func__, len, hdrlen, m_length(m, NULL)));
#ifdef TCP_HHOOK
/* Run HHOOK_TCP_ESTABLISHED_OUT helper hooks. */
hhook_run_tcp_est_out(tp, th, &to, len, tso);
#endif
TCP_PROBE3(debug__output, tp, th, m);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/* We're getting ready to send; log now. */
/* XXXMT: We are not honoring verbose logging. */
if (tcp_bblogging_on(tp))
lgb = tcp_log_event(tp, th, &so->so_rcv, &so->so_snd,
TCP_LOG_OUT, ERRNO_UNK, len, NULL, false, NULL, NULL, 0,
NULL);
else
lgb = NULL;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Fill in IP length and desired time to live and
* send to IP level. There should be a better way
* to handle ttl and tos; we could keep them in
* the template, but need a way to checksum without them.
*/
/*
2014-07-03 23:12:43 +00:00
* m->m_pkthdr.len should have been set before checksum calculation,
* because in6_cksum() need it.
*/
#ifdef INET6
if (isipv6) {
/*
* we separately set hoplimit for every segment, since the
* user might want to change the value via setsockopt.
* Also, desired default hop limit might be changed via
* Neighbor Discovery.
*/
ip6->ip6_hlim = in6_selecthlim(inp, NULL);
/*
* Set the packet size here for the benefit of DTrace probes.
* ip6_output() will set it properly; it's supposed to include
* the option header lengths as well.
*/
ip6->ip6_plen = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(*ip6));
if (V_path_mtu_discovery && tp->t_maxseg > V_tcp_minmss)
tp->t_flags2 |= TF2_PLPMTU_PMTUD;
else
tp->t_flags2 &= ~TF2_PLPMTU_PMTUD;
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_SENT)
TCP_PROBE5(connect__request, NULL, tp, ip6, tp, th);
TCP_PROBE5(send, NULL, tp, ip6, tp, th);
There are times when it would be really nice to have a record of the last few packets and/or state transitions from each TCP socket. That would help with narrowing down certain problems we see in the field that are hard to reproduce without understanding the history of how we got into a certain state. This change provides just that. It saves copies of the last N packets in a list in the tcpcb. When the tcpcb is destroyed, the list is freed. I thought this was likely to be more performance-friendly than saving copies of the tcpcb. Plus, with the packets, you should be able to reverse-engineer what happened to the tcpcb. To enable the feature, you will need to compile a kernel with the TCPPCAP option. Even then, the feature defaults to being deactivated. You can activate it by setting a positive value for the number of captured packets. You can do that on either a global basis or on a per-socket basis (via a setsockopt call). There is no way to get the packets out of the kernel other than using kmem or getting a coredump. I thought that would help some of the legal/privacy concerns regarding such a feature. However, it should be possible to add a future effort to export them in PCAP format. I tested this at low scale, and found that there were no mbuf leaks and the peak mbuf usage appeared to be unchanged with and without the feature. The main performance concern I can envision is the number of mbufs that would be used on systems with a large number of sockets. If you save five packets per direction per socket and have 3,000 sockets, that will consume at least 30,000 mbufs just to keep these packets. I tried to reduce the concerns associated with this by limiting the number of clusters (not mbufs) that could be used for this feature. Again, in my testing, that appears to work correctly. Differential Revision: D3100 Submitted by: Jonathan Looney <jlooney at juniper dot net> Reviewed by: gnn, hiren
2015-10-14 00:35:37 +00:00
#ifdef TCPPCAP
/* Save packet, if requested. */
tcp_pcap_add(th, m, &(tp->t_outpkts));
#endif
/* TODO: IPv6 IP6TOS_ECT bit on */
error = ip6_output(m, inp->in6p_outputopts, &inp->inp_route6,
((so->so_options & SO_DONTROUTE) ? IP_ROUTETOIF : 0),
NULL, NULL, inp);
if (error == EMSGSIZE && inp->inp_route6.ro_nh != NULL)
mtu = inp->inp_route6.ro_nh->nh_mtu;
}
#endif /* INET6 */
#if defined(INET) && defined(INET6)
else
#endif
#ifdef INET
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
ip->ip_len = htons(m->m_pkthdr.len);
#ifdef INET6
if (inp->inp_vflag & INP_IPV6PROTO)
ip->ip_ttl = in6_selecthlim(inp, NULL);
#endif /* INET6 */
/*
* If we do path MTU discovery, then we set DF on every packet.
