Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2016, 2018 Robert N. M. Watson
|
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This software was developed by BAE Systems, the University of Cambridge
|
|
|
|
* Computer Laboratory, and Memorial University under DARPA/AFRL contract
|
|
|
|
* FA8650-15-C-7558 ("CADETS"), as part of the DARPA Transparent Computing
|
|
|
|
* (TC) research program.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
|
|
|
|
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/conf.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/ctype.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/malloc.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/module.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/queue.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/refcount.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dtrace.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/dtrace_bsd.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <bsm/audit.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*-
|
|
|
|
* Audit DTrace provider: allow DTrace to request that audit records be
|
|
|
|
* generated for various audit events, and then expose those records (in
|
|
|
|
* various forms) to probes. The model is that each event type has two
|
|
|
|
* probes, which use the event's name to create the probe:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - "commit" passes the kernel-internal (unserialised) kaudit_record
|
|
|
|
* synchronously (from the originating thread) of the record as we prepare
|
|
|
|
* to "commit" the record to the audit queue.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - "bsm" also passes generated BSM, and executes asynchronously in the audit
|
|
|
|
* worker thread, once it has been extracted from the audit queue. This is
|
|
|
|
* the point at which an audit record would be enqueued to the trail on
|
|
|
|
* disk, or to pipes.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* These probes support very different goals. The former executes in the
|
|
|
|
* thread originating the record, making it easier to correlate other DTrace
|
|
|
|
* probe activity with the event described in the record. The latter gives
|
|
|
|
* access to BSM-formatted events (at a cost) allowing DTrace to extract BSM
|
|
|
|
* directly an alternative mechanism to the formal audit trail and audit
|
|
|
|
* pipes.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* To generate names for numeric event IDs, userspace will push the contents
|
|
|
|
* of /etc/security/audit_event into the kernel during audit setup, much as it
|
|
|
|
* does /etc/security/audit_class. We then create the probes for each of
|
|
|
|
* those mappings. If one (or both) of the probes are enabled, then we cause
|
|
|
|
* a record to be generated (as both normal audit preselection and audit pipes
|
|
|
|
* do), and catch it on the way out during commit. There are suitable hook
|
|
|
|
* functions in the audit code that this provider can register to catch
|
|
|
|
* various events in the audit-record life cycle.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Further ponderings:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - How do we want to handle events for which there are not names -- perhaps
|
|
|
|
* a catch-all probe for those events without mappings?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - Should the evname code really be present even if DTrace isn't loaded...?
|
|
|
|
* Right now, we arrange that it is so that userspace can usefully maintain
|
|
|
|
* the list in case DTrace is later loaded (and to prevent userspace
|
|
|
|
* confusion).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - Should we add an additional set of audit:class::commit probes that use
|
|
|
|
* event class names to match broader categories of events as specified in
|
|
|
|
* /etc/security/event_class?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - If we pursue that last point, we will want to pass the name of the event
|
|
|
|
* into the probe explicitly (e.g., as arg0), since it would no longer be
|
|
|
|
* available as the probe function name.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int dtaudit_unload(void);
|
|
|
|
static void dtaudit_getargdesc(void *, dtrace_id_t, void *,
|
|
|
|
dtrace_argdesc_t *);
|
|
|
|
static void dtaudit_provide(void *, dtrace_probedesc_t *);
|
|
|
|
static void dtaudit_destroy(void *, dtrace_id_t, void *);
|
|
|
|
static void dtaudit_enable(void *, dtrace_id_t, void *);
|
|
|
|
static void dtaudit_disable(void *, dtrace_id_t, void *);
|
|
|
|
