freebsd-dev/sys/crypto/ccp/ccp_hardware.c

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Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Chelsio Communications, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2017 Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
* Largely borrowed from ccr(4), Written by: John Baldwin <jhb@FreeBSD.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_ddb.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
#include <sys/bus.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/rman.h>
#include <sys/sglist.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#ifdef DDB
#include <ddb/ddb.h>
#endif
#include <dev/pci/pcireg.h>
#include <dev/pci/pcivar.h>
#include <machine/bus.h>
#include <machine/resource.h>
#include <machine/vmparam.h>
#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <vm/pmap.h>
#include "cryptodev_if.h"
#include "ccp.h"
#include "ccp_hardware.h"
#include "ccp_lsb.h"
CTASSERT(sizeof(struct ccp_desc) == 32);
static struct ccp_xts_unitsize_map_entry {
enum ccp_xts_unitsize cxu_id;
unsigned cxu_size;
} ccp_xts_unitsize_map[] = {
{ CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE_16, 16 },
{ CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE_512, 512 },
{ CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE_1024, 1024 },
{ CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE_2048, 2048 },
{ CCP_XTS_AES_UNIT_SIZE_4096, 4096 },
};
SYSCTL_NODE(_hw, OID_AUTO, ccp, CTLFLAG_RD | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
"ccp node");
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
unsigned g_ccp_ring_order = 11;
SYSCTL_UINT(_hw_ccp, OID_AUTO, ring_order, CTLFLAG_RDTUN, &g_ccp_ring_order,
0, "Set CCP ring order. (1 << this) == ring size. Min: 6, Max: 16");
/*
* Zero buffer, sufficient for padding LSB entries, that does not span a page
* boundary
*/
static const char g_zeroes[32] __aligned(32);
static inline uint32_t
ccp_read_4(struct ccp_softc *sc, uint32_t offset)
{
return (bus_space_read_4(sc->pci_bus_tag, sc->pci_bus_handle, offset));
}
static inline void
ccp_write_4(struct ccp_softc *sc, uint32_t offset, uint32_t value)
{
bus_space_write_4(sc->pci_bus_tag, sc->pci_bus_handle, offset, value);
}
static inline uint32_t
ccp_read_queue_4(struct ccp_softc *sc, unsigned queue, uint32_t offset)
{
/*
* Each queue gets its own 4kB register space. Queue 0 is at 0x1000.
*/
return (ccp_read_4(sc, (CMD_Q_STATUS_INCR * (1 + queue)) + offset));
}
static inline void
ccp_write_queue_4(struct ccp_softc *sc, unsigned queue, uint32_t offset,
uint32_t value)
{
ccp_write_4(sc, (CMD_Q_STATUS_INCR * (1 + queue)) + offset, value);
}
void
ccp_queue_write_tail(struct ccp_queue *qp)
{
ccp_write_queue_4(qp->cq_softc, qp->cq_qindex, CMD_Q_TAIL_LO_BASE,
((uint32_t)qp->desc_ring_bus_addr) + (Q_DESC_SIZE * qp->cq_tail));
}
/*
* Given a queue and a reserved LSB entry index, compute the LSB *entry id* of
* that entry for the queue's private LSB region.
*/
static inline uint8_t
ccp_queue_lsb_entry(struct ccp_queue *qp, unsigned lsb_entry)
{
return ((qp->private_lsb * LSB_REGION_LENGTH + lsb_entry));
}
/*
* Given a queue and a reserved LSB entry index, compute the LSB *address* of
* that entry for the queue's private LSB region.
*/
static inline uint32_t
ccp_queue_lsb_address(struct ccp_queue *qp, unsigned lsb_entry)
{
return (ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, lsb_entry) * LSB_ENTRY_SIZE);
}
/*
* Some terminology:
*
* LSB - Local Storage Block
* =========================
*
* 8 segments/regions, each containing 16 entries.
*
* Each entry contains 256 bits (32 bytes).
*
* Segments are virtually addressed in commands, but accesses cannot cross
* segment boundaries. Virtual map uses an identity mapping by default
* (virtual segment N corresponds to physical segment N).
*
* Access to a physical region can be restricted to any subset of all five
* queues.
*
* "Pass-through" mode
* ===================
*
* Pass-through is a generic DMA engine, much like ioat(4). Some nice
* features:
*
* - Supports byte-swapping for endian conversion (32- or 256-bit words)
* - AND, OR, XOR with fixed 256-bit mask
* - CRC32 of data (may be used in tandem with bswap, but not bit operations)
* - Read/write of LSB
* - Memset
*
* If bit manipulation mode is enabled, input must be a multiple of 256 bits
* (32 bytes).
*
* If byte-swapping is enabled, input must be a multiple of the word size.
*
* Zlib mode -- only usable from one queue at a time, single job at a time.
* ========================================================================
*
* Only usable from private host, aka PSP? Not host processor?
*
* RNG.
* ====
*
* Raw bits are conditioned with AES and fed through CTR_DRBG. Output goes in
* a ring buffer readable by software.
*
* NIST SP 800-90B Repetition Count and Adaptive Proportion health checks are
* implemented on the raw input stream and may be enabled to verify min-entropy
* of 0.5 bits per bit.
*/
static void
ccp_dmamap_cb(void *arg, bus_dma_segment_t *segs, int nseg, int error)
{
bus_addr_t *baddr;
KASSERT(error == 0, ("%s: error:%d", __func__, error));
baddr = arg;
*baddr = segs->ds_addr;
}
static int
ccp_hw_attach_queue(device_t dev, uint64_t lsbmask, unsigned queue)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc;
struct ccp_queue *qp;
void *desc;
size_t ringsz, num_descriptors;
int error;
desc = NULL;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
qp = &sc->queues[queue];
/*
* Don't bother allocating a ring for queues the host isn't allowed to
* drive.
*/
if ((sc->valid_queues & (1 << queue)) == 0)
return (0);
ccp_queue_decode_lsb_regions(sc, lsbmask, queue);
/* Ignore queues that do not have any LSB access. */
if (qp->lsb_mask == 0) {
device_printf(dev, "Ignoring queue %u with no LSB access\n",
queue);
sc->valid_queues &= ~(1 << queue);
return (0);
}
num_descriptors = 1 << sc->ring_size_order;
ringsz = sizeof(struct ccp_desc) * num_descriptors;
/*
* "Queue_Size" is order - 1.
*
* Queue must be aligned to 5+Queue_Size+1 == 5 + order bits.
*/
error = bus_dma_tag_create(bus_get_dma_tag(dev),
1 << (5 + sc->ring_size_order),
#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PAE)
0, BUS_SPACE_MAXADDR,
#else
(bus_addr_t)1 << 32, BUS_SPACE_MAXADDR_48BIT,
#endif
BUS_SPACE_MAXADDR, NULL, NULL, ringsz, 1,
ringsz, 0, NULL, NULL, &qp->ring_desc_tag);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
error = bus_dmamem_alloc(qp->ring_desc_tag, &desc,
BUS_DMA_ZERO | BUS_DMA_WAITOK, &qp->ring_desc_map);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
error = bus_dmamap_load(qp->ring_desc_tag, qp->ring_desc_map, desc,
ringsz, ccp_dmamap_cb, &qp->desc_ring_bus_addr, BUS_DMA_WAITOK);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
qp->desc_ring = desc;
qp->completions_ring = malloc(num_descriptors *
sizeof(*qp->completions_ring), M_CCP, M_ZERO | M_WAITOK);
/* Zero control register; among other things, clears the RUN flag. */
qp->qcontrol = 0;
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_CONTROL_BASE, qp->qcontrol);
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_INT_ENABLE_BASE, 0);
/* Clear any leftover interrupt status flags */
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_INTERRUPT_STATUS_BASE,
ALL_INTERRUPTS);
qp->qcontrol |= (sc->ring_size_order - 1) << CMD_Q_SIZE_SHIFT;
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_TAIL_LO_BASE,
(uint32_t)qp->desc_ring_bus_addr);
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_HEAD_LO_BASE,
(uint32_t)qp->desc_ring_bus_addr);
/*
* Enable completion interrupts, as well as error or administrative
* halt interrupts. We don't use administrative halts, but they
* shouldn't trip unless we do, so it ought to be harmless.
*/
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_INT_ENABLE_BASE,
INT_COMPLETION | INT_ERROR | INT_QUEUE_STOPPED);
qp->qcontrol |= (qp->desc_ring_bus_addr >> 32) << CMD_Q_PTR_HI_SHIFT;
qp->qcontrol |= CMD_Q_RUN;
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, queue, CMD_Q_CONTROL_BASE, qp->qcontrol);
out:
if (error != 0) {
if (qp->desc_ring != NULL)
bus_dmamap_unload(qp->ring_desc_tag,
qp->ring_desc_map);
if (desc != NULL)
bus_dmamem_free(qp->ring_desc_tag, desc,
qp->ring_desc_map);
if (qp->ring_desc_tag != NULL)
bus_dma_tag_destroy(qp->ring_desc_tag);
}
return (error);
}
static void
ccp_hw_detach_queue(device_t dev, unsigned queue)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc;
struct ccp_queue *qp;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
qp = &sc->queues[queue];
/*
* Don't bother allocating a ring for queues the host isn't allowed to
* drive.