* This might not be the best thing to do according to RFC3390
* Section 2. However the tcp hostcache migitates the problem
* so it affects only the first tcp connection with a host.
*
* NB: Don't set DF on small MTU/MSS to have a safe fallback.
*/
if (V_path_mtu_discovery && tp->t_maxseg > V_tcp_minmss) {
tp->t_flags2 |= TF2_PLPMTU_PMTUD;
if (tp->t_port == 0 || len < V_tcp_minmss) {
ip->ip_off |= htons(IP_DF);
}
} else {
tp->t_flags2 &= ~TF2_PLPMTU_PMTUD;
}
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_SYN_SENT)
TCP_PROBE5(connect__request, NULL, tp, ip, tp, th);
TCP_PROBE5(send, NULL, tp, ip, tp, th);
There are times when it would be really nice to have a record of the last few packets and/or state transitions from each TCP socket. That would help with narrowing down certain problems we see in the field that are hard to reproduce without understanding the history of how we got into a certain state. This change provides just that. It saves copies of the last N packets in a list in the tcpcb. When the tcpcb is destroyed, the list is freed. I thought this was likely to be more performance-friendly than saving copies of the tcpcb. Plus, with the packets, you should be able to reverse-engineer what happened to the tcpcb. To enable the feature, you will need to compile a kernel with the TCPPCAP option. Even then, the feature defaults to being deactivated. You can activate it by setting a positive value for the number of captured packets. You can do that on either a global basis or on a per-socket basis (via a setsockopt call). There is no way to get the packets out of the kernel other than using kmem or getting a coredump. I thought that would help some of the legal/privacy concerns regarding such a feature. However, it should be possible to add a future effort to export them in PCAP format. I tested this at low scale, and found that there were no mbuf leaks and the peak mbuf usage appeared to be unchanged with and without the feature. The main performance concern I can envision is the number of mbufs that would be used on systems with a large number of sockets. If you save five packets per direction per socket and have 3,000 sockets, that will consume at least 30,000 mbufs just to keep these packets. I tried to reduce the concerns associated with this by limiting the number of clusters (not mbufs) that could be used for this feature. Again, in my testing, that appears to work correctly. Differential Revision: D3100 Submitted by: Jonathan Looney <jlooney at juniper dot net> Reviewed by: gnn, hiren
2015-10-14 00:35:37 +00:00
#ifdef TCPPCAP
/* Save packet, if requested. */
tcp_pcap_add(th, m, &(tp->t_outpkts));
#endif
error = ip_output(m, inp->inp_options, &inp->inp_route,
((so->so_options & SO_DONTROUTE) ? IP_ROUTETOIF : 0), 0, inp);
if (error == EMSGSIZE && inp->inp_route.ro_nh != NULL)
mtu = inp->inp_route.ro_nh->nh_mtu;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
#endif /* INET */
if (lgb != NULL) {
lgb->tlb_errno = error;
lgb = NULL;
}
out:
if (error == 0)
tcp_account_for_send(tp, len, (tp->snd_nxt != tp->snd_max), 0, hw_tls);
/*
* In transmit state, time the transmission and arrange for
* the retransmit. In persist state, just set snd_max.
*/
if ((tp->t_flags & TF_FORCEDATA) == 0 ||
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) {
tcp_seq startseq = tp->snd_nxt;
/*
* Advance snd_nxt over sequence space of this segment.
