freebsd-dev/usr.bin/chpass/edit.c

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/*-
* Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Portions of this software were developed for the FreeBSD Project by
* ThinkSec AS and NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035
* ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
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*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* This product includes software developed by the University of
* California, Berkeley and its contributors.
* 4. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#if 0
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#ifndef lint
static char sccsid[] = "@(#)edit.c 8.3 (Berkeley) 4/2/94";
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#endif /* not lint */
#endif
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <err.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <pw_scan.h>
#include <libutil.h>
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#include "chpass.h"
static int display(const char *tfn, struct passwd *pw);
static struct passwd *verify(const char *tfn, struct passwd *pw);
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struct passwd *
edit(const char *tfn, struct passwd *pw)
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{
struct passwd *npw;
char *line;
size_t len;
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if (display(tfn, pw) == -1)
return (NULL);
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for (;;) {
switch (pw_edit(1)) {
case -1:
return (NULL);
case 0:
return (pw_dup(pw));
default:
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break;
}
if ((npw = verify(tfn, pw)) != NULL)
return (npw);
free(npw);
printf("re-edit the password file? ");
fflush(stdout);
if ((line = fgetln(stdin, &len)) == NULL) {
warn("fgetln()");
return (NULL);
}
if (len > 0 && (*line == 'N' || *line == 'n'))
return (NULL);
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}
}
/*
* display --
* print out the file for the user to edit; strange side-effect:
* set conditional flag if the user gets to edit the shell.
*/
static int
display(const char *tfn, struct passwd *pw)
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{
FILE *fp;
char *bp, *gecos, *p;
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if ((fp = fopen(tfn, "w")) == NULL) {
warn("%s", tfn);
return (-1);
}
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(void)fprintf(fp,
"#Changing user information for %s.\n", pw->pw_name);
if (master_mode) {
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(void)fprintf(fp, "Login: %s\n", pw->pw_name);
(void)fprintf(fp, "Password: %s\n", pw->pw_passwd);
(void)fprintf(fp, "Uid [#]: %lu\n", (unsigned long)pw->pw_uid);
(void)fprintf(fp, "Gid [# or name]: %lu\n",
(unsigned long)pw->pw_gid);
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(void)fprintf(fp, "Change [month day year]: %s\n",
ttoa(pw->pw_change));
(void)fprintf(fp, "Expire [month day year]: %s\n",
ttoa(pw->pw_expire));
(void)fprintf(fp, "Class: %s\n", pw->pw_class);
(void)fprintf(fp, "Home directory: %s\n", pw->pw_dir);
(void)fprintf(fp, "Shell: %s\n",
*pw->pw_shell ? pw->pw_shell : _PATH_BSHELL);
}
/* Only admin can change "restricted" shells. */
#if 0
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else if (ok_shell(pw->pw_shell))
/*
* Make shell a restricted field. Ugly with a
* necklace, but there's not much else to do.
*/
Merge in changes to support the new rpc.yppasswdd(8) and fix a few bugs. In passwd(1): - Gut most of yp_passwd.c and leave only a few things that aren't common to pw_yp.c. - Add support for -d and -h flags to select domains and NIS server hosts to use when updating NIS passwords. This allows passwd(1) to be used for changing NIS passwords from machines that aren't configured as NIS clients. (This is mostly to allow passwd(1) to work on NIS master servers that aren't configured as clients -- an NIS server need not necessarily be configured as a client itself.) NOTE: Realize that having the ability to specify a domain and hostname lets you use passwd(1) (and chpass(1) too) to submit update requests to yppasswd daemons running on remote servers in remote domains which you may not even be bound to. For example, my machine at home is not an NIS client of the servers on the network that I manage, yet I can easily change my password at work using my FreeBSD box at home by doing: 'passwd -d work.net.domain -h any.nis.server.on.my.net wpaul'. (Yes, I do use securenets at work; temporarily modified my securenets file to give my home system access.) Some people may not be too thrilled with this idea. Those who don't like this feature can recompile passwd(1) and chpass(1) with -DPARANOID to restrict the use of these flags to the superuser. (Oh, I should be adding proper securenets support to ypserv(8) and rpc.yppasswdd(8) over the weekend.) - Merge in changes to allow root on the NIS master server to bypass authentication and change any user's NIS password. (The super-user on the NIS master already has privileges to do this, but doing it through passwd(1) is much easier than updating the maps by hand.) Note that passwd(1) communicates with rpc.yppasswdd(8) via a UNIX domain socket instead of via standard RPC/IP in this case. - Update man page. In chpass(1): - Fix pw_yp.c to work properly in environments where NIS client services aren't available. - Use realloc() instead of malloc() in copy_yp_pass() and copy_local_pass(). - Fix silly bug in copy_yp_pass(); some of the members of the passwd structure weren't being filled in correctly. (This went unnoticed for a while since the old yppasswdd didn't allow changes to the fields that were being botched.) - chpass(1) now also allows the superuser on the NIS master server to make unrestricted changes to any user's NIS password information. - Use UNIX domain comm channel to rpc.yppasswdd(8) when run by the superuser on the NIS master. This allows several new things: o superuser can update an entire master.passwd.