2001-08-29 14:35:15 +00:00
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01//EN">
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<html>
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<head>
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<meta name="generator" content="HTML Tidy, see www.w3.org">
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<title>Authentication Options</title>
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</head>
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<body>
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<h3>Authentication Options</h3>
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<img align="left" src="pic/alice44.gif" alt="gif"><a href=
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"http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/pictures.htm">from <i>Alice's
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Adventures in Wonderland</i>, Lewis Carroll</a>
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<p>Our resident cryptographer; now you see him, now you don't.<br
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clear="left">
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</p>
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<hr>
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<h4>Authentication Support</h4>
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<p>Authentication support allows the NTP client to verify that the
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server is in fact known and trusted and not an intruder intending
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accidentally or on purpose to masquerade as that server. The NTPv3
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specification RFC-1305 defines an scheme which provides
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cryptographic authentication of received NTP packets. Originally,
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this was done using the Data Encryption Standard (DES) algorithm
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operating in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, commonly called
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DES-CBC. Subsequently, this was augmented by the RSA Message Digest
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5 (MD5) algorithm using a private key, commonly called keyed-MD5.
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Either algorithm computes a message digest, or one-way hash, which
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can be used to verify the server has the correct private key and
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key identifier.</p>
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<p>NTPv4 retains the NTPv3 schemes, properly described as
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symmetric-key cryptography and, in addition, provides a new Autokey
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scheme based on public-key cryptography. Public-key cryptography is
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generally considered more secure than symmetric-key cryptography,
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since the security is based on a private value which is generated
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by each server and never revealed. With Autokey all key
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distribution and management functions involve only public values,
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which considerably simplifies key distribution and storage.</p>
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<p>Authentication is configured separately for each association
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using the <tt>key</tt> or <tt>autokey</tt> subcommands on the <tt>
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peer</tt>, <tt>server</tt>, <tt>broadcast</tt> and <tt>
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manycastclient</tt> commands as described in the <a href=
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"config.htm">Configuration Options</a> page. The authentication
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options described below specify the suite of keys, select the key
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for each configured association and manage the configuration
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operations.</p>
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<p>The <tt>auth</tt> flag controls whether new associations or
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remote configuration commands require cryptographic authentication.
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This flag can be set or reset by the <tt>enable</tt> and <tt>
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disable</tt> configuration commands and also by remote
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configuration commands sent by a <tt>ntpdc</tt> program running in
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another machine. If this flag is enabled, which is the default
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case, new broadcast client and symmetric passive associations and
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remote configuration commands must be cryptographically
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authenticated using either symmetric-key or public-key schemes. If
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this flag is disabled, these operations are effective even if not
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cryptographic authenticated. It should be understood that operating
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in the latter mode invites a significant vulnerability where a
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rogue hacker can seriously disrupt client timekeeping.</p>
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<p>In networks with firewalls and large numbers of broadcast
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clients it may be acceptable to disable authentication, since that
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avoids key distribution and simplifies network maintenance.
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However, when the configuration file contains host names, or when a
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server or client is configured remotely, host names are resolved
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using the DNS and a separate name resolution process. In order to
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protect against bogus name server messages, name resolution
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messages are authenticated using an internally generated key which
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is normally invisible to the user. However, if cryptographic
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support is disabled, the name resolution process will fail. This
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can be avoided either by specifying IP addresses instead of host
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names, which is generally inadvisable, or by enabling the flag for
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name resolution and disabled it once the name resolution process is
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complete.</p>
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<p>An attractive alternative where multicast support is available
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is manycast mode, in which clients periodically troll for servers.
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Cryptographic authentication in this mode uses public-key schemes
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as described below. The principle advantage of this manycast mode
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is that potential servers need not be configured in advance, since
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the client finds them during regular operation, and the
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configuration files for all clients can be identical.</p>
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<p>In addition to the default symmetric-key cryptographic support,
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support for public-key cryptography is available if the requisite
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<tt>rsaref20</tt> software distribution has been installed before
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building the distribution. Public-key cryptography provides secure
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authentication of servers without compromising accuracy and
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stability. The security model and protocol schemes for both
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symmetric-key and public-key cryptography are described below.</p>
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<h4>Symmetric-Key Scheme</h4>
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The original RFC-1305 specification allows any one of possibly
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65,534 keys, each distinguished by a 32-bit key identifier, to
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authenticate an association. The servers and clients involved must
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agree on the key and key identifier to authenticate their messages.
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Keys and related information are specified in a key file, usually
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called <tt>ntp.keys</tt>, which should be exchanged and stored
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using secure procedures beyond the scope of the NTP protocol
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itself. Besides the keys used for ordinary NTP associations,
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additional keys can be used as passwords for the <tt><a href=
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"ntpq.htm">ntpq</a></tt> and <tt><a href="ntpdc.htm">ntpdc</a></tt>
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utility programs.
