freebsd-dev/sys/security/audit/audit.c

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/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2006-2007, 2016-2018 Robert N. M. Watson
* All rights reserved.
*
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
* Portions of this software were developed by BAE Systems, the University of
* Cambridge Computer Laboratory, and Memorial University under DARPA/AFRL
* contract FA8650-15-C-7558 ("CADETS"), as part of the DARPA Transparent
* Computing (TC) research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/condvar.h>
#include <sys/conf.h>
#include <sys/eventhandler.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ipc.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/kthread.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/priv.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/queue.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/unistd.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <bsm/audit.h>
#include <bsm/audit_internal.h>
#include <bsm/audit_kevents.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_pcb.h>
#include <security/audit/audit.h>
#include <security/audit/audit_private.h>
#include <vm/uma.h>
FEATURE(audit, "BSM audit support");
static uma_zone_t audit_record_zone;
static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITCRED, "audit_cred", "Audit cred storage");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITDATA, "audit_data", "Audit data storage");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITPATH, "audit_path", "Audit path storage");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITTEXT, "audit_text", "Audit text storage");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_AUDITGIDSET, "audit_gidset", "Audit GID set storage");
static SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, audit, CTLFLAG_RW | CTLFLAG_MPSAFE, 0,
"TrustedBSD audit controls");
/*
* Audit control settings that are set/read by system calls and are hence
* non-static.
*
* Define the audit control flags.
*/
int audit_trail_enabled;
int audit_trail_suspended;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
u_int audit_dtrace_enabled;
#endif
bool __read_frequently audit_syscalls_enabled;
/*
2006-09-09 10:23:00 +00:00
* Flags controlling behavior in low storage situations. Should we panic if
* a write fails? Should we fail stop if we're out of disk space?
*/
int audit_panic_on_write_fail;
int audit_fail_stop;
int audit_argv;
int audit_arge;
/*
* Are we currently "failing stop" due to out of disk space?
*/
int audit_in_failure;
/*
* Global audit statistics.
*/
struct audit_fstat audit_fstat;
/*
* Preselection mask for non-attributable events.
*/
struct au_mask audit_nae_mask;
/*
* Mutex to protect global variables shared between various threads and
* processes.
*/
struct mtx audit_mtx;
/*
* Queue of audit records ready for delivery to disk. We insert new records
* at the tail, and remove records from the head. Also, a count of the
* number of records used for checking queue depth. In addition, a counter
* of records that we have allocated but are not yet in the queue, which is
* needed to estimate the total size of the combined set of records
* outstanding in the system.
*/
struct kaudit_queue audit_q;
int audit_q_len;
int audit_pre_q_len;
/*
* Audit queue control settings (minimum free, low/high water marks, etc.)
*/
struct au_qctrl audit_qctrl;
/*
* Condition variable to signal to the worker that it has work to do: either
* new records are in the queue, or a log replacement is taking place.
*/
struct cv audit_worker_cv;
/*
* Condition variable to flag when crossing the low watermark, meaning that
* threads blocked due to hitting the high watermark can wake up and continue
* to commit records.
*/
struct cv audit_watermark_cv;
/*
* Condition variable for auditing threads wait on when in fail-stop mode.
* Threads wait on this CV forever (and ever), never seeing the light of day
* again.
*/
static struct cv audit_fail_cv;
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
/*
* Optional DTrace audit provider support: function pointers for preselection
* and commit events.
*/
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
void *(*dtaudit_hook_preselect)(au_id_t auid, au_event_t event,
au_class_t class);
int (*dtaudit_hook_commit)(struct kaudit_record *kar, au_id_t auid,
au_event_t event, au_class_t class, int sorf);
void (*dtaudit_hook_bsm)(struct kaudit_record *kar, au_id_t auid,
au_event_t event, au_class_t class, int sorf,
void *bsm_data, size_t bsm_lenlen);
#endif
/*
* Kernel audit information. This will store the current audit address
* or host information that the kernel will use when it's generating
* audit records. This data is modified by the A_GET{SET}KAUDIT auditon(2)
* command.
