freebsd-dev/sys/netinet6/ip6_output.c

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/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
2007-12-10 16:03:40 +00:00
*
* $KAME: ip6_output.c,v 1.279 2002/01/26 06:12:30 jinmei Exp $
*/
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1982, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)ip_output.c 8.3 (Berkeley) 1/21/94
*/
2007-12-10 16:03:40 +00:00
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include "opt_inet.h"
#include "opt_inet6.h"
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#include "opt_kern_tls.h"
#include "opt_ratelimit.h"
#include "opt_route.h"
#include "opt_rss.h"
#include "opt_sctp.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#include <sys/ktls.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/syslog.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <machine/in_cksum.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <net/if_var.h>
#include <net/if_llatbl.h>
#include <net/netisr.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/route/nhop.h>
#include <net/pfil.h>
#include <net/rss_config.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_var.h>
#include <netinet/ip_var.h>
#include <netinet6/in6_fib.h>
#include <netinet6/in6_var.h>
#include <netinet/ip6.h>
#include <netinet/icmp6.h>
#include <netinet6/ip6_var.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#include <netinet/tcp_var.h>
#include <netinet6/nd6.h>
#include <netinet6/in6_rss.h>
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#include <netipsec/ipsec_support.h>
#ifdef SCTP
#include <netinet/sctp.h>
#include <netinet/sctp_crc32.h>
#endif
#include <netinet6/ip6protosw.h>
#include <netinet6/scope6_var.h>
Bite the bullet, and make the IPv6 SSM and MLDv2 mega-commit: import from p4 bms_netdev. Summary of changes: * Connect netinet6/in6_mcast.c to build. The legacy KAME KPIs are mostly preserved. * Eliminate now dead code from ip6_output.c. Don't do mbuf bingo, we are not going to do RFC 2292 style CMSG tricks for multicast options as they are not required by any current IPv6 normative reference. * Refactor transports (UDP, raw_ip6) to do own mcast filtering. SCTP, TCP unaffected by this change. * Add ip6_msource, in6_msource structs to in6_var.h. * Hookup mld_ifinfo state to in6_ifextra, allocate from domifattach path. * Eliminate IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(), it is no longer referenced. Kernel consumers which need this should use in6m_lookup(). * Refactor IPv6 socket group memberships to use a vector (like IPv4). * Update ifmcstat(8) for IPv6 SSM. * Add witness lock order for IN6_MULTI_LOCK. * Move IN6_MULTI_LOCK out of lower ip6_output()/ip6_input() paths. * Introduce IP6STAT_ADD/SUB/INC/DEC as per rwatson's IPv4 cleanup. * Update carp(4) for new IPv6 SSM KPIs. * Virtualize ip6_mrouter socket. Changes mostly localized to IPv6 MROUTING. * Don't do a local group lookup in MROUTING. * Kill unused KAME prototypes in6_purgemkludge(), in6_restoremkludge(). * Preserve KAME DAD timer jitter behaviour in MLDv1 compatibility mode. * Bump __FreeBSD_version to 800084. * Update UPDATING. NOTE WELL: * This code hasn't been tested against real MLDv2 queriers (yet), although the on-wire protocol has been verified in Wireshark. * There are a few unresolved issues in the socket layer APIs to do with scope ID propagation. * There is a LOR present in ip6_output()'s use of in6_setscope() which needs to be resolved. See comments in mld6.c. This is believed to be benign and can't be avoided for the moment without re-introducing an indirect netisr. This work was mostly derived from the IGMPv3 implementation, and has been sponsored by a third party.
2009-04-29 19:19:13 +00:00
extern int in6_mcast_loop;
struct ip6_exthdrs {
struct mbuf *ip6e_ip6;
struct mbuf *ip6e_hbh;
struct mbuf *ip6e_dest1;
struct mbuf *ip6e_rthdr;
struct mbuf *ip6e_dest2;
};
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_IP6OPT, "ip6opt", "IPv6 options");
static int ip6_pcbopt(int, u_char *, int, struct ip6_pktopts **,
struct ucred *, int);
static int ip6_pcbopts(struct ip6_pktopts **, struct mbuf *,
struct socket *, struct sockopt *);
static int ip6_getpcbopt(struct inpcb *, int, struct sockopt *);
static int ip6_setpktopt(int, u_char *, int, struct ip6_pktopts *,
struct ucred *, int, int, int);
2008-01-08 19:08:58 +00:00
static int ip6_copyexthdr(struct mbuf **, caddr_t, int);
static int ip6_insertfraghdr(struct mbuf *, struct mbuf *, int,
struct ip6_frag **);
2008-01-08 19:08:58 +00:00
static int ip6_insert_jumboopt(struct ip6_exthdrs *, u_int32_t);
static int ip6_splithdr(struct mbuf *, struct ip6_exthdrs *);
static int ip6_getpmtu(struct route_in6 *, int,
struct ifnet *, const struct in6_addr *, u_long *, int *, u_int,
u_int);
static int ip6_calcmtu(struct ifnet *, const struct in6_addr *, u_long,
u_long *, int *, u_int);
static int ip6_getpmtu_ctl(u_int, const struct in6_addr *, u_long *);
2008-01-08 19:08:58 +00:00
static int copypktopts(struct ip6_pktopts *, struct ip6_pktopts *, int);
/*
* Make an extension header from option data. hp is the source,
* mp is the destination, and _ol is the optlen.
*/
#define MAKE_EXTHDR(hp, mp, _ol) \
do { \
if (hp) { \
struct ip6_ext *eh = (struct ip6_ext *)(hp); \
error = ip6_copyexthdr((mp), (caddr_t)(hp), \
((eh)->ip6e_len + 1) << 3); \
if (error) \
goto freehdrs; \
(_ol) += (*(mp))->m_len; \
} \
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
/*
* Form a chain of extension headers.
* m is the extension header mbuf
* mp is the previous mbuf in the chain
* p is the next header
* i is the type of option.
*/
#define MAKE_CHAIN(m, mp, p, i)\
do {\
if (m) {\
if (!hdrsplit) \
panic("%s:%d: assumption failed: "\
"hdr not split: hdrsplit %d exthdrs %p",\
__func__, __LINE__, hdrsplit, &exthdrs);\
*mtod((m), u_char *) = *(p);\
*(p) = (i);\
p = mtod((m), u_char *);\
(m)->m_next = (mp)->m_next;\
(mp)->m_next = (m);\
(mp) = (m);\
}\
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
void
in6_delayed_cksum(struct mbuf *m, uint32_t plen, u_short offset)
{
u_short csum;
csum = in_cksum_skip(m, offset + plen, offset);
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_UDP_IPV6 && csum == 0)
csum = 0xffff;
offset += m->m_pkthdr.csum_data; /* checksum offset */
if (offset + sizeof(csum) > m->m_len)
m_copyback(m, offset, sizeof(csum), (caddr_t)&csum);
else
*(u_short *)mtodo(m, offset) = csum;
}
static int
ip6_output_delayed_csum(struct mbuf *m, struct ifnet *ifp, int csum_flags,
int plen, int optlen, bool frag)
{
KASSERT((plen >= optlen), ("%s:%d: plen %d < optlen %d, m %p, ifp %p "
"csum_flags %#x frag %d\n",
__func__, __LINE__, plen, optlen, m, ifp, csum_flags, frag));
if ((csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) ||
#ifdef SCTP
(csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6) ||
#endif
(!frag && (ifp->if_capenable & IFCAP_NOMAP) == 0)) {
m = mb_unmapped_to_ext(m);
if (m == NULL) {
if (frag)
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_fragfail);
else
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_odropped);
return (ENOBUFS);
}
if (csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) {
in6_delayed_cksum(m, plen - optlen,
sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + optlen);
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6;
}
#ifdef SCTP
if (csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6) {
sctp_delayed_cksum(m, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr) + optlen);
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~CSUM_SCTP_IPV6;
}
#endif
}
return (0);
}
int
ip6_fragment(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m0, int hlen, u_char nextproto,
int fraglen , uint32_t id)
{
struct mbuf *m, **mnext, *m_frgpart;
struct ip6_hdr *ip6, *mhip6;
struct ip6_frag *ip6f;
int off;
int error;
int tlen = m0->m_pkthdr.len;
KASSERT((fraglen % 8 == 0), ("Fragment length must be a multiple of 8"));
m = m0;
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
mnext = &m->m_nextpkt;
for (off = hlen; off < tlen; off += fraglen) {
m = m_gethdr(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (!m) {
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_odropped);
return (ENOBUFS);
}
/*
* Make sure the complete packet header gets copied
* from the originating mbuf to the newly created
* mbuf. This also ensures that existing firewall
* classification(s), VLAN tags and so on get copied
* to the resulting fragmented packet(s):
*/
if (m_dup_pkthdr(m, m0, M_NOWAIT) == 0) {
m_free(m);
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_odropped);
return (ENOBUFS);
}
*mnext = m;
mnext = &m->m_nextpkt;
m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
mhip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
*mhip6 = *ip6;
m->m_len = sizeof(*mhip6);
error = ip6_insertfraghdr(m0, m, hlen, &ip6f);
if (error) {
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_odropped);
return (error);
}
ip6f->ip6f_offlg = htons((u_short)((off - hlen) & ~7));
if (off + fraglen >= tlen)
fraglen = tlen - off;
else
ip6f->ip6f_offlg |= IP6F_MORE_FRAG;
mhip6->ip6_plen = htons((u_short)(fraglen + hlen +
sizeof(*ip6f) - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)));
if ((m_frgpart = m_copym(m0, off, fraglen, M_NOWAIT)) == NULL) {
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_odropped);
return (ENOBUFS);
}
m_cat(m, m_frgpart);
m->m_pkthdr.len = fraglen + hlen + sizeof(*ip6f);
ip6f->ip6f_reserved = 0;
ip6f->ip6f_ident = id;
ip6f->ip6f_nxt = nextproto;
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_ofragments);
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_fragcreat);
}
return (0);
}
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
static int
ip6_output_send(struct inpcb *inp, struct ifnet *ifp, struct ifnet *origifp,
struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr_in6 *dst, struct route_in6 *ro,
bool stamp_tag)
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
{
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
struct ktls_session *tls = NULL;
#endif
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
struct m_snd_tag *mst;
int error;
MPASS((m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SND_TAG) == 0);
mst = NULL;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
/*
* If this is an unencrypted TLS record, save a reference to
* the record. This local reference is used to call
* ktls_output_eagain after the mbuf has been freed (thus
* dropping the mbuf's reference) in if_output.
*/
if (m->m_next != NULL && mbuf_has_tls_session(m->m_next)) {
tls = ktls_hold(m->m_next->m_epg_tls);
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
mst = tls->snd_tag;
/*
* If a TLS session doesn't have a valid tag, it must
* have had an earlier ifp mismatch, so drop this
* packet.
*/
if (mst == NULL) {
error = EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
/*
* Always stamp tags that include NIC ktls.
