freebsd-dev/sys/kgssapi/gsstest.c

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Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2008 Isilon Inc http://www.isilon.com/
* Authors: Doug Rabson <dfr@rabson.org>
* Developed with Red Inc: Alfred Perlstein <alfred@freebsd.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/ctype.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/kobj.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <kgssapi/gssapi.h>
#include <kgssapi/gssapi_impl.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
#include <rpc/rpc_com.h>
#include <rpc/rpcb_prot.h>
#include <rpc/rpcsec_gss.h>
static void
report_error(gss_OID mech, OM_uint32 maj, OM_uint32 min)
{
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
OM_uint32 message_context;
gss_buffer_desc buf;
uprintf("major_stat=%d, minor_stat=%d\n", maj, min);
message_context = 0;
do {
maj_stat = gss_display_status(&min_stat, maj,
GSS_C_GSS_CODE, GSS_C_NO_OID, &message_context, &buf);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat))
break;
uprintf("%.*s\n", (int)buf.length, (char *) buf.value);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &buf);
} while (message_context);
if (mech && min) {
message_context = 0;
do {
maj_stat = gss_display_status(&min_stat, min,
GSS_C_MECH_CODE, mech, &message_context, &buf);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat))
break;
uprintf("%.*s\n", (int)buf.length, (char *) buf.value);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &buf);
} while (message_context);
}
}
#if 0
static void
send_token_to_peer(const gss_buffer_t token)
{
const uint8_t *p;
size_t i;
printf("send token:\n");
printf("%d ", (int) token->length);
p = (const uint8_t *) token->value;
for (i = 0; i < token->length; i++)
printf("%02x", *p++);
printf("\n");
}
static void
receive_token_from_peer(gss_buffer_t token)
{
char line[8192];
char *p;
uint8_t *q;
int len, val;
printf("receive token:\n");
fgets(line, sizeof(line), stdin);
if (line[strlen(line) - 1] != '\n') {
printf("token truncated\n");
exit(1);
}
p = line;
if (sscanf(line, "%d ", &len) != 1) {
printf("bad token\n");
exit(1);
}
p = strchr(p, ' ') + 1;
token->length = len;
token->value = malloc(len);
q = (uint8_t *) token->value;
while (len) {
if (sscanf(p, "%02x", &val) != 1) {
printf("bad token\n");
exit(1);
}
*q++ = val;
p += 2;
len--;
}
}
#endif
#if 0
void
server(int argc, char** argv)
{
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
gss_buffer_desc input_token, output_token;
gss_ctx_id_t context_hdl = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
gss_name_t client_name;
gss_OID mech_type;
if (argc != 1)
usage();
do {
receive_token_from_peer(&input_token);
maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
&context_hdl,
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
&input_token,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&client_name,
&mech_type,
&output_token,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
}
if (output_token.length != 0) {
send_token_to_peer(&output_token);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
if (context_hdl != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat,
&context_hdl,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
break;
}
} while (maj_stat & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
if (client_name) {
gss_buffer_desc name_desc;
char buf[512];
gss_display_name(&min_stat, client_name, &name_desc, NULL);
memcpy(buf, name_desc.value, name_desc.length);
buf[name_desc.length] = 0;
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &name_desc);
printf("client name is %s\n", buf);
}
receive_token_from_peer(&input_token);
gss_unwrap(&min_stat, context_hdl, &input_token, &output_token,
NULL, NULL);
printf("%.*s\n", (int)output_token.length, (char *) output_token.value);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &output_token);
}
#endif
/* 1.2.752.43.13.14 */
static gss_OID_desc gss_krb5_set_allowable_enctypes_x_desc =
{6, (void *) "\x2a\x85\x70\x2b\x0d\x0e"};
gss_OID GSS_KRB5_SET_ALLOWABLE_ENCTYPES_X = &gss_krb5_set_allowable_enctypes_x_desc;
#define ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC 1
/*
* Create an initiator context and acceptor context in the kernel and
* use them to exchange signed and sealed messages.