*/
static struct auditinfo_addr audit_kinfo;
static struct rwlock audit_kinfo_lock;
#define KINFO_LOCK_INIT() rw_init(&audit_kinfo_lock, \
"audit_kinfo_lock")
#define KINFO_RLOCK() rw_rlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
#define KINFO_WLOCK() rw_wlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
#define KINFO_RUNLOCK() rw_runlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
#define KINFO_WUNLOCK() rw_wunlock(&audit_kinfo_lock)
/*
* Check various policies to see if we should enable system-call audit hooks.
* Note that despite the mutex being held, we want to assign a value exactly
* once, as checks of the flag are performed lock-free for performance
* reasons. The mutex is used to get a consistent snapshot of policy state --
* e.g., safely accessing the two audit_trail flags.
*/
void
audit_syscalls_enabled_update(void)
{
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
if (audit_dtrace_enabled)
audit_syscalls_enabled = true;
else {
#endif
if (audit_trail_enabled && !audit_trail_suspended)
audit_syscalls_enabled = true;
else
audit_syscalls_enabled = false;
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
}
#endif
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
}
void
audit_set_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak)
{
KASSERT(ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 ||
ak->ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6,
("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type"));
KINFO_WLOCK();
audit_kinfo = *ak;
KINFO_WUNLOCK();
}
void
audit_get_kinfo(struct auditinfo_addr *ak)
{
KASSERT(audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv4 ||
audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type == AU_IPv6,
("audit_set_kinfo: invalid address type"));
KINFO_RLOCK();
*ak = audit_kinfo;
KINFO_RUNLOCK();
}
/*
* Construct an audit record for the passed thread.
*/
static int
audit_record_ctor(void *mem, int size, void *arg, int flags)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct thread *td;
struct ucred *cred;
struct prison *pr;
KASSERT(sizeof(*ar) == size, ("audit_record_ctor: wrong size"));
td = arg;
ar = mem;
bzero(ar, sizeof(*ar));
ar->k_ar.ar_magic = AUDIT_RECORD_MAGIC;
nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_starttime);
/*
* Export the subject credential.
*/
cred = td->td_ucred;
cru2x(cred, &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_cred);
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_ruid = cred->cr_ruid;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_rgid = cred->cr_rgid;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_egid = cred->cr_groups[0];
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_asid = cred->cr_audit.ai_asid;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_pid = td->td_proc->p_pid;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask = cred->cr_audit.ai_mask;
ar->k_ar.ar_subj_term_addr = cred->cr_audit.ai_termid;
/*
* If this process is jailed, make sure we capture the name of the
* jail so we can use it to generate a zonename token when we covert
* this record to BSM.
*/
if (jailed(cred)) {
pr = cred->cr_prison;
(void) strlcpy(ar->k_ar.ar_jailname, pr->pr_name,
sizeof(ar->k_ar.ar_jailname));
} else
ar->k_ar.ar_jailname[0] = '\0';
return (0);
}
static void
audit_record_dtor(void *mem, int size, void *arg)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
KASSERT(sizeof(*ar) == size, ("audit_record_dtor: wrong size"));
ar = mem;
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1 != NULL)
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1, M_AUDITPATH);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2 != NULL)
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath2, M_AUDITPATH);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text != NULL)
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_text, M_AUDITTEXT);
if (ar->k_udata != NULL)
free(ar->k_udata, M_AUDITDATA);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv != NULL)
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_argv, M_AUDITTEXT);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv != NULL)
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_envv, M_AUDITTEXT);
if (ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset != NULL)
free(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_groups.gidset, M_AUDITGIDSET);
}
/*
* Initialize the Audit subsystem: configuration state, work queue,
* synchronization primitives, worker thread, and trigger device node. Also
* call into the BSM assembly code to initialize it.