static void dtaudit_load(void *);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static dtrace_pattr_t dtaudit_attr = {
|
|
|
|
{ DTRACE_STABILITY_EVOLVING, DTRACE_STABILITY_EVOLVING, DTRACE_CLASS_COMMON },
|
|
|
|
{ DTRACE_STABILITY_PRIVATE, DTRACE_STABILITY_PRIVATE, DTRACE_CLASS_UNKNOWN },
|
|
|
|
{ DTRACE_STABILITY_PRIVATE, DTRACE_STABILITY_PRIVATE, DTRACE_CLASS_UNKNOWN },
|
|
|
|
{ DTRACE_STABILITY_EVOLVING, DTRACE_STABILITY_EVOLVING, DTRACE_CLASS_COMMON },
|
|
|
|
{ DTRACE_STABILITY_EVOLVING, DTRACE_STABILITY_EVOLVING, DTRACE_CLASS_COMMON },
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Strings for the "module" and "name" portions of the probe. The name of the
|
|
|
|
* audit event will be the "function" portion of the probe. All dtaudit
|
|
|
|
* probes therefore take the form audit:event:<event name>:commit.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static char *dtaudit_module_str = "event";
|
|
|
|
static char *dtaudit_name_commit_str = "commit";
|
|
|
|
static char *dtaudit_name_bsm_str = "bsm";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static dtrace_pops_t dtaudit_pops = {
|
|
|
|
.dtps_provide = dtaudit_provide,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_provide_module = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_enable = dtaudit_enable,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_disable = dtaudit_disable,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_suspend = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_resume = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_getargdesc = dtaudit_getargdesc,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_getargval = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_usermode = NULL,
|
|
|
|
.dtps_destroy = dtaudit_destroy
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static dtrace_provider_id_t dtaudit_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Because looking up entries in the event-to-name mapping is quite expensive,
|
|
|
|
* maintain a global flag tracking whether any dtaudit probes are enabled. If
|
|
|
|
* not, don't bother doing all that work whenever potential queries about
|
|
|
|
* events turn up during preselection or commit.
|
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB: We used to maintain our own variable in dtaudit, but now use the
|
|
|
|
* centralized audit_dtrace_enabled variable imported from the audit code.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* static uint_t dtaudit_probes_enabled;
|
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Check dtaudit policy for the event to see whether this is an event we would
|
|
|
|
* like to preselect (i.e., cause an audit record to be generated for). To
|
|
|
|
* minimise probe effect when not used at all, we not only check for the probe
|
|
|
|
* on the individual event, but also a global flag indicating that at least
|
|
|
|
* one probe is enabled, before acquiring locks, searching lists, etc.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If the event is selected, return an evname_elem reference to be stored in
|
|
|
|
* the audit record, which we can use later to avoid further lookups. The
|
|
|
|
* contents of the evname_elem must be sufficiently stable so as to not risk
|
|
|
|
* race conditions here.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Currently, we take an interest only in the 'event' argument, but in the
|
|
|
|
* future might want to support other types of record selection tied to
|
|
|
|
* additional probe types (e.g., event clases).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: Should we have a catch-all probe here for events without registered
|
|
|
|
* names?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void *
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_preselect(au_id_t auid, au_event_t event, au_class_t class)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct evname_elem *ene;
|
|
|
|
int probe_enabled;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* NB: Lockless reads here may return a slightly stale value; this is
|
|
|
|
* considered better than acquiring a lock, however.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
if (!audit_dtrace_enabled)
|
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
ene = au_evnamemap_lookup(event);
|
|
|
|
if (ene == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* See if either of the two probes for the audit event are enabled.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB: Lock also not acquired here -- but perhaps it wouldn't matter
|
|
|
|
* given that we've already used the list lock above?