*/
if ((sc->valid_queues & (1 << queue)) == 0)
return;
free(qp->completions_ring, M_CCP);
bus_dmamap_unload(qp->ring_desc_tag, qp->ring_desc_map);
bus_dmamem_free(qp->ring_desc_tag, qp->desc_ring, qp->ring_desc_map);
bus_dma_tag_destroy(qp->ring_desc_tag);
}
static int
ccp_map_pci_bar(device_t dev)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
sc->pci_resource_id = PCIR_BAR(2);
sc->pci_resource = bus_alloc_resource_any(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY,
&sc->pci_resource_id, RF_ACTIVE);
if (sc->pci_resource == NULL) {
device_printf(dev, "unable to allocate pci resource\n");
return (ENODEV);
}
sc->pci_resource_id_msix = PCIR_BAR(5);
sc->pci_resource_msix = bus_alloc_resource_any(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY,
&sc->pci_resource_id_msix, RF_ACTIVE);
if (sc->pci_resource_msix == NULL) {
device_printf(dev, "unable to allocate pci resource msix\n");
bus_release_resource(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY, sc->pci_resource_id,
sc->pci_resource);
return (ENODEV);
}
sc->pci_bus_tag = rman_get_bustag(sc->pci_resource);
sc->pci_bus_handle = rman_get_bushandle(sc->pci_resource);
return (0);
}
static void
ccp_unmap_pci_bar(device_t dev)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
bus_release_resource(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY, sc->pci_resource_id_msix,
sc->pci_resource_msix);
bus_release_resource(dev, SYS_RES_MEMORY, sc->pci_resource_id,
sc->pci_resource);
}
const static struct ccp_error_code {
uint8_t ce_code;
const char *ce_name;
int ce_errno;
const char *ce_desc;
} ccp_error_codes[] = {
{ 0x01, "ILLEGAL_ENGINE", EIO, "Requested engine was invalid" },
{ 0x03, "ILLEGAL_FUNCTION_TYPE", EIO,
"A non-supported function type was specified" },
{ 0x04, "ILLEGAL_FUNCTION_MODE", EIO,
"A non-supported function mode was specified" },
{ 0x05, "ILLEGAL_FUNCTION_ENCRYPT", EIO,
"A CMAC type was specified when ENCRYPT was not specified" },
{ 0x06, "ILLEGAL_FUNCTION_SIZE", EIO,
"A non-supported function size was specified.\n"
"AES-CFB: Size was not 127 or 7;\n"
"3DES-CFB: Size was not 7;\n"
"RSA: See supported size table (7.4.2);\n"
"ECC: Size was greater than 576 bits." },
{ 0x07, "Zlib_MISSING_INIT_EOM", EIO,
"Zlib command does not have INIT and EOM set" },
{ 0x08, "ILLEGAL_FUNCTION_RSVD", EIO,
"Reserved bits in a function specification were not 0" },
{ 0x09, "ILLEGAL_BUFFER_LENGTH", EIO,
"The buffer length specified was not correct for the selected engine"
},
{ 0x0A, "VLSB_FAULT", EIO, "Illegal VLSB segment mapping:\n"
"Undefined VLSB segment mapping or\n"
"mapping to unsupported LSB segment id" },
{ 0x0B, "ILLEGAL_MEM_ADDR", EFAULT,
"The specified source/destination buffer access was illegal:\n"
"Data buffer located in a LSB location disallowed by the LSB protection masks; or\n"
"Data buffer not completely contained within a single segment; or\n"
"Pointer with Fixed=1 is not 32-bit aligned; or\n"
"Pointer with Fixed=1 attempted to reference non-AXI1 (local) memory."
},
{ 0x0C, "ILLEGAL_MEM_SEL", EIO,
"A src_mem, dst_mem, or key_mem field was illegal:\n"
"A field was set to a reserved value; or\n"
"A public command attempted to reference AXI1 (local) or GART memory; or\n"
"A Zlib command attmpted to use the LSB." },
{ 0x0D, "ILLEGAL_CONTEXT_ADDR", EIO,
"The specified context location was illegal:\n"
"Context located in a LSB location disallowed by the LSB protection masks; or\n"
"Context not completely contained within a single segment." },
{ 0x0E, "ILLEGAL_KEY_ADDR", EIO,
"The specified key location was illegal:\n"
"Key located in a LSB location disallowed by the LSB protection masks; or\n"
"Key not completely contained within a single segment." },
{ 0x12, "CMD_TIMEOUT", EIO, "A command timeout violation occurred" },
/* XXX Could fill out these descriptions too */
{ 0x13, "IDMA0_AXI_SLVERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x14, "IDMA0_AXI_DECERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x16, "IDMA1_AXI_SLVERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x17, "IDMA1_AXI_DECERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x19, "ZLIBVHB_AXI_SLVERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x1A, "ZLIBVHB_AXI_DECERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x1C, "ZLIB_UNEXPECTED_EOM", EIO, "" },
{ 0x1D, "ZLIB_EXTRA_DATA", EIO, "" },
{ 0x1E, "ZLIB_BTYPE", EIO, "" },
{ 0x20, "ZLIB_UNDEFINED_DISTANCE_SYMBOL", EIO, "" },
{ 0x21, "ZLIB_CODE_LENGTH_SYMBOL", EIO, "" },
{ 0x22, "ZLIB_VHB_ILLEGAL_FETCH", EIO, "" },
{ 0x23, "ZLIB_UNCOMPRESSED_LEN", EIO, "" },
{ 0x24, "ZLIB_LIMIT_REACHED", EIO, "" },
{ 0x25, "ZLIB_CHECKSUM_MISMATCH", EIO, "" },
{ 0x26, "ODMA0_AXI_SLVERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x27, "ODMA0_AXI_DECERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x29, "ODMA1_AXI_SLVERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x2A, "ODMA1_AXI_DECERR", EIO, "" },
{ 0x2B, "LSB_PARITY_ERR", EIO,
"A read from the LSB encountered a parity error" },
};
static void
ccp_intr_handle_error(struct ccp_queue *qp, const struct ccp_desc *desc)
{
struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx;
const struct ccp_error_code *ec;
struct ccp_softc *sc;
uint32_t status, error, esource, faultblock;
unsigned q, idx;
int errno;
sc = qp->cq_softc;
q = qp->cq_qindex;
status = ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_STATUS_BASE);
error = status & STATUS_ERROR_MASK;
/* Decode error status */
ec = NULL;
for (idx = 0; idx < nitems(ccp_error_codes); idx++)
if (ccp_error_codes[idx].ce_code == error) {
ec = &ccp_error_codes[idx];
break;
}
esource = (status >> STATUS_ERRORSOURCE_SHIFT) &
STATUS_ERRORSOURCE_MASK;
faultblock = (status >> STATUS_VLSB_FAULTBLOCK_SHIFT) &
STATUS_VLSB_FAULTBLOCK_MASK;
device_printf(sc->dev, "Error: %s (%u) Source: %u Faulting LSB block: %u\n",
(ec != NULL) ? ec->ce_name : "(reserved)", error, esource,
faultblock);
if (ec != NULL)
device_printf(sc->dev, "Error description: %s\n", ec->ce_desc);
/* TODO Could format the desc nicely here */
idx = desc - qp->desc_ring;
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "Bad descriptor index: %u contents: %32D\n", idx,
(const void *)desc, " ");
/*
* TODO Per § 14.4 "Error Handling," DMA_Status, DMA_Read/Write_Status,
* Zlib Decompress status may be interesting.
*/
while (true) {
/* Keep unused descriptors zero for next use. */
memset(&qp->desc_ring[idx], 0, sizeof(qp->desc_ring[idx]));
cctx = &qp->completions_ring[idx];
/*
* Restart procedure described in § 14.2.5. Could be used by HoC if we
* used that.
*
* Advance HEAD_LO past bad descriptor + any remaining in
* transaction manually, then restart queue.