*/
stamp_tag = true;
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
}
#endif
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
#ifdef RATELIMIT
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
if (inp != NULL && mst == NULL) {
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
if ((inp->inp_flags2 & INP_RATE_LIMIT_CHANGED) != 0 ||
(inp->inp_snd_tag != NULL &&
inp->inp_snd_tag->ifp != ifp))
in_pcboutput_txrtlmt(inp, ifp, m);
if (inp->inp_snd_tag != NULL)
mst = inp->inp_snd_tag;
}
#endif
if (stamp_tag && mst != NULL) {
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
KASSERT(m->m_pkthdr.rcvif == NULL,
("trying to add a send tag to a forwarded packet"));
if (mst->ifp != ifp) {
error = EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
/* stamp send tag on mbuf */
m->m_pkthdr.snd_tag = m_snd_tag_ref(mst);
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= CSUM_SND_TAG;
}
error = nd6_output_ifp(ifp, origifp, m, dst, (struct route *)ro);
done:
/* Check for route change invalidating send tags. */
Add kernel-side support for in-kernel TLS. KTLS adds support for in-kernel framing and encryption of Transport Layer Security (1.0-1.2) data on TCP sockets. KTLS only supports offload of TLS for transmitted data. Key negotation must still be performed in userland. Once completed, transmit session keys for a connection are provided to the kernel via a new TCP_TXTLS_ENABLE socket option. All subsequent data transmitted on the socket is placed into TLS frames and encrypted using the supplied keys. Any data written to a KTLS-enabled socket via write(2), aio_write(2), or sendfile(2) is assumed to be application data and is encoded in TLS frames with an application data type. Individual records can be sent with a custom type (e.g. handshake messages) via sendmsg(2) with a new control message (TLS_SET_RECORD_TYPE) specifying the record type. At present, rekeying is not supported though the in-kernel framework should support rekeying. KTLS makes use of the recently added unmapped mbufs to store TLS frames in the socket buffer. Each TLS frame is described by a single ext_pgs mbuf. The ext_pgs structure contains the header of the TLS record (and trailer for encrypted records) as well as references to the associated TLS session. KTLS supports two primary methods of encrypting TLS frames: software TLS and ifnet TLS. Software TLS marks mbufs holding socket data as not ready via M_NOTREADY similar to sendfile(2) when TLS framing information is added to an unmapped mbuf in ktls_frame(). ktls_enqueue() is then called to schedule TLS frames for encryption. In the case of sendfile_iodone() calls ktls_enqueue() instead of pru_ready() leaving the mbufs marked M_NOTREADY until encryption is completed. For other writes (vn_sendfile when pages are available, write(2), etc.), the PRUS_NOTREADY is set when invoking pru_send() along with invoking ktls_enqueue(). A pool of worker threads (the "KTLS" kernel process) encrypts TLS frames queued via ktls_enqueue(). Each TLS frame is temporarily mapped using the direct map and passed to a software encryption backend to perform the actual encryption. (Note: The use of PHYS_TO_DMAP could be replaced with sf_bufs if someone wished to make this work on architectures without a direct map.) KTLS supports pluggable software encryption backends. Internally, Netflix uses proprietary pure-software backends. This commit includes a simple backend in a new ktls_ocf.ko module that uses the kernel's OpenCrypto framework to provide AES-GCM encryption of TLS frames. As a result, software TLS is now a bit of a misnomer as it can make use of hardware crypto accelerators. Once software encryption has finished, the TLS frame mbufs are marked ready via pru_ready(). At this point, the encrypted data appears as regular payload to the TCP stack stored in unmapped mbufs. ifnet TLS permits a NIC to offload the TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. In this mode, a new send tag type (IF_SND_TAG_TYPE_TLS) is allocated on the interface a socket is routed over and associated with a TLS session. TLS records for a TLS session using ifnet TLS are not marked M_NOTREADY but are passed down the stack unencrypted. The ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() helper functions that apply send tags to outbound IP packets verify that the send tag of the TLS record matches the outbound interface. If so, the packet is tagged with the TLS send tag and sent to the interface. The NIC device driver must recognize packets with the TLS send tag and schedule them for TLS encryption and TCP segmentation. If the the outbound interface does not match the interface in the TLS send tag, the packet is dropped. In addition, a task is scheduled to refresh the TLS send tag for the TLS session. If a new TLS send tag cannot be allocated, the connection is dropped. If a new TLS send tag is allocated, however, subsequent packets will be tagged with the correct TLS send tag. (This latter case has been tested by configuring both ports of a Chelsio T6 in a lagg and failing over from one port to another. As the connections migrated to the new port, new TLS send tags were allocated for the new port and connections resumed without being dropped.) ifnet TLS can be enabled and disabled on supported network interfaces via new '[-]txtls[46]' options to ifconfig(8). ifnet TLS is supported across both vlan devices and lagg interfaces using failover, lacp with flowid enabled, or lacp with flowid enabled. Applications may request the current KTLS mode of a connection via a new TCP_TXTLS_MODE socket option. They can also use this socket option to toggle between software and ifnet TLS modes. In addition, a testing tool is available in tools/tools/switch_tls. This is modeled on tcpdrop and uses similar syntax. However, instead of dropping connections, -s is used to force KTLS connections to switch to software TLS and -i is used to switch to ifnet TLS. Various sysctls and counters are available under the kern.ipc.tls sysctl node. The kern.ipc.tls.enable node must be set to true to enable KTLS (it is off by default). The use of unmapped mbufs must also be enabled via kern.ipc.mb_use_ext_pgs to enable KTLS. KTLS is enabled via the KERN_TLS kernel option. This patch is the culmination of years of work by several folks including Scott Long and Randall Stewart for the original design and implementation; Drew Gallatin for several optimizations including the use of ext_pgs mbufs, the M_NOTREADY mechanism for TLS records awaiting software encryption, and pluggable software crypto backends; and John Baldwin for modifications to support hardware TLS offload. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rrs Obtained from: Netflix Sponsored by: Netflix, Chelsio Communications Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21277
2019-08-27 00:01:56 +00:00
#ifdef KERN_TLS
if (tls != NULL) {
if (error == EAGAIN)
error = ktls_output_eagain(inp, tls);
ktls_free(tls);
}
#endif
Restructure mbuf send tags to provide stronger guarantees. - Perform ifp mismatch checks (to determine if a send tag is allocated for a different ifp than the one the packet is being output on), in ip_output() and ip6_output(). This avoids sending packets with send tags to ifnet drivers that don't support send tags. Since we are now checking for ifp mismatches before invoking if_output, we can now try to allocate a new tag before invoking if_output sending the original packet on the new tag if allocation succeeds. To avoid code duplication for the fragment and unfragmented cases, add ip_output_send() and ip6_output_send() as wrappers around if_output and nd6_output_ifp, respectively. All of the logic for setting send tags and dealing with send tag-related errors is done in these wrapper functions. For pseudo interfaces that wrap other network interfaces (vlan and lagg), wrapper send tags are now allocated so that ip*_output see the wrapper ifp as the ifp in the send tag. The if_transmit routines rewrite the send tags after performing an ifp mismatch check. If an ifp mismatch is detected, the transmit routines fail with EAGAIN. - To provide clearer life cycle management of send tags, especially in the presence of vlan and lagg wrapper tags, add a reference count to send tags managed via m_snd_tag_ref() and m_snd_tag_rele(). Provide a helper function (m_snd_tag_init()) for use by drivers supporting send tags. m_snd_tag_init() takes care of the if_ref on the ifp meaning that code alloating send tags via if_snd_tag_alloc no longer has to manage that manually. Similarly, m_snd_tag_rele drops the refcount on the ifp after invoking if_snd_tag_free when the last reference to a send tag is dropped. This also closes use after free races if there are pending packets in driver tx rings after the socket is closed (e.g. from tcpdrop). In order for m_free to work reliably, add a new CSUM_SND_TAG flag in csum_flags to indicate 'snd_tag' is set (rather than 'rcvif'). Drivers now also check this flag instead of checking snd_tag against NULL. This avoids false positive matches when a forwarded packet has a non-NULL rcvif that was treated as a send tag. - cxgbe was relying on snd_tag_free being called when the inp was detached so that it could kick the firmware to flush any pending work on the flow. This is because the driver doesn't require ACK messages from the firmware for every request, but instead does a kind of manual interrupt coalescing by only setting a flag to request a completion on a subset of requests. If all of the in-flight requests don't have the flag when the tag is detached from the inp, the flow might never return the credits. The current snd_tag_free command issues a flush command to force the credits to return. However, the credit return is what also frees the mbufs, and since those mbufs now hold references on the tag, this meant that snd_tag_free would never be called. To fix, explicitly drop the mbuf's reference on the snd tag when the mbuf is queued in the firmware work queue. This means that once the inp's reference on the tag goes away and all in-flight mbufs have been queued to the firmware, tag's refcount will drop to zero and snd_tag_free will kick in and send the flush request. Note that we need to avoid doing this in the middle of ethofld_tx(), so the driver grabs a temporary reference on the tag around that loop to defer the free to the end of the function in case it sends the last mbuf to the queue after the inp has dropped its reference on the tag. - mlx5 preallocates send tags and was using the ifp pointer even when the send tag wasn't in use. Explicitly use the ifp from other data structures instead. - Sprinkle some assertions in various places to assert that received packets don't have a send tag, and that other places that overwrite rcvif (e.g. 802.11 transmit) don't clobber a send tag pointer. Reviewed by: gallatin, hselasky, rgrimes, ae Sponsored by: Netflix Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D20117
2019-05-24 22:30:40 +00:00
#ifdef RATELIMIT
if (error == EAGAIN)
in_pcboutput_eagain(inp);
#endif
return (error);
}
/*
* IP6 output.
* The packet in mbuf chain m contains a skeletal IP6 header (with pri, len,
* nxt, hlim, src, dst).
* This function may modify ver and hlim only.
* The mbuf chain containing the packet will be freed.
* The mbuf opt, if present, will not be freed.
* If route_in6 ro is present and has ro_nh initialized, route lookup would be
* skipped and ro->ro_nh would be used. If ro is present but ro->ro_nh is NULL,
* then result of route lookup is stored in ro->ro_nh.
*
* Type of "mtu": rt_mtu is u_long, ifnet.ifr_mtu is int, and nd_ifinfo.linkmtu
* is uint32_t. So we use u_long to hold largest one, which is rt_mtu.
*
* ifpp - XXX: just for statistics
*/
/*
* XXX TODO: no flowid is assigned for outbound flows?
*/
int
ip6_output(struct mbuf *m0, struct ip6_pktopts *opt,
struct route_in6 *ro, int flags, struct ip6_moptions *im6o,
struct ifnet **ifpp, struct inpcb *inp)
{
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
struct ifnet *ifp, *origifp;
struct mbuf *m = m0;
struct mbuf *mprev;
struct route_in6 *ro_pmtu;
struct nhop_object *nh;
struct sockaddr_in6 *dst, sin6, src_sa, dst_sa;
struct in6_addr odst;
u_char *nexthdrp;
int tlen, len;
int error = 0;
struct in6_ifaddr *ia = NULL;
u_long mtu;
int alwaysfrag, dontfrag;
u_int32_t optlen, plen = 0, unfragpartlen;
struct ip6_exthdrs exthdrs;
struct in6_addr src0, dst0;
u_int32_t zone;
bool hdrsplit;
int sw_csum, tso;
int needfiblookup;
uint32_t fibnum;
struct m_tag *fwd_tag = NULL;
uint32_t id;
NET_EPOCH_ASSERT();
if (inp != NULL) {
INP_LOCK_ASSERT(inp);
M_SETFIB(m, inp->inp_inc.inc_fibnum);
if ((flags & IP_NODEFAULTFLOWID) == 0) {
/* Unconditionally set flowid. */
m->m_pkthdr.flowid = inp->inp_flowid;
M_HASHTYPE_SET(m, inp->inp_flowtype);
}
#ifdef NUMA
m->m_pkthdr.numa_domain = inp->inp_numa_domain;
#endif
}
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
/*
* IPSec checking which handles several cases.
* FAST IPSEC: We re-injected the packet.
* XXX: need scope argument.
*/
if (IPSEC_ENABLED(ipv6)) {
if ((error = IPSEC_OUTPUT(ipv6, m, inp)) != 0) {
if (error == EINPROGRESS)
error = 0;
goto done;
}
}
#endif /* IPSEC */
/* Source address validation. */
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&ip6->ip6_src) &&
(flags & IPV6_UNSPECSRC) == 0) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
goto bad;
}
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_src)) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
goto bad;
}
/*
* If we are given packet options to add extension headers prepare them.
* Calculate the total length of the extension header chain.
* Keep the length of the unfragmentable part for fragmentation.
*/
bzero(&exthdrs, sizeof(exthdrs));
optlen = 0;
unfragpartlen = sizeof(struct ip6_hdr);
if (opt) {
/* Hop-by-Hop options header. */
MAKE_EXTHDR(opt->ip6po_hbh, &exthdrs.ip6e_hbh, optlen);
/* Destination options header (1st part). */
if (opt->ip6po_rthdr) {
#ifndef RTHDR_SUPPORT_IMPLEMENTED
/*
* If there is a routing header, discard the packet
* right away here. RH0/1 are obsolete and we do not
* currently support RH2/3/4.
* People trying to use RH253/254 may want to disable
* this check.
* The moment we do support any routing header (again)
* this block should check the routing type more
* selectively.
*/
error = EINVAL;
goto bad;
#endif
/*
* Destination options header (1st part).
* This only makes sense with a routing header.
* See Section 9.2 of RFC 3542.
* Disabling this part just for MIP6 convenience is
* a bad idea. We need to think carefully about a
* way to make the advanced API coexist with MIP6
* options, which might automatically be inserted in
* the kernel.
*/
MAKE_EXTHDR(opt->ip6po_dest1, &exthdrs.ip6e_dest1,
optlen);
}
/* Routing header. */
MAKE_EXTHDR(opt->ip6po_rthdr, &exthdrs.ip6e_rthdr, optlen);
unfragpartlen += optlen;
/*
* NOTE: we don't add AH/ESP length here (done in
* ip6_ipsec_output()).
*/
/* Destination options header (2nd part). */
MAKE_EXTHDR(opt->ip6po_dest2, &exthdrs.ip6e_dest2, optlen);
}
/*
* If there is at least one extension header,
* separate IP6 header from the payload.
*/
hdrsplit = false;
if (optlen) {
if ((error = ip6_splithdr(m, &exthdrs)) != 0) {
m = NULL;
goto freehdrs;
}
m = exthdrs.ip6e_ip6;
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
hdrsplit = true;
}
/* Adjust mbuf packet header length. */
m->m_pkthdr.len += optlen;
plen = m->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(*ip6);
/* If this is a jumbo payload, insert a jumbo payload option. */
if (plen > IPV6_MAXPACKET) {
if (!hdrsplit) {
if ((error = ip6_splithdr(m, &exthdrs)) != 0) {
m = NULL;
goto freehdrs;
}
m = exthdrs.ip6e_ip6;
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
hdrsplit = true;
}
if ((error = ip6_insert_jumboopt(&exthdrs, plen)) != 0)
goto freehdrs;
ip6->ip6_plen = 0;
} else
ip6->ip6_plen = htons(plen);
nexthdrp = &ip6->ip6_nxt;
if (optlen) {
/*
* Concatenate headers and fill in next header fields.
* Here we have, on "m"
* IPv6 payload
* and we insert headers accordingly.
* Finally, we should be getting:
* IPv6 hbh dest1 rthdr ah* [esp* dest2 payload].
*
* During the header composing process "m" points to IPv6
* header. "mprev" points to an extension header prior to esp.
*/
mprev = m;
/*
* We treat dest2 specially. This makes IPsec processing
* much easier. The goal here is to make mprev point the
* mbuf prior to dest2.
*
* Result: IPv6 dest2 payload.
* m and mprev will point to IPv6 header.
*/
if (exthdrs.ip6e_dest2) {
if (!hdrsplit)
panic("%s:%d: assumption failed: "
"hdr not split: hdrsplit %d exthdrs %p",
__func__, __LINE__, hdrsplit, &exthdrs);
exthdrs.ip6e_dest2->m_next = m->m_next;
m->m_next = exthdrs.ip6e_dest2;
*mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_dest2, u_char *) = ip6->ip6_nxt;
ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_DSTOPTS;
}
/*
* Result: IPv6 hbh dest1 rthdr dest2 payload.
* m will point to IPv6 header. mprev will point to the
* extension header prior to dest2 (rthdr in the above case).
*/
MAKE_CHAIN(exthdrs.ip6e_hbh, mprev, nexthdrp, IPPROTO_HOPOPTS);
MAKE_CHAIN(exthdrs.ip6e_dest1, mprev, nexthdrp,
IPPROTO_DSTOPTS);
MAKE_CHAIN(exthdrs.ip6e_rthdr, mprev, nexthdrp,
IPPROTO_ROUTING);
}
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_localout);
/* Route packet. */
ro_pmtu = ro;
if (opt && opt->ip6po_rthdr)
ro = &opt->ip6po_route;
if (ro != NULL)
dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ro->ro_dst;
else
dst = &sin6;
fibnum = (inp != NULL) ? inp->inp_inc.inc_fibnum : M_GETFIB(m);
again:
/*
* If specified, try to fill in the traffic class field.
* Do not override if a non-zero value is already set.
* We check the diffserv field and the ECN field separately.
*/
if (opt && opt->ip6po_tclass >= 0) {
int mask = 0;
if ((ip6->ip6_flow & htonl(0xfc << 20)) == 0)
mask |= 0xfc;
if ((ip6->ip6_flow & htonl(0x03 << 20)) == 0)
mask |= 0x03;
if (mask != 0)
ip6->ip6_flow |= htonl((opt->ip6po_tclass & mask) << 20);
}
/* Fill in or override the hop limit field, if necessary. */
if (opt && opt->ip6po_hlim != -1)
ip6->ip6_hlim = opt->ip6po_hlim & 0xff;
else if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
if (im6o != NULL)
ip6->ip6_hlim = im6o->im6o_multicast_hlim;
else
ip6->ip6_hlim = V_ip6_defmcasthlim;
}
if (ro == NULL || ro->ro_nh == NULL) {
bzero(dst, sizeof(*dst));
dst->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dst->sin6_len = sizeof(*dst);
dst->sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst;
}
/*
* Validate route against routing table changes.
* Make sure that the address family is set in route.
*/
nh = NULL;
ifp = NULL;
mtu = 0;
if (ro != NULL) {
if (ro->ro_nh != NULL && inp != NULL) {
ro->ro_dst.sin6_family = AF_INET6; /* XXX KASSERT? */
NH_VALIDATE((struct route *)ro, &inp->inp_rt_cookie,
fibnum);
}
if (ro->ro_nh != NULL && fwd_tag == NULL &&
(!NH_IS_VALID(ro->ro_nh) ||
ro->ro_dst.sin6_family != AF_INET6 ||
!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ro->ro_dst.sin6_addr, &ip6->ip6_dst)))
RO_INVALIDATE_CACHE(ro);
if (ro->ro_nh != NULL && fwd_tag == NULL &&
ro->ro_dst.sin6_family == AF_INET6 &&
IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&ro->ro_dst.sin6_addr, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
nh = ro->ro_nh;
ifp = nh->nh_ifp;
} else {
if (ro->ro_lle)
LLE_FREE(ro->ro_lle); /* zeros ro_lle */
ro->ro_lle = NULL;
if (fwd_tag == NULL) {
bzero(&dst_sa, sizeof(dst_sa));
dst_sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dst_sa.sin6_len = sizeof(dst_sa);
dst_sa.sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst;
}
error = in6_selectroute(&dst_sa, opt, im6o, ro, &ifp,
&nh, fibnum, m->m_pkthdr.flowid);
if (error != 0) {
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_noroute);
if (ifp != NULL)
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_discard);
goto bad;
}
if (ifp != NULL)
mtu = ifp->if_mtu;
}
if (nh == NULL) {
/*
* If in6_selectroute() does not return a nexthop
* dst may not have been updated.