*/
if (flags & (TH_SYN|TH_FIN)) {
if (flags & TH_SYN)
tp->snd_nxt++;
if (flags & TH_FIN) {
tp->snd_nxt++;
tp->t_flags |= TF_SENTFIN;
}
}
if (sack_rxmit)
goto timer;
tp->snd_nxt += len;
if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_nxt, tp->snd_max)) {
/*
* Update "made progress" indication if we just
* added new data to an empty socket buffer.
*/
if (tp->snd_una == tp->snd_max)
tp->t_acktime = ticks;
tp->snd_max = tp->snd_nxt;
/*
* Time this transmission if not a retransmission and
* not currently timing anything.
*/
tp->t_sndtime = ticks;
if (tp->t_rtttime == 0) {
tp->t_rtttime = ticks;
tp->t_rtseq = startseq;
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_segstimed);
}
#ifdef STATS
if (!(tp->t_flags & TF_GPUTINPROG) && len) {
tp->t_flags |= TF_GPUTINPROG;
tp->gput_seq = startseq;
tp->gput_ack = startseq +
ulmin(sbavail(&so->so_snd) - off, sendwin);
tp->gput_ts = tcp_ts_getticks();
}
#endif /* STATS */
}
/*
* Set retransmit timer if not currently set,
* and not doing a pure ack or a keep-alive probe.
* Initial value for retransmit timer is smoothed
* round-trip time + 2 * round-trip time variance.
* Initialize shift counter which is used for backoff
* of retransmit time.
*/
timer:
if (!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_REXMT) &&
((sack_rxmit && tp->snd_nxt != tp->snd_max) ||
(tp->snd_nxt != tp->snd_una))) {
if (tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) {
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_PERSIST, 0);
tp->t_rxtshift = 0;
}
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_REXMT, TP_RXTCUR(tp));
} else if (len == 0 && sbavail(&so->so_snd) &&
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_REXMT) &&
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) {
/*
* Avoid a situation where we do not set persist timer
* after a zero window condition. For example:
* 1) A -> B: packet with enough data to fill the window
* 2) B -> A: ACK for #1 + new data (0 window
* advertisement)
* 3) A -> B: ACK for #2, 0 len packet
*
* In this case, A will not activate the persist timer,
* because it chose to send a packet. Unless tcp_output
* is called for some other reason (delayed ack timer,
* another input packet from B, socket syscall), A will
* not send zero window probes.
*
* So, if you send a 0-length packet, but there is data
* in the socket buffer, and neither the rexmt or
* persist timer is already set, then activate the
* persist timer.
*/
tp->t_rxtshift = 0;
tcp_setpersist(tp);
}
} else {
/*
* Persist case, update snd_max but since we are in
* persist mode (no window) we do not update snd_nxt.
*/
int xlen = len;
if (flags & TH_SYN)
++xlen;
if (flags & TH_FIN) {
++xlen;
tp->t_flags |= TF_SENTFIN;
}
if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_nxt + xlen, tp->snd_max))
tp->snd_max = tp->snd_nxt + xlen;
}
if ((error == 0) &&
(TCPS_HAVEESTABLISHED(tp->t_state) &&
(tp->t_flags & TF_SACK_PERMIT) &&
tp->rcv_numsacks > 0)) {
/* Clean up any DSACK's sent */
tcp_clean_dsack_blocks(tp);
}
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (error) {
/*
* We know that the packet was lost, so back out the
* sequence number advance, if any.
*
* If the error is EPERM the packet got blocked by the
* local firewall. Normally we should terminate the
* connection but the blocking may have been spurious
* due to a firewall reconfiguration cycle. So we treat
* it like a packet loss and let the retransmit timer and
* timeouts do their work over time.
* XXX: It is a POLA question whether calling tcp_drop right
* away would be the really correct behavior instead.