*/
idx = (idx + 1) % (1 << sc->ring_size_order);
/* Callback function signals end of transaction */
if (cctx->callback_fn != NULL) {
if (ec == NULL)
errno = EIO;
else
errno = ec->ce_errno;
/* TODO More specific error code */
cctx->callback_fn(qp, cctx->session, cctx->callback_arg, errno);
cctx->callback_fn = NULL;
break;
}
}
qp->cq_head = idx;
qp->cq_waiting = false;
wakeup(&qp->cq_tail);
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: wrote sw head:%u\n", __func__, qp->cq_head);
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_HEAD_LO_BASE,
(uint32_t)qp->desc_ring_bus_addr + (idx * Q_DESC_SIZE));
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_CONTROL_BASE, qp->qcontrol);
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: Restarted queue\n", __func__);
}
static void
ccp_intr_run_completions(struct ccp_queue *qp, uint32_t ints)
{
struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx;
struct ccp_softc *sc;
const struct ccp_desc *desc;
uint32_t headlo, idx;
unsigned q, completed;
sc = qp->cq_softc;
q = qp->cq_qindex;
mtx_lock(&qp->cq_lock);
/*
* Hardware HEAD_LO points to the first incomplete descriptor. Process
* any submitted and completed descriptors, up to but not including
* HEAD_LO.
*/
headlo = ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_HEAD_LO_BASE);
idx = (headlo - (uint32_t)qp->desc_ring_bus_addr) / Q_DESC_SIZE;
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: hw head:%u sw head:%u\n", __func__, idx,
qp->cq_head);
completed = 0;
while (qp->cq_head != idx) {
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: completing:%u\n", __func__, qp->cq_head);
cctx = &qp->completions_ring[qp->cq_head];
if (cctx->callback_fn != NULL) {
cctx->callback_fn(qp, cctx->session,
cctx->callback_arg, 0);
cctx->callback_fn = NULL;
}
/* Keep unused descriptors zero for next use. */
memset(&qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_head], 0,
sizeof(qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_head]));
qp->cq_head = (qp->cq_head + 1) % (1 << sc->ring_size_order);
completed++;
}
if (completed > 0) {
qp->cq_waiting = false;
wakeup(&qp->cq_tail);
}
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: wrote sw head:%u\n", __func__, qp->cq_head);
/*
* Desc points to the first incomplete descriptor, at the time we read
* HEAD_LO. If there was an error flagged in interrupt status, the HW
* will not proceed past the erroneous descriptor by itself.
*/
desc = &qp->desc_ring[idx];
if ((ints & INT_ERROR) != 0)
ccp_intr_handle_error(qp, desc);
mtx_unlock(&qp->cq_lock);
}
static void
ccp_intr_handler(void *arg)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc = arg;
size_t i;
uint32_t ints;
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: interrupt\n", __func__);
/*
* We get one global interrupt per PCI device, shared over all of
* its queues. Scan each valid queue on interrupt for flags indicating
* activity.
*/
for (i = 0; i < nitems(sc->queues); i++) {
if ((sc->valid_queues & (1 << i)) == 0)
continue;
ints = ccp_read_queue_4(sc, i, CMD_Q_INTERRUPT_STATUS_BASE);
if (ints == 0)
continue;
#if 0
DPRINTF(sc->dev, "%s: %x interrupts on queue %zu\n", __func__,
(unsigned)ints, i);
#endif
/* Write back 1s to clear interrupt status bits. */
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, i, CMD_Q_INTERRUPT_STATUS_BASE, ints);
/*
* If there was an error, we still need to run completions on
* any descriptors prior to the error. The completions handler
* invoked below will also handle the error descriptor.
*/
if ((ints & (INT_COMPLETION | INT_ERROR)) != 0)
ccp_intr_run_completions(&sc->queues[i], ints);
if ((ints & INT_QUEUE_STOPPED) != 0)
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: queue %zu stopped\n",
__func__, i);
}
/* Re-enable interrupts after processing */
for (i = 0; i < nitems(sc->queues); i++) {
if ((sc->valid_queues & (1 << i)) == 0)
continue;
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, i, CMD_Q_INT_ENABLE_BASE,
INT_COMPLETION | INT_ERROR | INT_QUEUE_STOPPED);
}
}
static int
ccp_intr_filter(void *arg)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc = arg;
size_t i;
/* TODO: Split individual queues into separate taskqueues? */
for (i = 0; i < nitems(sc->queues); i++) {
if ((sc->valid_queues & (1 << i)) == 0)
continue;
/* Mask interrupt until task completes */
ccp_write_queue_4(sc, i, CMD_Q_INT_ENABLE_BASE, 0);
}
return (FILTER_SCHEDULE_THREAD);
}
static int
ccp_setup_interrupts(struct ccp_softc *sc)
{
uint32_t nvec;
int rid, error, n, ridcopy;
n = pci_msix_count(sc->dev);
if (n < 1) {
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: msix_count: %d\n", __func__, n);
return (ENXIO);
}
nvec = n;
error = pci_alloc_msix(sc->dev, &nvec);
if (error != 0) {
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: alloc_msix error: %d\n", __func__,
error);
return (error);
}
if (nvec < 1) {
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: alloc_msix: 0 vectors\n",
__func__);
return (ENXIO);
}
if (nvec > nitems(sc->intr_res)) {
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: too many vectors: %u\n", __func__,
nvec);
nvec = nitems(sc->intr_res);
}
for (rid = 1; rid < 1 + nvec; rid++) {
ridcopy = rid;
sc->intr_res[rid - 1] = bus_alloc_resource_any(sc->dev,
SYS_RES_IRQ, &ridcopy, RF_ACTIVE);
if (sc->intr_res[rid - 1] == NULL) {
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: Failed to alloc IRQ resource\n",
__func__);
return (ENXIO);
}
sc->intr_tag[rid - 1] = NULL;
error = bus_setup_intr(sc->dev, sc->intr_res[rid - 1],
INTR_MPSAFE | INTR_TYPE_MISC, ccp_intr_filter,
ccp_intr_handler, sc, &sc->intr_tag[rid - 1]);
if (error != 0)
device_printf(sc->dev, "%s: setup_intr: %d\n",
__func__, error);
}
sc->intr_count = nvec;
return (error);
}
static void
ccp_release_interrupts(struct ccp_softc *sc)
{
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->intr_count; i++) {
if (sc->intr_tag[i] != NULL)
bus_teardown_intr(sc->dev, sc->intr_res[i],
sc->intr_tag[i]);
if (sc->intr_res[i] != NULL)
bus_release_resource(sc->dev, SYS_RES_IRQ,
rman_get_rid(sc->intr_res[i]), sc->intr_res[i]);
}
pci_release_msi(sc->dev);
}
int
ccp_hw_attach(device_t dev)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc;
uint64_t lsbmask;
uint32_t version, lsbmasklo, lsbmaskhi;
unsigned queue_idx, j;
int error;
bool bars_mapped, interrupts_setup;
queue_idx = 0;
bars_mapped = interrupts_setup = false;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
error = ccp_map_pci_bar(dev);
if (error != 0) {
device_printf(dev, "%s: couldn't map BAR(s)\n", __func__);
goto out;
}
bars_mapped = true;
error = pci_enable_busmaster(dev);
if (error != 0) {
device_printf(dev, "%s: couldn't enable busmaster\n",
__func__);
goto out;
}
sc->ring_size_order = g_ccp_ring_order;
if (sc->ring_size_order < 6 || sc->ring_size_order > 16) {
device_printf(dev, "bogus hw.ccp.ring_order\n");
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
sc->valid_queues = ccp_read_4(sc, CMD_QUEUE_MASK_OFFSET);
version = ccp_read_4(sc, VERSION_REG);
if ((version & VERSION_NUM_MASK) < 5) {
device_printf(dev,
"driver supports version 5 and later hardware\n");
error = ENXIO;
goto out;
}
error = ccp_setup_interrupts(sc);
if (error != 0)
goto out;
interrupts_setup = true;
sc->hw_version = version & VERSION_NUM_MASK;
sc->num_queues = (version >> VERSION_NUMVQM_SHIFT) &
VERSION_NUMVQM_MASK;
sc->num_lsb_entries = (version >> VERSION_LSBSIZE_SHIFT) &
VERSION_LSBSIZE_MASK;
sc->hw_features = version & VERSION_CAP_MASK;
/*
* Copy private LSB mask to public registers to enable access to LSB
* from all queues allowed by BIOS.