*/
*dst = dst_sa; /* XXX */
} else {
if (nh->nh_flags & NHF_HOST)
mtu = nh->nh_mtu;
ia = (struct in6_ifaddr *)(nh->nh_ifa);
counter_u64_add(nh->nh_pksent, 1);
}
} else {
struct nhop6_extended nh6;
struct in6_addr kdst;
uint32_t scopeid;
if (fwd_tag == NULL) {
bzero(&dst_sa, sizeof(dst_sa));
dst_sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dst_sa.sin6_len = sizeof(dst_sa);
dst_sa.sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst;
}
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&dst_sa.sin6_addr) &&
im6o != NULL &&
(ifp = im6o->im6o_multicast_ifp) != NULL) {
/* We do not need a route lookup. */
*dst = dst_sa; /* XXX */
goto nonh6lookup;
}
in6_splitscope(&dst_sa.sin6_addr, &kdst, &scopeid);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MC_LINKLOCAL(&dst_sa.sin6_addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_MC_NODELOCAL(&dst_sa.sin6_addr)) {
if (scopeid > 0) {
ifp = in6_getlinkifnet(scopeid);
*dst = dst_sa; /* XXX */
goto nonh6lookup;
}
}
error = fib6_lookup_nh_ext(fibnum, &kdst, scopeid, NHR_REF, 0,
&nh6);
if (error != 0) {
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_noroute);
/* No ifp in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_discard); */
error = EHOSTUNREACH;;
goto bad;
}
ifp = nh6.nh_ifp;
mtu = nh6.nh_mtu;
dst->sin6_addr = nh6.nh_addr;
ia = nh6.nh_ia;
fib6_free_nh_ext(fibnum, &nh6);
nonh6lookup:
;
}
/* Then nh (for unicast) and ifp must be non-NULL valid values. */
if ((flags & IPV6_FORWARDING) == 0) {
/* XXX: the FORWARDING flag can be set for mrouting. */
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_request);
}
/* Setup data structures for scope ID checks. */
src0 = ip6->ip6_src;
bzero(&src_sa, sizeof(src_sa));
src_sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
src_sa.sin6_len = sizeof(src_sa);
src_sa.sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_src;
dst0 = ip6->ip6_dst;
/* Re-initialize to be sure. */
bzero(&dst_sa, sizeof(dst_sa));
dst_sa.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
dst_sa.sin6_len = sizeof(dst_sa);
dst_sa.sin6_addr = ip6->ip6_dst;
/* Check for valid scope ID. */
if (in6_setscope(&src0, ifp, &zone) == 0 &&
sa6_recoverscope(&src_sa) == 0 && zone == src_sa.sin6_scope_id &&
in6_setscope(&dst0, ifp, &zone) == 0 &&
sa6_recoverscope(&dst_sa) == 0 && zone == dst_sa.sin6_scope_id) {
/*
* The outgoing interface is in the zone of the source
* and destination addresses.
*
* Because the loopback interface cannot receive
* packets with a different scope ID than its own,
* there is a trick to pretend the outgoing packet
* was received by the real network interface, by
* setting "origifp" different from "ifp". This is
* only allowed when "ifp" is a loopback network
* interface. Refer to code in nd6_output_ifp() for
* more details.
*/
origifp = ifp;
/*
* We should use ia_ifp to support the case of sending
* packets to an address of our own.
*/
if (ia != NULL && ia->ia_ifp)
ifp = ia->ia_ifp;
} else if ((ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) == 0 ||
sa6_recoverscope(&src_sa) != 0 ||
sa6_recoverscope(&dst_sa) != 0 ||
dst_sa.sin6_scope_id == 0 ||
(src_sa.sin6_scope_id != 0 &&
src_sa.sin6_scope_id != dst_sa.sin6_scope_id) ||
(origifp = ifnet_byindex(dst_sa.sin6_scope_id)) == NULL) {
/*
* If the destination network interface is not a
* loopback interface, or the destination network
* address has no scope ID, or the source address has
* a scope ID set which is different from the
* destination address one, or there is no network
* interface representing this scope ID, the address
* pair is considered invalid.
*/
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_badscope);
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_discard);
if (error == 0)
error = EHOSTUNREACH; /* XXX */
goto bad;
}
/* All scope ID checks are successful. */
if (nh && !IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
if (opt && opt->ip6po_nextroute.ro_nh) {
/*
* The nexthop is explicitly specified by the
* application. We assume the next hop is an IPv6
* address.
*/
dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)opt->ip6po_nexthop;
}
else if ((nh->nh_flags & NHF_GATEWAY))
dst = &nh->gw6_sa;
}
if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
m->m_flags &= ~(M_BCAST | M_MCAST); /* Just in case. */
} else {
m->m_flags = (m->m_flags & ~M_BCAST) | M_MCAST;
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_mcast);
/* Confirm that the outgoing interface supports multicast. */
if (!(ifp->if_flags & IFF_MULTICAST)) {
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_noroute);
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_discard);
error = ENETUNREACH;
goto bad;
}
Bite the bullet, and make the IPv6 SSM and MLDv2 mega-commit: import from p4 bms_netdev. Summary of changes: * Connect netinet6/in6_mcast.c to build. The legacy KAME KPIs are mostly preserved. * Eliminate now dead code from ip6_output.c. Don't do mbuf bingo, we are not going to do RFC 2292 style CMSG tricks for multicast options as they are not required by any current IPv6 normative reference. * Refactor transports (UDP, raw_ip6) to do own mcast filtering. SCTP, TCP unaffected by this change. * Add ip6_msource, in6_msource structs to in6_var.h. * Hookup mld_ifinfo state to in6_ifextra, allocate from domifattach path. * Eliminate IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(), it is no longer referenced. Kernel consumers which need this should use in6m_lookup(). * Refactor IPv6 socket group memberships to use a vector (like IPv4). * Update ifmcstat(8) for IPv6 SSM. * Add witness lock order for IN6_MULTI_LOCK. * Move IN6_MULTI_LOCK out of lower ip6_output()/ip6_input() paths. * Introduce IP6STAT_ADD/SUB/INC/DEC as per rwatson's IPv4 cleanup. * Update carp(4) for new IPv6 SSM KPIs. * Virtualize ip6_mrouter socket. Changes mostly localized to IPv6 MROUTING. * Don't do a local group lookup in MROUTING. * Kill unused KAME prototypes in6_purgemkludge(), in6_restoremkludge(). * Preserve KAME DAD timer jitter behaviour in MLDv1 compatibility mode. * Bump __FreeBSD_version to 800084. * Update UPDATING. NOTE WELL: * This code hasn't been tested against real MLDv2 queriers (yet), although the on-wire protocol has been verified in Wireshark. * There are a few unresolved issues in the socket layer APIs to do with scope ID propagation. * There is a LOR present in ip6_output()'s use of in6_setscope() which needs to be resolved. See comments in mld6.c. This is believed to be benign and can't be avoided for the moment without re-introducing an indirect netisr. This work was mostly derived from the IGMPv3 implementation, and has been sponsored by a third party.
2009-04-29 19:19:13 +00:00
if ((im6o == NULL && in6_mcast_loop) ||
(im6o && im6o->im6o_multicast_loop)) {
/*
Bite the bullet, and make the IPv6 SSM and MLDv2 mega-commit: import from p4 bms_netdev. Summary of changes: * Connect netinet6/in6_mcast.c to build. The legacy KAME KPIs are mostly preserved. * Eliminate now dead code from ip6_output.c. Don't do mbuf bingo, we are not going to do RFC 2292 style CMSG tricks for multicast options as they are not required by any current IPv6 normative reference. * Refactor transports (UDP, raw_ip6) to do own mcast filtering. SCTP, TCP unaffected by this change. * Add ip6_msource, in6_msource structs to in6_var.h. * Hookup mld_ifinfo state to in6_ifextra, allocate from domifattach path. * Eliminate IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(), it is no longer referenced. Kernel consumers which need this should use in6m_lookup(). * Refactor IPv6 socket group memberships to use a vector (like IPv4). * Update ifmcstat(8) for IPv6 SSM. * Add witness lock order for IN6_MULTI_LOCK. * Move IN6_MULTI_LOCK out of lower ip6_output()/ip6_input() paths. * Introduce IP6STAT_ADD/SUB/INC/DEC as per rwatson's IPv4 cleanup. * Update carp(4) for new IPv6 SSM KPIs. * Virtualize ip6_mrouter socket. Changes mostly localized to IPv6 MROUTING. * Don't do a local group lookup in MROUTING. * Kill unused KAME prototypes in6_purgemkludge(), in6_restoremkludge(). * Preserve KAME DAD timer jitter behaviour in MLDv1 compatibility mode. * Bump __FreeBSD_version to 800084. * Update UPDATING. NOTE WELL: * This code hasn't been tested against real MLDv2 queriers (yet), although the on-wire protocol has been verified in Wireshark. * There are a few unresolved issues in the socket layer APIs to do with scope ID propagation. * There is a LOR present in ip6_output()'s use of in6_setscope() which needs to be resolved. See comments in mld6.c. This is believed to be benign and can't be avoided for the moment without re-introducing an indirect netisr. This work was mostly derived from the IGMPv3 implementation, and has been sponsored by a third party.
2009-04-29 19:19:13 +00:00
* Loop back multicast datagram if not expressly
* forbidden to do so, even if we have not joined
* the address; protocols will filter it later,
* thus deferring a hash lookup and lock acquisition
* at the expense of an m_copym().
*/
ip6_mloopback(ifp, m);
} else {
/*
* If we are acting as a multicast router, perform
* multicast forwarding as if the packet had just
* arrived on the interface to which we are about
* to send. The multicast forwarding function
* recursively calls this function, using the
* IPV6_FORWARDING flag to prevent infinite recursion.
*
* Multicasts that are looped back by ip6_mloopback(),
* above, will be forwarded by the ip6_input() routine,
* if necessary.
*/
Bite the bullet, and make the IPv6 SSM and MLDv2 mega-commit: import from p4 bms_netdev. Summary of changes: * Connect netinet6/in6_mcast.c to build. The legacy KAME KPIs are mostly preserved. * Eliminate now dead code from ip6_output.c. Don't do mbuf bingo, we are not going to do RFC 2292 style CMSG tricks for multicast options as they are not required by any current IPv6 normative reference. * Refactor transports (UDP, raw_ip6) to do own mcast filtering. SCTP, TCP unaffected by this change. * Add ip6_msource, in6_msource structs to in6_var.h. * Hookup mld_ifinfo state to in6_ifextra, allocate from domifattach path. * Eliminate IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(), it is no longer referenced. Kernel consumers which need this should use in6m_lookup(). * Refactor IPv6 socket group memberships to use a vector (like IPv4). * Update ifmcstat(8) for IPv6 SSM. * Add witness lock order for IN6_MULTI_LOCK. * Move IN6_MULTI_LOCK out of lower ip6_output()/ip6_input() paths. * Introduce IP6STAT_ADD/SUB/INC/DEC as per rwatson's IPv4 cleanup. * Update carp(4) for new IPv6 SSM KPIs. * Virtualize ip6_mrouter socket. Changes mostly localized to IPv6 MROUTING. * Don't do a local group lookup in MROUTING. * Kill unused KAME prototypes in6_purgemkludge(), in6_restoremkludge(). * Preserve KAME DAD timer jitter behaviour in MLDv1 compatibility mode. * Bump __FreeBSD_version to 800084. * Update UPDATING. NOTE WELL: * This code hasn't been tested against real MLDv2 queriers (yet), although the on-wire protocol has been verified in Wireshark. * There are a few unresolved issues in the socket layer APIs to do with scope ID propagation. * There is a LOR present in ip6_output()'s use of in6_setscope() which needs to be resolved. See comments in mld6.c. This is believed to be benign and can't be avoided for the moment without re-introducing an indirect netisr. This work was mostly derived from the IGMPv3 implementation, and has been sponsored by a third party.
2009-04-29 19:19:13 +00:00
if (V_ip6_mrouter && (flags & IPV6_FORWARDING) == 0) {
/*
* XXX: ip6_mforward expects that rcvif is NULL
* when it is called from the originating path.
* However, it may not always be the case.
*/
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
if (ip6_mforward(ip6, ifp, m) != 0) {
m_freem(m);
goto done;
}
}
}
/*
* Multicasts with a hoplimit of zero may be looped back,
* above, but must not be transmitted on a network.
* Also, multicasts addressed to the loopback interface
* are not sent -- the above call to ip6_mloopback() will
* loop back a copy if this host actually belongs to the
* destination group on the loopback interface.
*/
if (ip6->ip6_hlim == 0 || (ifp->if_flags & IFF_LOOPBACK) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_MC_INTFACELOCAL(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
m_freem(m);
goto done;
}
}
/*
* Fill the outgoing inteface to tell the upper layer
* to increment per-interface statistics.
*/
if (ifpp)
*ifpp = ifp;
/* Determine path MTU. */
if ((error = ip6_getpmtu(ro_pmtu, ro != ro_pmtu, ifp, &ip6->ip6_dst,
&mtu, &alwaysfrag, fibnum, *nexthdrp)) != 0)
goto bad;
KASSERT(mtu > 0, ("%s:%d: mtu %ld, ro_pmtu %p ro %p ifp %p "
"alwaysfrag %d fibnum %u\n", __func__, __LINE__, mtu, ro_pmtu, ro,
ifp, alwaysfrag, fibnum));
/*
* The caller of this function may specify to use the minimum MTU
* in some cases.
* An advanced API option (IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU) can also override MTU
* setting. The logic is a bit complicated; by default, unicast
* packets will follow path MTU while multicast packets will be sent at
* the minimum MTU. If IP6PO_MINMTU_ALL is specified, all packets
* including unicast ones will be sent at the minimum MTU. Multicast
* packets will always be sent at the minimum MTU unless
* IP6PO_MINMTU_DISABLE is explicitly specified.
* See RFC 3542 for more details.
*/
if (mtu > IPV6_MMTU) {
if ((flags & IPV6_MINMTU))
mtu = IPV6_MMTU;
else if (opt && opt->ip6po_minmtu == IP6PO_MINMTU_ALL)
mtu = IPV6_MMTU;
else if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&ip6->ip6_dst) &&
(opt == NULL ||
opt->ip6po_minmtu != IP6PO_MINMTU_DISABLE)) {
mtu = IPV6_MMTU;
}
}
/*
* Clear embedded scope identifiers if necessary.
* in6_clearscope() will touch the addresses only when necessary.
*/
in6_clearscope(&ip6->ip6_src);
in6_clearscope(&ip6->ip6_dst);
/*
* If the outgoing packet contains a hop-by-hop options header,
* it must be examined and processed even by the source node.
* (RFC 2460, section 4.)