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: Alternatively, au_evnamemap_lookup() could return these
|
|
|
|
* values while holding the list lock...?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
probe_enabled = ene->ene_commit_probe_enabled ||
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_bsm_probe_enabled;
|
|
|
|
if (!probe_enabled)
|
|
|
|
return (NULL);
|
|
|
|
return ((void *)ene);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Commit probe pre-BSM. Fires the probe but also checks to see if we should
|
|
|
|
* ask the audit framework to call us again with BSM arguments in the audit
|
|
|
|
* worker thread.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: Should we have a catch-all probe here for events without registered
|
|
|
|
* names?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_commit(struct kaudit_record *kar, au_id_t auid, au_event_t event,
|
|
|
|
au_class_t class, int sorf)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char ene_name_lower[EVNAMEMAP_NAME_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
struct evname_elem *ene;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ene = (struct evname_elem *)kar->k_dtaudit_state;
|
|
|
|
if (ene == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Process a possibly registered commit probe.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (ene->ene_commit_probe_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: Lock ene to provide stability to the name string. A
|
|
|
|
* bit undesirable! We may want another locking strategy
|
|
|
|
* here. At least we don't run the DTrace probe under the
|
|
|
|
* lock.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: We provide the struct audit_record pointer -- but
|
|
|
|
* perhaps should provide the kaudit_record pointer?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
EVNAME_LOCK(ene);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ene_name_lower); i++)
|
|
|
|
ene_name_lower[i] = tolower(ene->ene_name[i]);
|
|
|
|
EVNAME_UNLOCK(ene);
|
|
|
|
dtrace_probe(ene->ene_commit_probe_id,
|
|
|
|
(uintptr_t)ene_name_lower, (uintptr_t)&kar->k_ar, 0, 0, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Return the state of the BSM probe to the caller.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return (ene->ene_bsm_probe_enabled);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Commit probe post-BSM.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: Should we have a catch-all probe here for events without registered
|
|
|
|
* names?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_bsm(struct kaudit_record *kar, au_id_t auid, au_event_t event,
|
|
|
|
au_class_t class, int sorf, void *bsm_data, size_t bsm_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char ene_name_lower[EVNAMEMAP_NAME_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
struct evname_elem *ene;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ene = (struct evname_elem *)kar->k_dtaudit_state;
|
|
|
|
if (ene == NULL)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (!(ene->ene_bsm_probe_enabled))
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: Lock ene to provide stability to the name string. A bit
|
|
|
|
* undesirable! We may want another locking strategy here. At least
|
|
|
|
* we don't run the DTrace probe under the lock.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: We provide the struct audit_record pointer -- but perhaps
|
|
|
|
* should provide the kaudit_record pointer?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
EVNAME_LOCK(ene);
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ene_name_lower); i++)
|
|
|
|
ene_name_lower[i] = tolower(ene->ene_name[i]);
|
|
|
|
EVNAME_UNLOCK(ene);
|
|
|
|
dtrace_probe(ene->ene_bsm_probe_id, (uintptr_t)ene_name_lower,
|
|
|
|
(uintptr_t)&kar->k_ar, (uintptr_t)bsm_data, (uintptr_t)bsm_len,
|
|
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* A very simple provider: argument types are identical across all probes: the
|
|
|
|
* kaudit_record, plus a BSM pointer and length.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_getargdesc(void *arg, dtrace_id_t id, void *parg,
|
|
|
|
dtrace_argdesc_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct evname_elem *ene;
|
|
|
|
const char *p;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ene = (struct evname_elem *)parg;
|
|
|
|
p = NULL;
|
|
|
|
switch (desc->dtargd_ndx) {
|
|
|
|
case 0:
|
|
|
|
/* Audit event name. */
|
|
|
|
p = "char *";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 1:
|
|
|
|
