2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 2015 Allan Jude <allanjude@FreeBSD.org>
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* Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net>
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $FreeBSD$
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*/
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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#include <crypto/intake.h>
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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#ifndef _GELIBOOT_H_
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#define _GELIBOOT_H_
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h>
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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#ifndef DEV_BSIZE
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#define DEV_BSIZE 512
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#endif
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2016-04-06 23:21:44 +00:00
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#ifndef DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE
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#define DEV_GELIBOOT_BSIZE 4096
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#endif
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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#ifndef MIN
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#define MIN(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
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#endif
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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#define GELI_MAX_KEYS 64
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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#define GELI_PW_MAXLEN 256
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#define GELI_KEYBUF_SIZE (sizeof(struct keybuf) + \
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(GELI_MAX_KEYS * sizeof(struct keybuf_ent)))
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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2020-07-11 06:51:42 +00:00
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typedef enum geli_op {
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GELI_DECRYPT,
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GELI_ENCRYPT
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} geli_op_t;
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2017-08-26 14:07:24 +00:00
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extern void pwgets(char *buf, int n, int hide);
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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typedef u_char geli_ukey[G_ELI_USERKEYLEN];
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/*
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* An opaque struct used internally by geliboot functions. Returned by
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* geli_taste(), a pointer to one of these is essentially a device handle. There
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* is no need to release or free or "give back" the pointer.
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*/
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struct geli_dev;
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2017-08-26 18:30:08 +00:00
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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/* Forward decls. */
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struct open_file;
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struct preloaded_file;
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/*
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* Low-level interface, used by early-stage bootloaders...
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*/
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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/* Read callback function type for geli_taste(). */
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typedef int (*geli_readfunc)(void *vdev, void *readpriv, off_t offbytes,
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void *buf, size_t sizebytes);
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2016-05-13 11:24:55 +00:00
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2020-07-11 06:51:42 +00:00
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struct geli_dev *geli_taste(geli_readfunc readfunc, void *readpriv,
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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daddr_t lastsector, const char *namefmt, ...);
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2020-07-11 06:51:42 +00:00
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int geli_io(struct geli_dev *gdev, geli_op_t, off_t offset, u_char *buf,
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size_t bytes);
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2018-07-13 17:50:25 +00:00
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int geli_havekey(struct geli_dev *gdev);
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int geli_passphrase(struct geli_dev *gdev, char *pw);
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/*
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* Libsa device-and-file-level interface.
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*/
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void geli_probe_and_attach(struct open_file *f);
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/*
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* Manage key data.
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*/
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void geli_add_key(geli_ukey key);
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void geli_import_key_buffer(struct keybuf *keybuf);
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void geli_export_key_buffer(struct keybuf *keybuf);
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void geli_export_key_metadata(struct preloaded_file *kfp);
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Implement boot-time encryption key passing (keybuf)
This patch adds a general mechanism for providing encryption keys to the
kernel from the boot loader. This is intended to enable GELI support at
boot time, providing a better mechanism for passing keys to the kernel
than environment variables. It is designed to be extensible to other
applications, and can easily handle multiple encrypted volumes with
different keys.
This mechanism is currently used by the pending GELI EFI work.
Additionally, this mechanism can potentially be used to interface with
GRUB, opening up options for coreboot+GRUB configurations with completely
encrypted disks.
Another benefit over the existing system is that it does not require
re-deriving the user key from the password at each boot stage.
Most of this patch was written by Eric McCorkle. It was extended by
Allan Jude with a number of minor enhancements and extending the keybuf
feature into boot2.
GELI user keys are now derived once, in boot2, then passed to the loader,
which reuses the key, then passes it to the kernel, where the GELI module
destroys the keybuf after decrypting the volumes.
Submitted by: Eric McCorkle <eric@metricspace.net> (Original Version)
Reviewed by: oshogbo (earlier version), cem (earlier version)
MFC after: 3 weeks
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: ScaleEngine Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9575
2017-04-01 05:05:22 +00:00
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2016-03-16 23:12:19 +00:00
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#endif /* _GELIBOOT_H_ */
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