*/
lsbmasklo = ccp_read_4(sc, LSB_PRIVATE_MASK_LO_OFFSET);
lsbmaskhi = ccp_read_4(sc, LSB_PRIVATE_MASK_HI_OFFSET);
ccp_write_4(sc, LSB_PUBLIC_MASK_LO_OFFSET, lsbmasklo);
ccp_write_4(sc, LSB_PUBLIC_MASK_HI_OFFSET, lsbmaskhi);
lsbmask = ((uint64_t)lsbmaskhi << 30) | lsbmasklo;
for (; queue_idx < nitems(sc->queues); queue_idx++) {
error = ccp_hw_attach_queue(dev, lsbmask, queue_idx);
if (error != 0) {
device_printf(dev, "%s: couldn't attach queue %u\n",
__func__, queue_idx);
goto out;
}
}
ccp_assign_lsb_regions(sc, lsbmask);
out:
if (error != 0) {
if (interrupts_setup)
ccp_release_interrupts(sc);
for (j = 0; j < queue_idx; j++)
ccp_hw_detach_queue(dev, j);
if (sc->ring_size_order != 0)
pci_disable_busmaster(dev);
if (bars_mapped)
ccp_unmap_pci_bar(dev);
}
return (error);
}
void
ccp_hw_detach(device_t dev)
{
struct ccp_softc *sc;
unsigned i;
sc = device_get_softc(dev);
for (i = 0; i < nitems(sc->queues); i++)
ccp_hw_detach_queue(dev, i);
ccp_release_interrupts(sc);
pci_disable_busmaster(dev);
ccp_unmap_pci_bar(dev);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_passthrough(struct ccp_queue *qp, bus_addr_t dst,
enum ccp_memtype dst_type, bus_addr_t src, enum ccp_memtype src_type,
bus_size_t len, enum ccp_passthru_byteswap swapmode,
enum ccp_passthru_bitwise bitmode, bool interrupt,
const struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx)
{
struct ccp_desc *desc;
if (ccp_queue_get_ring_space(qp) == 0)
return (EAGAIN);
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_PASSTHRU;
desc->pt.ioc = interrupt;
desc->pt.byteswap = swapmode;
desc->pt.bitwise = bitmode;
desc->length = len;
desc->src_lo = (uint32_t)src;
desc->src_hi = src >> 32;
desc->src_mem = src_type;
desc->dst_lo = (uint32_t)dst;
desc->dst_hi = dst >> 32;
desc->dst_mem = dst_type;
if (bitmode != CCP_PASSTHRU_BITWISE_NOOP)
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY);
if (cctx != NULL)
memcpy(&qp->completions_ring[qp->cq_tail], cctx, sizeof(*cctx));
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) % (1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
return (0);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_passthrough_sgl(struct ccp_queue *qp, bus_addr_t lsb_addr, bool tolsb,
struct sglist *sgl, bus_size_t len, bool interrupt,
const struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx)
{
struct sglist_seg *seg;
size_t i, remain, nb;
int error;
remain = len;
for (i = 0; i < sgl->sg_nseg && remain != 0; i++) {
seg = &sgl->sg_segs[i];
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
/* crp lengths are int, so 32-bit min() is ok. */
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
nb = min(remain, seg->ss_len);
if (tolsb)
error = ccp_passthrough(qp, lsb_addr, CCP_MEMTYPE_SB,
seg->ss_paddr, CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM, nb,
CCP_PASSTHRU_BYTESWAP_NOOP,
CCP_PASSTHRU_BITWISE_NOOP,
(nb == remain) && interrupt, cctx);
else
error = ccp_passthrough(qp, seg->ss_paddr,
CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM, lsb_addr, CCP_MEMTYPE_SB, nb,
CCP_PASSTHRU_BYTESWAP_NOOP,
CCP_PASSTHRU_BITWISE_NOOP,
(nb == remain) && interrupt, cctx);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
remain -= nb;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Note that these vectors are in reverse of the usual order.
*/
const struct SHA_vectors {
uint32_t SHA1[8];
uint32_t SHA224[8];
uint32_t SHA256[8];
uint64_t SHA384[8];
uint64_t SHA512[8];
} SHA_H __aligned(PAGE_SIZE) = {
.SHA1 = {
0xc3d2e1f0ul,
0x10325476ul,
0x98badcfeul,
0xefcdab89ul,
0x67452301ul,
0,
0,
0,
},
.SHA224 = {
0xbefa4fa4ul,
0x64f98fa7ul,
0x68581511ul,
0xffc00b31ul,
0xf70e5939ul,
0x3070dd17ul,
0x367cd507ul,
0xc1059ed8ul,
},
.SHA256 = {
0x5be0cd19ul,
0x1f83d9abul,
0x9b05688cul,
0x510e527ful,
0xa54ff53aul,
0x3c6ef372ul,
0xbb67ae85ul,
0x6a09e667ul,
},
.SHA384 = {
0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ull,
0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ull,
0x8eb44a8768581511ull,
0x67332667ffc00b31ull,
0x152fecd8f70e5939ull,
0x9159015a3070dd17ull,
0x629a292a367cd507ull,
0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ull,
},
.SHA512 = {
0x5be0cd19137e2179ull,
0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bull,
0x9b05688c2b3e6c1full,
0x510e527fade682d1ull,
0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ull,
0x3c6ef372fe94f82bull,
0xbb67ae8584caa73bull,
0x6a09e667f3bcc908ull,
},
};
/*
* Ensure vectors do not cross a page boundary.
*
* Disabled due to a new Clang error: "expression is not an integral constant
* expression." GCC (cross toolchain) seems to handle this assertion with
* _Static_assert just fine.
*/
#if 0
CTASSERT(PAGE_SIZE - ((uintptr_t)&SHA_H % PAGE_SIZE) >= sizeof(SHA_H));
#endif
const struct SHA_Defn {
enum sha_version version;
const void *H_vectors;
size_t H_size;
struct auth_hash *axf;
enum ccp_sha_type engine_type;
} SHA_definitions[] = {
{
.version = SHA1,
.H_vectors = SHA_H.SHA1,
.H_size = sizeof(SHA_H.SHA1),
.axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1,
.engine_type = CCP_SHA_TYPE_1,
},
#if 0
{
.version = SHA2_224,
.H_vectors = SHA_H.SHA224,
.H_size = sizeof(SHA_H.SHA224),
.axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_224,
.engine_type = CCP_SHA_TYPE_224,
},
#endif
{
.version = SHA2_256,
.H_vectors = SHA_H.SHA256,
.H_size = sizeof(SHA_H.SHA256),
.axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256,
.engine_type = CCP_SHA_TYPE_256,
},
{
.version = SHA2_384,
.H_vectors = SHA_H.SHA384,
.H_size = sizeof(SHA_H.SHA384),
.axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384,
.engine_type = CCP_SHA_TYPE_384,
},
{
.version = SHA2_512,
.H_vectors = SHA_H.SHA512,
.H_size = sizeof(SHA_H.SHA512),
.axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512,
.engine_type = CCP_SHA_TYPE_512,
},
};
static int __must_check
ccp_sha_single_desc(struct ccp_queue *qp, const struct SHA_Defn *defn,
vm_paddr_t addr, size_t len, bool start, bool end, uint64_t msgbits)
{
struct ccp_desc *desc;
if (ccp_queue_get_ring_space(qp) == 0)
return (EAGAIN);
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
memset(desc, 0, sizeof(*desc));
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_SHA;
desc->som = start;
desc->eom = end;
desc->sha.type = defn->engine_type;
desc->length = len;
if (end) {
desc->sha_len_lo = (uint32_t)msgbits;
desc->sha_len_hi = msgbits >> 32;
}
desc->src_lo = (uint32_t)addr;
desc->src_hi = addr >> 32;
desc->src_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM;
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_SHA);
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) % (1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
return (0);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_sha(struct ccp_queue *qp, enum sha_version version, struct sglist *sgl_src,
struct sglist *sgl_dst, const struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx)
{
const struct SHA_Defn *defn;
struct sglist_seg *seg;
size_t i, msgsize, remaining, nb;
uint32_t lsbaddr;
int error;
for (i = 0; i < nitems(SHA_definitions); i++)
if (SHA_definitions[i].version == version)
break;
if (i == nitems(SHA_definitions))
return (EINVAL);
defn = &SHA_definitions[i];
/* XXX validate input ??? */
/* Load initial SHA state into LSB */
/* XXX ensure H_vectors don't span page boundaries */
error = ccp_passthrough(qp, ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_SHA),
CCP_MEMTYPE_SB, pmap_kextract((vm_offset_t)defn->H_vectors),
CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM, roundup2(defn->H_size, LSB_ENTRY_SIZE),
CCP_PASSTHRU_BYTESWAP_NOOP, CCP_PASSTHRU_BITWISE_NOOP, false,
NULL);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/* Execute series of SHA updates on correctly sized buffers */
msgsize = 0;
for (i = 0; i < sgl_src->sg_nseg; i++) {
seg = &sgl_src->sg_segs[i];
msgsize += seg->ss_len;
error = ccp_sha_single_desc(qp, defn, seg->ss_paddr,
seg->ss_len, i == 0, i == sgl_src->sg_nseg - 1,
msgsize << 3);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
/* Copy result out to sgl_dst */
remaining = roundup2(defn->H_size, LSB_ENTRY_SIZE);
lsbaddr = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_SHA);
for (i = 0; i < sgl_dst->sg_nseg; i++) {
seg = &sgl_dst->sg_segs[i];
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
/* crp lengths are int, so 32-bit min() is ok. */
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
nb = min(remaining, seg->ss_len);
error = ccp_passthrough(qp, seg->ss_paddr, CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM,
lsbaddr, CCP_MEMTYPE_SB, nb, CCP_PASSTHRU_BYTESWAP_NOOP,
CCP_PASSTHRU_BITWISE_NOOP,
(cctx != NULL) ? (nb == remaining) : false,
(nb == remaining) ? cctx : NULL);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
remaining -= nb;
lsbaddr += nb;
if (remaining == 0)
break;
}
return (0);
}
static void
byteswap256(uint64_t *buffer)
{
uint64_t t;
t = bswap64(buffer[3]);
buffer[3] = bswap64(buffer[0]);
buffer[0] = t;
t = bswap64(buffer[2]);
buffer[2] = bswap64(buffer[1]);
buffer[1] = t;
}
/*
* Translate CCP internal LSB hash format into a standard hash ouput.