*/
if (((tp->t_flags & TF_FORCEDATA) == 0 ||
!tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_PERSIST)) &&
((flags & TH_SYN) == 0) &&
(error != EPERM)) {
if (sack_rxmit) {
p->rxmit -= len;
tp->sackhint.sack_bytes_rexmit -= len;
KASSERT(tp->sackhint.sack_bytes_rexmit >= 0,
("sackhint bytes rtx >= 0"));
KASSERT((flags & TH_FIN) == 0,
("error while FIN with SACK rxmit"));
} else {
tp->snd_nxt -= len;
if (flags & TH_FIN)
tp->snd_nxt--;
}
}
SOCKBUF_UNLOCK_ASSERT(&so->so_snd); /* Check gotos. */
switch (error) {
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
case EACCES:
case EPERM:
tp->t_softerror = error;
return (error);
case ENOBUFS:
TCP_XMIT_TIMER_ASSERT(tp, len, flags);
tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_maxseg;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (0);
case EMSGSIZE:
/*
* For some reason the interface we used initially
* to send segments changed to another or lowered
* its MTU.
* If TSO was active we either got an interface
* without TSO capabilits or TSO was turned off.
* If we obtained mtu from ip_output() then update
* it and try again.
*/
if (tso)
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_TSO;
if (mtu != 0) {
tcp_mss_update(tp, -1, mtu, NULL, NULL);
goto again;
}
return (error);
case EHOSTDOWN:
case EHOSTUNREACH:
case ENETDOWN:
case ENETUNREACH:
if (TCPS_HAVERCVDSYN(tp->t_state)) {
tp->t_softerror = error;
return (0);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
return (error);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
}
}
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sndtotal);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Data sent (as far as we can tell).
* If this advertises a larger window than any other segment,
* then remember the size of the advertised window.
* Any pending ACK has now been sent.
*/
if (SEQ_GT(tp->rcv_nxt + recwin, tp->rcv_adv))
tp->rcv_adv = tp->rcv_nxt + recwin;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
tp->last_ack_sent = tp->rcv_nxt;
tp->t_flags &= ~(TF_ACKNOW | TF_DELACK);
if (tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_DELACK))
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_DELACK, 0);
#if 0
/*
* This completely breaks TCP if newreno is turned on. What happens
* is that if delayed-acks are turned on on the receiver, this code
* on the transmitter effectively destroys the TCP window, forcing
* it to four packets (1.5Kx4 = 6K window).
*/
This commit marks the first formal contribution of the "Five New TCP Congestion Control Algorithms for FreeBSD" FreeBSD Foundation funded project. More details about the project are available at: http://caia.swin.edu.au/freebsd/5cc/ - Add a KPI and supporting infrastructure to allow modular congestion control algorithms to be used in the net stack. Algorithms can maintain per-connection state if required, and connections maintain their own algorithm pointer, which allows different connections to concurrently use different algorithms. The TCP_CONGESTION socket option can be used with getsockopt()/setsockopt() to programmatically query or change the congestion control algorithm respectively from within an application at runtime. - Integrate the framework with the TCP stack in as least intrusive a manner as possible. Care was also taken to develop the framework in a way that should allow integration with other congestion aware transport protocols (e.g. SCTP) in the future. The hope is that we will one day be able to share a single set of congestion control algorithm modules between all congestion aware transport protocols. - Introduce a new congestion recovery (TF_CONGRECOVERY) state into the TCP stack and use it to decouple the meaning of recovery from a congestion event and recovery from packet loss (TF_FASTRECOVERY) a la RFC2581. ECN and delay based congestion control protocols don't generally need to recover from packet loss and need a different way to note a congestion recovery episode within the stack. - Remove the net.inet.tcp.newreno sysctl, which simplifies some portions of code and ensures the stack always uses the appropriate mechanisms for recovering from packet loss during a congestion recovery episode. - Extract the NewReno congestion control algorithm from the TCP stack and massage it into module form. NewReno is always built into the kernel