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freebsd-dev/sys/security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.c

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Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
*
License and wording updates: NAI has authorized the removal of clause three from their BSD-style license. Also, s/NAI Labs/Network Associates Laboratories/.
2002-11-04 01:53:12 +00:00
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
* "BSD Extended" MAC policy, allowing the administrator to impose
* mandatory rules regarding users and some system objects.
*
* XXX: Much locking support required here.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_types.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
#include <vm/vm.h>
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
#include <security/mac_bsdextended/mac_bsdextended.h>
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, bsdextended, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD extended BSD MAC policy controls");
static int mac_bsdextended_enabled = 1;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_bsdextended_enabled, 0, "Enforce extended BSD policy");
TUNABLE_INT("security.mac.bsdextended.enabled", &mac_bsdextended_enabled);
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACBSDEXTENDED, "mac_bsdextended", "BSD Extended MAC rule");
#define MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES 250
static struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rules[MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES];
static int rule_count = 0;
static int rule_slots = 0;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_count, CTLFLAG_RD,
&rule_count, 0, "Number of defined rules\n");
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rule_slots, CTLFLAG_RD,
&rule_slots, 0, "Number of used rule slots\n");
static int mac_bsdextended_debugging;
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, debugging, CTLFLAG_RW,
&mac_bsdextended_debugging, 0, "Enable debugging on failure");
static int
mac_bsdextended_rule_valid(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule)
{
if ((rule->mbr_subject.mbi_flags | MBI_BITS) != MBI_BITS)
return (EINVAL);
if ((rule->mbr_object.mbi_flags | MBI_BITS) != MBI_BITS)
return (EINVAL);
if ((rule->mbr_mode | VALLPERM) != VALLPERM)
return (EINVAL);
return (0);
}
static int
sysctl_rule(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
{
struct mac_bsdextended_rule temprule, *ruleptr;
u_int namelen;
int error, index, *name;
name = (int *)arg1;
namelen = arg2;
/* printf("bsdextended sysctl handler (namelen %d)\n", namelen); */
if (namelen != 1)
return (EINVAL);
index = name[0];
if (index < 0 || index > rule_slots + 1)
return (ENOENT);
if (rule_slots >= MAC_BSDEXTENDED_MAXRULES)
return (ENOENT);
if (req->oldptr) {
if (rules[index] == NULL)
return (ENOENT);
error = SYSCTL_OUT(req, rules[index], sizeof(*rules[index]));
if (error)
return (error);
}
if (req->newptr) {
if (req->newlen == 0) {
/* printf("deletion\n"); */
ruleptr = rules[index];
if (ruleptr == NULL)
return (ENOENT);
rule_count--;
rules[index] = NULL;
FREE(ruleptr, M_MACBSDEXTENDED);
return(0);
}
error = SYSCTL_IN(req, &temprule, sizeof(temprule));
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_rule_valid(&temprule);
if (error)
return (error);
if (rules[index] == NULL) {
/* printf("addition\n"); */
MALLOC(ruleptr, struct mac_bsdextended_rule *,
Back out M_* changes, per decision of the TRB. Approved by: trb
2003-02-19 05:47:46 +00:00
sizeof(*ruleptr), M_MACBSDEXTENDED, M_WAITOK |
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
M_ZERO);
*ruleptr = temprule;
rules[index] = ruleptr;
if (index+1 > rule_slots)
rule_slots = index+1;
rule_count++;
} else {
/* printf("replacement\n"); */
*rules[index] = temprule;
}
}
return (0);
}
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac_bsdextended, OID_AUTO, rules,
CTLFLAG_RW, sysctl_rule, "BSD extended MAC rules");
static void
mac_bsdextended_init(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
/* Initialize ruleset lock. */
/* Register dynamic sysctl's for rules. */
}
static void
mac_bsdextended_destroy(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
/* Tear down sysctls. */
/* Destroy ruleset lock. */
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_rulecheck(struct mac_bsdextended_rule *rule,
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
struct ucred *cred, uid_t object_uid, gid_t object_gid, int acc_mode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
int match;
/*
* Is there a subject match?
