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freebsd-dev/sys/security/audit/audit.h

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Further synchronization of copyrights, licenses, white space, etc from Apple and from the OpenBSM vendor tree. Obtained from: Apple Inc., TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 days
2008-07-31 09:54:35 +00:00
/*-
sys: further adoption of SPDX licensing ID tags. Mainly focus on files that use BSD 3-Clause license. The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way, superceed or replace the license texts. Special thanks to Wind River for providing access to "The Duke of Highlander" tool: an older (2014) run over FreeBSD tree was useful as a starting point.
2017-11-20 19:43:44 +00:00
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
In preparation to sync Apple and FreeBSD versions of security audit, pick up the Apple Computer -> Apple change in their copyright and license templates. Obtained from: Apple Inc. MFC after: 3 days
2008-07-22 15:29:48 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 1999-2005 Apple Inc.
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are captured: 1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled, suspended, etc. 2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the policy changes, so that the value can be updated. 3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() -- at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here, so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks. 4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether dtaudit would like system calls to be audited. 5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables are for. These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit (trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot capture system-call data without auditd(8) started. Reviewed by: gnn Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Approved by: re (gjb) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
* Copyright (c) 2016-2018 Robert N. M. Watson
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
* All rights reserved.
*
When handling msgsys(2), semsys(2), and shmsys(2) multiplex system calls, map the 'which' argument into a suitable audit event identifier for the specific operation requested. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-29 23:31:35 +00:00
* This software was developed by BAE Systems, the University of Cambridge
* Computer Laboratory, and Memorial University under DARPA/AFRL contract
* FA8650-15-C-7558 ("CADETS"), as part of the DARPA Transparent Computing
* (TC) research program.
*
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
In preparation to sync Apple and FreeBSD versions of security audit, pick up the Apple Computer -> Apple change in their copyright and license templates. Obtained from: Apple Inc. MFC after: 3 days
2008-07-22 15:29:48 +00:00
* 3. Neither the name of Apple Inc. ("Apple") nor the names of
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
* its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY APPLE AND ITS CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL APPLE OR ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
* IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $FreeBSD$
*/
/*
* This header includes function prototypes and type definitions that are
* necessary for the kernel as a whole to interact with the audit subsystem.
*/
Merge Perforce change 93568 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Normalize nested include guards. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 15:37:04 +00:00
#ifndef _SECURITY_AUDIT_KERNEL_H_
Fix include guard spelling. MFC after: 3 days Submitted by: diego
2008-04-27 15:51:49 +00:00
#define _SECURITY_AUDIT_KERNEL_H_
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
#ifndef _KERNEL
#error "no user-serviceable parts inside"
#endif
#include <bsm/audit.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
/*
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are captured: 1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled, suspended, etc. 2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the policy changes, so that the value can be updated. 3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() -- at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here, so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks. 4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether dtaudit would like system calls to be audited. 5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables are for. These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit (trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot capture system-call data without auditd(8) started. Reviewed by: gnn Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Approved by: re (gjb) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
* Audit subsystem condition flags. The audit_trail_enabled flag is set and
Clean up audit comments--formatting, spelling, etc.
2007-06-01 21:58:59 +00:00
* removed automatically as a result of configuring log files, and can be
* observed but should not be directly manipulated. The audit suspension
* flag permits audit to be temporarily disabled without reconfiguring the
* audit target.
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are captured: 1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled, suspended, etc. 2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the policy changes, so that the value can be updated. 3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() -- at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here, so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks. 4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether dtaudit would like system calls to be audited. 5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables are for. These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit (trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot capture system-call data without auditd(8) started. Reviewed by: gnn Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Approved by: re (gjb) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
*
* As DTrace can also request system-call auditing, a further
* audit_syscalls_enabled flag tracks whether newly entering system calls
* should be considered for auditing or not.
*
* XXXRW: Move trail flags to audit_private.h, as they no longer need to be
* visible outside the audit code...?
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
*/
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are captured: 1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled, suspended, etc. 2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the policy changes, so that the value can be updated. 3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() -- at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here, so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks. 4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether dtaudit would like system calls to be audited. 5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables are for. These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit (trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot capture system-call data without auditd(8) started. Reviewed by: gnn Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Approved by: re (gjb) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
extern u_int audit_dtrace_enabled;
extern int audit_trail_enabled;
extern int audit_trail_suspended;
audit: change audit_syscalls_enabled type to bool So that it fits better in __read_frequently. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2018-11-29 08:37:33 +00:00
extern bool audit_syscalls_enabled;
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_syscall_enter(unsigned short code, struct thread *td);
void audit_syscall_exit(int error, struct thread *td);
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
/*
Clean up audit comments--formatting, spelling, etc.
2007-06-01 21:58:59 +00:00
* The remaining kernel functions are conditionally compiled in as they are
* wrapped by a macro, and the macro should be the only place in the source
* tree where these functions are referenced.