*/
if (exthdrs.ip6e_hbh) {
struct ip6_hbh *hbh = mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_hbh, struct ip6_hbh *);
u_int32_t dummy; /* XXX unused */
u_int32_t plen = 0; /* XXX: ip6_process will check the value */
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
if ((hbh->ip6h_len + 1) << 3 > exthdrs.ip6e_hbh->m_len)
panic("ip6e_hbh is not contiguous");
#endif
/*
* XXX: if we have to send an ICMPv6 error to the sender,
* we need the M_LOOP flag since icmp6_error() expects
* the IPv6 and the hop-by-hop options header are
* contiguous unless the flag is set.
*/
m->m_flags |= M_LOOP;
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = ifp;
if (ip6_process_hopopts(m, (u_int8_t *)(hbh + 1),
((hbh->ip6h_len + 1) << 3) - sizeof(struct ip6_hbh),
&dummy, &plen) < 0) {
/* m was already freed at this point. */
error = EINVAL;/* better error? */
goto done;
}
m->m_flags &= ~M_LOOP; /* XXX */
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
}
/* Jump over all PFIL processing if hooks are not active. */
New pfil(9) KPI together with newborn pfil API and control utility. The KPI have been reviewed and cleansed of features that were planned back 20 years ago and never implemented. The pfil(9) internals have been made opaque to protocols with only returned types and function declarations exposed. The KPI is made more strict, but at the same time more extensible, as kernel uses same command structures that userland ioctl uses. In nutshell [KA]PI is about declaring filtering points, declaring filters and linking and unlinking them together. New [KA]PI makes it possible to reconfigure pfil(9) configuration: change order of hooks, rehook filter from one filtering point to a different one, disconnect a hook on output leaving it on input only, prepend/append a filter to existing list of filters. Now it possible for a single packet filter to provide multiple rulesets that may be linked to different points. Think of per-interface ACLs in Cisco or Juniper. None of existing packet filters yet support that, however limited usage is already possible, e.g. default ruleset can be moved to single interface, as soon as interface would pride their filtering points. Another future feature is possiblity to create pfil heads, that provide not an mbuf pointer but just a memory pointer with length. That would allow filtering at very early stages of a packet lifecycle, e.g. when packet has just been received by a NIC and no mbuf was yet allocated. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18951
2019-01-31 23:01:03 +00:00
if (!PFIL_HOOKED_OUT(V_inet6_pfil_head))
goto passout;
odst = ip6->ip6_dst;
/* Run through list of hooks for output packets. */
New pfil(9) KPI together with newborn pfil API and control utility. The KPI have been reviewed and cleansed of features that were planned back 20 years ago and never implemented. The pfil(9) internals have been made opaque to protocols with only returned types and function declarations exposed. The KPI is made more strict, but at the same time more extensible, as kernel uses same command structures that userland ioctl uses. In nutshell [KA]PI is about declaring filtering points, declaring filters and linking and unlinking them together. New [KA]PI makes it possible to reconfigure pfil(9) configuration: change order of hooks, rehook filter from one filtering point to a different one, disconnect a hook on output leaving it on input only, prepend/append a filter to existing list of filters. Now it possible for a single packet filter to provide multiple rulesets that may be linked to different points. Think of per-interface ACLs in Cisco or Juniper. None of existing packet filters yet support that, however limited usage is already possible, e.g. default ruleset can be moved to single interface, as soon as interface would pride their filtering points. Another future feature is possiblity to create pfil heads, that provide not an mbuf pointer but just a memory pointer with length. That would allow filtering at very early stages of a packet lifecycle, e.g. when packet has just been received by a NIC and no mbuf was yet allocated. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18951
2019-01-31 23:01:03 +00:00
switch (pfil_run_hooks(V_inet6_pfil_head, &m, ifp, PFIL_OUT, inp)) {
case PFIL_PASS:
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
break;
case PFIL_DROPPED:
error = EACCES;
New pfil(9) KPI together with newborn pfil API and control utility. The KPI have been reviewed and cleansed of features that were planned back 20 years ago and never implemented. The pfil(9) internals have been made opaque to protocols with only returned types and function declarations exposed. The KPI is made more strict, but at the same time more extensible, as kernel uses same command structures that userland ioctl uses. In nutshell [KA]PI is about declaring filtering points, declaring filters and linking and unlinking them together. New [KA]PI makes it possible to reconfigure pfil(9) configuration: change order of hooks, rehook filter from one filtering point to a different one, disconnect a hook on output leaving it on input only, prepend/append a filter to existing list of filters. Now it possible for a single packet filter to provide multiple rulesets that may be linked to different points. Think of per-interface ACLs in Cisco or Juniper. None of existing packet filters yet support that, however limited usage is already possible, e.g. default ruleset can be moved to single interface, as soon as interface would pride their filtering points. Another future feature is possiblity to create pfil heads, that provide not an mbuf pointer but just a memory pointer with length. That would allow filtering at very early stages of a packet lifecycle, e.g. when packet has just been received by a NIC and no mbuf was yet allocated. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18951
2019-01-31 23:01:03 +00:00
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PFIL_CONSUMED:
goto done;
New pfil(9) KPI together with newborn pfil API and control utility. The KPI have been reviewed and cleansed of features that were planned back 20 years ago and never implemented. The pfil(9) internals have been made opaque to protocols with only returned types and function declarations exposed. The KPI is made more strict, but at the same time more extensible, as kernel uses same command structures that userland ioctl uses. In nutshell [KA]PI is about declaring filtering points, declaring filters and linking and unlinking them together. New [KA]PI makes it possible to reconfigure pfil(9) configuration: change order of hooks, rehook filter from one filtering point to a different one, disconnect a hook on output leaving it on input only, prepend/append a filter to existing list of filters. Now it possible for a single packet filter to provide multiple rulesets that may be linked to different points. Think of per-interface ACLs in Cisco or Juniper. None of existing packet filters yet support that, however limited usage is already possible, e.g. default ruleset can be moved to single interface, as soon as interface would pride their filtering points. Another future feature is possiblity to create pfil heads, that provide not an mbuf pointer but just a memory pointer with length. That would allow filtering at very early stages of a packet lifecycle, e.g. when packet has just been received by a NIC and no mbuf was yet allocated. Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18951
2019-01-31 23:01:03 +00:00
}
needfiblookup = 0;
/* See if destination IP address was changed by packet filter. */
if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&odst, &ip6->ip6_dst)) {
m->m_flags |= M_SKIP_FIREWALL;
/* If destination is now ourself drop to ip6_input(). */
if (in6_localip(&ip6->ip6_dst)) {
m->m_flags |= M_FASTFWD_OURS;
if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif == NULL)
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = V_loif;
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) {
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |=
CSUM_DATA_VALID_IPV6 | CSUM_PSEUDO_HDR;
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = 0xffff;
}
#ifdef SCTP
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6)
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= CSUM_SCTP_VALID;
#endif
error = netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m);
goto done;
} else {
if (ro != NULL)
RO_INVALIDATE_CACHE(ro);
needfiblookup = 1; /* Redo the routing table lookup. */
}
}
/* See if fib was changed by packet filter. */
if (fibnum != M_GETFIB(m)) {
m->m_flags |= M_SKIP_FIREWALL;
fibnum = M_GETFIB(m);
if (ro != NULL)
RO_INVALIDATE_CACHE(ro);
needfiblookup = 1;
}
if (needfiblookup)
goto again;
/* See if local, if yes, send it to netisr. */
if (m->m_flags & M_FASTFWD_OURS) {
if (m->m_pkthdr.rcvif == NULL)
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = V_loif;
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) {
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |=
CSUM_DATA_VALID_IPV6 | CSUM_PSEUDO_HDR;
m->m_pkthdr.csum_data = 0xffff;
}
#ifdef SCTP
if (m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_SCTP_IPV6)
m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= CSUM_SCTP_VALID;
#endif
error = netisr_queue(NETISR_IPV6, m);
goto done;
}
/* Or forward to some other address? */
if ((m->m_flags & M_IP6_NEXTHOP) &&
(fwd_tag = m_tag_find(m, PACKET_TAG_IPFORWARD, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (ro != NULL)
dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ro->ro_dst;
else
dst = &sin6;
bcopy((fwd_tag+1), &dst_sa, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
m->m_flags |= M_SKIP_FIREWALL;
m->m_flags &= ~M_IP6_NEXTHOP;
m_tag_delete(m, fwd_tag);
goto again;
}
passout:
/*
* Send the packet to the outgoing interface.
* If necessary, do IPv6 fragmentation before sending.
*
* The logic here is rather complex:
* 1: normal case (dontfrag == 0, alwaysfrag == 0)
* 1-a: send as is if tlen <= path mtu
* 1-b: fragment if tlen > path mtu
*
* 2: if user asks us not to fragment (dontfrag == 1)
* 2-a: send as is if tlen <= interface mtu
* 2-b: error if tlen > interface mtu
*
* 3: if we always need to attach fragment header (alwaysfrag == 1)
* always fragment
*
* 4: if dontfrag == 1 && alwaysfrag == 1
* error, as we cannot handle this conflicting request.
*/
sw_csum = m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags;
if (!hdrsplit) {
tso = ((sw_csum & ifp->if_hwassist & CSUM_TSO) != 0) ? 1 : 0;
sw_csum &= ~ifp->if_hwassist;
} else
tso = 0;
/*
* If we added extension headers, we will not do TSO and calculate the
* checksums ourselves for now.
* XXX-BZ Need a framework to know when the NIC can handle it, even
* with ext. hdrs.
*/
error = ip6_output_delayed_csum(m, ifp, sw_csum, plen, optlen, false);
if (error != 0)
goto bad;
/* XXX-BZ m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags &= ~ifp->if_hwassist; */
tlen = m->m_pkthdr.len;
if ((opt && (opt->ip6po_flags & IP6PO_DONTFRAG)) || tso)
dontfrag = 1;
else
dontfrag = 0;
if (dontfrag && alwaysfrag) { /* Case 4. */
/* Conflicting request - can't transmit. */
error = EMSGSIZE;
goto bad;
}
if (dontfrag && tlen > IN6_LINKMTU(ifp) && !tso) { /* Case 2-b. */
/*
* Even if the DONTFRAG option is specified, we cannot send the
* packet when the data length is larger than the MTU of the
* outgoing interface.
* Notify the error by sending IPV6_PATHMTU ancillary data if
* application wanted to know the MTU value. Also return an
* error code (this is not described in the API spec).
*/
if (inp != NULL)
ip6_notify_pmtu(inp, &dst_sa, (u_int32_t)mtu);
error = EMSGSIZE;
goto bad;
}
/* Transmit packet without fragmentation. */
if (dontfrag || (!alwaysfrag && tlen <= mtu)) { /* Cases 1-a and 2-a. */
struct in6_ifaddr *ia6;
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
ia6 = in6_ifawithifp(ifp, &ip6->ip6_src);
if (ia6) {
/* Record statistics for this interface address. */
counter_u64_add(ia6->ia_ifa.ifa_opackets, 1);
counter_u64_add(ia6->ia_ifa.ifa_obytes,
m->m_pkthdr.len);
ifa_free(&ia6->ia_ifa);
}
error = ip6_output_send(inp, ifp, origifp, m, dst, ro,
(flags & IP_NO_SND_TAG_RL) ? false : true);
goto done;
}
/* Try to fragment the packet. Cases 1-b and 3. */
if (mtu < IPV6_MMTU) {
/* Path MTU cannot be less than IPV6_MMTU. */
error = EMSGSIZE;
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_fragfail);
goto bad;
} else if (ip6->ip6_plen == 0) {
/* Jumbo payload cannot be fragmented. */
error = EMSGSIZE;
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_fragfail);
goto bad;
} else {
u_char nextproto;
/*
* Too large for the destination or interface;
* fragment if possible.
* Must be able to put at least 8 bytes per fragment.
*/
if (mtu > IPV6_MAXPACKET)
mtu = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
len = (mtu - unfragpartlen - sizeof(struct ip6_frag)) & ~7;
if (len < 8) {
error = EMSGSIZE;
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_fragfail);
goto bad;
}
/*
* If the interface will not calculate checksums on
* fragmented packets, then do it here.
* XXX-BZ handle the hw offloading case. Need flags.
*/
error = ip6_output_delayed_csum(m, ifp, m->m_pkthdr.csum_flags,
plen, optlen, true);
if (error != 0)
goto bad;
/*
* Change the next header field of the last header in the
* unfragmentable part.
*/
if (exthdrs.ip6e_rthdr) {
nextproto = *mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_rthdr, u_char *);
*mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_rthdr, u_char *) = IPPROTO_FRAGMENT;
} else if (exthdrs.ip6e_dest1) {
nextproto = *mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_dest1, u_char *);
*mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_dest1, u_char *) = IPPROTO_FRAGMENT;
} else if (exthdrs.ip6e_hbh) {
nextproto = *mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_hbh, u_char *);
*mtod(exthdrs.ip6e_hbh, u_char *) = IPPROTO_FRAGMENT;
} else {
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
nextproto = ip6->ip6_nxt;
ip6->ip6_nxt = IPPROTO_FRAGMENT;
}
/*
* Loop through length of segment after first fragment,
* make new header and copy data of each part and link onto
* chain.
*/
m0 = m;
id = htonl(ip6_randomid());
error = ip6_fragment(ifp, m, unfragpartlen, nextproto,len, id);
if (error != 0)
goto sendorfree;
in6_ifstat_inc(ifp, ifs6_out_fragok);
}
/* Remove leading garbage. */
sendorfree:
m = m0->m_nextpkt;
m0->m_nextpkt = 0;
m_freem(m0);
for (; m; m = m0) {
m0 = m->m_nextpkt;
m->m_nextpkt = 0;
if (error == 0) {
/* Record statistics for this interface address. */
if (ia) {
counter_u64_add(ia->ia_ifa.ifa_opackets, 1);
counter_u64_add(ia->ia_ifa.ifa_obytes,
m->m_pkthdr.len);
}
error = ip6_output_send(inp, ifp, origifp, m, dst, ro,
true);
} else
m_freem(m);
}
if (error == 0)
IP6STAT_INC(ip6s_fragmented);
done:
return (error);
freehdrs:
m_freem(exthdrs.ip6e_hbh); /* m_freem() checks if mbuf is NULL. */
m_freem(exthdrs.ip6e_dest1);
m_freem(exthdrs.ip6e_rthdr);
m_freem(exthdrs.ip6e_dest2);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
bad:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
goto done;
}
static int
ip6_copyexthdr(struct mbuf **mp, caddr_t hdr, int hlen)
{
struct mbuf *m;
if (hlen > MCLBYTES)
return (ENOBUFS); /* XXX */
if (hlen > MLEN)
m = m_getcl(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA, 0);
else
m = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (m == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
m->m_len = hlen;
if (hdr)
bcopy(hdr, mtod(m, caddr_t), hlen);
*mp = m;
return (0);
}
/*
* Insert jumbo payload option.
*/
static int
ip6_insert_jumboopt(struct ip6_exthdrs *exthdrs, u_int32_t plen)
{
struct mbuf *mopt;
u_char *optbuf;
u_int32_t v;
#define JUMBOOPTLEN 8 /* length of jumbo payload option and padding */
/*
* If there is no hop-by-hop options header, allocate new one.
* If there is one but it doesn't have enough space to store the
* jumbo payload option, allocate a cluster to store the whole options.