and will remain the default algorithm for the forseeable future. Implementations of additional different algorithms will become available in the near future. - Bump __FreeBSD_version to 900025 and note in UPDATING that rebuilding code that relies on the size of "struct tcpcb" is required. Many thanks go to the Cisco University Research Program Fund at Community Foundation Silicon Valley and the FreeBSD Foundation. Their support of our work at the Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne University of Technology is greatly appreciated. In collaboration with: David Hayes <dahayes at swin edu au> and Grenville Armitage <garmitage at swin edu au> Sponsored by: Cisco URP, FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: rpaulo Tested by: David Hayes (and many others over the years) MFC after: 3 months
2010-11-12 06:41:55 +00:00
if (sendalot && --maxburst)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
goto again;
#endif
if (sendalot)
goto again;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
return (0);
}
void
tcp_setpersist(struct tcpcb *tp)
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
{
int t = ((tp->t_srtt >> 2) + tp->t_rttvar) >> 1;
int tt;
int maxunacktime;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
TCP reuses t_rxtshift to determine the backoff timer used for both the persist state and the retransmit timer. However, the code that implements "bad retransmit recovery" only checks t_rxtshift to see if an ACK has been received in during the first retransmit timeout window. As a result, if ticks has wrapped over to a negative value and a socket is in the persist state, it can incorrectly treat an ACK from the remote peer as a "bad retransmit recovery" and restore saved values such as snd_ssthresh and snd_cwnd. However, if the socket has never had a retransmit timeout, then these saved values will be zero, so snd_ssthresh and snd_cwnd will be set to 0. If the socket is in fast recovery (this can be caused by excessive duplicate ACKs such as those fixed by 220794), then each ACK that arrives triggers either NewReno or SACK partial ACK handling which clamps snd_cwnd to be no larger than snd_ssthresh. In effect, the socket's send window is permamently stuck at 0 even though the remote peer is advertising a much larger window and pending data is only sent via TCP window probes (so one byte every few seconds). Fix this by adding a new TCP pcb flag (TF_PREVVALID) that indicates that the various snd_*_prev fields in the pcb are valid and only perform "bad retransmit recovery" if this flag is set in the pcb. The flag is set on the first retransmit timeout that occurs and is cleared on subsequent retransmit timeouts or when entering the persist state. Reviewed by: bz MFC after: 2 weeks
2011-04-29 15:40:12 +00:00
tp->t_flags &= ~TF_PREVVALID;
if (tcp_timer_active(tp, TT_REXMT))
panic("tcp_setpersist: retransmit pending");
/*
* If the state is already closed, don't bother.
*/
if (tp->t_state == TCPS_CLOSED)
return;
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
/*
* Start/restart persistence timer.
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
*/
TCPT_RANGESET(tt, t * tcp_backoff[tp->t_rxtshift],
tcp_persmin, tcp_persmax);
if (TP_MAXUNACKTIME(tp) && tp->t_acktime) {
maxunacktime = tp->t_acktime + TP_MAXUNACKTIME(tp) - ticks;
if (maxunacktime < 1)
maxunacktime = 1;
if (maxunacktime < tt)
tt = maxunacktime;
}
tcp_timer_activate(tp, TT_PERSIST, tt);
1994-05-24 10:09:53 +00:00
if (tp->t_rxtshift < TCP_MAXRXTSHIFT)
tp->t_rxtshift++;
}
/*
* Insert TCP options according to the supplied parameters to the place
* optp in a consistent way. Can handle unaligned destinations.
*
* The order of the option processing is crucial for optimal packing and
* alignment for the scarce option space.
*
* The optimal order for a SYN/SYN-ACK segment is:
* MSS (4) + NOP (1) + Window scale (3) + SACK permitted (2) +
* Timestamp (10) + Signature (18) = 38 bytes out of a maximum of 40.
*
* The SACK options should be last. SACK blocks consume 8*n+2 bytes.
* So a full size SACK blocks option is 34 bytes (with 4 SACK blocks).
* At minimum we need 10 bytes (to generate 1 SACK block). If both
* TCP Timestamps (12 bytes) and TCP Signatures (18 bytes) are present,
* we only have 10 bytes for SACK options (40 - (12 + 18)).