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<p>When <tt>ntpd</tt> is first started, it reads the key file
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specified int he <tt>keys</tt> command and installs the keys in the
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key cache. However, the keys must be activated with the <tt>
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trusted</tt> command before use. This allows, for instance, the
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installation of possibly several batches of keys and then
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activating or deactivating each batch remotely using <tt>
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ntpdc</tt>. This also provides a revocation capability that can be
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used if a key becomes compromised. The <tt>requestkey</tt> command
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selects the key used as the password for the <tt>ntpdc</tt>
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utility, while the <tt>controlkey</tt> command selects the key used
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as the password for the <tt>ntpq</tt> utility.</p>
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<h4>Public-Key Scheme</h4>
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The original NTPv3 authentication scheme described in RFC-1305
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continues to be supported; however, in NTPv4 an additional
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authentication scheme called Autokey is available. It uses MD5
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message digest, RSA public-key signature and Diffie-Hellman key
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agreement algorithms available from several sources, but not
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included in the NTPv4 software distribution. In order to be
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effective, the <tt>rsaref20</tt> package must be installed as
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described in the <tt>README.rsa</tt> file. Once installed, the
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configure and build process automatically detects it and compiles
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the routines required. The Autokey scheme has several modes of
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operation corresponding to the various NTP modes supported. RSA
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signatures with timestamps are used in all modes to verify the
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source of cryptographic values. All modes use a special cookie
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which can be computed independently by the client and server. In
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symmetric modes the cookie is constructed using the Diffie-Hellman
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key agreement algorithm. In other modes the cookie is constructed
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from the IP addresses and a private value known only to the server.
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All modes use in addition a variant of the S-KEY scheme, in which a
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pseudo-random key list is generated and used in reverse order.
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These schemes are described along with an executive summary,
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current status, briefing slides and reading list, on the <a href=
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"http://www.eecis.udel.edu/~mills/autokey.htm">Autonomous
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Authentication</a> page.
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<p>The cryptographic values used by the Autokey scheme are
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incorporated as a set of files generated by the <a href=
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"genkeys.htm"><tt>ntp-genkeys</tt></a> program, including the
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symmetric private keys, public/private key pair, and the agreement
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parameters. See the <tt>ntp-genkeys</tt> page for a description of
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the formats of these files. They contain cryptographic values
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generated by the algorithms of the <tt>rsaref20</tt> package and
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are in printable ASCII format. All file names include the
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timestamp, in NTP seconds, following the default names given below.
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Since the file data are derived from random values seeded by the
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system clock and the file name includes the timestamp, every
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generation produces a different file and different file name.</p>
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<p>The <tt>ntp.keys</tt> file contains the DES/MD5 private keys. It
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must be distributed by secure means to other servers and clients
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sharing the same security compartment and made visible only to
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root. While this file is not used with the Autokey scheme, it is
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needed to authenticate some remote configuration commands used by
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the <a href="ntpdc.htm"><tt>ntpq</tt></a> and <a href="ntpq.htm">
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<tt>ntpdc</tt></a> utilities. The <tt>ntpkey</tt> file contains the
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RSA private key. It is useful only to the machine that generated it
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and never shared with any other daemon or application program, so
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must be made visible only to root.</p>
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<p>The <tt>ntp_dh</tt> file contains the agreement parameters,
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which are used only in symmetric (active and passive) modes. It is
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necessary that both peers beginning a symmetric-mode association
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share the same parameters, but it does not matter which <tt>
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ntp_dh</tt> file generates them. If one of the peers contains the
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parameters, the other peer obtains them using the Autokey protocol.
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If both peers contain the parameters, the most recent copy is used
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by both peers. If a peer does not have the parameters, they will be
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requested by all associations, either configured or not; but, none
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of the associations can proceed until one of them has received the
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parameters. Once loaded, the parameters can be provided on request
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to other clients and servers. The <tt>ntp_dh</tt> file can be also
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be distributed using insecure means, since the data are public
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values.</p>
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<p>The <tt>ntpkey_<i>host</i></tt> file contains the RSA public
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key, where <tt><i>host</i></tt> is the name of the host. Each host
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must have its own <tt>ntpkey_<i>host</i></tt> file, which is
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normally provided to other hosts using the Autokey protocol Each
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<tt>server</tt> or <tt>peer</tt> association requires the public
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key associated with the particular server or peer to be loaded
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either directly from a local file or indirectly from the server
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using the Autokey protocol. These files can be widely distributed
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and stored using insecure means, since the data are public
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values.</p>
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<p>The optional <tt>ntpkey_certif_<i>host</i></tt> file contains
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the PKI certificate for the host. This provides a binding between
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the host hame and RSA public key. In the current implementation the
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certificate is obtained by a client, if present, but the contents
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are ignored.</p>
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<p>Due to the widespread use of interface-specific naming, the host
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names used in configured and mobilized associations are determined
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by the Unix <tt>gethostname()</tt> library routine. Both the <tt>
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ntp-genkeys</tt> program and the Autokey protocol derive the name
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of the public key file using the name returned by this routine.