*/
static int
gsstest_1(struct thread *td)
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
{
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
OM_uint32 smaj_stat, smin_stat;
int context_established = 0;
gss_ctx_id_t client_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
gss_ctx_id_t server_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
gss_cred_id_t client_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_cred_id_t server_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
gss_name_t name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_name_t received_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_buffer_desc name_desc;
gss_buffer_desc client_token, server_token, message_buf;
gss_OID mech, actual_mech, mech_type;
static gss_OID_desc krb5_desc =
{9, (void *)"\x2a\x86\x48\x86\xf7\x12\x01\x02\x02"};
#if 0
static gss_OID_desc spnego_desc =
{6, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
static gss_OID_desc ntlm_desc =
{10, (void *)"\x2b\x06\x01\x04\x01\x82\x37\x02\x02\x0a"};
#endif
char enctype[sizeof(uint32_t)];
mech = GSS_C_NO_OID;
{
static char sbuf[512];
memcpy(sbuf, "nfs@", 4);
getcredhostname(td->td_ucred, sbuf + 4, sizeof(sbuf) - 4);
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
name_desc.value = sbuf;
}
name_desc.length = strlen((const char *) name_desc.value);
maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &name_desc,
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &name);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_import_name failed\n");
report_error(mech, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
maj_stat = gss_acquire_cred(&min_stat, GSS_C_NO_NAME,
0, GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, GSS_C_INITIATE, &client_cred,
NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_acquire_cred (client) failed\n");
report_error(mech, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
enctype[0] = (ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC >> 24) & 0xff;
enctype[1] = (ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC >> 16) & 0xff;
enctype[2] = (ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC >> 8) & 0xff;
enctype[3] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC & 0xff;
message_buf.length = sizeof(enctype);
message_buf.value = enctype;
maj_stat = gss_set_cred_option(&min_stat, &client_cred,
GSS_KRB5_SET_ALLOWABLE_ENCTYPES_X, &message_buf);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_set_cred_option failed\n");
report_error(mech, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
server_token.length = 0;
server_token.value = NULL;
while (!context_established) {
client_token.length = 0;
client_token.value = NULL;
maj_stat = gss_init_sec_context(&min_stat,
client_cred,
&client_context,
name,
mech,
GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG|GSS_C_CONF_FLAG|GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG,
0,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&server_token,
&actual_mech,
&client_token,
NULL,
NULL);
if (server_token.length)
gss_release_buffer(&smin_stat, &server_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_init_sec_context failed\n");
report_error(mech, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
if (client_token.length != 0) {
if (!server_cred) {
gss_OID_set_desc oid_set;
oid_set.count = 1;
oid_set.elements = &krb5_desc;
smaj_stat = gss_acquire_cred(&smin_stat,
name, 0, &oid_set, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &server_cred,
NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(smaj_stat)) {
printf("gss_acquire_cred (server) failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, smaj_stat, smin_stat);
goto out;
}
}
smaj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&smin_stat,
&server_context,
server_cred,
&client_token,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
&received_name,
&mech_type,
&server_token,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(smaj_stat)) {
printf("gss_accept_sec_context failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, smaj_stat, smin_stat);
goto out;
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &client_token);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
if (client_context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat,
&client_context,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
break;
}
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
context_established = 1;
}
}
message_buf.length = strlen("Hello world");
message_buf.value = (void *) "Hello world";
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, client_context,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &message_buf, &client_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_get_mic failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(&min_stat, server_context,
&message_buf, &client_token, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_verify_mic failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &client_token);
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, client_context,
TRUE, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &message_buf, NULL, &client_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_wrap failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, server_context,
&client_token, &server_token, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_unwrap failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
if (message_buf.length != server_token.length
|| memcmp(message_buf.value, server_token.value,
message_buf.length))
printf("unwrap result corrupt\n");
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &client_token);
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &server_token);
out:
if (client_context)
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &client_context,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
if (server_context)
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &server_context,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
if (client_cred)
gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &client_cred);
if (server_cred)
gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &server_cred);
if (name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
if (received_name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &received_name);
return (0);
}
/*
* Interoperability with userland. This takes several steps:
*
* 1. Accept an initiator token from userland, return acceptor
* token. Repeat this step until both userland and kernel return
* GSS_S_COMPLETE.
*
* 2. Receive a signed message from userland and verify the
* signature. Return a signed reply to userland for it to verify.