*
* Manipulates input buffer with byteswap256 operation.
*/
static void
ccp_sha_copy_result(char *output, char *buffer, enum sha_version version)
{
const struct SHA_Defn *defn;
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < nitems(SHA_definitions); i++)
if (SHA_definitions[i].version == version)
break;
if (i == nitems(SHA_definitions))
panic("bogus sha version auth_mode %u\n", (unsigned)version);
defn = &SHA_definitions[i];
/* Swap 256bit manually -- DMA engine can, but with limitations */
byteswap256((void *)buffer);
if (defn->axf->hashsize > LSB_ENTRY_SIZE)
byteswap256((void *)(buffer + LSB_ENTRY_SIZE));
switch (defn->version) {
case SHA1:
memcpy(output, buffer + 12, defn->axf->hashsize);
break;
#if 0
case SHA2_224:
memcpy(output, buffer + XXX, defn->axf->hashsize);
break;
#endif
case SHA2_256:
memcpy(output, buffer, defn->axf->hashsize);
break;
case SHA2_384:
memcpy(output,
buffer + LSB_ENTRY_SIZE * 3 - defn->axf->hashsize,
defn->axf->hashsize - LSB_ENTRY_SIZE);
memcpy(output + defn->axf->hashsize - LSB_ENTRY_SIZE, buffer,
LSB_ENTRY_SIZE);
break;
case SHA2_512:
memcpy(output, buffer + LSB_ENTRY_SIZE, LSB_ENTRY_SIZE);
memcpy(output + LSB_ENTRY_SIZE, buffer, LSB_ENTRY_SIZE);
break;
}
}
static void
ccp_do_hmac_done(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
struct cryptop *crp, int error)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
{
char ihash[SHA2_512_HASH_LEN /* max hash len */];
union authctx auth_ctx;
struct auth_hash *axf;
axf = s->hmac.auth_hash;
s->pending--;
if (error != 0) {
crp->crp_etype = error;
goto out;
}
/* Do remaining outer hash over small inner hash in software */
axf->Init(&auth_ctx);
axf->Update(&auth_ctx, s->hmac.opad, axf->blocksize);
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
ccp_sha_copy_result(ihash, s->hmac.res, s->hmac.auth_mode);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
#if 0
INSECURE_DEBUG(dev, "%s sha intermediate=%64D\n", __func__,
(u_char *)ihash, " ");
#endif
axf->Update(&auth_ctx, ihash, axf->hashsize);
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
axf->Final(s->hmac.res, &auth_ctx);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (crp->crp_op & CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST) {
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, s->hmac.hash_len,
ihash);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(s->hmac.res, ihash, s->hmac.hash_len) != 0)
crp->crp_etype = EBADMSG;
} else
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, s->hmac.hash_len,
s->hmac.res);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/* Avoid leaking key material */
explicit_bzero(&auth_ctx, sizeof(auth_ctx));
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
explicit_bzero(s->hmac.res, sizeof(s->hmac.res));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
out:
crypto_done(crp);
}
static void
ccp_hmac_done(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, void *vcrp,
int error)
{
struct cryptop *crp;
crp = vcrp;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
ccp_do_hmac_done(qp, s, crp, error);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_hmac(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
const struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
{
device_t dev;
struct auth_hash *axf;
int error;
dev = qp->cq_softc->dev;
axf = s->hmac.auth_hash;
/*
* Populate the SGL describing inside hash contents. We want to hash
* the ipad (key XOR fixed bit pattern) concatenated with the user
* data.
*/
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_ulptx);
error = sglist_append(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, s->hmac.ipad, axf->blocksize);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) {
error = sglist_append_sglist(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_crp,
crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
error = sglist_append_sglist(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0) {
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: sglist too short\n", __func__);
return (error);
}
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
/* Populate SGL for output -- use hmac.res buffer. */
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_dst);
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
error = sglist_append(qp->cq_sg_dst, s->hmac.res,
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
roundup2(axf->hashsize, LSB_ENTRY_SIZE));
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_sha(qp, s->hmac.auth_mode, qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_dst,
cctx);
if (error != 0) {
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: ccp_sha error\n", __func__);
return (error);
}
return (0);
}
int __must_check
ccp_hmac(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct ccp_completion_ctx ctx;
ctx.callback_fn = ccp_hmac_done;
ctx.callback_arg = crp;
ctx.session = s;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
return (ccp_do_hmac(qp, s, crp, &ctx));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
}
static void
ccp_byteswap(char *data, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
char t;
len--;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++, len--) {
t = data[i];
data[i] = data[len];
data[len] = t;
}
}
static void
ccp_blkcipher_done(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, void *vcrp,
int error)
{
struct cryptop *crp;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
explicit_bzero(&s->blkcipher.iv, sizeof(s->blkcipher.iv));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
crp = vcrp;
s->pending--;
if (error != 0)
crp->crp_etype = error;
DPRINTF(qp->cq_softc->dev, "%s: qp=%p crp=%p\n", __func__, qp, crp);
crypto_done(crp);
}
static void
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
ccp_collect_iv(struct cryptop *crp, const struct crypto_session_params *csp,
char *iv)
{
crypto_read_iv(crp, iv);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/*
* If the input IV is 12 bytes, append an explicit counter of 1.
*/
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GCM_16 &&
csp->csp_ivlen == 12)
*(uint32_t *)&iv[12] = htobe32(1);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS &&
csp->csp_ivlen < AES_BLOCK_LEN)
memset(&iv[csp->csp_ivlen], 0, AES_BLOCK_LEN - csp->csp_ivlen);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/* Reverse order of IV material for HW */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
INSECURE_DEBUG(NULL, "%s: IV: %16D len: %u\n", __func__, iv, " ",
csp->csp_ivlen);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/*
* For unknown reasons, XTS mode expects the IV in the reverse byte
* order to every other AES mode.
*/
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg != CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
ccp_byteswap(iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(struct ccp_queue *qp, uint32_t lsbaddr, const void *src,
size_t len)
{
int error;
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_ulptx);
error = sglist_append(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, __DECONST(void *, src), len);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_passthrough_sgl(qp, lsbaddr, true, qp->cq_sg_ulptx, len,
false, NULL);
return (error);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_xts(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
enum ccp_cipher_dir dir, const struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
{
struct ccp_desc *desc;
device_t dev;
unsigned i;
enum ccp_xts_unitsize usize;
/* IV and Key data are already loaded */
dev = qp->cq_softc->dev;
for (i = 0; i < nitems(ccp_xts_unitsize_map); i++)
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (ccp_xts_unitsize_map[i].cxu_size ==
crp->crp_payload_length) {
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
usize = ccp_xts_unitsize_map[i].cxu_id;
break;
}
if (i >= nitems(ccp_xts_unitsize_map))
return (EINVAL);
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; i++) {
struct sglist_seg *seg;
seg = &qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i];
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_XTS_AES;
desc->som = (i == 0);
desc->eom = (i == qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg - 1);
desc->ioc = (desc->eom && cctx != NULL);
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: XTS %u: som:%d eom:%d ioc:%d dir:%d\n",
__func__, qp->cq_tail, (int)desc->som, (int)desc->eom,
(int)desc->ioc, (int)dir);
if (desc->ioc)
memcpy(&qp->completions_ring[qp->cq_tail], cctx,
sizeof(*cctx));
desc->aes_xts.encrypt = dir;
desc->aes_xts.type = s->blkcipher.cipher_type;
desc->aes_xts.size = usize;
DPRINTF(dev, "XXX %s: XTS %u: type:%u size:%u\n", __func__,
qp->cq_tail, (unsigned)desc->aes_xts.type,
(unsigned)desc->aes_xts.size);
desc->length = seg->ss_len;
desc->src_lo = (uint32_t)seg->ss_paddr;
desc->src_hi = (seg->ss_paddr >> 32);
desc->src_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM;
/* Crypt in-place */
desc->dst_lo = desc->src_lo;
desc->dst_hi = desc->src_hi;
desc->dst_mem = desc->src_mem;
desc->key_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY);
desc->key_hi = 0;
desc->key_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV);
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) %
(1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
}
return (0);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_blkcipher(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
struct cryptop *crp, const struct ccp_completion_ctx *cctx)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
{
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
struct ccp_desc *desc;
char *keydata;
device_t dev;
enum ccp_cipher_dir dir;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
int error, iv_len;
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
size_t keydata_len;
unsigned i, j;
dev = qp->cq_softc->dev;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0 || crp->crp_payload_length == 0) {
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: empty\n", __func__);
return (EINVAL);
}
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if ((crp->crp_payload_length % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) {
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: len modulo: %d\n", __func__,
crp->crp_payload_length);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* Individual segments must be multiples of AES block size for the HW
* to process it. Non-compliant inputs aren't bogus, just not doable
* on this hardware.