*/
if (rule->mbr_subject.mbi_flags & MBI_UID_DEFINED) {
match = (rule->mbr_subject.mbi_uid == cred->cr_uid ||
rule->mbr_subject.mbi_uid == cred->cr_ruid ||
rule->mbr_subject.mbi_uid == cred->cr_svuid);
if (rule->mbr_subject.mbi_flags & MBI_NEGATED)
match = !match;
if (!match)
return (0);
}
if (rule->mbr_subject.mbi_flags & MBI_GID_DEFINED) {
match = (groupmember(rule->mbr_subject.mbi_gid, cred) ||
rule->mbr_subject.mbi_gid == cred->cr_rgid ||
rule->mbr_subject.mbi_gid == cred->cr_svgid);
if (rule->mbr_subject.mbi_flags & MBI_NEGATED)
match = !match;
if (!match)
return (0);
}
/*
* Is there an object match?
*/
if (rule->mbr_object.mbi_flags & MBI_UID_DEFINED) {
match = (rule->mbr_object.mbi_uid == object_uid);
if (rule->mbr_object.mbi_flags & MBI_NEGATED)
match = !match;
if (!match)
return (0);
}
if (rule->mbr_object.mbi_flags & MBI_GID_DEFINED) {
match = (rule->mbr_object.mbi_gid == object_gid);
if (rule->mbr_object.mbi_flags & MBI_NEGATED)
match = !match;
if (!match)
return (0);
}
/*
* Is the access permitted?
*/
if ((rule->mbr_mode & acc_mode) != acc_mode) {
if (mac_bsdextended_debugging)
printf("mac_bsdextended: %d:%d request %d on %d:%d"
" fails\n", cred->cr_ruid, cred->cr_rgid,
acc_mode, object_uid, object_gid);
return (EACCES);
}
return (0);
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check(struct ucred *cred, uid_t object_uid, gid_t object_gid,
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
int acc_mode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
int error, i;
for (i = 0; i < rule_slots; i++) {
if (rules[i] == NULL)
continue;
Map VAPPEND to VWRITE since the ugidfw rule syntax doesn't specifically address the append access mode. Reported by: "Daniel C. Sobral" <dcs@newsguy.com> Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponosred by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories MFC Candidate.
2002-12-28 23:41:18 +00:00
/*
* Since we don't separately handle append, map append to
* write.
*/
if (acc_mode & VAPPEND) {
acc_mode &= ~VAPPEND;
acc_mode |= VWRITE;
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
error = mac_bsdextended_rulecheck(rules[i], cred, object_uid,
object_gid, acc_mode);
if (error)
return (error);
}
return (0);
}
Expand scope of the BSD extended "file system firewall" policy to include a new entry point available for enforcement: mac_bsdextended_check_system_swapon() - Apply extended access control checks to the file target of swap. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:14:03 +00:00
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_system_swapon(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE));
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_access(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
struct label *label, int acc_mode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, acc_mode));
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_chdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VEXEC));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_chroot(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VEXEC));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_create_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap)
{
struct vattr dvap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &dvap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, dvap.va_uid, dvap.va_gid, VWRITE));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_delete(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE);
if (error)
return (error);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_deleteacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, acl_type_t type)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_exec(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
Update MAC modules for changes in arguments for exec MAC policy entry points to include an explicit execlabel. Approved by: re Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-11-08 18:04:36 +00:00
struct label *label, struct image_params *imgp,
struct label *execlabel)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid,
VREAD|VEXEC));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_getacl(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, acl_type_t type)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VSTAT));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_getextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VREAD));
}
Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_link(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE);
Various minor type, prototype tweaks -- clean up cruft due to lack of type checking on entry points (to be introduced shortly). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:10:46 +00:00
if (error)
return (error);
Merge implementation of mpo_check_vnode_link() for various appropriate file-system aware MAC policies. Sync to MAC tree. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 18:25:48 +00:00
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE);
if (error)
return (error);
return (0);
}
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_lookup(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct componentname *cnp)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VEXEC));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_open(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
While 'mode_t' seemed like a good idea for the access mode argument for MAC access() and open() checks, the argument actually has an int type where it becomes available. Switch to using 'int' for the mode argument throughout the MAC Framework and policy modules. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 17:56:57 +00:00
struct label *filelabel, int acc_mode)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, acc_mode));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_readdir(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VREAD));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_readdlink(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VREAD));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_rename_from(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE);
if (error)
return (error);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE);
return (error);
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_rename_to(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int samedir,
struct componentname *cnp)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(dvp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE);
if (error)
return (error);
if (vp != NULL) {
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
error = mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid,
VWRITE);
}
return (error);
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_revoke(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_setacl_vnode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, acl_type_t type, struct acl *acl)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setextattr(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, int attrnamespace, const char *name, struct uio *uio)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VWRITE));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setflags(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, u_long flags)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setmode(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, mode_t mode)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setowner(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setutimes(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