*
* 3. Receive a wrapped message from userland and unwrap it. Return a
* wrapped reply to userland.
*/
static int
gsstest_2(struct thread *td, int step, const gss_buffer_t input_token,
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
OM_uint32 *maj_stat_res, OM_uint32 *min_stat_res, gss_buffer_t output_token)
{
OM_uint32 maj_stat, min_stat;
static int context_established = 0;
static gss_ctx_id_t server_context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
static gss_cred_id_t server_cred = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
static gss_name_t name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
gss_buffer_desc name_desc;
gss_buffer_desc message_buf;
gss_OID mech_type = GSS_C_NO_OID;
char enctype[sizeof(uint32_t)];
int error = EINVAL;
maj_stat = GSS_S_FAILURE;
min_stat = 0;
switch (step) {
case 1:
if (server_context == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) {
static char sbuf[512];
memcpy(sbuf, "nfs@", 4);
getcredhostname(td->td_ucred, sbuf + 4,
sizeof(sbuf) - 4);
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
name_desc.value = sbuf;
name_desc.length = strlen((const char *)
name_desc.value);
maj_stat = gss_import_name(&min_stat, &name_desc,
GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &name);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_import_name failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
maj_stat = gss_acquire_cred(&min_stat,
name, 0, GSS_C_NO_OID_SET, GSS_C_ACCEPT,
&server_cred, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_acquire_cred (server) failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
enctype[0] = (ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC >> 24) & 0xff;
enctype[1] = (ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC >> 16) & 0xff;
enctype[2] = (ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC >> 8) & 0xff;
enctype[3] = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC & 0xff;
message_buf.length = sizeof(enctype);
message_buf.value = enctype;
maj_stat = gss_set_cred_option(&min_stat, &server_cred,
GSS_KRB5_SET_ALLOWABLE_ENCTYPES_X, &message_buf);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_set_cred_option failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
}
maj_stat = gss_accept_sec_context(&min_stat,
&server_context,
server_cred,
input_token,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS,
NULL,
&mech_type,
output_token,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_accept_sec_context failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
if (maj_stat == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
context_established = 1;
}
*maj_stat_res = maj_stat;
*min_stat_res = min_stat;
break;
case 2:
message_buf.length = strlen("Hello world");
message_buf.value = (void *) "Hello world";
maj_stat = gss_verify_mic(&min_stat, server_context,
&message_buf, input_token, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_verify_mic failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
maj_stat = gss_get_mic(&min_stat, server_context,
GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &message_buf, output_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_get_mic failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
break;
case 3:
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, server_context,
input_token, &message_buf, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_unwrap failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &message_buf);
message_buf.length = strlen("Hello world");
message_buf.value = (void *) "Hello world";
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, server_context,
TRUE, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &message_buf, NULL, output_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_wrap failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
break;
case 4:
maj_stat = gss_unwrap(&min_stat, server_context,
input_token, &message_buf, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_unwrap failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
gss_release_buffer(&min_stat, &message_buf);
message_buf.length = strlen("Hello world");
message_buf.value = (void *) "Hello world";
maj_stat = gss_wrap(&min_stat, server_context,
FALSE, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, &message_buf, NULL, output_token);
if (GSS_ERROR(maj_stat)) {
printf("gss_wrap failed\n");
report_error(mech_type, maj_stat, min_stat);
goto out;
}
break;
case 5:
error = 0;
goto out;
}
*maj_stat_res = maj_stat;
*min_stat_res = min_stat;
return (0);
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
out:
*maj_stat_res = maj_stat;
*min_stat_res = min_stat;
if (server_context)
gss_delete_sec_context(&min_stat, &server_context,
GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
if (server_cred)
gss_release_cred(&min_stat, &server_cred);
if (name)
gss_release_name(&min_stat, &name);
return (error);
}
/*
* Create an RPC client handle for the given (address,prog,vers)
* triple using UDP.