*/
static void
audit_init(void)
{
audit_trail_enabled = 0;
audit_trail_suspended = 0;
audit_syscalls_enabled = false;
audit_panic_on_write_fail = 0;
audit_fail_stop = 0;
audit_in_failure = 0;
audit_argv = 0;
audit_arge = 0;
audit_fstat.af_filesz = 0; /* '0' means unset, unbounded. */
audit_fstat.af_currsz = 0;
audit_nae_mask.am_success = 0;
audit_nae_mask.am_failure = 0;
TAILQ_INIT(&audit_q);
audit_q_len = 0;
audit_pre_q_len = 0;
audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater = AQ_HIWATER;
audit_qctrl.aq_lowater = AQ_LOWATER;
audit_qctrl.aq_bufsz = AQ_BUFSZ;
audit_qctrl.aq_minfree = AU_FS_MINFREE;
audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
audit_kinfo.ai_termid.at_addr[0] = INADDR_ANY;
mtx_init(&audit_mtx, "audit_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
KINFO_LOCK_INIT();
cv_init(&audit_worker_cv, "audit_worker_cv");
cv_init(&audit_watermark_cv, "audit_watermark_cv");
cv_init(&audit_fail_cv, "audit_fail_cv");
audit_record_zone = uma_zcreate("audit_record",
sizeof(struct kaudit_record), audit_record_ctor,
audit_record_dtor, NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, 0);
/* First initialisation of audit_syscalls_enabled. */
audit_syscalls_enabled_update();
/* Initialize the BSM audit subsystem. */
kau_init();
audit_trigger_init();
/* Register shutdown handler. */
EVENTHANDLER_REGISTER(shutdown_pre_sync, audit_shutdown, NULL,
SHUTDOWN_PRI_FIRST);
/* Start audit worker thread. */
audit_worker_init();
}
SYSINIT(audit_init, SI_SUB_AUDIT, SI_ORDER_FIRST, audit_init, NULL);
/*
* Drain the audit queue and close the log at shutdown. Note that this can
* be called both from the system shutdown path and also from audit
* configuration syscalls, so 'arg' and 'howto' are ignored.
*
* XXXRW: In FreeBSD 7.x and 8.x, this fails to wait for the record queue to
* drain before returning, which could lead to lost records on shutdown.
*/
void
audit_shutdown(void *arg, int howto)
{
audit_rotate_vnode(NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* Return the current thread's audit record, if any.
*/
struct kaudit_record *
currecord(void)
{
return (curthread->td_ar);
}
/*
* XXXAUDIT: Shouldn't there be logic here to sleep waiting on available
* pre_q space, suspending the system call until there is room?
*/
struct kaudit_record *
audit_new(int event, struct thread *td)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
/*
* Note: the number of outstanding uncommitted audit records is
* limited to the number of concurrent threads servicing system calls
* in the kernel.
*/
ar = uma_zalloc_arg(audit_record_zone, td, M_WAITOK);
ar->k_ar.ar_event = event;
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_pre_q_len++;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
return (ar);
}
void
audit_free(struct kaudit_record *ar)
{
uma_zfree(audit_record_zone, ar);
}
void
audit_commit(struct kaudit_record *ar, int error, int retval)
{
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
au_event_t event;
au_class_t class;
au_id_t auid;
int sorf;
struct au_mask *aumask;
if (ar == NULL)
return;
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
ar->k_ar.ar_errno = error;
ar->k_ar.ar_retval = retval;
nanotime(&ar->k_ar.ar_endtime);
/*
* Decide whether to commit the audit record by checking the error
* value from the system call and using the appropriate audit mask.
*/
if (ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
else
aumask = &ar->k_ar.ar_subj_amask;
if (error)
sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
else
sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
/*
* syscalls.master sometimes contains a prototype event number, which
* we will transform into a more specific event number now that we
* have more complete information gathered during the system call.
