freebsd-dev/contrib/openbsm/tools/audump.c

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/*-
* Copyright (c) 2005-2009 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $P4: //depot/projects/trustedbsd/openbsm/tools/audump.c#9 $
*/
#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
/*
* Simple tool to dump various /etc/security databases using the defined APIs.
*/
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "usage: audump [class|class_r|control|event|event_r|"
"user|user_r]\n");
exit(-1);
}
static void
audump_class(void)
{
au_class_ent_t *cp;
while ((cp = getauclassent()) != NULL)
printf("0x%08x:%s:%s\n", cp->ac_class, cp->ac_name,
cp->ac_desc);
}
static void
audump_class_r(void)
{
char class_ent_name[AU_CLASS_NAME_MAX];
char class_ent_desc[AU_CLASS_DESC_MAX];
au_class_ent_t c, *cp;
bzero(&c, sizeof(c));
bzero(class_ent_name, sizeof(class_ent_name));
bzero(class_ent_desc, sizeof(class_ent_desc));
c.ac_name = class_ent_name;
c.ac_desc = class_ent_desc;
while ((cp = getauclassent_r(&c)) != NULL)
printf("0x%08x:%s:%s\n", cp->ac_class, cp->ac_name,
cp->ac_desc);
}
static void
audump_control(void)
{
Vendor import of OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11, with the following change history notes since the last import: OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11 - Reclassify certain read/write operations as having no class rather than the fr/fw class; our default classes audit intent (open) not operations (read, write). - Introduce AUE_SYSCTL_WRITE event so that BSD/Darwin systems can audit reads and writes of sysctls as separate events. Add additional kernel environment and jail events for FreeBSD. - Break AUDIT_TRIGGER_OPEN_NEW into two events, AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_USER (issued by the user audit(8) tool) and AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL (issued by the kernel audit implementation) so that they can be distinguished. - Disable rate limiting of rotate requests; as the kernel doesn't retransmit a dropped request, the log file will otherwise grow indefinitely if the trigger is dropped. - Improve auditd debugging output. - Fix a number of threading related bugs in audit_control file reading routines. - Add APIs au_poltostr() and au_strtopol() to convert between text representations of audit_control policy flags and the flags passed to auditon(A_SETPOLICY) and retrieved from auditon(A_GETPOLICY). - Add API getacpol() to return the 'policy:' entry from audit_control, an extension to the Solaris file format to allow specification of policy persistent flags. - Update audump to print the audit_control policy field. - Update auditd to read the audit_control policy field and set the kernel policy to match it when configuring/reconfiguring. Remove the -s and -h arguments as these policies are now set via the configuration file. If a policy line is not found in the configuration file, continue with the current default of setting AUDIT_CNT. - Fix bugs in the parsing of large execve(2) arguments and environmental variable tokens; increase maximum parsed argument and variable count. - configure now detects strlcat(), used by policy-related functions. - Reference token and record sample files added to test tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-21 07:07:33 +00:00
char string[PATH_MAX], string2[PATH_MAX];
int ret, val;
Vendor import of OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11, with the following change history notes since the last import: OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11 - Reclassify certain read/write operations as having no class rather than the fr/fw class; our default classes audit intent (open) not operations (read, write). - Introduce AUE_SYSCTL_WRITE event so that BSD/Darwin systems can audit reads and writes of sysctls as separate events. Add additional kernel environment and jail events for FreeBSD. - Break AUDIT_TRIGGER_OPEN_NEW into two events, AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_USER (issued by the user audit(8) tool) and AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL (issued by the kernel audit implementation) so that they can be distinguished. - Disable rate limiting of rotate requests; as the kernel doesn't retransmit a dropped request, the log file will otherwise grow indefinitely if the trigger is dropped. - Improve auditd debugging output. - Fix a number of threading related bugs in audit_control file reading routines. - Add APIs au_poltostr() and au_strtopol() to convert between text representations