*/
static CLIENT *
gsstest_get_rpc(struct sockaddr *sa, rpcprog_t prog, rpcvers_t vers)
{
struct thread *td = curthread;
const char* protofmly;
struct sockaddr_storage ss;
struct socket *so;
CLIENT *rpcb;
struct timeval timo;
RPCB parms;
char *uaddr;
enum clnt_stat stat = RPC_SUCCESS;
int rpcvers = RPCBVERS4;
bool_t do_tcp = FALSE;
struct portmap mapping;
u_short port = 0;
/*
* First we need to contact the remote RPCBIND service to find
* the right port.
*/
memcpy(&ss, sa, sa->sa_len);
switch (ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
((struct sockaddr_in *)&ss)->sin_port = htons(111);
protofmly = "inet";
socreate(AF_INET, &so, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
break;
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss)->sin6_port = htons(111);
protofmly = "inet6";
socreate(AF_INET6, &so, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
break;
#endif
default:
/*
* Unsupported address family - fail.
*/
return (NULL);
}
rpcb = clnt_dg_create(so, (struct sockaddr *)&ss,
RPCBPROG, rpcvers, 0, 0);
if (!rpcb)
return (NULL);
try_tcp:
parms.r_prog = prog;
parms.r_vers = vers;
if (do_tcp)
parms.r_netid = "tcp";
else
parms.r_netid = "udp";
parms.r_addr = "";
parms.r_owner = "";
/*
* Use the default timeout.
*/
timo.tv_sec = 25;
timo.tv_usec = 0;
again:
switch (rpcvers) {
case RPCBVERS4:
case RPCBVERS:
/*
* Try RPCBIND 4 then 3.
*/
uaddr = NULL;
stat = CLNT_CALL(rpcb, (rpcprog_t) RPCBPROC_GETADDR,
(xdrproc_t) xdr_rpcb, &parms,
(xdrproc_t) xdr_wrapstring, &uaddr, timo);
if (stat == RPC_PROGVERSMISMATCH) {
if (rpcvers == RPCBVERS4)
rpcvers = RPCBVERS;
else if (rpcvers == RPCBVERS)
rpcvers = PMAPVERS;
CLNT_CONTROL(rpcb, CLSET_VERS, &rpcvers);
goto again;
} else if (stat == RPC_SUCCESS) {
/*
* We have a reply from the remote RPCBIND - turn it
* into an appropriate address and make a new client
* that can talk to the remote service.
*
* XXX fixup IPv6 scope ID.
*/
struct netbuf *a;
a = __rpc_uaddr2taddr_af(ss.ss_family, uaddr);
xdr_free((xdrproc_t) xdr_wrapstring, &uaddr);
if (!a) {
CLNT_DESTROY(rpcb);
return (NULL);
}
memcpy(&ss, a->buf, a->len);
free(a->buf, M_RPC);
free(a, M_RPC);
}
break;
case PMAPVERS:
/*
* Try portmap.
*/
mapping.pm_prog = parms.r_prog;
mapping.pm_vers = parms.r_vers;
mapping.pm_prot = do_tcp ? IPPROTO_TCP : IPPROTO_UDP;
mapping.pm_port = 0;
stat = CLNT_CALL(rpcb, (rpcprog_t) PMAPPROC_GETPORT,
(xdrproc_t) xdr_portmap, &mapping,
(xdrproc_t) xdr_u_short, &port, timo);
if (stat == RPC_SUCCESS) {
switch (ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
((struct sockaddr_in *)&ss)->sin_port =
htons(port);
break;
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss)->sin6_port =
htons(port);
break;
#endif
}
}
break;
default:
panic("invalid rpcvers %d", rpcvers);
}
/*
* We may have a positive response from the portmapper, but
* the requested service was not found. Make sure we received
* a valid port.
*/
switch (ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)&ss)->sin_port;
break;
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss)->sin6_port;
break;
#endif
}
if (stat != RPC_SUCCESS || !port) {
/*
* If we were able to talk to rpcbind or portmap, but the udp
* variant wasn't available, ask about tcp.
*
* XXX - We could also check for a TCP portmapper, but
* if the host is running a portmapper at all, we should be able
* to hail it over UDP.