{byname,byuid} entry o superuser can update records in arbitrary domains using -d flag to select a domain (before you could only change the default domain) o superuser can _add_ records to the NIS master.passwd maps, provided rpc.yppasswdd(8) has been started with the -a flag (to do this, the superuser must force NIS operation by specifying the -y flag to chpass(1) along with -a, i.e. 'chpass -y -a 'foo:::::::::') - Back out the 'chpass -a <new password entry> breaks with NIS' fix from the last revision and fix it properly this time. The previous revision fixed the immediate problem but broke NIS operation in some cases. - In edit.c, be a little more reasonable about deciding when to prevent the shell field from being changed. Submitted by Charles Owens <owensc@enc.edu>, who said: "I made a minor (one-line) modification to chpass, with regards to whether or not it allows the changing of shells. In the 2.0.5 code, field changing follows the settings specified in the "list" structure defined in table.c . For the shell, though, this is ignored. A quick look in edit.c showed me why, but I don't understand why it was written as such. The logic was if shell is standard shell, allow changing I changed it to if shell changing is allowed (per table.c) and it is a standard shell OR if uid=0, then allow changing." Makes sense to me. - Update man page.
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#else
else if ((!list[E_SHELL].restricted && ok_shell(pw->pw_shell)) ||
master_mode)
Merge in changes to support the new rpc.yppasswdd(8) and fix a few bugs. In passwd(1): - Gut most of yp_passwd.c and leave only a few things that aren't common to pw_yp.c. - Add support for -d and -h flags to select domains and NIS server hosts to use when updating NIS passwords. This allows passwd(1) to be used for changing NIS passwords from machines that aren't configured as NIS clients. (This is mostly to allow passwd(1) to work on NIS master servers that aren't configured as clients -- an NIS server need not necessarily be configured as a client itself.) NOTE: Realize that having the ability to specify a domain and hostname lets you use passwd(1) (and chpass(1) too) to submit update requests to yppasswd daemons running on remote servers in remote domains which you may not even be bound to. For example, my machine at home is not an NIS client of the servers on the network that I manage, yet I can easily change my password at work using my FreeBSD box at home by doing: 'passwd -d work.net.domain -h any.nis.server.on.my.net wpaul'. (Yes, I do use securenets at work; temporarily modified my securenets file to give my home system access.) Some people may not be too thrilled with this idea. Those who don't like this feature can recompile passwd(1) and chpass(1) with -DPARANOID to restrict the use of these flags to the superuser. (Oh, I should be adding proper securenets support to ypserv(8) and rpc.yppasswdd(8) over the weekend.) - Merge in changes to allow root on the NIS master server to bypass authentication and change any user's NIS password. (The super-user on the NIS master already has privileges to do this, but doing it through passwd(1) is much easier than updating the maps by hand.) Note that passwd(1) communicates with rpc.yppasswdd(8) via a UNIX domain socket instead of via standard RPC/IP in this case. - Update man page. In chpass(1): - Fix pw_yp.c to work properly in environments where NIS client services aren't available. - Use realloc() instead of malloc() in copy_yp_pass() and copy_local_pass(). - Fix silly bug in copy_yp_pass(); some of the members of the passwd structure weren't being filled in correctly. (This went unnoticed for a while since the old yppasswdd didn't allow changes to the fields that were being botched.) - chpass(1) now also allows the superuser on the NIS master server to make unrestricted changes to any user's NIS password information. - Use UNIX domain comm channel to rpc.yppasswdd(8) when run by the superuser on the NIS master. This allows several new things: o superuser can update an entire master.passwd.{byname,byuid} entry o superuser can update records in arbitrary domains using -d flag to select a domain (before you could only change the default domain) o superuser can _add_ records to the NIS master.passwd maps, provided rpc.yppasswdd(8) has been started with the -a flag (to do this, the superuser must force NIS operation by specifying the -y flag to chpass(1) along with -a, i.e. 'chpass -y -a 'foo:::::::::') - Back out the 'chpass -a <new password entry> breaks with NIS' fix from the last revision and fix it properly this time. The previous revision fixed the immediate problem but broke NIS operation in some cases. - In edit.c, be a little more reasonable about deciding when to prevent the shell field from being changed. Submitted by Charles Owens <owensc@enc.edu>, who said: "I made a minor (one-line) modification to chpass, with regards to whether or not it allows the changing of shells. In the 2.0.5 code, field changing follows the settings specified in the "list" structure defined in table.c . For the shell, though, this is ignored. A quick look in edit.c showed me why, but I don't understand why it was written as such. The logic was if shell is standard shell, allow changing I changed it to if shell changing is allowed (per table.c) and it is a standard shell OR if uid=0, then allow changing." Makes sense to me. - Update man page.