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While every server and client is required to load their own public
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and private keys, the public keys for each client or peer
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association can be obtained from the server or peer using the
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Autokey protocol. Note however, that at the current stage of
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development the authenticity of the server or peer and the
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cryptographic binding of the server name, address and public key is
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not yet established by a certificate authority or web of trust.</p>
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<h4>Leapseconds Table</h4>
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<p>The NIST provides a table showing the epoch for all historic
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occasions of leap second insertion since 1972. The leapsecond table
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shows each epoch of insertion along with the offset of
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International Atomic Time (TAI) with respect to Coordinated
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Universtal Time (UTC), as disseminated by NTP. The table can be
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obtained directly from NIST national time servers using <tt>
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ftp</tt> as the ASCII file <tt>pub/leap-seconds</tt>.</p>
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<p>While not strictly a security function, the Autokey scheme
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provides means to securely retrieve the leapsecond table from a
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server or peer. Servers load the leapsecond table directly from the
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file specified in the <tt>crypto</tt> command, while clients can
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load the table indirectly from the servers using the Autokey
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protocol. Once loaded, the table can be provided on request to
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other clients and servers.</p>
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<h4>Key Management</h4>
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<p>All key files are installed by default in <tt>
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/usr/local/etc</tt>, which is normally in a shared filesystem in
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NFS-mounted networks and avoids installing them in each machine
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separately. The default can be overridden by the <tt>keysdir</tt>
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configuration command. However, this is not a good place to install
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the private key file, since each machine needs its own file. A
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suitable place to install it is in <tt>/etc</tt>, which is normally
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not in a shared filesystem.</p>
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<p>The recommended practice is to keep the timestamp extensions
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when installing a file and to install a link from the default name
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(without the timestamp extension) to the actual file. This allows
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new file generations to be activated simply by changing the link.
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However, <tt>ntpd</tt> parses the link name when present to extract
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the extension value and sends it along with the public key and host
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name when requested. This allows clients to verify that the file
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and generation time are always current. However, the actual
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location of each file can be overridden by the <tt>crypto</tt>
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configuration command.</p>
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<p>All cryptographic keys and related parameters should be
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regenerated on a periodic and automatic basis, like once per month.
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The <tt>ntp-genkeys</tt> program uses the same timestamp extension
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for all files generated at one time, so each generation is distinct
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and can be readily recognized in monitoring data. While a
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public/private key pair must be generated by every server and
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client, the public keys and agreement parameters do not need to be
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explicitly copied to all machines in the same security compartment,
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since they can be obtained automatically using the Autokey
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protocol. However, it is necessary that all primary servers have
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the same agreement parameter file. The recommended way to do this
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is for one of the primary servers to generate that file and then
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copy it to the other primary servers in the same compartment using
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the Unix <tt>rdist</tt> command. Future versions of the Autokey
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protocol are to contain provisions for an agreement protocol to do
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this automatically.</p>
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<p>Servers and clients can make a new generation in the following
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way. All machines have loaded the old generation at startup and are
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operating normally. At designated intervals, each machine generates
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a new public/private key pair and makes links from the default file
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names to the new file names. The <tt>ntpd</tt> is then restarted
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and loads the new generation, with result clients no longer can
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authenticate correctly. The Autokey protocol is designed so that
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after a few minutes the clients time out and restart the protocol
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from the beginning, with result the new generation is loaded and
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operation continues as before. A similar procedure can be used for
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the agreement parameter file, but in this case precautions must be
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take to be sure that all machines with this file have the same
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copy.</p>
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<h4>Authentication Commands</h4>
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<dl>
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<dt><tt>autokey [<i>logsec</i>]</tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the interval between regenerations of the session key
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list used with the Autokey protocol. Note that the size of the key
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list for each association depends on this interval and the current
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poll interval. The default value is 12 (4096 s or about 1.1 hours).