*/
int
tcp_addoptions(struct tcpopt *to, u_char *optp)
{
u_int32_t mask, optlen = 0;
for (mask = 1; mask < TOF_MAXOPT; mask <<= 1) {
if ((to->to_flags & mask) != mask)
continue;
if (optlen == TCP_MAXOLEN)
break;
switch (to->to_flags & mask) {
case TOF_MSS:
while (optlen % 4) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_NOP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_NOP;
}
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < TCPOLEN_MAXSEG)
continue;
optlen += TCPOLEN_MAXSEG;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_MAXSEG;
*optp++ = TCPOLEN_MAXSEG;
to->to_mss = htons(to->to_mss);
bcopy((u_char *)&to->to_mss, optp, sizeof(to->to_mss));
optp += sizeof(to->to_mss);
break;
case TOF_SCALE:
while (!optlen || optlen % 2 != 1) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_NOP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_NOP;
}
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < TCPOLEN_WINDOW)
continue;
optlen += TCPOLEN_WINDOW;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_WINDOW;
*optp++ = TCPOLEN_WINDOW;
*optp++ = to->to_wscale;
break;
case TOF_SACKPERM:
while (optlen % 2) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_NOP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_NOP;
}
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < TCPOLEN_SACK_PERMITTED)
continue;
optlen += TCPOLEN_SACK_PERMITTED;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_SACK_PERMITTED;
*optp++ = TCPOLEN_SACK_PERMITTED;
break;
case TOF_TS:
while (!optlen || optlen % 4 != 2) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_NOP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_NOP;
}
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP)
continue;
optlen += TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP;
*optp++ = TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP;
to->to_tsval = htonl(to->to_tsval);
to->to_tsecr = htonl(to->to_tsecr);
bcopy((u_char *)&to->to_tsval, optp, sizeof(to->to_tsval));
optp += sizeof(to->to_tsval);
bcopy((u_char *)&to->to_tsecr, optp, sizeof(to->to_tsecr));
optp += sizeof(to->to_tsecr);
break;
case TOF_SIGNATURE:
{
int siglen = TCPOLEN_SIGNATURE - 2;
while (!optlen || optlen % 4 != 2) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_NOP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_NOP;
}
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < TCPOLEN_SIGNATURE) {
to->to_flags &= ~TOF_SIGNATURE;
continue;
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
}
optlen += TCPOLEN_SIGNATURE;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_SIGNATURE;
*optp++ = TCPOLEN_SIGNATURE;
to->to_signature = optp;
while (siglen--)
*optp++ = 0;
break;
}
case TOF_SACK:
{
int sackblks = 0;
struct sackblk *sack = (struct sackblk *)to->to_sacks;
tcp_seq sack_seq;
while (!optlen || optlen % 4 != 2) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_NOP;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_NOP;
}
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < TCPOLEN_SACKHDR + TCPOLEN_SACK)
continue;
optlen += TCPOLEN_SACKHDR;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_SACK;
sackblks = min(to->to_nsacks,
(TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen) / TCPOLEN_SACK);
*optp++ = TCPOLEN_SACKHDR + sackblks * TCPOLEN_SACK;
while (sackblks--) {
sack_seq = htonl(sack->start);
bcopy((u_char *)&sack_seq, optp, sizeof(sack_seq));
optp += sizeof(sack_seq);
sack_seq = htonl(sack->end);
bcopy((u_char *)&sack_seq, optp, sizeof(sack_seq));
optp += sizeof(sack_seq);
optlen += TCPOLEN_SACK;
sack++;
}
TCPSTAT_INC(tcps_sack_send_blocks);
break;
}
case TOF_FASTOPEN:
{
int total_len;
/* XXX is there any point to aligning this option? */
total_len = TCPOLEN_FAST_OPEN_EMPTY + to->to_tfo_len;
if (TCP_MAXOLEN - optlen < total_len) {
to->to_flags &= ~TOF_FASTOPEN;
continue;
}
*optp++ = TCPOPT_FAST_OPEN;
*optp++ = total_len;
if (to->to_tfo_len > 0) {
bcopy(to->to_tfo_cookie, optp, to->to_tfo_len);
optp += to->to_tfo_len;
}
optlen += total_len;
break;
}
default:
panic("%s: unknown TCP option type", __func__);
break;
}
}
/* Terminate and pad TCP options to a 4 byte boundary. */
if (optlen % 4) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_EOL;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_EOL;
}
/*
* According to RFC 793 (STD0007):
* "The content of the header beyond the End-of-Option option
* must be header padding (i.e., zero)."