*/
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_crp->sg_nseg; i++)
if ((qp->cq_sg_crp->sg_segs[i].ss_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) {
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: seg modulo: %zu\n", __func__,
qp->cq_sg_crp->sg_segs[i].ss_len);
return (EINVAL);
}
/* Gather IV/nonce data */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
ccp_collect_iv(crp, csp, s->blkcipher.iv);
iv_len = csp->csp_ivlen;
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
iv_len = AES_BLOCK_LEN;
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
dir = CCP_CIPHER_DIR_ENCRYPT;
else
dir = CCP_CIPHER_DIR_DECRYPT;
/* Set up passthrough op(s) to copy IV into LSB */
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp, ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV),
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
s->blkcipher.iv, iv_len);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/*
* Initialize keydata and keydata_len for GCC. The default case of the
* following switch is impossible to reach, but GCC doesn't know that.
*/
keydata_len = 0;
keydata = NULL;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
switch (csp->csp_cipher_alg) {
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
case CRYPTO_AES_XTS:
for (j = 0; j < nitems(ccp_xts_unitsize_map); j++)
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (ccp_xts_unitsize_map[j].cxu_size ==
crp->crp_payload_length)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
break;
/* Input buffer must be a supported UnitSize */
if (j >= nitems(ccp_xts_unitsize_map)) {
device_printf(dev, "%s: rejected block size: %u\n",
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
__func__, crp->crp_payload_length);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
return (EOPNOTSUPP);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
case CRYPTO_AES_ICM:
keydata = s->blkcipher.enckey;
keydata_len = s->blkcipher.key_len;
break;
}
INSECURE_DEBUG(dev, "%s: KEY(%zu): %16D\n", __func__, keydata_len,
keydata, " ");
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
INSECURE_DEBUG(dev, "%s: KEY(XTS): %64D\n", __func__, keydata, " ");
/* Reverse order of key material for HW */
ccp_byteswap(keydata, keydata_len);
/* Store key material into LSB to avoid page boundaries */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS) {
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/*
* XTS mode uses 2 256-bit vectors for the primary key and the
* tweak key. For 128-bit keys, the vectors are zero-padded.
*
* After byteswapping the combined OCF-provided K1:K2 vector
* above, we need to reverse the order again so the hardware
* gets the swapped keys in the order K1':K2'.
*/
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY + 1), keydata,
keydata_len / 2);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY),
keydata + (keydata_len / 2), keydata_len / 2);
/* Zero-pad 128 bit keys */
if (keydata_len == 32) {
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY) +
keydata_len / 2, g_zeroes, keydata_len / 2);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY + 1) +
keydata_len / 2, g_zeroes, keydata_len / 2);
}
} else
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY), keydata,
keydata_len);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/*
* Point SGLs at the subset of cryptop buffer contents representing the
* data.
*/
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_ulptx);
error = sglist_append_sglist(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
INSECURE_DEBUG(dev, "%s: Contents: %16D\n", __func__,
(void *)PHYS_TO_DMAP(qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[0].ss_paddr), " ");
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: starting AES ops @ %u\n", __func__, qp->cq_tail);
if (ccp_queue_get_ring_space(qp) < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg)
return (EAGAIN);
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_XTS)
return (ccp_do_xts(qp, s, crp, dir, cctx));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; i++) {
struct sglist_seg *seg;
seg = &qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i];
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_AES;
desc->som = (i == 0);
desc->eom = (i == qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg - 1);
desc->ioc = (desc->eom && cctx != NULL);
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: AES %u: som:%d eom:%d ioc:%d dir:%d\n",
__func__, qp->cq_tail, (int)desc->som, (int)desc->eom,
(int)desc->ioc, (int)dir);
if (desc->ioc)
memcpy(&qp->completions_ring[qp->cq_tail], cctx,
sizeof(*cctx));
desc->aes.encrypt = dir;
desc->aes.mode = s->blkcipher.cipher_mode;
desc->aes.type = s->blkcipher.cipher_type;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (csp->csp_cipher_alg == CRYPTO_AES_ICM)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/*
* Size of CTR value in bits, - 1. ICM mode uses all
* 128 bits as counter.
*/
desc->aes.size = 127;
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: AES %u: mode:%u type:%u size:%u\n", __func__,
qp->cq_tail, (unsigned)desc->aes.mode,
(unsigned)desc->aes.type, (unsigned)desc->aes.size);
desc->length = seg->ss_len;
desc->src_lo = (uint32_t)seg->ss_paddr;
desc->src_hi = (seg->ss_paddr >> 32);
desc->src_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM;
/* Crypt in-place */
desc->dst_lo = desc->src_lo;
desc->dst_hi = desc->src_hi;
desc->dst_mem = desc->src_mem;
desc->key_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY);
desc->key_hi = 0;
desc->key_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV);
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) %
(1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
}
return (0);
}
int __must_check
ccp_blkcipher(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct ccp_completion_ctx ctx;
ctx.callback_fn = ccp_blkcipher_done;
ctx.session = s;
ctx.callback_arg = crp;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
return (ccp_do_blkcipher(qp, s, crp, &ctx));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
}
static void
ccp_authenc_done(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, void *vcrp,
int error)
{
struct cryptop *crp;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
explicit_bzero(&s->blkcipher.iv, sizeof(s->blkcipher.iv));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
crp = vcrp;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
ccp_do_hmac_done(qp, s, crp, error);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
}
int __must_check
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
ccp_authenc(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
{
struct ccp_completion_ctx ctx;
int error;
ctx.callback_fn = ccp_authenc_done;
ctx.session = s;
ctx.callback_arg = crp;
/* Perform first operation */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
error = ccp_do_blkcipher(qp, s, crp, NULL);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
else
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
error = ccp_do_hmac(qp, s, crp, NULL);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/* Perform second operation */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
error = ccp_do_hmac(qp, s, crp, &ctx);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
else
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
error = ccp_do_blkcipher(qp, s, crp, &ctx);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
return (error);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_ghash_aad(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s)
{
struct ccp_desc *desc;
struct sglist_seg *seg;
unsigned i;
if (ccp_queue_get_ring_space(qp) < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg)
return (EAGAIN);
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; i++) {
seg = &qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i];
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_AES;
desc->aes.mode = CCP_AES_MODE_GHASH;
desc->aes.type = s->blkcipher.cipher_type;
desc->aes.encrypt = CCP_AES_MODE_GHASH_AAD;
desc->som = (i == 0);
desc->length = seg->ss_len;
desc->src_lo = (uint32_t)seg->ss_paddr;
desc->src_hi = (seg->ss_paddr >> 32);
desc->src_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM;
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV);
desc->key_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY);
desc->key_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) %
(1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
}
return (0);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_gctr(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s,
enum ccp_cipher_dir dir, struct sglist_seg *seg, bool som, bool eom)
{
struct ccp_desc *desc;
if (ccp_queue_get_ring_space(qp) == 0)
return (EAGAIN);
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_AES;
desc->aes.mode = CCP_AES_MODE_GCTR;
desc->aes.type = s->blkcipher.cipher_type;
desc->aes.encrypt = dir;
desc->aes.size = 8 * (seg->ss_len % GMAC_BLOCK_LEN) - 1;
desc->som = som;
desc->eom = eom;
/* Trailing bytes will be masked off by aes.size above. */
desc->length = roundup2(seg->ss_len, GMAC_BLOCK_LEN);
desc->dst_lo = desc->src_lo = (uint32_t)seg->ss_paddr;
desc->dst_hi = desc->src_hi = seg->ss_paddr >> 32;
desc->dst_mem = desc->src_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SYSTEM;
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV);
desc->key_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY);
desc->key_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) %
(1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
return (0);
}
static int __must_check
ccp_do_ghash_final(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s)
{
struct ccp_desc *desc;
if (ccp_queue_get_ring_space(qp) == 0)
return (EAGAIN);
desc = &qp->desc_ring[qp->cq_tail];
desc->engine = CCP_ENGINE_AES;