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For poll intervals above the specified interval, a session key list
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with a single entry will be regenerated for every message
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sent.</dd>
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<dt><tt>controlkey <i>key</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the key identifier to use with the <a href=
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"ntpq.htm"><tt>ntpq</tt></a> utility, which uses the standard
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protocol defined in RFC-1305. The <tt><i>key</i></tt> argument is
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the key identifier for a trusted key, where the value can be in the
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range 1 to 65534, inclusive.</dd>
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<dt><tt>crypto [flags <i>flags</i>] [privatekey <i>file</i>]
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[publickey <i>file</i>] [dhparms <i>file</i>] [leap <i>
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file</i>]</tt></dt>
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<dd>This command requires the NTP daemon build process be
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configured with the RSA library. This command activates public-key
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cryptography and loads the required RSA private and public key
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files and the optional Diffie-Hellman agreement parameter file, if
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present. If one or more files are left unspecified, the default
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names are used as described below. Following are the
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subcommands:</dd>
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<dd>
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<dl>
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<dt><tt>privatekey <i>file</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the location of the RSA private key file, which
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otherwise defaults to <tt>/usr/local/etc/ntpkey</tt>.</dd>
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<dt><tt>publickey <i>file</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the location of the RSA public key file, which
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otherwise defaults to <tt>/usr/local/etc/ntpkey_<i>host</i></tt>.,
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where <i>host</i> is the name of the generating machine.</dd>
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<dt><tt>dhparms <i>file</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the location of the Diffie-Hellman parameters file,
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which otherwise defaults to <tt>/usr/local/etc/ntpkey_dh</tt>.</dd>
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<dt><tt>leap <i>file</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the location of the leapsecond table file, which
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otherwise defaults to <tt>/usr/local/etc/ntpkey_leap</tt>.</dd>
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</dl>
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</dd>
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<dt><tt>keys <i>keyfile</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the location of the DES/MD5 private key file
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containing the keys and key identifiers used by <tt>ntpd</tt>, <tt>
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ntpq</tt> and <tt>ntpdc</tt> when operating in symmetric-key
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mode.</dd>
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<dt><tt>keysdir <i>path</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>This command requires the NTP daemon build process be
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|
configured with the RSA library. It specifies the default directory
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path for the private key file, agreement parameters file and one or
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more public key files. The default when this command does not
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appear in the configuration file is <tt>/usr/local/etc/</tt>.</dd>
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<dt><tt>requestkey <i>key</i></tt></dt>
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<dd>Specifies the key identifier to use with the <a href=
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|
|
"ntpdc.htm"><tt>ntpdc</tt></a> utility program, which uses a
|
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|
|
proprietary protocol specific to this implementation of <tt>
|
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|
|
ntpd</tt>. The <tt><i>key</i></tt> argument is a key identifier for
|
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|
|
the trusted key, where the value can be in the range 1 to 65534,
|
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|
inclusive.</dd>
|
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|
|
<dt><tt>revoke [<i>logsec</i>]</tt></dt>
|
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|
<dd>Specifies the interval between re-randomization of certain
|
|
|
|
|
cryptographic values used by the Autokey scheme, as a power of 2 in
|
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|
|
seconds. These values need to be updated frequently in order to
|
|
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|
|
deflect brute-force attacks on the algorithms of the scheme;
|
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|
|
however, updating some values is a relatively expensive operation.
|
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|
|
The default interval is 16 (65,536 s or about 18 hours). For poll
|
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|
|
intervals above the specified interval, the values will be updated
|
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|
|
for every message sent.</dd>
|
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|
|
<dt><tt>trustedkey <i>key</i> [...]</tt></dt>
|
|
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|
|
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|
|
<dd>Specifies the key identifiers which are trusted for the
|
|
|
|
|
purposes of authenticating peers with symmetric-key cryptography,
|
|
|
|
|
as well as keys used by the <tt>ntpq</tt> and <tt>ntpdc</tt>
|
|
|
|
|
programs. The authentication procedures require that both the local
|
|
|
|
|
and remote servers share the same key and key identifier for this
|
|
|
|
|
purpose, although different keys can be used with different
|
|
|
|
|
servers. The <tt><i>key</i></tt> arguments are 32-bit unsigned
|
|
|
|
|
integers with values from 1 to 65,534.</dd>
|
|
|
|
|
</dl>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<h4>Files</h4>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<tt>ntp.keys</tt> private MD5 keys <br>
|
|
|
|
|
<tt>ntpkey</tt> RSA private key <br>
|
|
|
|
|
<tt>ntpkey_<i>host</i></tt> RSA public key <br>
|
|
|
|
|
<tt>ntp_dh</tt> Diffie-Hellman agreement parameters
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<h4>Bugs</h4>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The <tt>ntpkey_<i>host</i></tt> files are really digital
|
|
|
|
|
certificates. These should be obtained via secure directory
|
|
|
|
|
services when they become universally available.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<hr>
|
|
|
|
|
<a href="index.htm"><img align="left" src="pic/home.gif" alt=
|
|
|
|
|
"gif"></a>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
<address><a href="mailto:mills@udel.edu">David L. Mills
|
|
|
|
|
<mills@udel.edu></a></address>
|
|
|
|
|
</body>
|
|
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|
|
</html>
|
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|