*/
switch(ar->k_ar.ar_event) {
case AUE_OPEN_RWTC:
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openevent(
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
case AUE_OPENAT_RWTC:
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_flags_and_error_to_openatevent(
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_fflags, error);
break;
case AUE_SYSCTL:
ar->k_ar.ar_event = audit_ctlname_to_sysctlevent(
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_ctlname, ar->k_ar.ar_valid_arg);
break;
case AUE_AUDITON:
/* Convert the auditon() command to an event. */
ar->k_ar.ar_event = auditon_command_event(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_cmd);
break;
case AUE_MSGSYS:
if (ARG_IS_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_WHICH))
ar->k_ar.ar_event =
audit_msgsys_to_event(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_which);
break;
case AUE_SEMSYS:
if (ARG_IS_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_WHICH))
ar->k_ar.ar_event =
audit_semsys_to_event(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_which);
break;
case AUE_SHMSYS:
if (ARG_IS_VALID(ar, ARG_SVIPC_WHICH))
ar->k_ar.ar_event =
audit_shmsys_to_event(ar->k_ar.ar_arg_svipc_which);
break;
}
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
auid = ar->k_ar.ar_subj_auid;
event = ar->k_ar.ar_event;
class = au_event_class(event);
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_COMMIT_KERNEL;
if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, sorf) != 0)
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL;
if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, sorf,
ar->k_ar_commit & AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL) != 0)
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_PIPE;
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
/*
* Expose the audit record to DTrace, both to allow the "commit" probe
* to fire if it's desirable, and also to allow a decision to be made
* about later firing with BSM in the audit worker.
*/
if (dtaudit_hook_commit != NULL) {
if (dtaudit_hook_commit(ar, auid, event, class, sorf) != 0)
ar->k_ar_commit |= AR_PRESELECT_DTRACE;
}
#endif
if ((ar->k_ar_commit & (AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_PIPE |
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL | AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE |
AR_PRESELECT_DTRACE)) == 0) {
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
audit_pre_q_len--;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
audit_free(ar);
return;
}
/*
* Note: it could be that some records initiated while audit was
* enabled should still be committed?
*
* NB: The check here is not for audit_syscalls because any
* DTrace-related obligations have been fulfilled above -- we're just
* down to the trail and pipes now.
*/
mtx_lock(&audit_mtx);
if (audit_trail_suspended || !audit_trail_enabled) {
audit_pre_q_len--;
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
audit_free(ar);
return;
}
/*
* Constrain the number of committed audit records based on the
* configurable parameter.
*/
while (audit_q_len >= audit_qctrl.aq_hiwater)
cv_wait(&audit_watermark_cv, &audit_mtx);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&audit_q, ar, k_q);
audit_q_len++;
audit_pre_q_len--;
cv_signal(&audit_worker_cv);
mtx_unlock(&audit_mtx);
}
/*
* audit_syscall_enter() is called on entry to each system call. It is
* responsible for deciding whether or not to audit the call (preselection),
* and if so, allocating a per-thread audit record. audit_new() will fill in
* basic thread/credential properties.
*
* This function will be entered only if audit_syscalls_enabled was set in the
* macro wrapper for this function. It could be cleared by the time this
* function runs, but that is an acceptable race.
*/
void
audit_syscall_enter(unsigned short code, struct thread *td)
{
struct au_mask *aumask;
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
void *dtaudit_state;
#endif
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
au_class_t class;
au_event_t event;
au_id_t auid;
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
int record_needed;
KASSERT(td->td_ar == NULL, ("audit_syscall_enter: td->td_ar != NULL"));
KASSERT((td->td_pflags & TDP_AUDITREC) == 0,
("audit_syscall_enter: TDP_AUDITREC set"));
/*
* In FreeBSD, each ABI has its own system call table, and hence
* mapping of system call codes to audit events. Convert the code to
* an audit event identifier using the process system call table
* reference. In Darwin, there's only one, so we use the global
* symbol for the system call table. No audit record is generated
* for bad system calls, as no operation has been performed.
*/
if (code >= td->td_proc->p_sysent->sv_size)
return;
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
event = td->td_proc->p_sysent->sv_table[code].sy_auevent;
if (event == AUE_NULL)
return;
/*
* Check which audit mask to use; either the kernel non-attributable
* event mask or the process audit mask.