* Otherwise, use it to store the options.
*/
if (exthdrs->ip6e_hbh == NULL) {
mopt = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (mopt == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
mopt->m_len = JUMBOOPTLEN;
optbuf = mtod(mopt, u_char *);
optbuf[1] = 0; /* = ((JUMBOOPTLEN) >> 3) - 1 */
exthdrs->ip6e_hbh = mopt;
} else {
struct ip6_hbh *hbh;
mopt = exthdrs->ip6e_hbh;
if (M_TRAILINGSPACE(mopt) < JUMBOOPTLEN) {
/*
* XXX assumption:
* - exthdrs->ip6e_hbh is not referenced from places
* other than exthdrs.
* - exthdrs->ip6e_hbh is not an mbuf chain.
*/
int oldoptlen = mopt->m_len;
struct mbuf *n;
/*
* XXX: give up if the whole (new) hbh header does
* not fit even in an mbuf cluster.
*/
if (oldoptlen + JUMBOOPTLEN > MCLBYTES)
return (ENOBUFS);
/*
* As a consequence, we must always prepare a cluster
* at this point.
*/
n = m_getcl(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA, 0);
if (n == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
n->m_len = oldoptlen + JUMBOOPTLEN;
bcopy(mtod(mopt, caddr_t), mtod(n, caddr_t),
oldoptlen);
optbuf = mtod(n, caddr_t) + oldoptlen;
m_freem(mopt);
mopt = exthdrs->ip6e_hbh = n;
} else {
optbuf = mtod(mopt, u_char *) + mopt->m_len;
mopt->m_len += JUMBOOPTLEN;
}
optbuf[0] = IP6OPT_PADN;
optbuf[1] = 1;
/*
* Adjust the header length according to the pad and
* the jumbo payload option.
*/
hbh = mtod(mopt, struct ip6_hbh *);
hbh->ip6h_len += (JUMBOOPTLEN >> 3);
}
/* fill in the option. */
optbuf[2] = IP6OPT_JUMBO;
optbuf[3] = 4;
v = (u_int32_t)htonl(plen + JUMBOOPTLEN);
bcopy(&v, &optbuf[4], sizeof(u_int32_t));
/* finally, adjust the packet header length */
exthdrs->ip6e_ip6->m_pkthdr.len += JUMBOOPTLEN;
return (0);
#undef JUMBOOPTLEN
}
/*
* Insert fragment header and copy unfragmentable header portions.
*/
static int
ip6_insertfraghdr(struct mbuf *m0, struct mbuf *m, int hlen,
struct ip6_frag **frghdrp)
{
struct mbuf *n, *mlast;
if (hlen > sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
n = m_copym(m0, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr),
hlen - sizeof(struct ip6_hdr), M_NOWAIT);
if (n == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
m->m_next = n;
} else
n = m;
/* Search for the last mbuf of unfragmentable part. */
for (mlast = n; mlast->m_next; mlast = mlast->m_next)
;
if (M_WRITABLE(mlast) &&
M_TRAILINGSPACE(mlast) >= sizeof(struct ip6_frag)) {
/* use the trailing space of the last mbuf for the fragment hdr */
*frghdrp = (struct ip6_frag *)(mtod(mlast, caddr_t) +
mlast->m_len);
mlast->m_len += sizeof(struct ip6_frag);
m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(struct ip6_frag);
} else {
/* allocate a new mbuf for the fragment header */
struct mbuf *mfrg;
mfrg = m_get(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (mfrg == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
mfrg->m_len = sizeof(struct ip6_frag);
*frghdrp = mtod(mfrg, struct ip6_frag *);
mlast->m_next = mfrg;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Calculates IPv6 path mtu for destination @dst.
* Resulting MTU is stored in @mtup.
*
* Returns 0 on success.
*/
static int
ip6_getpmtu_ctl(u_int fibnum, const struct in6_addr *dst, u_long *mtup)
{
struct nhop6_extended nh6;
struct in6_addr kdst;
uint32_t scopeid;
struct ifnet *ifp;
u_long mtu;
int error;
in6_splitscope(dst, &kdst, &scopeid);
if (fib6_lookup_nh_ext(fibnum, &kdst, scopeid, NHR_REF, 0, &nh6) != 0)
return (EHOSTUNREACH);
ifp = nh6.nh_ifp;
mtu = nh6.nh_mtu;
error = ip6_calcmtu(ifp, dst, mtu, mtup, NULL, 0);
fib6_free_nh_ext(fibnum, &nh6);
return (error);
}
/*
* Calculates IPv6 path MTU for @dst based on transmit @ifp,
* and cached data in @ro_pmtu.
* MTU from (successful) route lookup is saved (along with dst)
* inside @ro_pmtu to avoid subsequent route lookups after packet
* filter processing.
*
* Stores mtu and always-frag value into @mtup and @alwaysfragp.
* Returns 0 on success.
*/
static int
ip6_getpmtu(struct route_in6 *ro_pmtu, int do_lookup,
struct ifnet *ifp, const struct in6_addr *dst, u_long *mtup,
int *alwaysfragp, u_int fibnum, u_int proto)
{
struct nhop6_basic nh6;
struct in6_addr kdst;
uint32_t scopeid;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6_dst, sin6;
u_long mtu;
mtu = 0;
if (ro_pmtu == NULL || do_lookup) {
/*
* Here ro_pmtu has final destination address, while
* ro might represent immediate destination.
* Use ro_pmtu destination since mtu might differ.
*/
if (ro_pmtu != NULL) {
sa6_dst = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ro_pmtu->ro_dst;
if (!IN6_ARE_ADDR_EQUAL(&sa6_dst->sin6_addr, dst))
ro_pmtu->ro_mtu = 0;
} else
sa6_dst = &sin6;
if (ro_pmtu == NULL || ro_pmtu->ro_mtu == 0) {
bzero(sa6_dst, sizeof(*sa6_dst));
sa6_dst->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sa6_dst->sin6_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
sa6_dst->sin6_addr = *dst;
in6_splitscope(dst, &kdst, &scopeid);
if (fib6_lookup_nh_basic(fibnum, &kdst, scopeid, 0, 0,
&nh6) == 0) {
mtu = nh6.nh_mtu;
if (ro_pmtu != NULL)
ro_pmtu->ro_mtu = mtu;
}
} else
mtu = ro_pmtu->ro_mtu;
}
if (ro_pmtu != NULL && ro_pmtu->ro_nh != NULL)
mtu = ro_pmtu->ro_nh->nh_mtu;
return (ip6_calcmtu(ifp, dst, mtu, mtup, alwaysfragp, proto));
}
/*
* Calculate MTU based on transmit @ifp, route mtu @rt_mtu and
* hostcache data for @dst.
* Stores mtu and always-frag value into @mtup and @alwaysfragp.
*
* Returns 0 on success.
*/
static int
ip6_calcmtu(struct ifnet *ifp, const struct in6_addr *dst, u_long rt_mtu,
u_long *mtup, int *alwaysfragp, u_int proto)
{
u_long mtu = 0;
int alwaysfrag = 0;
int error = 0;
if (rt_mtu > 0) {
u_int32_t ifmtu;
struct in_conninfo inc;
bzero(&inc, sizeof(inc));
inc.inc_flags |= INC_ISIPV6;
inc.inc6_faddr = *dst;
ifmtu = IN6_LINKMTU(ifp);
/* TCP is known to react to pmtu changes so skip hc */
if (proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
mtu = tcp_hc_getmtu(&inc);
if (mtu)
mtu = min(mtu, rt_mtu);
else
mtu = rt_mtu;
if (mtu == 0)
mtu = ifmtu;
else if (mtu < IPV6_MMTU) {
/*
* RFC2460 section 5, last paragraph:
* if we record ICMPv6 too big message with
* mtu < IPV6_MMTU, transmit packets sized IPV6_MMTU
* or smaller, with framgent header attached.
* (fragment header is needed regardless from the
* packet size, for translators to identify packets)
*/
alwaysfrag = 1;
mtu = IPV6_MMTU;
}
} else if (ifp) {
mtu = IN6_LINKMTU(ifp);
} else
error = EHOSTUNREACH; /* XXX */
*mtup = mtu;
if (alwaysfragp)
*alwaysfragp = alwaysfrag;
return (error);
}
/*
* IP6 socket option processing.
*/
int
ip6_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
{
int optdatalen, uproto;
void *optdata;
struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);
int error, optval;
int level, op, optname;
int optlen;
struct thread *td;
#ifdef RSS
uint32_t rss_bucket;
int retval;
#endif
/*
* Don't use more than a quarter of mbuf clusters. N.B.:
* nmbclusters is an int, but nmbclusters * MCLBYTES may overflow
* on LP64 architectures, so cast to u_long to avoid undefined
* behavior. ILP32 architectures cannot have nmbclusters
* large enough to overflow for other reasons.
*/
#define IPV6_PKTOPTIONS_MBUF_LIMIT ((u_long)nmbclusters * MCLBYTES / 4)
level = sopt->sopt_level;
op = sopt->sopt_dir;
optname = sopt->sopt_name;
optlen = sopt->sopt_valsize;
td = sopt->sopt_td;
error = 0;
optval = 0;
uproto = (int)so->so_proto->pr_protocol;
if (level != IPPROTO_IPV6) {
error = EINVAL;
if (sopt->sopt_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
sopt->sopt_dir == SOPT_SET) {
switch (sopt->sopt_name) {
case SO_REUSEADDR:
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if ((so->so_options & SO_REUSEADDR) != 0)
inp->inp_flags2 |= INP_REUSEADDR;
else
inp->inp_flags2 &= ~INP_REUSEADDR;
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
error = 0;
break;
case SO_REUSEPORT:
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if ((so->so_options & SO_REUSEPORT) != 0)
inp->inp_flags2 |= INP_REUSEPORT;
else
inp->inp_flags2 &= ~INP_REUSEPORT;
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
error = 0;
break;
case SO_REUSEPORT_LB:
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if ((so->so_options & SO_REUSEPORT_LB) != 0)
inp->inp_flags2 |= INP_REUSEPORT_LB;
else
inp->inp_flags2 &= ~INP_REUSEPORT_LB;
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
error = 0;
break;
case SO_SETFIB:
INP_WLOCK(inp);
inp->inp_inc.inc_fibnum = so->so_fibnum;
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
error = 0;
break;
Implement kernel support for hardware rate limited sockets. - Add RATELIMIT kernel configuration keyword which must be set to enable the new functionality. - Add support for hardware driven, Receive Side Scaling, RSS aware, rate limited sendqueues and expose the functionality through the already established SO_MAX_PACING_RATE setsockopt(). The API support rates in the range from 1 to 4Gbytes/s which are suitable for regular TCP and UDP streams. The setsockopt(2) manual page has been updated. - Add rate limit function callback API to "struct ifnet" which supports the following operations: if_snd_tag_alloc(), if_snd_tag_modify(), if_snd_tag_query() and if_snd_tag_free(). - Add support to ifconfig to view, set and clear the IFCAP_TXRTLMT flag, which tells if a network driver supports rate limiting or not. - This patch also adds support for rate limiting through VLAN and LAGG intermediate network devices. - How rate limiting works: 1) The userspace application calls setsockopt() after accepting or making a new connection to set the rate which is then stored in the socket structure in the kernel. Later on when packets are transmitted a check is made in the transmit path for rate changes. A rate change implies a non-blocking ifp->if_snd_tag_alloc() call will be made to the destination network interface, which then sets up a custom sendqueue with the given rate limitation parameter. A "struct m_snd_tag" pointer is returned which serves as a "snd_tag" hint in the m_pkthdr for the subsequently transmitted mbufs. 2) When the network driver sees the "m->m_pkthdr.snd_tag" different from NULL, it will move the packets into a designated rate limited sendqueue given by the snd_tag pointer. It is up to the individual drivers how the rate limited traffic will be rate limited. 3) Route changes are detected by the NIC drivers in the ifp->if_transmit() routine when the ifnet pointer in the incoming snd_tag mismatches the one of the network interface. The network adapter frees the mbuf and returns EAGAIN which causes the ip_output() to release and clear the send tag. Upon next ip_output() a new "snd_tag" will be tried allocated. 4) When the PCB is detached the custom sendqueue will be released by a non-blocking ifp->if_snd_tag_free() call to the currently bound network interface. Reviewed by: wblock (manpages), adrian, gallatin, scottl (network) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3687 Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies MFC after: 3 months
2017-01-18 13:31:17 +00:00
case SO_MAX_PACING_RATE:
#ifdef RATELIMIT
INP_WLOCK(inp);
inp->inp_flags2 |= INP_RATE_LIMIT_CHANGED;
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
Implement kernel support for hardware rate limited sockets. - Add RATELIMIT kernel configuration keyword which must be set to enable the new functionality. - Add support for hardware driven, Receive Side Scaling, RSS aware, rate limited sendqueues and expose the functionality through the already established SO_MAX_PACING_RATE setsockopt(). The API support rates in the range from 1 to 4Gbytes/s which are suitable for regular TCP and UDP streams. The setsockopt(2) manual page has been updated. - Add rate limit function callback API to "struct ifnet" which supports the following operations: if_snd_tag_alloc(), if_snd_tag_modify(), if_snd_tag_query() and if_snd_tag_free(). - Add support to ifconfig to view, set and clear the IFCAP_TXRTLMT flag, which tells if a network driver supports rate limiting or not. - This patch also adds support for rate limiting through VLAN and LAGG intermediate network devices. - How rate limiting works: 1) The userspace application calls setsockopt() after accepting or making a new connection to set the rate which is then stored in the socket structure in the kernel. Later on when packets are transmitted a check is made in the transmit path for rate changes. A rate change implies a non-blocking ifp->if_snd_tag_alloc() call will be made to the destination network interface, which then sets up a custom sendqueue with the given rate limitation parameter. A "struct m_snd_tag" pointer is returned which serves as a "snd_tag" hint in the m_pkthdr for the subsequently transmitted mbufs. 2) When the network driver sees the "m->m_pkthdr.snd_tag" different from NULL, it will move the packets into a designated rate limited sendqueue given by the snd_tag pointer. It is up to the individual drivers how the rate limited traffic will be rate limited. 3) Route changes are detected by the NIC drivers in the ifp->if_transmit() routine when the ifnet pointer in the incoming snd_tag mismatches the one of the network interface. The network adapter frees the mbuf and returns EAGAIN which causes the ip_output() to release and clear the send tag. Upon next ip_output() a new "snd_tag" will be tried allocated. 4) When the PCB is detached the custom sendqueue will be released by a non-blocking ifp->if_snd_tag_free() call to the currently bound network interface. Reviewed by: wblock (manpages), adrian, gallatin, scottl (network) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D3687 Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies MFC after: 3 months
2017-01-18 13:31:17 +00:00
error = 0;
#else
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
break;
default:
break;
}
}
} else { /* level == IPPROTO_IPV6 */
switch (op) {
case SOPT_SET:
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
#ifdef IPV6_PKTOPTIONS
case IPV6_PKTOPTIONS:
#endif
{
struct mbuf *m;
if (optlen > IPV6_PKTOPTIONS_MBUF_LIMIT) {
printf("ip6_ctloutput: mbuf limit hit\n");
error = ENOBUFS;
break;
}
error = soopt_getm(sopt, &m); /* XXX */
if (error != 0)
break;
error = soopt_mcopyin(sopt, m); /* XXX */
if (error != 0)
break;
INP_WLOCK(inp);
error = ip6_pcbopts(&inp->in6p_outputopts, m,
so, sopt);
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
m_freem(m); /* XXX */
break;
}
/*
* Use of some Hop-by-Hop options or some
* Destination options, might require special
* privilege. That is, normal applications
* (without special privilege) might be forbidden
* from setting certain options in outgoing packets,
* and might never see certain options in received
* packets. [RFC 2292 Section 6]
* KAME specific note:
* KAME prevents non-privileged users from sending or
* receiving ANY hbh/dst options in order to avoid
* overhead of parsing options in the kernel.