/* In-kernel audit record. */
|
|
|
|
p = "struct audit_record *";
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 2:
|
|
|
|
/* BSM data, if present. */
|
|
|
|
if (id == ene->ene_bsm_probe_id)
|
|
|
|
p = "const void *";
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
desc->dtargd_ndx = DTRACE_ARGNONE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
case 3:
|
|
|
|
/* BSM length, if present. */
|
|
|
|
if (id == ene->ene_bsm_probe_id)
|
|
|
|
p = "size_t";
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
desc->dtargd_ndx = DTRACE_ARGNONE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
desc->dtargd_ndx = DTRACE_ARGNONE;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (p != NULL)
|
|
|
|
strlcpy(desc->dtargd_native, p, sizeof(desc->dtargd_native));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Callback from the event-to-name mapping code when performing
|
|
|
|
* evname_foreach(). Note that we may update the entry, so the foreach code
|
|
|
|
* must have a write lock. However, as the synchronisation model is private
|
|
|
|
* to the evname code, we cannot easily assert it here.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: How do we want to handle event rename / collision issues here --
|
|
|
|
* e.g., if userspace was using a name to point to one event number, and then
|
|
|
|
* changes it so that the name points at another? For now, paper over this by
|
|
|
|
* skipping event numbers that are already registered, and likewise skipping
|
|
|
|
* names that are already registered. However, this could lead to confusing
|
|
|
|
* behaviour so possibly needs to be resolved in the longer term.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_au_evnamemap_callback(struct evname_elem *ene)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char ene_name_lower[EVNAMEMAP_NAME_SIZE];
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* DTrace, by convention, has lower-case probe names. However, the
|
|
|
|
* in-kernel event-to-name mapping table must maintain event-name case
|
|
|
|
* as submitted by userspace. Create a temporary lower-case version
|
|
|
|
* here, away from the fast path, to use when exposing the event name
|
|
|
|
* to DTrace as part of the name of a probe.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB: Convert the entire array, including the terminating nul,
|
|
|
|
* because these strings are short and it's more work not to. If they
|
|
|
|
* become long, we might feel more guilty about this sloppiness!
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(ene_name_lower); i++)
|
|
|
|
ene_name_lower[i] = tolower(ene->ene_name[i]);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Don't register a new probe if this event number already has an
|
|
|
|
* associated commit probe -- or if another event has already
|
|
|
|
* registered this name.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: There is an argument that if multiple numeric events match
|
|
|
|
* a single name, they should all be exposed to the same named probe.
|
|
|
|
* In particular, we should perhaps use a probe ID returned by this
|
|
|
|
* lookup and just stick that in the saved probe ID?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ene->ene_commit_probe_id == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
(dtrace_probe_lookup(dtaudit_id, dtaudit_module_str,
|
|
|
|
ene_name_lower, dtaudit_name_commit_str) == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create the commit probe.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB: We don't declare any extra stack frames because stack()
|
|
|
|
* will just return the path to the audit commit code, which
|
|
|
|
* is not really interesting anyway.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We pass in the pointer to the evnam_elem entry so that we
|
|
|
|
* can easily change its enabled flag in the probe
|
|
|
|
* enable/disable interface.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_commit_probe_id = dtrace_probe_create(dtaudit_id,
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_module_str, ene_name_lower,
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_name_commit_str, 0, ene);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Don't register a new probe if this event number already has an
|
|
|
|
* associated bsm probe -- or if another event has already
|
|
|
|
* registered this name.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* XXXRW: There is an argument that if multiple numeric events match
|
|
|
|
* a single name, they should all be exposed to the same named probe.