*/
auid = td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
else
aumask = &td->td_ucred->cr_audit.ai_mask;
/*
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
* Determine whether trail or pipe preselection would like an audit
* record allocated for this system call.
*/
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
class = au_event_class(event);
if (au_preselect(event, class, aumask, AU_PRS_BOTH)) {
/*
* If we're out of space and need to suspend unprivileged
* processes, do that here rather than trying to allocate
* another audit record.
*
* Note: we might wish to be able to continue here in the
* future, if the system recovers. That should be possible
* by means of checking the condition in a loop around
* cv_wait(). It might be desirable to reevaluate whether an
* audit record is still required for this event by
* re-calling au_preselect().
*/
if (audit_in_failure &&
priv_check(td, PRIV_AUDIT_FAILSTOP) != 0) {
cv_wait(&audit_fail_cv, &audit_mtx);
panic("audit_failing_stop: thread continued");
}
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
record_needed = 1;
} else if (audit_pipe_preselect(auid, event, class, AU_PRS_BOTH, 0)) {
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
record_needed = 1;
} else {
record_needed = 0;
}
/*
* After audit trails and pipes have made their policy choices, DTrace
* may request that records be generated as well. This is a slightly
* complex affair, as the DTrace audit provider needs the audit
* framework to maintain some state on the audit record, which has not
* been allocated at the point where the decision has to be made.
* This hook must run even if we are not changing the decision, as
* DTrace may want to stick event state onto a record we were going to
* produce due to the trail or pipes. The event state returned by the
* DTrace provider must be safe without locks held between here and
* below -- i.e., dtaudit_state must must refer to stable memory.
*/
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
dtaudit_state = NULL;
if (dtaudit_hook_preselect != NULL) {
dtaudit_state = dtaudit_hook_preselect(auid, event, class);
if (dtaudit_state != NULL)
record_needed = 1;
}
#endif
/*
* If a record is required, allocate it and attach it to the thread
* for use throughout the system call. Also attach DTrace state if
* required.
*
* XXXRW: If we decide to reference count the evname_elem underlying
* dtaudit_state, we will need to free here if no record is allocated
* or allocatable.
*/
if (record_needed) {
Introduce support for per-audit pipe preselection independent from the global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail. Allowing application interest specification without changing the global configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are present). To implement this: - Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem, set during record commit, so that this information is available after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by either record target will cause the record to be kept. - Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and pipes. - au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly looking up the mask for each preselection test. - Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether they want to track the global trail, or program their own preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of interest are received in future reads. - Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection model. - Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read support to audit pipes. By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of interest, and toggle the preselection mode. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-06-05 14:48:17 +00:00
td->td_ar = audit_new(event, td);
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
if (td->td_ar != NULL) {
td->td_pflags |= TDP_AUDITREC;
Add an experimental DTrace audit provider, which allows users of DTrace to instrument security event auditing rather than relying on conventional BSM trail files or audit pipes: - Add a set of per-event 'commit' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of commit in system-call return. These probes gain access to audit data via the in-kernel audit_record data structure, providing convenient access to system-call arguments and return values in a single probe. - Add a set of per-event 'bsm' probes, which provide access to particular auditable events at the time of BSM record generation in the audit worker thread. These probes have access to the in-kernel audit_record data structure and BSM representation as would be written to a trail file or audit pipe -- i.e., asynchronously in the audit worker thread. DTrace probe arguments consist of the name of the audit event (to support future mechanisms of instrumenting multiple events via a single probe -- e.g., using classes), a pointer to the in-kernel audit record, and an optional pointer to the BSM data and its length. For human convenience, upper-case audit event names (AUE_...) are converted to lower case in DTrace. DTrace scripts can now cause additional audit-based data to be collected on system calls, and inspect internal and BSM representations of the data. They do not affect data captured in the audit trail or audit pipes configured in the system. auditd(8) must be configured and running in order to provide a database of event information, as well as other audit configuration parameters (e.g., to capture command-line arguments or environmental variables) for the provider to operate. Reviewed by: gnn, jonathan, markj Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL MFC after: 3 weeks Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10149
2017-03-29 19:58:00 +00:00
#ifdef KDTRACE_HOOKS
td->td_ar->k_dtaudit_state = dtaudit_state;
#endif
}
} else
td->td_ar = NULL;
}
/*
* audit_syscall_exit() is called from the return of every system call, or in
* the event of exit1(), during the execution of exit1(). It is responsible
* for committing the audit record, if any, along with return condition.