*/
if (stat == RPC_SUCCESS && !do_tcp) {
do_tcp = TRUE;
goto try_tcp;
}
/* Otherwise, bad news. */
printf("gsstest_get_rpc: failed to contact remote rpcbind, "
"stat = %d, port = %d\n",
(int) stat, port);
CLNT_DESTROY(rpcb);
return (NULL);
}
if (do_tcp) {
/*
* Destroy the UDP client we used to speak to rpcbind and
* recreate as a TCP client.
*/
struct netconfig *nconf = NULL;
CLNT_DESTROY(rpcb);
switch (ss.ss_family) {
case AF_INET:
nconf = getnetconfigent("tcp");
break;
#ifdef INET6
case AF_INET6:
nconf = getnetconfigent("tcp6");
break;
#endif
}
rpcb = clnt_reconnect_create(nconf, (struct sockaddr *)&ss,
prog, vers, 0, 0);
} else {
/*
* Re-use the client we used to speak to rpcbind.
*/
CLNT_CONTROL(rpcb, CLSET_SVC_ADDR, &ss);
CLNT_CONTROL(rpcb, CLSET_PROG, &prog);
CLNT_CONTROL(rpcb, CLSET_VERS, &vers);
}
return (rpcb);
}
/*
* RPCSEC_GSS client
*/
static int
gsstest_3(struct thread *td)
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
{
struct sockaddr_in sin;
char service[128];
CLIENT *client;
AUTH *auth;
rpc_gss_options_ret_t options_ret;
enum clnt_stat stat;
struct timeval tv;
rpc_gss_service_t svc;
int i;
sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
sin.sin_port = 0;
client = gsstest_get_rpc((struct sockaddr *) &sin, 123456, 1);
if (!client) {
uprintf("Can't connect to service\n");
return(1);
}
memcpy(service, "host@", 5);
getcredhostname(td->td_ucred, service + 5, sizeof(service) - 5);
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
auth = rpc_gss_seccreate(client, curthread->td_ucred,
service, "kerberosv5", rpc_gss_svc_privacy,
NULL, NULL, &options_ret);
if (!auth) {
gss_OID oid;
uprintf("Can't authorize to service (mech=%s)\n",
options_ret.actual_mechanism);
oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
rpc_gss_mech_to_oid(options_ret.actual_mechanism, &oid);
report_error(oid, options_ret.major_status,
options_ret.minor_status);
CLNT_DESTROY(client);
return (1);
}
for (svc = rpc_gss_svc_none; svc <= rpc_gss_svc_privacy; svc++) {
const char *svc_names[] = {
"rpc_gss_svc_default",
"rpc_gss_svc_none",
"rpc_gss_svc_integrity",
"rpc_gss_svc_privacy"
};
int num;
rpc_gss_set_defaults(auth, svc, NULL);
client->cl_auth = auth;
tv.tv_sec = 5;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
for (i = 42; i < 142; i++) {
num = i;
stat = CLNT_CALL(client, 1,
(xdrproc_t) xdr_int, (char *) &num,
(xdrproc_t) xdr_int, (char *) &num, tv);
if (stat == RPC_SUCCESS) {
if (num != i + 100)
uprintf("unexpected reply %d\n", num);
} else {
uprintf("call failed, stat=%d\n", (int) stat);
break;
}
}
if (i == 142)
uprintf("call succeeded with %s\n", svc_names[svc]);
}
AUTH_DESTROY(auth);
CLNT_RELEASE(client);
return (0);
}
/*
* RPCSEC_GSS server
*/
static rpc_gss_principal_t server_acl = NULL;
static bool_t server_new_context(struct svc_req *req, gss_cred_id_t deleg,
gss_ctx_id_t gss_context, rpc_gss_lock_t *lock, void **cookie);
static void server_program_1(struct svc_req *rqstp, register SVCXPRT *transp);
static int
gsstest_4(struct thread *td)
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
{
SVCPOOL *pool;