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/*
* If change not restrict (table.c) and standard shell
* OR if root, then allow editing of shell.
*/
#endif
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(void)fprintf(fp, "Shell: %s\n",
*pw->pw_shell ? pw->pw_shell : _PATH_BSHELL);
else
list[E_SHELL].restricted = 1;
if ((bp = gecos = strdup(pw->pw_gecos)) == NULL) {
warn(NULL);
fclose(fp);
return (-1);
}
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p = strsep(&bp, ",");
p = strdup(p ? p : "");
list[E_NAME].save = p;
if (!list[E_NAME].restricted || master_mode)
(void)fprintf(fp, "Full Name: %s\n", p);
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p = strsep(&bp, ",");
p = strdup(p ? p : "");
list[E_LOCATE].save = p;
if (!list[E_LOCATE].restricted || master_mode)
(void)fprintf(fp, "Office Location: %s\n", p);
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p = strsep(&bp, ",");
p = strdup(p ? p : "");
list[E_BPHONE].save = p;
if (!list[E_BPHONE].restricted || master_mode)
(void)fprintf(fp, "Office Phone: %s\n", p);
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p = strsep(&bp, ",");
p = strdup(p ? p : "");
list[E_HPHONE].save = p;
if (!list[E_HPHONE].restricted || master_mode)
(void)fprintf(fp, "Home Phone: %s\n", p);
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bp = strdup(bp ? bp : "");
list[E_OTHER].save = bp;
if (!list[E_OTHER].restricted || master_mode)
(void)fprintf(fp, "Other information: %s\n", bp);
free(gecos);
(void)fchown(fileno(fp), getuid(), getgid());
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(void)fclose(fp);
return (0);
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}
static struct passwd *
verify(const char *tfn, struct passwd *pw)
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{
struct passwd *npw;
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ENTRY *ep;
char *buf, *p, *val;
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struct stat sb;
FILE *fp;
int line;
size_t len;
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if ((pw = pw_dup(pw)) == NULL)
return (NULL);
if ((fp = fopen(tfn, "r")) == NULL ||
fstat(fileno(fp), &sb) == -1) {
warn("%s", tfn);
free(pw);
return (NULL);
}
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if (sb.st_size == 0) {
warnx("corrupted temporary file");
fclose(fp);
free(pw);
return (NULL);
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}
val = NULL;
for (line = 1; (buf = fgetln(fp, &len)) != NULL; ++line) {
if (*buf == '\0' || *buf == '#')
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continue;
while (len > 0 && isspace(buf[len - 1]))
--len;
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for (ep = list;; ++ep) {
if (!ep->prompt) {
warnx("%s: unrecognized field on line %d",
tfn, line);
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goto bad;
}
if (ep->len > len)
continue;
if (strncasecmp(buf, ep->prompt, ep->len) != 0)
continue;
if (ep->restricted && !master_mode) {
warnx("%s: you may not change the %s field",
tfn, ep->prompt);
goto bad;
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}
for (p = buf; p < buf + len && *p != ':'; ++p)
/* nothing */ ;
if (*p != ':') {
warnx("%s: line %d corrupted", tfn, line);
goto bad;
}
while (++p < buf + len && isspace(*p))
/* nothing */ ;
free(val);
asprintf(&val, "%.*s", (int)(buf + len - p), p);
if (val == NULL)
goto bad;
if (ep->except && strpbrk(val, ep->except)) {
warnx("%s: invalid character in \"%s\" field '%s'",
tfn, ep->prompt, val);
goto bad;
}
if ((ep->func)(val, pw, ep))
goto bad;
break;
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}
}
free(val);
fclose(fp);
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/* Build the gecos field. */
len = asprintf(&p, "%s,%s,%s,%s,%s", list[E_NAME].save,
list[E_LOCATE].save, list[E_BPHONE].save,
list[E_HPHONE].save, list[E_OTHER].save);
if (p == NULL) {
warn("asprintf()");
free(pw);
return (NULL);
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}
while (len > 0 && p[len - 1] == ',')
p[--len] = '\0';
pw->pw_gecos = p;
buf = pw_make(pw);
free(pw);
free(p);
if (buf == NULL) {
warn("pw_make()");
return (NULL);
}
npw = pw_scan(buf, PWSCAN_WARN|PWSCAN_MASTER);
free(buf);
return (npw);
bad:
free(pw);
free(val);
fclose(fp);
return (NULL);
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}