*/
void
audit_syscall_exit(int error, struct thread *td)
{
int retval;
/*
* Commit the audit record as desired; once we pass the record into
* audit_commit(), the memory is owned by the audit subsystem. The
* return value from the system call is stored on the user thread.
* If there was an error, the return value is set to -1, imitating
* the behavior of the cerror routine.
*/
if (error)
retval = -1;
else
retval = td->td_retval[0];
audit_commit(td->td_ar, error, retval);
td->td_ar = NULL;
td->td_pflags &= ~TDP_AUDITREC;
}
void
audit_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest)
{
bcopy(&src->cr_audit, &dest->cr_audit, sizeof(dest->cr_audit));
}
void
audit_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred)
{
}
void
audit_cred_init(struct ucred *cred)
{
bzero(&cred->cr_audit, sizeof(cred->cr_audit));
}
/*
* Initialize audit information for the first kernel process (proc 0) and for
* the first user process (init).
*/
void
audit_cred_kproc0(struct ucred *cred)
{
cred->cr_audit.ai_auid = AU_DEFAUDITID;
cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
}
void
audit_cred_proc1(struct ucred *cred)
{
cred->cr_audit.ai_auid = AU_DEFAUDITID;
cred->cr_audit.ai_termid.at_type = AU_IPv4;
}
void
audit_thread_alloc(struct thread *td)
{
td->td_ar = NULL;
}
void
audit_thread_free(struct thread *td)
{
KASSERT(td->td_ar == NULL, ("audit_thread_free: td_ar != NULL"));
KASSERT((td->td_pflags & TDP_AUDITREC) == 0,
("audit_thread_free: TDP_AUDITREC set"));
}
void
audit_proc_coredump(struct thread *td, char *path, int errcode)
{
struct kaudit_record *ar;
struct au_mask *aumask;
struct ucred *cred;
au_class_t class;
int ret, sorf;
char **pathp;
au_id_t auid;
ret = 0;
/*
* Make sure we are using the correct preselection mask.
*/
cred = td->td_ucred;
auid = cred->cr_audit.ai_auid;
if (auid == AU_DEFAUDITID)
aumask = &audit_nae_mask;
else
aumask = &cred->cr_audit.ai_mask;
/*
* It's possible for coredump(9) generation to fail. Make sure that
* we handle this case correctly for preselection.
*/
if (errcode != 0)
sorf = AU_PRS_FAILURE;
else
sorf = AU_PRS_SUCCESS;
class = au_event_class(AUE_CORE);
if (au_preselect(AUE_CORE, class, aumask, sorf) == 0 &&
audit_pipe_preselect(auid, AUE_CORE, class, sorf, 0) == 0)
return;
/*
* If we are interested in seeing this audit record, allocate it.
* Where possible coredump records should contain a pathname and arg32
* (signal) tokens.
*/
ar = audit_new(AUE_CORE, td);
if (ar == NULL)
return;
if (path != NULL) {
pathp = &ar->k_ar.ar_arg_upath1;
*pathp = malloc(MAXPATHLEN, M_AUDITPATH, M_WAITOK);
audit_canon_path(td, AT_FDCWD, path, *pathp);
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_UPATH1);
}
ar->k_ar.ar_arg_signum = td->td_proc->p_sig;
ARG_SET_VALID(ar, ARG_SIGNUM);
if (errcode != 0)
ret = 1;
audit_commit(ar, errcode, ret);
}