|
|
|
|
* In particular, we should perhaps use a probe ID returned by this
|
|
|
|
* lookup and just stick that in the saved probe ID?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if ((ene->ene_bsm_probe_id == 0) &&
|
|
|
|
(dtrace_probe_lookup(dtaudit_id, dtaudit_module_str,
|
|
|
|
ene_name_lower, dtaudit_name_bsm_str) == 0)) {
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Create the bsm probe.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NB: We don't declare any extra stack frames because stack()
|
|
|
|
* will just return the path to the audit commit code, which
|
|
|
|
* is not really interesting anyway.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We pass in the pointer to the evnam_elem entry so that we
|
|
|
|
* can easily change its enabled flag in the probe
|
|
|
|
* enable/disable interface.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_bsm_probe_id = dtrace_probe_create(dtaudit_id,
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_module_str, ene_name_lower, dtaudit_name_bsm_str,
|
|
|
|
0, ene);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_provide(void *arg, dtrace_probedesc_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Walk all registered number-to-name mapping entries, and ensure each
|
|
|
|
* is properly registered.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
au_evnamemap_foreach(dtaudit_au_evnamemap_callback);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_destroy(void *arg, dtrace_id_t id, void *parg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_enable(void *arg, dtrace_id_t id, void *parg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct evname_elem *ene;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ene = parg;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(ene->ene_commit_probe_id == id || ene->ene_bsm_probe_id == id,
|
|
|
|
("%s: probe ID mismatch (%u, %u != %u)", __func__,
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_commit_probe_id, ene->ene_bsm_probe_id, id));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (id == ene->ene_commit_probe_id)
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_commit_probe_enabled = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_bsm_probe_enabled = 1;
|
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
refcount_acquire(&audit_dtrace_enabled);
|
|
|
|
audit_syscalls_enabled_update();
|
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_disable(void *arg, dtrace_id_t id, void *parg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct evname_elem *ene;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ene = parg;
|
|
|
|
KASSERT(ene->ene_commit_probe_id == id || ene->ene_bsm_probe_id == id,
|
|
|
|
("%s: probe ID mismatch (%u, %u != %u)", __func__,
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_commit_probe_id, ene->ene_bsm_probe_id, id));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (id == ene->ene_commit_probe_id)
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_commit_probe_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
ene->ene_bsm_probe_enabled = 0;
|
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at
system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are
captured:
1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls
whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing
components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled,
suspended, etc.
2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is
called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the
policy changes, so that the value can be updated.
3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() --
at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that
system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here,
so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks.
4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a
dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether
dtaudit would like system calls to be audited.
5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables
are for.
These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit
(trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call
probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot
capture system-call data without auditd(8) started.
Reviewed by: gnn
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Approved by: re (gjb)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
|
|
|
(void)refcount_release(&audit_dtrace_enabled);
|
|
|
|
audit_syscalls_enabled_update();
|
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to
instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM
trail files or audit pipes:
- Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to
particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return.
These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record
data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and
return values in a single probe.
- Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular
auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit
worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record
data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail
file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread.
DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support
future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe --
e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an
optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience,
upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in
DTrace.
DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected
on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data.
They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes
configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in
order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit
configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or
environmental variables) for the provider to operate.
Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_load(void *dummy)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (dtrace_register("audit", &dtaudit_attr, DTRACE_PRIV_USER, NULL,
|
|
|
|
&dtaudit_pops, NULL, &dtaudit_id) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_hook_preselect = dtaudit_preselect;
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_hook_commit = dtaudit_commit;
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_hook_bsm = dtaudit_bsm;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_unload(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_hook_preselect = NULL;
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_hook_commit = NULL;
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_hook_bsm = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if ((error = dtrace_unregister(dtaudit_id)) != 0)
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_modevent(module_t mod __unused, int type, void *data __unused)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int error = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch (type) {
|
|
|
|
case MOD_LOAD:
|
|
|
|
case MOD_UNLOAD:
|
|
|
|
case MOD_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (error);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSINIT(dtaudit_load, SI_SUB_DTRACE_PROVIDER, SI_ORDER_ANY, dtaudit_load,
|
|
|
|
NULL);
|
|
|
|
SYSUNINIT(dtaudit_unload, SI_SUB_DTRACE_PROVIDER, SI_ORDER_ANY,
|
|
|
|
dtaudit_unload, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DEV_MODULE(dtaudit, dtaudit_modevent, NULL);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_VERSION(dtaudit, 1);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DEPEND(dtaudit, dtrace, 1, 1, 1);
|
|
|
|
MODULE_DEPEND(dtaudit, opensolaris, 1, 1, 1);
|