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
*/
#ifdef AUDIT
struct ipc_perm;
struct sockaddr;
union auditon_udata;
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_addr(void * addr);
void audit_arg_exit(int status, int retval);
void audit_arg_len(int len);
Audit file descriptors passed to fooat(2) system calls, which are used instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record BSM encoding for fooat(2). Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2) auditing. Approved by: re (kib) Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:39:58 +00:00
void audit_arg_atfd1(int atfd);
void audit_arg_atfd2(int atfd);
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_fd(int fd);
void audit_arg_fflags(int fflags);
void audit_arg_gid(gid_t gid);
void audit_arg_uid(uid_t uid);
void audit_arg_egid(gid_t egid);
void audit_arg_euid(uid_t euid);
void audit_arg_rgid(gid_t rgid);
void audit_arg_ruid(uid_t ruid);
void audit_arg_sgid(gid_t sgid);
void audit_arg_suid(uid_t suid);
void audit_arg_groupset(gid_t *gidset, u_int gidset_size);
void audit_arg_login(char *login);
void audit_arg_ctlname(int *name, int namelen);
void audit_arg_mask(int mask);
void audit_arg_mode(mode_t mode);
void audit_arg_dev(int dev);
void audit_arg_value(long value);
void audit_arg_owner(uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
void audit_arg_pid(pid_t pid);
void audit_arg_process(struct proc *p);
void audit_arg_signum(u_int signum);
void audit_arg_socket(int sodomain, int sotype, int soprotocol);
- Implement two new system calls: int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen); int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'. - Add manual pages for the new syscalls. - Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox. - Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work. - Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor. - Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights. - Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
2013-03-02 21:11:30 +00:00
void audit_arg_sockaddr(struct thread *td, int dirfd, struct sockaddr *sa);
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_auid(uid_t auid);
void audit_arg_auditinfo(struct auditinfo *au_info);
- Add audit_arg_audinfo_addr() for auditing the arguments for setaudit_addr(2) - In audit_bsm.c, make sure all the arguments: ARG_AUID, ARG_ASID, ARG_AMASK, and ARG_TERMID{_ADDR} are valid before auditing their arguments. (This is done for both setaudit and setaudit_addr. - Audit the arguments passed to setaudit_addr(2) - AF_INET6 does not equate to AU_IPv6. Change this in au_to_in_addr_ex() so the audit token is created with the correct type. This fixes the processing of the in_addr_ex token in users pace. - Change the size of the token (as generated by the kernel) from 5*4 bytes to 4*4 bytes (the correct size of an ip6 address) - Correct regression from ucred work which resulted in getaudit() not returning E2BIG if the subject had an ip6 termid - Correct slight regression in getaudit(2) which resulted in the size of a pointer being passed instead of the size of the structure. (This resulted in invalid auditinfo data being returned via getaudit(2)) Reviewed by: rwatson Approved by: re@ (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2007-06-27 17:01:15 +00:00
void audit_arg_auditinfo_addr(struct auditinfo_addr *au_info);
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
void audit_arg_upath1(struct thread *td, int dirfd, char *upath);
Audit arguments to POSIX message queues, semaphores, and shared memory. This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem root). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 13:43:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_upath1_canon(char *upath);
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
void audit_arg_upath2(struct thread *td, int dirfd, char *upath);
Audit arguments to POSIX message queues, semaphores, and shared memory. This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem root). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 13:43:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_upath2_canon(char *upath);
audit: provide audit_canon_path variant which accepts vnodes
2020-02-21 01:40:49 +00:00
void audit_arg_upath1_vp(struct thread *td, struct vnode *rdir,
struct vnode *cdir, char *upath);
void audit_arg_upath2_vp(struct thread *td, struct vnode *rdir,
struct vnode *cdir, char *upath);
Rework vnode argument auditing to follow the same structure, in order to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a system call. Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
void audit_arg_vnode1(struct vnode *vp);
void audit_arg_vnode2(struct vnode *vp);
Add const to input-only char * arguments. These arguments are mostly paths handled by NAMEI*() macros which already take const char * arguments. This change improves the match between syscalls.master and the public declerations of system calls. Reviewed by: kib (prior version) Obtained from: CheriBSD Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17812
2018-11-02 20:50:22 +00:00
void audit_arg_text(const char *text);
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_cmd(int cmd);
void audit_arg_svipc_cmd(int cmd);
void audit_arg_svipc_perm(struct ipc_perm *perm);
void audit_arg_svipc_id(int id);
void audit_arg_svipc_addr(void *addr);
When handling msgsys(2), semsys(2), and shmsys(2) multiplex system calls, map the 'which' argument into a suitable audit event identifier for the specific operation requested. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-29 23:31:35 +00:00
void audit_arg_svipc_which(int which);
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm(uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode);
void audit_arg_auditon(union auditon_udata *udata);
void audit_arg_file(struct proc *p, struct file *fp);
Audit the argv and env vectors passed in on exec: Add the argument auditing functions for argv and env. Add kernel-specific versions of the tokenizer functions for the arg and env represented as a char array. Implement the AUDIT_ARGV and AUDIT_ARGE audit policy commands to enable/disable argv/env auditing. Call the argument auditing from the exec system calls. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
2006-09-01 11:45:40 +00:00
void audit_arg_argv(char *argv, int argc, int length);
void audit_arg_envv(char *envv, int envc, int length);
Change the cap_rights_t type from uint64_t to a structure that we can extend in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way. The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285 rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough. The structure definition looks like this: struct cap_rights { uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2]; }; The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0. The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to 0, we have 2 array elements. The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0. The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means there can be at most five array elements in the future. To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg. #define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL) We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong to the same array element, eg: #define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL) #define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL) #define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP) There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure: cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...); bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights); void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src); void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src); bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little); Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(), cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by separating them with commas, eg: cap_rights_t rights; cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT); There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are actually macros that take care of the termination, eg: #define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \ __cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL) void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...); Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1: cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL); Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition. This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls, but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still experimental and this change is not going to 9.x. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-09-05 00:09:56 +00:00