*/
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RECVRTHDRDSTOPTS:
if (td != NULL) {
error = priv_check(td,
PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS);
if (error)
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
case IPV6_HOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
case IPV6_RECVFLOWID:
#ifdef RSS
case IPV6_RECVRSSBUCKETID:
#endif
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
case IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:
case IPV6_BINDANY:
case IPV6_BINDMULTI:
#ifdef RSS
case IPV6_RSS_LISTEN_BUCKET:
#endif
if (optname == IPV6_BINDANY && td != NULL) {
error = priv_check(td,
PRIV_NETINET_BINDANY);
if (error)
break;
}
if (optlen != sizeof(int)) {
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval,
sizeof optval, sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
if (optval < -1 || optval >= 256)
error = EINVAL;
else {
/* -1 = kernel default */
inp->in6p_hops = optval;
if ((inp->inp_vflag &
INP_IPV4) != 0)
inp->inp_ip_ttl = optval;
}
break;
#define OPTSET(bit) \
do { \
INP_WLOCK(inp); \
if (optval) \
inp->inp_flags |= (bit); \
else \
inp->inp_flags &= ~(bit); \
INP_WUNLOCK(inp); \
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
#define OPTSET2292(bit) \
do { \
INP_WLOCK(inp); \
inp->inp_flags |= IN6P_RFC2292; \
if (optval) \
inp->inp_flags |= (bit); \
else \
inp->inp_flags &= ~(bit); \
INP_WUNLOCK(inp); \
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
#define OPTBIT(bit) (inp->inp_flags & (bit) ? 1 : 0)
#define OPTSET2_N(bit, val) do { \
if (val) \
inp->inp_flags2 |= bit; \
else \
inp->inp_flags2 &= ~bit; \
} while (0)
#define OPTSET2(bit, val) do { \
INP_WLOCK(inp); \
OPTSET2_N(bit, val); \
INP_WUNLOCK(inp); \
} while (0)
#define OPTBIT2(bit) (inp->inp_flags2 & (bit) ? 1 : 0)
#define OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(bit) \
do { \
INP_WLOCK(inp); \
if (OPTBIT(IN6P_RFC2292)) { \
error = EINVAL; \
} else { \
if (optval) \
inp->inp_flags |= (bit); \
else \
inp->inp_flags &= ~(bit); \
} \
INP_WUNLOCK(inp); \
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_PKTINFO);
break;
case IPV6_HOPLIMIT:
{
struct ip6_pktopts **optp;
/* cannot mix with RFC2292 */
if (OPTBIT(IN6P_RFC2292)) {
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if (inp->inp_flags & (INP_TIMEWAIT | INP_DROPPED)) {
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
return (ECONNRESET);
}
optp = &inp->in6p_outputopts;
error = ip6_pcbopt(IPV6_HOPLIMIT,
(u_char *)&optval, sizeof(optval),
optp, (td != NULL) ? td->td_ucred :
NULL, uproto);
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
break;
}
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_HOPLIMIT);
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_HOPOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_DSTOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDRDSTOPTS:
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_RTHDRDSTOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_RTHDR);
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
/*
* We ignore this option for TCP
* sockets.
* (RFC3542 leaves this case
* unspecified.)
*/
if (uproto != IPPROTO_TCP)
OPTSET(IN6P_MTU);
break;
case IPV6_RECVFLOWID:
OPTSET2(INP_RECVFLOWID, optval);
break;
#ifdef RSS
case IPV6_RECVRSSBUCKETID:
OPTSET2(INP_RECVRSSBUCKETID, optval);
break;
#endif
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if (inp->inp_lport ||
!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&inp->in6p_laddr)) {
/*
* The socket is already bound.
*/
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
if (optval) {
inp->inp_flags |= IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY;
inp->inp_vflag &= ~INP_IPV4;
} else {
inp->inp_flags &= ~IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY;
inp->inp_vflag |= INP_IPV4;
}
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
break;
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
/* cannot mix with RFC2292 XXX */
OPTSET2292_EXCLUSIVE(IN6P_TCLASS);
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
OPTSET(IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL);
break;
case IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:
OPTSET2(INP_ORIGDSTADDR, optval);
break;
case IPV6_BINDANY:
OPTSET(INP_BINDANY);
break;
case IPV6_BINDMULTI:
OPTSET2(INP_BINDMULTI, optval);
break;
#ifdef RSS
case IPV6_RSS_LISTEN_BUCKET:
if ((optval >= 0) &&
(optval < rss_getnumbuckets())) {
INP_WLOCK(inp);
inp->inp_rss_listen_bucket = optval;
OPTSET2_N(INP_RSS_BUCKET_SET, 1);
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
} else {
error = EINVAL;
}
break;
#endif
}
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
case IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU:
case IPV6_PREFER_TEMPADDR:
if (optlen != sizeof(optval)) {
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval,
sizeof optval, sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
{
struct ip6_pktopts **optp;
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if (inp->inp_flags & (INP_TIMEWAIT | INP_DROPPED)) {
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
return (ECONNRESET);
}
optp = &inp->in6p_outputopts;
error = ip6_pcbopt(optname,
(u_char *)&optval, sizeof(optval),
optp, (td != NULL) ? td->td_ucred :
NULL, uproto);
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
break;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
/* RFC 2292 */
if (optlen != sizeof(int)) {
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval,
sizeof optval, sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
OPTSET2292(IN6P_PKTINFO);
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
OPTSET2292(IN6P_HOPLIMIT);
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
/*
* Check super-user privilege.
* See comments for IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS.
*/
if (td != NULL) {
error = priv_check(td,
PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS);
if (error)
return (error);
}
OPTSET2292(IN6P_HOPOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
if (td != NULL) {
error = priv_check(td,
PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS);
if (error)
return (error);
}
OPTSET2292(IN6P_DSTOPTS|IN6P_RTHDRDSTOPTS); /* XXX */
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
OPTSET2292(IN6P_RTHDR);
break;
}
break;
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_NEXTHOP:
{
/* new advanced API (RFC3542) */
u_char *optbuf;
u_char optbuf_storage[MCLBYTES];
int optlen;
struct ip6_pktopts **optp;
/* cannot mix with RFC2292 */
if (OPTBIT(IN6P_RFC2292)) {
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
/*
* We only ensure valsize is not too large
* here. Further validation will be done
* later.
*/
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, optbuf_storage,
sizeof(optbuf_storage), 0);
if (error)
break;
optlen = sopt->sopt_valsize;
optbuf = optbuf_storage;
INP_WLOCK(inp);
if (inp->inp_flags & (INP_TIMEWAIT | INP_DROPPED)) {
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
return (ECONNRESET);
}
optp = &inp->in6p_outputopts;
error = ip6_pcbopt(optname, optbuf, optlen,
optp, (td != NULL) ? td->td_ucred : NULL,
uproto);
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
break;
}
#undef OPTSET
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
case IPV6_JOIN_GROUP:
case IPV6_LEAVE_GROUP:
Bite the bullet, and make the IPv6 SSM and MLDv2 mega-commit: import from p4 bms_netdev. Summary of changes: * Connect netinet6/in6_mcast.c to build. The legacy KAME KPIs are mostly preserved. * Eliminate now dead code from ip6_output.c. Don't do mbuf bingo, we are not going to do RFC 2292 style CMSG tricks for multicast options as they are not required by any current IPv6 normative reference. * Refactor transports (UDP, raw_ip6) to do own mcast filtering. SCTP, TCP unaffected by this change. * Add ip6_msource, in6_msource structs to in6_var.h. * Hookup mld_ifinfo state to in6_ifextra, allocate from domifattach path. * Eliminate IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(), it is no longer referenced. Kernel consumers which need this should use in6m_lookup(). * Refactor IPv6 socket group memberships to use a vector (like IPv4). * Update ifmcstat(8) for IPv6 SSM. * Add witness lock order for IN6_MULTI_LOCK. * Move IN6_MULTI_LOCK out of lower ip6_output()/ip6_input() paths. * Introduce IP6STAT_ADD/SUB/INC/DEC as per rwatson's IPv4 cleanup. * Update carp(4) for new IPv6 SSM KPIs. * Virtualize ip6_mrouter socket. Changes mostly localized to IPv6 MROUTING. * Don't do a local group lookup in MROUTING. * Kill unused KAME prototypes in6_purgemkludge(), in6_restoremkludge(). * Preserve KAME DAD timer jitter behaviour in MLDv1 compatibility mode. * Bump __FreeBSD_version to 800084. * Update UPDATING. NOTE WELL: * This code hasn't been tested against real MLDv2 queriers (yet), although the on-wire protocol has been verified in Wireshark. * There are a few unresolved issues in the socket layer APIs to do with scope ID propagation. * There is a LOR present in ip6_output()'s use of in6_setscope() which needs to be resolved. See comments in mld6.c. This is believed to be benign and can't be avoided for the moment without re-introducing an indirect netisr. This work was mostly derived from the IGMPv3 implementation, and has been sponsored by a third party.
2009-04-29 19:19:13 +00:00
case IPV6_MSFILTER:
case MCAST_BLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_UNBLOCK_SOURCE:
case MCAST_JOIN_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_GROUP:
case MCAST_JOIN_SOURCE_GROUP:
case MCAST_LEAVE_SOURCE_GROUP:
error = ip6_setmoptions(inp, sopt);
break;
case IPV6_PORTRANGE:
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval,
sizeof optval, sizeof optval);
if (error)
break;
INP_WLOCK(inp);
switch (optval) {
case IPV6_PORTRANGE_DEFAULT:
inp->inp_flags &= ~(INP_LOWPORT);
inp->inp_flags &= ~(INP_HIGHPORT);
break;
case IPV6_PORTRANGE_HIGH:
inp->inp_flags &= ~(INP_LOWPORT);
inp->inp_flags |= INP_HIGHPORT;
break;
case IPV6_PORTRANGE_LOW:
inp->inp_flags &= ~(INP_HIGHPORT);
inp->inp_flags |= INP_LOWPORT;
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
INP_WUNLOCK(inp);
break;
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
if (IPSEC_ENABLED(ipv6)) {
error = IPSEC_PCBCTL(ipv6, inp, sopt);
break;
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
#endif /* IPSEC */
default:
error = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
break;
case SOPT_GET:
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
#ifdef IPV6_PKTOPTIONS
case IPV6_PKTOPTIONS:
#endif
/*
* RFC3542 (effectively) deprecated the
* semantics of the 2292-style pktoptions.
* Since it was not reliable in nature (i.e.,
* applications had to expect the lack of some
* information after all), it would make sense
* to simplify this part by always returning
* empty data.
*/
sopt->sopt_valsize = 0;
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RECVRTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
2000-01-13 05:07:42 +00:00
case IPV6_PORTRANGE:
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
case IPV6_BINDANY:
case IPV6_FLOWID:
case IPV6_FLOWTYPE:
case IPV6_RECVFLOWID:
#ifdef RSS
case IPV6_RSSBUCKETID:
case IPV6_RECVRSSBUCKETID:
#endif
case IPV6_BINDMULTI:
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_RECVHOPOPTS:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_HOPOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_RECVDSTOPTS:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_DSTOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDRDSTOPTS:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_RTHDRDSTOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_UNICAST_HOPS:
optval = inp->in6p_hops;
break;
case IPV6_RECVPKTINFO:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_PKTINFO);
break;
case IPV6_RECVHOPLIMIT:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_HOPLIMIT);
break;
case IPV6_RECVRTHDR:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_RTHDR);
break;
case IPV6_RECVPATHMTU:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_MTU);
break;
case IPV6_V6ONLY:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_IPV6_V6ONLY);
break;
case IPV6_PORTRANGE:
{
int flags;
flags = inp->inp_flags;
if (flags & INP_HIGHPORT)
optval = IPV6_PORTRANGE_HIGH;
else if (flags & INP_LOWPORT)
optval = IPV6_PORTRANGE_LOW;
else
optval = 0;
break;
}
case IPV6_RECVTCLASS:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_TCLASS);
break;
case IPV6_AUTOFLOWLABEL:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_AUTOFLOWLABEL);
break;
case IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:
optval = OPTBIT2(INP_ORIGDSTADDR);
break;
case IPV6_BINDANY:
optval = OPTBIT(INP_BINDANY);
break;
case IPV6_FLOWID:
optval = inp->inp_flowid;
break;
case IPV6_FLOWTYPE:
optval = inp->inp_flowtype;
break;
case IPV6_RECVFLOWID:
optval = OPTBIT2(INP_RECVFLOWID);
break;
#ifdef RSS
case IPV6_RSSBUCKETID:
retval =
rss_hash2bucket(inp->inp_flowid,
inp->inp_flowtype,
&rss_bucket);
if (retval == 0)
optval = rss_bucket;
else
error = EINVAL;
break;
case IPV6_RECVRSSBUCKETID:
optval = OPTBIT2(INP_RECVRSSBUCKETID);
break;
#endif
case IPV6_BINDMULTI:
optval = OPTBIT2(INP_BINDMULTI);
break;
}
if (error)
break;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval,
sizeof optval);
break;
case IPV6_PATHMTU:
{
u_long pmtu = 0;
struct ip6_mtuinfo mtuinfo;
struct in6_addr addr;
if (!(so->so_state & SS_ISCONNECTED))
return (ENOTCONN);
/*
* XXX: we dot not consider the case of source
* routing, or optional information to specify
* the outgoing interface.
* Copy faddr out of inp to avoid holding lock
* on inp during route lookup.