* and later: "The padding is composed of zeros."
*/
while (optlen % 4) {
optlen += TCPOLEN_PAD;
*optp++ = TCPOPT_PAD;
}
KASSERT(optlen <= TCP_MAXOLEN, ("%s: TCP options too long", __func__));
return (optlen);
}
/*
* This is a copy of m_copym(), taking the TSO segment size/limit
* constraints into account, and advancing the sndptr as it goes.
*/
struct mbuf *
tcp_m_copym(struct mbuf *m, int32_t off0, int32_t *plen,
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
int32_t seglimit, int32_t segsize, struct sockbuf *sb, bool hw_tls)
{
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
struct ktls_session *tls, *ntls;
struct mbuf *start __diagused;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#endif
struct mbuf *n, **np;
struct mbuf *top;
int32_t off = off0;
int32_t len = *plen;
int32_t fragsize;
int32_t len_cp = 0;
int32_t *pkthdrlen;
uint32_t mlen, frags;
bool copyhdr;
KASSERT(off >= 0, ("tcp_m_copym, negative off %d", off));
KASSERT(len >= 0, ("tcp_m_copym, negative len %d", len));
if (off == 0 && m->m_flags & M_PKTHDR)
copyhdr = true;
else
copyhdr = false;
while (off > 0) {
KASSERT(m != NULL, ("tcp_m_copym, offset > size of mbuf chain"));
if (off < m->m_len)
break;
off -= m->m_len;
if ((sb) && (m == sb->sb_sndptr)) {
sb->sb_sndptroff += m->m_len;
sb->sb_sndptr = m->m_next;
}
m = m->m_next;
}
np = &top;
top = NULL;
pkthdrlen = NULL;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
if (hw_tls && (m->m_flags & M_EXTPG))
tls = m->m_epg_tls;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
else
tls = NULL;
start = m;
#endif
while (len > 0) {
if (m == NULL) {
KASSERT(len == M_COPYALL,
("tcp_m_copym, length > size of mbuf chain"));
*plen = len_cp;
if (pkthdrlen != NULL)
*pkthdrlen = len_cp;
break;
}
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
if (hw_tls) {
if (m->m_flags & M_EXTPG)
ntls = m->m_epg_tls;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
else
ntls = NULL;
/*
* Avoid mixing TLS records with handshake
* data or TLS records from different
* sessions.
*/
if (tls != ntls) {
MPASS(m != start);
*plen = len_cp;
if (pkthdrlen != NULL)
*pkthdrlen = len_cp;
break;
}
}
#endif
mlen = min(len, m->m_len - off);
if (seglimit) {
/*
* For M_EXTPG mbufs, add 3 segments
* + 1 in case we are crossing page boundaries
* + 2 in case the TLS hdr/trailer are used
* It is cheaper to just add the segments
* than it is to take the cache miss to look
* at the mbuf ext_pgs state in detail.
*/
if (m->m_flags & M_EXTPG) {
fragsize = min(segsize, PAGE_SIZE);
frags = 3;
} else {
fragsize = segsize;
frags = 0;
}
/* Break if we really can't fit anymore. */
if ((frags + 1) >= seglimit) {
*plen = len_cp;
if (pkthdrlen != NULL)
*pkthdrlen = len_cp;
break;
}
/*
* Reduce size if you can't copy the whole
* mbuf. If we can't copy the whole mbuf, also
* adjust len so the loop will end after this
* mbuf.