struct label *label, struct timespec atime, struct timespec utime)
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, cred, curthread);
if (error)
return (error);
return (mac_bsdextended_check(cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid, VADMIN));
}
static int
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_stat(struct ucred *active_cred,
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp, struct label *label)
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
struct vattr vap;
int error;
if (!mac_bsdextended_enabled)
return (0);
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
error = VOP_GETATTR(vp, &vap, active_cred, curthread);
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
if (error)
return (error);
Pass active_cred and file_cred into the MAC framework explicitly for mac_check_vnode_{poll,read,stat,write}(). Pass in fp->f_cred when calling these checks with a struct file available. Otherwise, pass NOCRED. All currently MAC policies use active_cred, but could now offer the cached credential semantic used for the base system security model. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
return (mac_bsdextended_check(active_cred, vap.va_uid, vap.va_gid,
VSTAT));
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
}
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
static struct mac_policy_ops mac_bsdextended_ops =
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
{
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
.mpo_destroy = mac_bsdextended_destroy,
.mpo_init = mac_bsdextended_init,
Expand scope of the BSD extended "file system firewall" policy to include a new entry point available for enforcement: mac_bsdextended_check_system_swapon() - Apply extended access control checks to the file target of swap. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-25 01:14:03 +00:00
.mpo_check_system_swapon = mac_bsdextended_check_system_swapon,
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops structure definition, rather than using an operation vector we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector for two reasons: (1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in a few hundred NULL function pointers. (2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its entry point set. Both of these no longer apply: (1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure. (2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers, argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the complexity. This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point implementation arguments. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
.mpo_check_vnode_access = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_access,
.mpo_check_vnode_chdir = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_chdir,
.mpo_check_vnode_chroot = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_chroot,
.mpo_check_vnode_create = mac_bsdextended_check_create_vnode,
.mpo_check_vnode_delete = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_delete,
.mpo_check_vnode_deleteacl = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_deleteacl,
.mpo_check_vnode_exec = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_exec,
.mpo_check_vnode_getacl = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_getacl,
.mpo_check_vnode_getextattr = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_getextattr,
.mpo_check_vnode_link = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_link,
.mpo_check_vnode_lookup = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_lookup,
.mpo_check_vnode_open = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_open,
.mpo_check_vnode_readdir = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_readdir,
.mpo_check_vnode_readlink = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_readdlink,
.mpo_check_vnode_rename_from = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_rename_from,
.mpo_check_vnode_rename_to = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_rename_to,
.mpo_check_vnode_revoke = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_revoke,
.mpo_check_vnode_setacl = mac_bsdextended_check_setacl_vnode,
.mpo_check_vnode_setextattr = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setextattr,
.mpo_check_vnode_setflags = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setflags,
.mpo_check_vnode_setmode = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setmode,
.mpo_check_vnode_setowner = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setowner,
.mpo_check_vnode_setutimes = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_setutimes,
.mpo_check_vnode_stat = mac_bsdextended_check_vnode_stat,
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
};
Trim "trustedbsd_" from the front of the policy module "short names"; the vendor is only included in the long name currently, reducing verbosity when modules are registered and unregistered. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2003-03-27 19:26:39 +00:00
MAC_POLICY_SET(&mac_bsdextended_ops, mac_bsdextended,
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible kernel access control. Provide implementations of some sample operating system security policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited) production environments. Some are not yet in their final form, and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative. They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework for implementing a variety of security policies. mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned integrity levels, and information flow is controlled based on a read-up, write-down policy. Currently, purely hierarchal. mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall", which allows the administrator to specify a series of rules limiting access by users and groups to objects owned by other users and groups. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (file permissions/ownership, process credentials). mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the various network stacks from generating any output despite an interface being live for reception. mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security confidentiality policy, similar to those found in a number of commercial trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality levels, and information flow is controlled based on a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the works. mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry points with empty stubs. A good place to start if you want all the prototypes types in for you, and don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but has no access control impact. Useful also for performance measurements. mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly more detailed policy involving exceptions for members of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system security labeling (process credentials). mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are not freed multiple times, etc, etc. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
"TrustedBSD MAC/BSD Extended", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);
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