*/
INP_RLOCK(inp);
bcopy(&inp->in6p_faddr, &addr, sizeof(addr));
INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
error = ip6_getpmtu_ctl(so->so_fibnum,
&addr, &pmtu);
if (error)
break;
if (pmtu > IPV6_MAXPACKET)
pmtu = IPV6_MAXPACKET;
bzero(&mtuinfo, sizeof(mtuinfo));
mtuinfo.ip6m_mtu = (u_int32_t)pmtu;
optdata = (void *)&mtuinfo;
optdatalen = sizeof(mtuinfo);
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, optdata,
optdatalen);
break;
}
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_PKTINFO);
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_HOPLIMIT);
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_HOPOPTS);
break;
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_RTHDR);
break;
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
optval = OPTBIT(IN6P_DSTOPTS|IN6P_RTHDRDSTOPTS);
break;
}
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval,
sizeof optval);
break;
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_NEXTHOP:
case IPV6_TCLASS:
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
case IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU:
case IPV6_PREFER_TEMPADDR:
error = ip6_getpcbopt(inp, optname, sopt);
break;
case IPV6_MULTICAST_IF:
case IPV6_MULTICAST_HOPS:
case IPV6_MULTICAST_LOOP:
Bite the bullet, and make the IPv6 SSM and MLDv2 mega-commit: import from p4 bms_netdev. Summary of changes: * Connect netinet6/in6_mcast.c to build. The legacy KAME KPIs are mostly preserved. * Eliminate now dead code from ip6_output.c. Don't do mbuf bingo, we are not going to do RFC 2292 style CMSG tricks for multicast options as they are not required by any current IPv6 normative reference. * Refactor transports (UDP, raw_ip6) to do own mcast filtering. SCTP, TCP unaffected by this change. * Add ip6_msource, in6_msource structs to in6_var.h. * Hookup mld_ifinfo state to in6_ifextra, allocate from domifattach path. * Eliminate IN6_LOOKUP_MULTI(), it is no longer referenced. Kernel consumers which need this should use in6m_lookup(). * Refactor IPv6 socket group memberships to use a vector (like IPv4). * Update ifmcstat(8) for IPv6 SSM. * Add witness lock order for IN6_MULTI_LOCK. * Move IN6_MULTI_LOCK out of lower ip6_output()/ip6_input() paths. * Introduce IP6STAT_ADD/SUB/INC/DEC as per rwatson's IPv4 cleanup. * Update carp(4) for new IPv6 SSM KPIs. * Virtualize ip6_mrouter socket. Changes mostly localized to IPv6 MROUTING. * Don't do a local group lookup in MROUTING. * Kill unused KAME prototypes in6_purgemkludge(), in6_restoremkludge(). * Preserve KAME DAD timer jitter behaviour in MLDv1 compatibility mode. * Bump __FreeBSD_version to 800084. * Update UPDATING. NOTE WELL: * This code hasn't been tested against real MLDv2 queriers (yet), although the on-wire protocol has been verified in Wireshark. * There are a few unresolved issues in the socket layer APIs to do with scope ID propagation. * There is a LOR present in ip6_output()'s use of in6_setscope() which needs to be resolved. See comments in mld6.c. This is believed to be benign and can't be avoided for the moment without re-introducing an indirect netisr. This work was mostly derived from the IGMPv3 implementation, and has been sponsored by a third party.
2009-04-29 19:19:13 +00:00
case IPV6_MSFILTER:
error = ip6_getmoptions(inp, sopt);
break;
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#if defined(IPSEC) || defined(IPSEC_SUPPORT)
case IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY:
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
if (IPSEC_ENABLED(ipv6)) {
error = IPSEC_PCBCTL(ipv6, inp, sopt);
break;
}
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
/* FALLTHROUGH */
#endif /* IPSEC */
default:
error = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
break;
}
}
return (error);
}
int
ip6_raw_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
{
int error = 0, optval, optlen;
const int icmp6off = offsetof(struct icmp6_hdr, icmp6_cksum);
struct inpcb *inp = sotoinpcb(so);
int level, op, optname;
level = sopt->sopt_level;
op = sopt->sopt_dir;
optname = sopt->sopt_name;
optlen = sopt->sopt_valsize;
if (level != IPPROTO_IPV6) {
return (EINVAL);
}
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_CHECKSUM:
/*
* For ICMPv6 sockets, no modification allowed for checksum
* offset, permit "no change" values to help existing apps.
*
* RFC3542 says: "An attempt to set IPV6_CHECKSUM
* for an ICMPv6 socket will fail."
* The current behavior does not meet RFC3542.
*/
switch (op) {
case SOPT_SET:
if (optlen != sizeof(int)) {
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
error = sooptcopyin(sopt, &optval, sizeof(optval),
sizeof(optval));
if (error)
break;
if (optval < -1 || (optval % 2) != 0) {
/*
* The API assumes non-negative even offset
* values or -1 as a special value.
*/
error = EINVAL;
} else if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol ==
IPPROTO_ICMPV6) {
if (optval != icmp6off)
error = EINVAL;
} else
inp->in6p_cksum = optval;
break;
case SOPT_GET:
if (so->so_proto->pr_protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6)
optval = icmp6off;
else
optval = inp->in6p_cksum;
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, &optval, sizeof(optval));
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
break;
}
break;
default:
error = ENOPROTOOPT;
break;
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Set up IP6 options in pcb for insertion in output packets or
* specifying behavior of outgoing packets.
*/
static int
ip6_pcbopts(struct ip6_pktopts **pktopt, struct mbuf *m,
struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
{
struct ip6_pktopts *opt = *pktopt;
int error = 0;
struct thread *td = sopt->sopt_td;
/* turn off any old options. */
if (opt) {
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
if (opt->ip6po_pktinfo || opt->ip6po_nexthop ||
opt->ip6po_hbh || opt->ip6po_dest1 || opt->ip6po_dest2 ||
opt->ip6po_rhinfo.ip6po_rhi_rthdr)
printf("ip6_pcbopts: all specified options are cleared.\n");
#endif
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, -1);
} else {
opt = malloc(sizeof(*opt), M_IP6OPT, M_NOWAIT);
if (opt == NULL)
return (ENOMEM);
}
*pktopt = NULL;
if (!m || m->m_len == 0) {
/*
* Only turning off any previous options, regardless of
* whether the opt is just created or given.
*/
free(opt, M_IP6OPT);
return (0);
}
/* set options specified by user. */
if ((error = ip6_setpktopts(m, opt, NULL, (td != NULL) ?
td->td_ucred : NULL, so->so_proto->pr_protocol)) != 0) {
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, -1); /* XXX: discard all options */
free(opt, M_IP6OPT);
return (error);
}
*pktopt = opt;
return (0);
}
/*
* initialize ip6_pktopts. beware that there are non-zero default values in
* the struct.
*/
void
ip6_initpktopts(struct ip6_pktopts *opt)
{
bzero(opt, sizeof(*opt));
opt->ip6po_hlim = -1; /* -1 means default hop limit */
opt->ip6po_tclass = -1; /* -1 means default traffic class */
opt->ip6po_minmtu = IP6PO_MINMTU_MCASTONLY;
opt->ip6po_prefer_tempaddr = IP6PO_TEMPADDR_SYSTEM;
}
static int
ip6_pcbopt(int optname, u_char *buf, int len, struct ip6_pktopts **pktopt,
struct ucred *cred, int uproto)
{
struct ip6_pktopts *opt;
if (*pktopt == NULL) {
*pktopt = malloc(sizeof(struct ip6_pktopts), M_IP6OPT,
M_NOWAIT);
if (*pktopt == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
ip6_initpktopts(*pktopt);
}
opt = *pktopt;
return (ip6_setpktopt(optname, buf, len, opt, cred, 1, 0, uproto));
}
#define GET_PKTOPT_VAR(field, lenexpr) do { \
if (pktopt && pktopt->field) { \
INP_RUNLOCK(inp); \
optdata = malloc(sopt->sopt_valsize, M_TEMP, M_WAITOK); \
malloc_optdata = true; \
INP_RLOCK(inp); \
if (inp->inp_flags & (INP_TIMEWAIT | INP_DROPPED)) { \
INP_RUNLOCK(inp); \
free(optdata, M_TEMP); \
return (ECONNRESET); \
} \
pktopt = inp->in6p_outputopts; \
if (pktopt && pktopt->field) { \
optdatalen = min(lenexpr, sopt->sopt_valsize); \
bcopy(&pktopt->field, optdata, optdatalen); \
} else { \
free(optdata, M_TEMP); \
optdata = NULL; \
malloc_optdata = false; \
} \
} \
} while(0)
#define GET_PKTOPT_EXT_HDR(field) GET_PKTOPT_VAR(field, \
(((struct ip6_ext *)pktopt->field)->ip6e_len + 1) << 3)
#define GET_PKTOPT_SOCKADDR(field) GET_PKTOPT_VAR(field, \
pktopt->field->sa_len)
static int
ip6_getpcbopt(struct inpcb *inp, int optname, struct sockopt *sopt)
{
void *optdata = NULL;
bool malloc_optdata = false;
int optdatalen = 0;
int error = 0;
struct in6_pktinfo null_pktinfo;
int deftclass = 0, on;
int defminmtu = IP6PO_MINMTU_MCASTONLY;
int defpreftemp = IP6PO_TEMPADDR_SYSTEM;
struct ip6_pktopts *pktopt;
INP_RLOCK(inp);
pktopt = inp->in6p_outputopts;
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
optdata = (void *)&null_pktinfo;
if (pktopt && pktopt->ip6po_pktinfo) {
bcopy(pktopt->ip6po_pktinfo, &null_pktinfo,
sizeof(null_pktinfo));
in6_clearscope(&null_pktinfo.ipi6_addr);
} else {
/* XXX: we don't have to do this every time... */
bzero(&null_pktinfo, sizeof(null_pktinfo));
}
optdatalen = sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo);
break;
case IPV6_TCLASS:
if (pktopt && pktopt->ip6po_tclass >= 0)
deftclass = pktopt->ip6po_tclass;
optdata = (void *)&deftclass;
optdatalen = sizeof(int);
break;
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
GET_PKTOPT_EXT_HDR(ip6po_hbh);
break;
case IPV6_RTHDR:
GET_PKTOPT_EXT_HDR(ip6po_rthdr);
break;
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
GET_PKTOPT_EXT_HDR(ip6po_dest1);
break;
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
GET_PKTOPT_EXT_HDR(ip6po_dest2);
break;
case IPV6_NEXTHOP:
GET_PKTOPT_SOCKADDR(ip6po_nexthop);
break;
case IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU:
if (pktopt)
defminmtu = pktopt->ip6po_minmtu;
optdata = (void *)&defminmtu;
optdatalen = sizeof(int);
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
if (pktopt && ((pktopt->ip6po_flags) & IP6PO_DONTFRAG))
on = 1;
else
on = 0;
optdata = (void *)&on;
optdatalen = sizeof(on);
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_TEMPADDR:
if (pktopt)
defpreftemp = pktopt->ip6po_prefer_tempaddr;
optdata = (void *)&defpreftemp;
optdatalen = sizeof(int);
break;
default: /* should not happen */
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
panic("ip6_getpcbopt: unexpected option\n");
#endif
INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
return (ENOPROTOOPT);
}
INP_RUNLOCK(inp);
error = sooptcopyout(sopt, optdata, optdatalen);
if (malloc_optdata)
free(optdata, M_TEMP);
return (error);
}
void
ip6_clearpktopts(struct ip6_pktopts *pktopt, int optname)
{
if (pktopt == NULL)
return;
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_PKTINFO) {
if (pktopt->ip6po_pktinfo)
free(pktopt->ip6po_pktinfo, M_IP6OPT);
pktopt->ip6po_pktinfo = NULL;
}
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_HOPLIMIT)
pktopt->ip6po_hlim = -1;
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_TCLASS)
pktopt->ip6po_tclass = -1;
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_NEXTHOP) {
if (pktopt->ip6po_nextroute.ro_nh) {
NH_FREE(pktopt->ip6po_nextroute.ro_nh);
pktopt->ip6po_nextroute.ro_nh = NULL;
}
if (pktopt->ip6po_nexthop)
free(pktopt->ip6po_nexthop, M_IP6OPT);
pktopt->ip6po_nexthop = NULL;
}
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS) {
if (pktopt->ip6po_hbh)
free(pktopt->ip6po_hbh, M_IP6OPT);
pktopt->ip6po_hbh = NULL;
}
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS) {
if (pktopt->ip6po_dest1)
free(pktopt->ip6po_dest1, M_IP6OPT);
pktopt->ip6po_dest1 = NULL;
}
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_RTHDR) {
if (pktopt->ip6po_rhinfo.ip6po_rhi_rthdr)
free(pktopt->ip6po_rhinfo.ip6po_rhi_rthdr, M_IP6OPT);
pktopt->ip6po_rhinfo.ip6po_rhi_rthdr = NULL;
if (pktopt->ip6po_route.ro_nh) {
NH_FREE(pktopt->ip6po_route.ro_nh);
pktopt->ip6po_route.ro_nh = NULL;
}
}
if (optname == -1 || optname == IPV6_DSTOPTS) {
if (pktopt->ip6po_dest2)
free(pktopt->ip6po_dest2, M_IP6OPT);
pktopt->ip6po_dest2 = NULL;
}
}
#define PKTOPT_EXTHDRCPY(type) \
do {\
if (src->type) {\
int hlen = (((struct ip6_ext *)src->type)->ip6e_len + 1) << 3;\
dst->type = malloc(hlen, M_IP6OPT, canwait);\
if (dst->type == NULL)\
goto bad;\
bcopy(src->type, dst->type, hlen);\
}\
} while (/*CONSTCOND*/ 0)
static int
copypktopts(struct ip6_pktopts *dst, struct ip6_pktopts *src, int canwait)
{
if (dst == NULL || src == NULL) {
printf("ip6_clearpktopts: invalid argument\n");
return (EINVAL);
}
dst->ip6po_hlim = src->ip6po_hlim;
dst->ip6po_tclass = src->ip6po_tclass;
dst->ip6po_flags = src->ip6po_flags;
dst->ip6po_minmtu = src->ip6po_minmtu;
dst->ip6po_prefer_tempaddr = src->ip6po_prefer_tempaddr;
if (src->ip6po_pktinfo) {
dst->ip6po_pktinfo = malloc(sizeof(*dst->ip6po_pktinfo),
M_IP6OPT, canwait);
if (dst->ip6po_pktinfo == NULL)
goto bad;
*dst->ip6po_pktinfo = *src->ip6po_pktinfo;
}
if (src->ip6po_nexthop) {
dst->ip6po_nexthop = malloc(src->ip6po_nexthop->sa_len,
M_IP6OPT, canwait);
if (dst->ip6po_nexthop == NULL)
goto bad;
bcopy(src->ip6po_nexthop, dst->ip6po_nexthop,
src->ip6po_nexthop->sa_len);
}
PKTOPT_EXTHDRCPY(ip6po_hbh);
PKTOPT_EXTHDRCPY(ip6po_dest1);
PKTOPT_EXTHDRCPY(ip6po_dest2);
PKTOPT_EXTHDRCPY(ip6po_rthdr); /* not copy the cached route */
return (0);
bad:
ip6_clearpktopts(dst, -1);
return (ENOBUFS);
}
#undef PKTOPT_EXTHDRCPY
struct ip6_pktopts *
ip6_copypktopts(struct ip6_pktopts *src, int canwait)
{
int error;
struct ip6_pktopts *dst;
dst = malloc(sizeof(*dst), M_IP6OPT, canwait);
if (dst == NULL)
return (NULL);
ip6_initpktopts(dst);
if ((error = copypktopts(dst, src, canwait)) != 0) {
free(dst, M_IP6OPT);
return (NULL);
}
return (dst);
}
void
ip6_freepcbopts(struct ip6_pktopts *pktopt)
{
if (pktopt == NULL)
return;
ip6_clearpktopts(pktopt, -1);
free(pktopt, M_IP6OPT);
}
/*
* Set IPv6 outgoing packet options based on advanced API.
*/
int
ip6_setpktopts(struct mbuf *control, struct ip6_pktopts *opt,
struct ip6_pktopts *stickyopt, struct ucred *cred, int uproto)
{
struct cmsghdr *cm = NULL;
if (control == NULL || opt == NULL)
return (EINVAL);
ip6_initpktopts(opt);
if (stickyopt) {
int error;
/*
* If stickyopt is provided, make a local copy of the options
* for this particular packet, then override them by ancillary
* objects.