*/
if ((frags + howmany(mlen, fragsize)) >= seglimit) {
mlen = (seglimit - frags - 1) * fragsize;
len = mlen;
*plen = len_cp + len;
if (pkthdrlen != NULL)
*pkthdrlen = *plen;
}
frags += howmany(mlen, fragsize);
if (frags == 0)
frags++;
seglimit -= frags;
KASSERT(seglimit > 0,
("%s: seglimit went too low", __func__));
}
if (copyhdr)
n = m_gethdr(M_NOWAIT, m->m_type);
else
n = m_get(M_NOWAIT, m->m_type);
*np = n;
if (n == NULL)
goto nospace;
if (copyhdr) {
if (!m_dup_pkthdr(n, m, M_NOWAIT))
goto nospace;
if (len == M_COPYALL)
n->m_pkthdr.len -= off0;
else
n->m_pkthdr.len = len;
pkthdrlen = &n->m_pkthdr.len;
copyhdr = false;
}
n->m_len = mlen;
len_cp += n->m_len;
if (m->m_flags & (M_EXT|M_EXTPG)) {
n->m_data = m->m_data + off;
mb_dupcl(n, m);
} else
bcopy(mtod(m, caddr_t)+off, mtod(n, caddr_t),
(u_int)n->m_len);
if (sb && (sb->sb_sndptr == m) &&
((n->m_len + off) >= m->m_len) && m->m_next) {
sb->sb_sndptroff += m->m_len;
sb->sb_sndptr = m->m_next;
}
off = 0;
if (len != M_COPYALL) {
len -= n->m_len;
}
m = m->m_next;
np = &n->m_next;
}
return (top);
nospace:
m_freem(top);
return (NULL);
}
void
tcp_sndbuf_autoscale(struct tcpcb *tp, struct socket *so, uint32_t sendwin)
{
/*
* Automatic sizing of send socket buffer. Often the send buffer
* size is not optimally adjusted to the actual network conditions
* at hand (delay bandwidth product). Setting the buffer size too
* small limits throughput on links with high bandwidth and high
* delay (eg. trans-continental/oceanic links). Setting the
* buffer size too big consumes too much real kernel memory,
* especially with many connections on busy servers.
*
* The criteria to step up the send buffer one notch are:
* 1. receive window of remote host is larger than send buffer
* (with a fudge factor of 5/4th);
* 2. send buffer is filled to 7/8th with data (so we actually
* have data to make use of it);
* 3. send buffer fill has not hit maximal automatic size;
* 4. our send window (slow start and cogestion controlled) is
* larger than sent but unacknowledged data in send buffer.
*
* The remote host receive window scaling factor may limit the
* growing of the send buffer before it reaches its allowed
* maximum.
*
* It scales directly with slow start or congestion window
* and does at most one step per received ACK. This fast
* scaling has the drawback of growing the send buffer beyond
* what is strictly necessary to make full use of a given
* delay*bandwidth product. However testing has shown this not
* to be much of an problem. At worst we are trading wasting
* of available bandwidth (the non-use of it) for wasting some
* socket buffer memory.
*
* TODO: Shrink send buffer during idle periods together
* with congestion window. Requires another timer. Has to
* wait for upcoming tcp timer rewrite.
*
* XXXGL: should there be used sbused() or sbavail()?
*/
if (V_tcp_do_autosndbuf && so->so_snd.sb_flags & SB_AUTOSIZE) {
int lowat;
lowat = V_tcp_sendbuf_auto_lowat ? so->so_snd.sb_lowat : 0;
if ((tp->snd_wnd / 4 * 5) >= so->so_snd.sb_hiwat - lowat &&
sbused(&so->so_snd) >=
(so->so_snd.sb_hiwat / 8 * 7) - lowat &&
sbused(&so->so_snd) < V_tcp_autosndbuf_max &&
sendwin >= (sbused(&so->so_snd) -
(tp->snd_nxt - tp->snd_una))) {
if (!sbreserve_locked(so, SO_SND,
min(so->so_snd.sb_hiwat + V_tcp_autosndbuf_inc,
V_tcp_autosndbuf_max), curthread))
so->so_snd.sb_flags &= ~SB_AUTOSIZE;
}
}
}