char principal[128 + 5];
const char **mechs;
static rpc_gss_callback_t cb;
memcpy(principal, "host@", 5);
getcredhostname(td->td_ucred, principal + 5, sizeof(principal) - 5);
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
mechs = rpc_gss_get_mechanisms();
while (*mechs) {
if (!rpc_gss_set_svc_name(principal, *mechs, GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
123456, 1)) {
rpc_gss_error_t e;
rpc_gss_get_error(&e);
printf("setting name for %s for %s failed: %d, %d\n",
principal, *mechs,
e.rpc_gss_error, e.system_error);
}
mechs++;
}
cb.program = 123456;
cb.version = 1;
cb.callback = server_new_context;
rpc_gss_set_callback(&cb);
pool = svcpool_create("gsstest", NULL);
svc_create(pool, server_program_1, 123456, 1, NULL);
svc_run(pool);
rpc_gss_clear_svc_name(123456, 1);
rpc_gss_clear_callback(&cb);
svcpool_destroy(pool);
return (0);
}
static void
server_program_1(struct svc_req *rqstp, register SVCXPRT *transp)
{
rpc_gss_rawcred_t *rcred;
rpc_gss_ucred_t *ucred;
int i, num;
if (rqstp->rq_cred.oa_flavor != RPCSEC_GSS) {
svcerr_weakauth(rqstp);
return;
}
if (!rpc_gss_getcred(rqstp, &rcred, &ucred, NULL)) {
svcerr_systemerr(rqstp);
return;
}
printf("svc=%d, mech=%s, uid=%d, gid=%d, gids={",
rcred->service, rcred->mechanism, ucred->uid, ucred->gid);
for (i = 0; i < ucred->gidlen; i++) {
if (i > 0) printf(",");
printf("%d", ucred->gidlist[i]);
}
printf("}\n");
switch (rqstp->rq_proc) {
case 0:
if (!svc_getargs(rqstp, (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, 0)) {
svcerr_decode(rqstp);
goto out;
}
if (!svc_sendreply(rqstp, (xdrproc_t) xdr_void, 0)) {
svcerr_systemerr(rqstp);
}
goto out;
case 1:
if (!svc_getargs(rqstp, (xdrproc_t) xdr_int,
(char *) &num)) {
svcerr_decode(rqstp);
goto out;
}
num += 100;
if (!svc_sendreply(rqstp, (xdrproc_t) xdr_int,
(char *) &num)) {
svcerr_systemerr(rqstp);
}
goto out;
default:
svcerr_noproc(rqstp);
goto out;
}
out:
svc_freereq(rqstp);
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
return;
}
static void
print_principal(rpc_gss_principal_t principal)
{
int i, len, n;
uint8_t *p;
len = principal->len;
p = (uint8_t *) principal->name;
while (len > 0) {
n = len;
if (n > 16)
n = 16;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
printf("%02x ", p[i]);
for (; i < 16; i++)
printf(" ");
printf("|");
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
printf("%c", isprint(p[i]) ? p[i] : '.');
printf("|\n");
len -= n;
p += n;
}
}
static bool_t
server_new_context(__unused struct svc_req *req,
gss_cred_id_t deleg,
__unused gss_ctx_id_t gss_context,
rpc_gss_lock_t *lock,
__unused void **cookie)
{
rpc_gss_rawcred_t *rcred = lock->raw_cred;
OM_uint32 junk;
printf("new security context version=%d, mech=%s, qop=%s:\n",
rcred->version, rcred->mechanism, rcred->qop);
print_principal(rcred->client_principal);
if (server_acl) {
if (rcred->client_principal->len != server_acl->len
|| memcmp(rcred->client_principal->name, server_acl->name,
server_acl->len)) {
return (FALSE);
}
}
gss_release_cred(&junk, &deleg);
return (TRUE);
}
/*
* Hook up a syscall for gssapi testing.