* XXX: copypktopts() does not copy the cached route to a next
* hop (if any). This is not very good in terms of efficiency,
* but we can allow this since this option should be rarely
* used.
*/
if ((error = copypktopts(opt, stickyopt, M_NOWAIT)) != 0)
return (error);
}
/*
* XXX: Currently, we assume all the optional information is stored
* in a single mbuf.
*/
if (control->m_next)
return (EINVAL);
for (; control->m_len > 0; control->m_data += CMSG_ALIGN(cm->cmsg_len),
control->m_len -= CMSG_ALIGN(cm->cmsg_len)) {
int error;
if (control->m_len < CMSG_LEN(0))
return (EINVAL);
cm = mtod(control, struct cmsghdr *);
if (cm->cmsg_len == 0 || cm->cmsg_len > control->m_len)
return (EINVAL);
if (cm->cmsg_level != IPPROTO_IPV6)
continue;
error = ip6_setpktopt(cm->cmsg_type, CMSG_DATA(cm),
cm->cmsg_len - CMSG_LEN(0), opt, cred, 0, 1, uproto);
if (error)
return (error);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Set a particular packet option, as a sticky option or an ancillary data
* item. "len" can be 0 only when it's a sticky option.
* We have 4 cases of combination of "sticky" and "cmsg":
* "sticky=0, cmsg=0": impossible
* "sticky=0, cmsg=1": RFC2292 or RFC3542 ancillary data
* "sticky=1, cmsg=0": RFC3542 socket option
* "sticky=1, cmsg=1": RFC2292 socket option
*/
static int
ip6_setpktopt(int optname, u_char *buf, int len, struct ip6_pktopts *opt,
struct ucred *cred, int sticky, int cmsg, int uproto)
{
int minmtupolicy, preftemp;
int error;
if (!sticky && !cmsg) {
#ifdef DIAGNOSTIC
printf("ip6_setpktopt: impossible case\n");
#endif
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* IPV6_2292xxx is for backward compatibility to RFC2292, and should
* not be specified in the context of RFC3542. Conversely,
* RFC3542 types should not be specified in the context of RFC2292.
*/
if (!cmsg) {
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_2292NEXTHOP:
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
case IPV6_2292PKTOPTIONS:
return (ENOPROTOOPT);
}
}
if (sticky && cmsg) {
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
case IPV6_HOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_NEXTHOP:
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
case IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU:
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
case IPV6_TCLASS:
case IPV6_PREFER_TEMPADDR: /* XXX: not an RFC3542 option */
return (ENOPROTOOPT);
}
}
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292PKTINFO:
case IPV6_PKTINFO:
{
struct ifnet *ifp = NULL;
struct in6_pktinfo *pktinfo;
if (len != sizeof(struct in6_pktinfo))
return (EINVAL);
pktinfo = (struct in6_pktinfo *)buf;
/*
* An application can clear any sticky IPV6_PKTINFO option by
* doing a "regular" setsockopt with ipi6_addr being
* in6addr_any and ipi6_ifindex being zero.
* [RFC 3542, Section 6]
*/
if (optname == IPV6_PKTINFO && opt->ip6po_pktinfo &&
pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex == 0 &&
IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&pktinfo->ipi6_addr)) {
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, optname);
break;
}
if (uproto == IPPROTO_TCP && optname == IPV6_PKTINFO &&
sticky && !IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&pktinfo->ipi6_addr)) {
return (EINVAL);
}
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&pktinfo->ipi6_addr))
return (EINVAL);
/* validate the interface index if specified. */
2013-10-15 10:12:19 +00:00
if (pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex > V_if_index)
return (ENXIO);
if (pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex) {
ifp = ifnet_byindex(pktinfo->ipi6_ifindex);
if (ifp == NULL)
return (ENXIO);
}
if (ifp != NULL && (ifp->if_afdata[AF_INET6] == NULL ||
(ND_IFINFO(ifp)->flags & ND6_IFF_IFDISABLED) != 0))
return (ENETDOWN);
if (ifp != NULL &&
!IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&pktinfo->ipi6_addr)) {
struct in6_ifaddr *ia;
in6_setscope(&pktinfo->ipi6_addr, ifp, NULL);
ia = in6ifa_ifpwithaddr(ifp, &pktinfo->ipi6_addr);
if (ia == NULL)
return (EADDRNOTAVAIL);
ifa_free(&ia->ia_ifa);
}
/*
* We store the address anyway, and let in6_selectsrc()
* validate the specified address. This is because ipi6_addr
* may not have enough information about its scope zone, and
* we may need additional information (such as outgoing
* interface or the scope zone of a destination address) to
* disambiguate the scope.
* XXX: the delay of the validation may confuse the
* application when it is used as a sticky option.
*/
if (opt->ip6po_pktinfo == NULL) {
opt->ip6po_pktinfo = malloc(sizeof(*pktinfo),
M_IP6OPT, M_NOWAIT);
if (opt->ip6po_pktinfo == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
}
bcopy(pktinfo, opt->ip6po_pktinfo, sizeof(*pktinfo));
break;
}
case IPV6_2292HOPLIMIT:
case IPV6_HOPLIMIT:
{
int *hlimp;
/*
* RFC 3542 deprecated the usage of sticky IPV6_HOPLIMIT
* to simplify the ordering among hoplimit options.
*/
if (optname == IPV6_HOPLIMIT && sticky)
return (ENOPROTOOPT);
if (len != sizeof(int))
return (EINVAL);
hlimp = (int *)buf;
if (*hlimp < -1 || *hlimp > 255)
return (EINVAL);
opt->ip6po_hlim = *hlimp;
break;
}
case IPV6_TCLASS:
{
int tclass;
if (len != sizeof(int))
return (EINVAL);
tclass = *(int *)buf;
if (tclass < -1 || tclass > 255)
return (EINVAL);
opt->ip6po_tclass = tclass;
break;
}
case IPV6_2292NEXTHOP:
case IPV6_NEXTHOP:
if (cred != NULL) {
error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS);
if (error)
return (error);
}
if (len == 0) { /* just remove the option */
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, IPV6_NEXTHOP);
break;
}
/* check if cmsg_len is large enough for sa_len */
if (len < sizeof(struct sockaddr) || len < *buf)
return (EINVAL);
switch (((struct sockaddr *)buf)->sa_family) {
case AF_INET6:
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)buf;
int error;
if (sa6->sin6_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
return (EINVAL);
if (IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&sa6->sin6_addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_MULTICAST(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
return (EINVAL);
}
if ((error = sa6_embedscope(sa6, V_ip6_use_defzone))
!= 0) {
return (error);
}
break;
}
case AF_LINK: /* should eventually be supported */
default:
return (EAFNOSUPPORT);
}
/* turn off the previous option, then set the new option. */
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, IPV6_NEXTHOP);
opt->ip6po_nexthop = malloc(*buf, M_IP6OPT, M_NOWAIT);
if (opt->ip6po_nexthop == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
bcopy(buf, opt->ip6po_nexthop, *buf);
break;
case IPV6_2292HOPOPTS:
case IPV6_HOPOPTS:
{
struct ip6_hbh *hbh;
int hbhlen;
/*
* XXX: We don't allow a non-privileged user to set ANY HbH
* options, since per-option restriction has too much
* overhead.
*/
if (cred != NULL) {
error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS);
if (error)
return (error);
}
if (len == 0) {
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, IPV6_HOPOPTS);
break; /* just remove the option */
}
/* message length validation */
if (len < sizeof(struct ip6_hbh))
return (EINVAL);
hbh = (struct ip6_hbh *)buf;
hbhlen = (hbh->ip6h_len + 1) << 3;
if (len != hbhlen)
return (EINVAL);
/* turn off the previous option, then set the new option. */
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, IPV6_HOPOPTS);
opt->ip6po_hbh = malloc(hbhlen, M_IP6OPT, M_NOWAIT);
if (opt->ip6po_hbh == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
bcopy(hbh, opt->ip6po_hbh, hbhlen);
break;
}
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
{
struct ip6_dest *dest, **newdest = NULL;
int destlen;
if (cred != NULL) { /* XXX: see the comment for IPV6_HOPOPTS */
error = priv_check_cred(cred, PRIV_NETINET_SETHDROPTS);
if (error)
return (error);
}
if (len == 0) {
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, optname);
break; /* just remove the option */
}
/* message length validation */
if (len < sizeof(struct ip6_dest))
return (EINVAL);
dest = (struct ip6_dest *)buf;
destlen = (dest->ip6d_len + 1) << 3;
if (len != destlen)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Determine the position that the destination options header
* should be inserted; before or after the routing header.
*/
switch (optname) {
case IPV6_2292DSTOPTS:
/*
* The old advacned API is ambiguous on this point.
* Our approach is to determine the position based
* according to the existence of a routing header.
* Note, however, that this depends on the order of the
* extension headers in the ancillary data; the 1st
* part of the destination options header must appear
* before the routing header in the ancillary data,
* too.
* RFC3542 solved the ambiguity by introducing
* separate ancillary data or option types.
*/
if (opt->ip6po_rthdr == NULL)
newdest = &opt->ip6po_dest1;
else
newdest = &opt->ip6po_dest2;
break;
case IPV6_RTHDRDSTOPTS:
newdest = &opt->ip6po_dest1;
break;
case IPV6_DSTOPTS:
newdest = &opt->ip6po_dest2;
break;
}
/* turn off the previous option, then set the new option. */
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, optname);
*newdest = malloc(destlen, M_IP6OPT, M_NOWAIT);
if (*newdest == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
bcopy(dest, *newdest, destlen);
break;
}
case IPV6_2292RTHDR:
case IPV6_RTHDR:
{
struct ip6_rthdr *rth;
int rthlen;
if (len == 0) {
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, IPV6_RTHDR);
break; /* just remove the option */
}
/* message length validation */
if (len < sizeof(struct ip6_rthdr))
return (EINVAL);
rth = (struct ip6_rthdr *)buf;
rthlen = (rth->ip6r_len + 1) << 3;
if (len != rthlen)
return (EINVAL);
switch (rth->ip6r_type) {
case IPV6_RTHDR_TYPE_0:
if (rth->ip6r_len == 0) /* must contain one addr */
return (EINVAL);
if (rth->ip6r_len % 2) /* length must be even */
return (EINVAL);
if (rth->ip6r_len / 2 != rth->ip6r_segleft)
return (EINVAL);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL); /* not supported */
}
/* turn off the previous option */
ip6_clearpktopts(opt, IPV6_RTHDR);
opt->ip6po_rthdr = malloc(rthlen, M_IP6OPT, M_NOWAIT);
if (opt->ip6po_rthdr == NULL)
return (ENOBUFS);
bcopy(rth, opt->ip6po_rthdr, rthlen);
break;
}
case IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU:
if (len != sizeof(int))
return (EINVAL);
minmtupolicy = *(int *)buf;
if (minmtupolicy != IP6PO_MINMTU_MCASTONLY &&
minmtupolicy != IP6PO_MINMTU_DISABLE &&
minmtupolicy != IP6PO_MINMTU_ALL) {
return (EINVAL);
}
opt->ip6po_minmtu = minmtupolicy;
break;
case IPV6_DONTFRAG:
if (len != sizeof(int))
return (EINVAL);
if (uproto == IPPROTO_TCP || *(int *)buf == 0) {
/*
* we ignore this option for TCP sockets.
* (RFC3542 leaves this case unspecified.)
*/
opt->ip6po_flags &= ~IP6PO_DONTFRAG;
} else
opt->ip6po_flags |= IP6PO_DONTFRAG;
break;
case IPV6_PREFER_TEMPADDR:
if (len != sizeof(int))
return (EINVAL);
preftemp = *(int *)buf;
if (preftemp != IP6PO_TEMPADDR_SYSTEM &&
preftemp != IP6PO_TEMPADDR_NOTPREFER &&
preftemp != IP6PO_TEMPADDR_PREFER) {
return (EINVAL);
}
opt->ip6po_prefer_tempaddr = preftemp;
break;
default:
return (ENOPROTOOPT);
} /* end of switch */
return (0);
}
/*
* Routine called from ip6_output() to loop back a copy of an IP6 multicast
* packet to the input queue of a specified interface. Note that this
* calls the output routine of the loopback "driver", but with an interface
* pointer that might NOT be &loif -- easier than replicating that code here.
*/
void
ip6_mloopback(struct ifnet *ifp, struct mbuf *m)
{
struct mbuf *copym;
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
copym = m_copym(m, 0, M_COPYALL, M_NOWAIT);
if (copym == NULL)
return;
/*
* Make sure to deep-copy IPv6 header portion in case the data
* is in an mbuf cluster, so that we can safely override the IPv6
* header portion later.
*/
if (!M_WRITABLE(copym) ||
copym->m_len < sizeof(struct ip6_hdr)) {
copym = m_pullup(copym, sizeof(struct ip6_hdr));
if (copym == NULL)
return;
}
ip6 = mtod(copym, struct ip6_hdr *);
/*
* clear embedded scope identifiers if necessary.
* in6_clearscope will touch the addresses only when necessary.
*/
in6_clearscope(&ip6->ip6_src);
in6_clearscope(&ip6->ip6_dst);
if (copym->m_pkthdr.csum_flags & CSUM_DELAY_DATA_IPV6) {
copym->m_pkthdr.csum_flags |= CSUM_DATA_VALID_IPV6 |
CSUM_PSEUDO_HDR;
copym->m_pkthdr.csum_data = 0xffff;
}
if_simloop(ifp, copym, AF_INET6, 0);
}
/*
* Chop IPv6 header off from the payload.
*/
static int
ip6_splithdr(struct mbuf *m, struct ip6_exthdrs *exthdrs)
{
struct mbuf *mh;
struct ip6_hdr *ip6;
ip6 = mtod(m, struct ip6_hdr *);
if (m->m_len > sizeof(*ip6)) {
mh = m_gethdr(M_NOWAIT, MT_DATA);
if (mh == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
m_move_pkthdr(mh, m);
M_ALIGN(mh, sizeof(*ip6));
m->m_len -= sizeof(*ip6);
m->m_data += sizeof(*ip6);
mh->m_next = m;
m = mh;
m->m_len = sizeof(*ip6);
bcopy((caddr_t)ip6, mtod(m, caddr_t), sizeof(*ip6));
}
exthdrs->ip6e_ip6 = m;
return 0;
}
/*
* Compute IPv6 extension header length.
*/
int
ip6_optlen(struct inpcb *inp)
{
int len;
if (!inp->in6p_outputopts)
return 0;
len = 0;
#define elen(x) \
(((struct ip6_ext *)(x)) ? (((struct ip6_ext *)(x))->ip6e_len + 1) << 3 : 0)
len += elen(inp->in6p_outputopts->ip6po_hbh);
if (inp->in6p_outputopts->ip6po_rthdr)
/* dest1 is valid with rthdr only */
len += elen(inp->in6p_outputopts->ip6po_dest1);
len += elen(inp->in6p_outputopts->ip6po_rthdr);
len += elen(inp->in6p_outputopts->ip6po_dest2);
return len;
#undef elen
}