desc->aes.mode = CCP_AES_MODE_GHASH;
desc->aes.type = s->blkcipher.cipher_type;
desc->aes.encrypt = CCP_AES_MODE_GHASH_FINAL;
desc->length = GMAC_BLOCK_LEN;
desc->src_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_GHASH_IN);
desc->src_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
desc->lsb_ctx_id = ccp_queue_lsb_entry(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV);
desc->key_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY);
desc->key_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
desc->dst_lo = ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_GHASH);
desc->dst_mem = CCP_MEMTYPE_SB;
qp->cq_tail = (qp->cq_tail + 1) %
(1 << qp->cq_softc->ring_size_order);
return (0);
}
static void
ccp_gcm_done(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, void *vcrp,
int error)
{
char tag[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
struct cryptop *crp;
crp = vcrp;
s->pending--;
if (error != 0) {
crp->crp_etype = error;
goto out;
}
/* Encrypt is done. Decrypt needs to verify tag. */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
goto out;
/* Copy in message tag. */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, s->gmac.hash_len, tag);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/* Verify tag against computed GMAC */
if (timingsafe_bcmp(tag, s->gmac.final_block, s->gmac.hash_len) != 0)
crp->crp_etype = EBADMSG;
out:
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
explicit_bzero(&s->blkcipher.iv, sizeof(s->blkcipher.iv));
explicit_bzero(&s->gmac.final_block, sizeof(s->gmac.final_block));
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
crypto_done(crp);
}
int __must_check
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
ccp_gcm(struct ccp_queue *qp, struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
{
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
const struct crypto_session_params *csp;
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
struct ccp_completion_ctx ctx;
enum ccp_cipher_dir dir;
device_t dev;
unsigned i;
int error;
if (s->blkcipher.key_len == 0)
return (EINVAL);
dev = qp->cq_softc->dev;
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op))
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
dir = CCP_CIPHER_DIR_ENCRYPT;
else
dir = CCP_CIPHER_DIR_DECRYPT;
/* Zero initial GHASH portion of context */
memset(s->blkcipher.iv, 0, sizeof(s->blkcipher.iv));
/* Gather IV data */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
csp = crypto_get_params(crp->crp_session);
ccp_collect_iv(crp, csp, s->blkcipher.iv);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/* Reverse order of key material for HW */
ccp_byteswap(s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len);
/* Prepare input buffer of concatenated lengths for final GHASH */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
be64enc(s->gmac.final_block, (uint64_t)crp->crp_aad_length * 8);
be64enc(&s->gmac.final_block[8], (uint64_t)crp->crp_payload_length * 8);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
/* Send IV + initial zero GHASH, key data, and lengths buffer to LSB */
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp, ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV),
s->blkcipher.iv, 32);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp, ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_KEY),
s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_GHASH_IN), s->gmac.final_block,
GMAC_BLOCK_LEN);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/* First step - compute GHASH over AAD */
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
if (crp->crp_aad_length != 0) {
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_ulptx);
error = sglist_append_sglist(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
crp->crp_aad_start, crp->crp_aad_length);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/* This engine cannot process non-block multiple AAD data. */
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; i++)
if ((qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i].ss_len %
GMAC_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) {
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: AD seg modulo: %zu\n",
__func__,
qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i].ss_len);
return (EINVAL);
}
error = ccp_do_ghash_aad(qp, s);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
/* Feed data piece by piece into GCTR */
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_ulptx);
error = sglist_append_sglist(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
crp->crp_payload_start, crp->crp_payload_length);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/*
* All segments except the last must be even multiples of AES block
* size for the HW to process it. Non-compliant inputs aren't bogus,
* just not doable on this hardware.
*
* XXX: Well, the hardware will produce a valid tag for shorter final
* segment inputs, but it will still write out a block-sized plaintext
* or ciphertext chunk. For a typical CRP this tramples trailing data,
* including the provided message tag. So, reject such inputs for now.
*/
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; i++)
if ((qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i].ss_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) {
DPRINTF(dev, "%s: seg modulo: %zu\n", __func__,
qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i].ss_len);
return (EINVAL);
}
for (i = 0; i < qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg; i++) {
struct sglist_seg *seg;
seg = &qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_segs[i];
error = ccp_do_gctr(qp, s, dir, seg,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
(i == 0 && crp->crp_aad_length == 0),
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
i == (qp->cq_sg_ulptx->sg_nseg - 1));
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
/* Send just initial IV (not GHASH!) to LSB again */
error = ccp_do_pst_to_lsb(qp, ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_IV),
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
s->blkcipher.iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
if (error != 0)
return (error);
ctx.callback_fn = ccp_gcm_done;
ctx.session = s;
ctx.callback_arg = crp;
/* Compute final hash and copy result back */
error = ccp_do_ghash_final(qp, s);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
/* When encrypting, copy computed tag out to caller buffer. */
sglist_reset(qp->cq_sg_ulptx);
if (dir == CCP_CIPHER_DIR_ENCRYPT)
error = sglist_append_sglist(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, qp->cq_sg_crp,
Refactor driver and consumer interfaces for OCF (in-kernel crypto). - The linked list of cryptoini structures used in session initialization is replaced with a new flat structure: struct crypto_session_params. This session includes a new mode to define how the other fields should be interpreted. Available modes include: - COMPRESS (for compression/decompression) - CIPHER (for simply encryption/decryption) - DIGEST (computing and verifying digests) - AEAD (combined auth and encryption such as AES-GCM and AES-CCM) - ETA (combined auth and encryption using encrypt-then-authenticate) Additional modes could be added in the future (e.g. if we wanted to support TLS MtE for AES-CBC in the kernel we could add a new mode for that. TLS modes might also affect how AAD is interpreted, etc.) The flat structure also includes the key lengths and algorithms as before. However, code doesn't have to walk the linked list and switch on the algorithm to determine which key is the auth key vs encryption key. The 'csp_auth_*' fields are always used for auth keys and settings and 'csp_cipher_*' for cipher. (Compression algorithms are stored in csp_cipher_alg.) - Drivers no longer register a list of supported algorithms. This doesn't quite work when you factor in modes (e.g. a driver might support both AES-CBC and SHA2-256-HMAC separately but not combined for ETA). Instead, a new 'crypto_probesession' method has been added to the kobj interface for symmteric crypto drivers. This method returns a negative value on success (similar to how device_probe works) and the crypto framework uses this value to pick the "best" driver. There are three constants for hardware (e.g. ccr), accelerated software (e.g. aesni), and plain software (cryptosoft) that give preference in that order. One effect of this is that if you request only hardware when creating a new session, you will no longer get a session using accelerated software. Another effect is that the default setting to disallow software crypto via /dev/crypto now disables accelerated software. Once a driver is chosen, 'crypto_newsession' is invoked as before. - Crypto operations are now solely described by the flat 'cryptop' structure. The linked list of descriptors has been removed. A separate enum has been added to describe the type of data buffer in use instead of using CRYPTO_F_* flags to make it easier to add more types in the future if needed (e.g. wired userspace buffers for zero-copy). It will also make it easier to re-introduce separate input and output buffers (in-kernel TLS would benefit from this). Try to make the flags related to IV handling less insane: - CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE means that the IV is stored in the 'crp_iv' member of the operation structure. If this flag is not set, the IV is stored in the data buffer at the 'crp_iv_start' offset. - CRYPTO_F_IV_GENERATE means that a random IV should be generated and stored into the data buffer. This cannot be used with CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. If a consumer wants to deal with explicit vs implicit IVs, etc. it can always generate the IV however it needs and store partial IVs in the buffer and the full IV/nonce in crp_iv and set CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE. The layout of the buffer is now described via fields in cryptop. crp_aad_start and crp_aad_length define the boundaries of any AAD. Previously with GCM and CCM you defined an auth crd with this range, but for ETA your auth crd had to span both the AAD and plaintext (and they had to be adjacent). crp_payload_start and crp_payload_length define the boundaries of the plaintext/ciphertext. Modes that only do a single operation (COMPRESS, CIPHER, DIGEST) should only use this region and leave the AAD region empty. If a digest is present (or should be generated), it's starting location is marked by crp_digest_start. Instead of using the CRD_F_ENCRYPT flag to determine the direction of the operation, cryptop now includes an 'op' field defining the operation to perform. For digests I've added a new VERIFY digest mode which assumes a digest is present in the input and fails the request with EBADMSG if it doesn't match the internally-computed digest. GCM and CCM already assumed this, and the new AEAD mode requires this for decryption. The new ETA mode now also requires this for decryption, so IPsec and GELI no longer do their own authentication verification. Simple DIGEST operations can also do this, though there are no in-tree consumers. To eventually support some refcounting to close races, the session cookie is now passed to crypto_getop() and clients should no longer set crp_sesssion directly. - Assymteric crypto operation structures should be allocated via crypto_getkreq() and freed via crypto_freekreq(). This permits the crypto layer to track open asym requests and close races with a driver trying to unregister while asym requests are in flight. - crypto_copyback, crypto_copydata, crypto_apply, and crypto_contiguous_subsegment now accept the 'crp' object as the first parameter instead of individual members. This makes it easier to deal with different buffer types in the future as well as separate input and output buffers. It's also simpler for driver writers to use. - bus_dmamap_load_crp() loads a DMA mapping for a crypto buffer. This understands the various types of buffers so that drivers that use DMA do not have to be aware of different buffer types. - Helper routines now exist to build an auth context for HMAC IPAD and OPAD. This reduces some duplicated work among drivers. - Key buffers are now treated as const throughout the framework and in device drivers. However, session key buffers provided when a session is created are expected to remain alive for the duration of the session. - GCM and CCM sessions now only specify a cipher algorithm and a cipher key. The redundant auth information is not needed or used. - For cryptosoft, split up the code a bit such that the 'process' callback now invokes a function pointer in the session. This function pointer is set based on the mode (in effect) though it simplifies a few edge cases that would otherwise be in the switch in 'process'. It does split up GCM vs CCM which I think is more readable even if there is some duplication. - I changed /dev/crypto to support GMAC requests using CRYPTO_AES_NIST_GMAC as an auth algorithm and updated cryptocheck to work with it. - Combined cipher and auth sessions via /dev/crypto now always use ETA mode. The COP_F_CIPHER_FIRST flag is now a no-op that is ignored. This was actually documented as being true in crypto(4) before, but the code had not implemented this before I added the CIPHER_FIRST flag. - I have not yet updated /dev/crypto to be aware of explicit modes for sessions. I will probably do that at some point in the future as well as teach it about IV/nonce and tag lengths for AEAD so we can support all of the NIST KAT tests for GCM and CCM. - I've split up the exising crypto.9 manpage into several pages of which many are written from scratch. - I have converted all drivers and consumers in the tree and verified that they compile, but I have not tested all of them. I have tested the following drivers: - cryptosoft - aesni (AES only) - blake2 - ccr and the following consumers: - cryptodev - IPsec - ktls_ocf - GELI (lightly) I have not tested the following: - ccp - aesni with sha - hifn - kgssapi_krb5 - ubsec - padlock - safe - armv8_crypto (aarch64) - glxsb (i386) - sec (ppc) - cesa (armv7) - cryptocteon (mips64) - nlmsec (mips64) Discussed with: cem Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23677
2020-03-27 18:25:23 +00:00
crp->crp_digest_start, s->gmac.hash_len);
Add ccp(4): experimental driver for AMD Crypto Co-Processor * Registers TRNG source for random(4) * Finds available queues, LSBs; allocates static objects * Allocates a shared MSI-X for all queues. The hardware does not have separate interrupts per queue. Working interrupt mode driver. * Computes SHA hashes, HMAC. Passes cryptotest.py, cryptocheck tests. * Does AES-CBC, CTR mode, and XTS. cryptotest.py and cryptocheck pass. * Support for "authenc" (AES + HMAC). (SHA1 seems to result in "unaligned" cleartext inputs from cryptocheck -- which the engine cannot handle. SHA2 seems to work fine.) * GCM passes for block-multiple AAD, input lengths Largely based on ccr(4), part of cxgbe(4). Rough performance averages on AMD Ryzen 1950X (4kB buffer): aesni: SHA1: ~8300 Mb/s SHA256: ~8000 Mb/s ccp: ~630 Mb/s SHA256: ~660 Mb/s SHA512: ~700 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1800 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s As you can see, performance is poor in comparison to aesni(4) and even cryptosoft (due to high setup cost). At a larger buffer size (128kB), throughput is a little better (but still worse than aesni(4)): aesni: SHA1:~10400 Mb/s SHA256: ~9950 Mb/s ccp: ~2200 Mb/s SHA256: ~2600 Mb/s SHA512: ~3800 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s SHA256: ~1800 Mb/s SHA512: ~2700 Mb/s AES performance has a similar story: aesni: 4kB: ~11250 Mb/s 128kB: ~11250 Mb/s ccp: ~350 Mb/s 128kB: ~4600 Mb/s cryptosoft: ~1750 Mb/s 128kB: ~1700 Mb/s This driver is EXPERIMENTAL. You should verify cryptographic results on typical and corner case inputs from your application against a known- good implementation. Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12723
2018-01-18 22:01:30 +00:00
else
/*
* For decrypting, copy the computed tag out to our session
* buffer to verify in our callback.
*/
error = sglist_append(qp->cq_sg_ulptx, s->gmac.final_block,
s->gmac.hash_len);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ccp_passthrough_sgl(qp,
ccp_queue_lsb_address(qp, LSB_ENTRY_GHASH), false, qp->cq_sg_ulptx,
s->gmac.hash_len, true, &ctx);
return (error);
}
#define MAX_TRNG_RETRIES 10
u_int
random_ccp_read(void *v, u_int c)
{
uint32_t *buf;
u_int i, j;
KASSERT(c % sizeof(*buf) == 0, ("%u not multiple of u_long", c));
buf = v;
for (i = c; i > 0; i -= sizeof(*buf)) {
for (j = 0; j < MAX_TRNG_RETRIES; j++) {
*buf = ccp_read_4(g_ccp_softc, TRNG_OUT_OFFSET);
if (*buf != 0)
break;
}
if (j == MAX_TRNG_RETRIES)
return (0);
buf++;
}
return (c);
}
#ifdef DDB
void
db_ccp_show_hw(struct ccp_softc *sc)
{
db_printf(" queue mask: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, CMD_QUEUE_MASK_OFFSET));
db_printf(" queue prio: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, CMD_QUEUE_PRIO_OFFSET));
db_printf(" reqid: 0x%x\n", ccp_read_4(sc, CMD_REQID_CONFIG_OFFSET));
db_printf(" trng output: 0x%x\n", ccp_read_4(sc, TRNG_OUT_OFFSET));
db_printf(" cmd timeout: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, CMD_CMD_TIMEOUT_OFFSET));
db_printf(" lsb public mask lo: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, LSB_PUBLIC_MASK_LO_OFFSET));
db_printf(" lsb public mask hi: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, LSB_PUBLIC_MASK_HI_OFFSET));
db_printf(" lsb private mask lo: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, LSB_PRIVATE_MASK_LO_OFFSET));
db_printf(" lsb private mask hi: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_4(sc, LSB_PRIVATE_MASK_HI_OFFSET));
db_printf(" version: 0x%x\n", ccp_read_4(sc, VERSION_REG));
}
void
db_ccp_show_queue_hw(struct ccp_queue *qp)
{
const struct ccp_error_code *ec;
struct ccp_softc *sc;
uint32_t status, error, esource, faultblock, headlo, qcontrol;
unsigned q, i;
sc = qp->cq_softc;
q = qp->cq_qindex;
qcontrol = ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_CONTROL_BASE);
db_printf(" qcontrol: 0x%x%s%s\n", qcontrol,
(qcontrol & CMD_Q_RUN) ? " RUN" : "",
(qcontrol & CMD_Q_HALTED) ? " HALTED" : "");
db_printf(" tail_lo: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_TAIL_LO_BASE));
headlo = ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_HEAD_LO_BASE);
db_printf(" head_lo: 0x%x\n", headlo);
db_printf(" int enable: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_INT_ENABLE_BASE));
db_printf(" interrupt status: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_INTERRUPT_STATUS_BASE));
status = ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_STATUS_BASE);
db_printf(" status: 0x%x\n", status);
db_printf(" int stats: 0x%x\n",
ccp_read_queue_4(sc, q, CMD_Q_INT_STATUS_BASE));
error = status & STATUS_ERROR_MASK;
if (error == 0)
return;
esource = (status >> STATUS_ERRORSOURCE_SHIFT) &
STATUS_ERRORSOURCE_MASK;
faultblock = (status >> STATUS_VLSB_FAULTBLOCK_SHIFT) &
STATUS_VLSB_FAULTBLOCK_MASK;
ec = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < nitems(ccp_error_codes); i++)
if (ccp_error_codes[i].ce_code == error)
break;
if (i < nitems(ccp_error_codes))
ec = &ccp_error_codes[i];
db_printf(" Error: %s (%u) Source: %u Faulting LSB block: %u\n",
(ec != NULL) ? ec->ce_name : "(reserved)", error, esource,
faultblock);
if (ec != NULL)
db_printf(" Error description: %s\n", ec->ce_desc);
i = (headlo - (uint32_t)qp->desc_ring_bus_addr) / Q_DESC_SIZE;
db_printf(" Bad descriptor idx: %u contents:\n %32D\n", i,
(void *)&qp->desc_ring[i], " ");
}
#endif