of audit_control policy flags and the flags passed to auditon(A_SETPOLICY) and retrieved from auditon(A_GETPOLICY). - Add API getacpol() to return the 'policy:' entry from audit_control, an extension to the Solaris file format to allow specification of policy persistent flags. - Update audump to print the audit_control policy field. - Update auditd to read the audit_control policy field and set the kernel policy to match it when configuring/reconfiguring. Remove the -s and -h arguments as these policies are now set via the configuration file. If a policy line is not found in the configuration file, continue with the current default of setting AUDIT_CNT. - Fix bugs in the parsing of large execve(2) arguments and environmental variable tokens; increase maximum parsed argument and variable count. - configure now detects strlcat(), used by policy-related functions. - Reference token and record sample files added to test tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-21 07:07:33 +00:00
long policy;
time_t age;
size_t size;
ret = getacflg(string, PATH_MAX);
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getacflg");
if (ret != 0)
errx(-1, "getacflg: %d", ret);
printf("flags:%s\n", string);
ret = getacmin(&val);
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getacmin");
if (ret != 0)
errx(-1, "getacmin: %d", ret);
printf("min:%d\n", val);
ret = getacna(string, PATH_MAX);
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getacna");
if (ret != 0)
errx(-1, "getacna: %d", ret);
printf("naflags:%s\n", string);
setac();
do {
ret = getacdir(string, PATH_MAX);
if (ret == -1)
break;
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getacdir");
if (ret != 0)
errx(-1, "getacdir: %d", ret);
printf("dir:%s\n", string);
} while (ret == 0);
Vendor import of OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11, with the following change history notes since the last import: OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11 - Reclassify certain read/write operations as having no class rather than the fr/fw class; our default classes audit intent (open) not operations (read, write). - Introduce AUE_SYSCTL_WRITE event so that BSD/Darwin systems can audit reads and writes of sysctls as separate events. Add additional kernel environment and jail events for FreeBSD. - Break AUDIT_TRIGGER_OPEN_NEW into two events, AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_USER (issued by the user audit(8) tool) and AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL (issued by the kernel audit implementation) so that they can be distinguished. - Disable rate limiting of rotate requests; as the kernel doesn't retransmit a dropped request, the log file will otherwise grow indefinitely if the trigger is dropped. - Improve auditd debugging output. - Fix a number of threading related bugs in audit_control file reading routines. - Add APIs au_poltostr() and au_strtopol() to convert between text representations of audit_control policy flags and the flags passed to auditon(A_SETPOLICY) and retrieved from auditon(A_GETPOLICY). - Add API getacpol() to return the 'policy:' entry from audit_control, an extension to the Solaris file format to allow specification of policy persistent flags. - Update audump to print the audit_control policy field. - Update auditd to read the audit_control policy field and set the kernel policy to match it when configuring/reconfiguring. Remove the -s and -h arguments as these policies are now set via the configuration file. If a policy line is not found in the configuration file, continue with the current default of setting AUDIT_CNT. - Fix bugs in the parsing of large execve(2) arguments and environmental variable tokens; increase maximum parsed argument and variable count. - configure now detects strlcat(), used by policy-related functions. - Reference token and record sample files added to test tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-21 07:07:33 +00:00
ret = getacpol(string, PATH_MAX);
if (ret != 0)
err(-1, "getacpol");
if (au_strtopol(string, &policy) < 0)
err(-1, "au_strtopol");
if (au_poltostr(policy, PATH_MAX, string2) < 0)