*/
struct gsstest_args {
int a_op;
void *a_args;
void *a_res;
};
struct gsstest_2_args {
int step; /* test step number */
gss_buffer_desc input_token; /* token from userland */
gss_buffer_desc output_token; /* buffer to receive reply token */
};
struct gsstest_2_res {
OM_uint32 maj_stat; /* maj_stat from kernel */
OM_uint32 min_stat; /* min_stat from kernel */
gss_buffer_desc output_token; /* reply token (using space from gsstest_2_args.output) */
};
static int
gsstest(struct thread *td, struct gsstest_args *uap)
{
int error;
switch (uap->a_op) {
case 1:
return (gsstest_1(td));
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
case 2: {
struct gsstest_2_args args;
struct gsstest_2_res res;
gss_buffer_desc input_token, output_token;
OM_uint32 junk;
error = copyin(uap->a_args, &args, sizeof(args));
if (error)
return (error);
input_token.length = args.input_token.length;
input_token.value = malloc(input_token.length, M_GSSAPI,
M_WAITOK);
error = copyin(args.input_token.value, input_token.value,
input_token.length);
if (error) {
gss_release_buffer(&junk, &input_token);
return (error);
}
output_token.length = 0;
output_token.value = NULL;
gsstest_2(td, args.step, &input_token,
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
&res.maj_stat, &res.min_stat, &output_token);
gss_release_buffer(&junk, &input_token);
if (output_token.length > args.output_token.length) {
gss_release_buffer(&junk, &output_token);
return (EOVERFLOW);
}
res.output_token.length = output_token.length;
res.output_token.value = args.output_token.value;
error = copyout(output_token.value, res.output_token.value,
output_token.length);
gss_release_buffer(&junk, &output_token);
if (error)
return (error);
return (copyout(&res, uap->a_res, sizeof(res)));
break;
}
case 3:
return (gsstest_3(td));
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
case 4:
return (gsstest_4(td));
Implement support for RPCSEC_GSS authentication to both the NFS client and server. This replaces the RPC implementation of the NFS client and server with the newer RPC implementation originally developed (actually ported from the userland sunrpc code) to support the NFS Lock Manager. I have tested this code extensively and I believe it is stable and that performance is at least equal to the legacy RPC implementation. The NFS code currently contains support for both the new RPC implementation and the older legacy implementation inherited from the original NFS codebase. The default is to use the new implementation - add the NFS_LEGACYRPC option to fall back to the old code. When I merge this support back to RELENG_7, I will probably change this so that users have to 'opt in' to get the new code. To use RPCSEC_GSS on either client or server, you must build a kernel which includes the KGSSAPI option and the crypto device. On the userland side, you must build at least a new libc, mountd, mount_nfs and gssd. You must install new versions of /etc/rc.d/gssd and /etc/rc.d/nfsd and add 'gssd_enable=YES' to /etc/rc.conf. As long as gssd is running, you should be able to mount an NFS filesystem from a server that requires RPCSEC_GSS authentication. The mount itself can happen without any kerberos credentials but all access to the filesystem will be denied unless the accessing user has a valid ticket file in the standard place (/tmp/krb5cc_<uid>). There is currently no support for situations where the ticket file is in a different place, such as when the user logged in via SSH and has delegated credentials from that login. This restriction is also present in Solaris and Linux. In theory, we could improve this in future, possibly using Brooks Davis' implementation of variant symlinks. Supporting RPCSEC_GSS on a server is nearly as simple. You must create service creds for the server in the form 'nfs/<fqdn>@<REALM>' and install them in /etc/krb5.keytab. The standard heimdal utility ktutil makes this fairly easy. After the service creds have been created, you can add a '-sec=krb5' option to /etc/exports and restart both mountd and nfsd. The only other difference an administrator should notice is that nfsd doesn't fork to create service threads any more. In normal operation, there will be two nfsd processes, one in userland waiting for TCP connections and one in the kernel handling requests. The latter process will create as many kthreads as required - these should be visible via 'top -H'. The code has some support for varying the number of service threads according to load but initially at least, nfsd uses a fixed number of threads according to the value supplied to its '-n' option. Sponsored by: Isilon Systems MFC after: 1 month
2008-11-03 10:38:00 +00:00
}
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* The `sysent' for the new syscall
*/
static struct sysent gsstest_sysent = {
3, /* sy_narg */
(sy_call_t *) gsstest /* sy_call */
};
/*
* The offset in sysent where the syscall is allocated.
*/
static int gsstest_offset = NO_SYSCALL;
/*
* The function called at load/unload.
*/
static int
gsstest_load(struct module *module, int cmd, void *arg)
{
int error = 0;
switch (cmd) {
case MOD_LOAD :
break;
case MOD_UNLOAD :
break;
default :
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
return error;
}
SYSCALL_MODULE(gsstest_syscall, &gsstest_offset, &gsstest_sysent,
gsstest_load, NULL);