Vendor import of OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11, with the following change history notes since the last import: OpenBSM 1.0 alpha 11 - Reclassify certain read/write operations as having no class rather than the fr/fw class; our default classes audit intent (open) not operations (read, write). - Introduce AUE_SYSCTL_WRITE event so that BSD/Darwin systems can audit reads and writes of sysctls as separate events. Add additional kernel environment and jail events for FreeBSD. - Break AUDIT_TRIGGER_OPEN_NEW into two events, AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_USER (issued by the user audit(8) tool) and AUDIT_TRIGGER_ROTATE_KERNEL (issued by the kernel audit implementation) so that they can be distinguished. - Disable rate limiting of rotate requests; as the kernel doesn't retransmit a dropped request, the log file will otherwise grow indefinitely if the trigger is dropped. - Improve auditd debugging output. - Fix a number of threading related bugs in audit_control file reading routines. - Add APIs au_poltostr() and au_strtopol() to convert between text representations of audit_control policy flags and the flags passed to auditon(A_SETPOLICY) and retrieved from auditon(A_GETPOLICY). - Add API getacpol() to return the 'policy:' entry from audit_control, an extension to the Solaris file format to allow specification of policy persistent flags. - Update audump to print the audit_control policy field. - Update auditd to read the audit_control policy field and set the kernel policy to match it when configuring/reconfiguring. Remove the -s and -h arguments as these policies are now set via the configuration file. If a policy line is not found in the configuration file, continue with the current default of setting AUDIT_CNT. - Fix bugs in the parsing of large execve(2) arguments and environmental variable tokens; increase maximum parsed argument and variable count. - configure now detects strlcat(), used by policy-related functions. - Reference token and record sample files added to test tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-09-21 07:07:33 +00:00
err(-1, "au_poltostr");
printf("policy:%s\n", string2);
ret = getacfilesz(&size);
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getacfilesz");
if (ret != 0)
err(-1, "getacfilesz: %d", ret);
printf("filesz:%ldB\n", size);
ret = getachost(string, PATH_MAX);
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getachost");
if (ret == -3)
err(-1, "getachost: %d", ret);
if (ret == 0 && ret != 1)
printf("host:%s\n", string);
ret = getacexpire(&val, &age, &size);
if (ret == -2)
err(-1, "getacexpire");
if (ret == -1)
err(-1, "getacexpire: %d", ret);
if (ret == 0 && ret != 1)
printf("expire-after:%ldB %s %lds\n", size,
val ? "AND" : "OR", age);
}
static void
printf_classmask(au_class_t classmask)
{
au_class_ent_t *c;
u_int32_t i;
int first;
first = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
if (classmask & (1 << i)) {
if (first)
first = 0;
else
printf(",");
c = getauclassnum(1 << i);
if (c != NULL)
printf("%s", c->ac_name);
else
printf("0x%x", 1 << i);
}
}
}
static void
audump_event(void)
{
au_event_ent_t *ep;
while ((ep = getauevent()) != NULL) {
printf("%d:%s:%s:", ep->ae_number, ep->ae_name, ep->ae_desc);
printf_classmask(ep->ae_class);
printf("\n");
}
}
static void
audump_event_r(void)
{
char event_ent_name[AU_EVENT_NAME_MAX];
char event_ent_desc[AU_EVENT_DESC_MAX];
au_event_ent_t e, *ep;
bzero(&e, sizeof(e));
bzero(event_ent_name, sizeof(event_ent_name));
bzero(event_ent_desc, sizeof(event_ent_desc));
e.ae_name = event_ent_name;
e.ae_desc = event_ent_desc;
while ((ep = getauevent_r(&e)) != NULL) {
printf("%d:%s:%s:", ep->ae_number, ep->ae_name, ep->ae_desc);
printf_classmask(ep->ae_class);
printf("\n");
}
}
static void
audump_user(void)
{
au_user_ent_t *up;
while ((up = getauuserent()) != NULL) {
printf("%s:", up->au_name);
// printf_classmask(up->au_always);
printf(":");
// printf_classmask(up->au_never);
printf("\n");
}
}
static void
audump_user_r(void)
{
char user_ent_name[AU_USER_NAME_MAX];
au_user_ent_t u, *up;
bzero(&u, sizeof(u));
bzero(user_ent_name, sizeof(user_ent_name));
u.au_name = user_ent_name;
while ((up = getauuserent_r(&u)) != NULL) {
printf("%s:", up->au_name);
// printf_classmask(up->au_always);
printf(":");
// printf_classmask(up->au_never);
printf("\n");
}
}
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc != 2)
usage();
if (strcmp(argv[1], "class") == 0)
audump_class();
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "class_r") == 0)
audump_class_r();
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "control") == 0)
audump_control();
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "event") == 0)
audump_event();
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "event_r") == 0)
audump_event_r();
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "user") == 0)
audump_user();
else if (strcmp(argv[1], "user_r") == 0)
audump_user_r();
else
usage();
return (0);
}