void audit_arg_rights(cap_rights_t *rightsp);
Merge Capsicum overhaul: - Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor has set of its own capability rights. - The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and should not be used in new code. - The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor without creating a new one. - The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2). - If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall. - If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive them with cap_fcntls_get(2). - To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was heavly modified. - The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to recognize new syscalls. - Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes that are described in detail below: CAP_CREATE old behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. - Allow for linkat(2). - Allow for symlinkat(2). CAP_CREATE new behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. Added CAP_LINKAT: - Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit. - Allow to be target for renameat(2). Added CAP_SYMLINKAT: - Allow for symlinkat(2). Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object. - Allow to be source for renameat(2). Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory. Added CAP_RENAMEAT: - Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall. Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR): - Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object. - Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this call. Removed CAP_MAPEXEC. CAP_MMAP old behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and PROT_WRITE. CAP_MMAP new behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE. Added CAP_MMAP_R: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ). Added CAP_MMAP_W: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_X: - Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RW: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_RX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_WX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RWX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT. Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT. Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT. CAP_READ old behaviour: - Allow pread(2). - Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_READ new behaviour: - Allow read(2), readv(2). - Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required). CAP_WRITE old behaviour: - Allow pwrite(2). - Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_WRITE new behaviour: - Allow write(2), writev(2). - Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required). Added convinient defines: #define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL) #define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W) #define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_RECV CAP_READ #define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE #define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \ (CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \ CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) #define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \ (CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \ CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \ CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) Added defines for backward API compatibility: #define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X #define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT #define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT #define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT #define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de> Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
void audit_arg_fcntl_rights(uint32_t fcntlrights);
audit: rework AUDIT_SYSCLOSE This in particular avoids spurious lookups on close.
2020-12-17 18:52:04 +00:00
void audit_sysclose(struct thread *td, int fd, struct file *fp);
Move per-process audit state from a pointer in the proc structure to embedded storage in struct ucred. This allows audit state to be cached with the thread, avoiding locking operations with each system call, and makes it available in asynchronous execution contexts, such as deep in the network stack or VFS. Reviewed by: csjp Approved by: re (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2007-06-07 22:27:15 +00:00
void audit_cred_copy(struct ucred *src, struct ucred *dest);
void audit_cred_destroy(struct ucred *cred);
void audit_cred_init(struct ucred *cred);
void audit_cred_kproc0(struct ucred *cred);
void audit_cred_proc1(struct ucred *cred);
Implement AUE_CORE, which adds process core dump support into the kernel. This change introduces audit_proc_coredump() which is called by coredump(9) to create an audit record for the coredump event. When a process dumps a core, it could be security relevant. It could be an indicator that a stack within the process has been overflowed with an incorrectly constructed malicious payload or a number of other events. The record that is generated looks like this: header,111,10,process dumped core,0,Thu Oct 25 19:36:29 2007, + 179 msec argument,0,0xb,signal path,/usr/home/csjp/test.core subject,csjp,csjp,staff,csjp,staff,1101,1095,50457,10.37.129.2 return,success,1 trailer,111 - We allocate a completely new record to make sure we arent clobbering the audit data associated with the syscall that produced the core (assuming the core is being generated in response to SIGABRT and not an invalid memory access). - Shuffle around expand_name() so we can use the coredump name at the very beginning of the coredump call. Make sure we free the storage referenced by "name" if we need to bail out early. - Audit both successful and failed coredump creation efforts Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 1 month
2007-10-26 01:23:07 +00:00
void audit_proc_coredump(struct thread *td, char *path, int errcode);
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
void audit_thread_alloc(struct thread *td);
void audit_thread_free(struct thread *td);
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
/*
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
* Define macros to wrap the audit_arg_* calls by checking the global
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are captured: 1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled, suspended, etc. 2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the policy changes, so that the value can be updated. 3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() -- at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here, so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks. 4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether dtaudit would like system calls to be audited. 5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables are for. These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit (trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot capture system-call data without auditd(8) started. Reviewed by: gnn Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Approved by: re (gjb) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
* audit_syscalls_enabled flag before performing the actual call.
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
*/
audit: predict AUDITING_TD as false By default it is compiled in and disabled. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2018-11-29 09:19:48 +00:00
#define AUDITING_TD(td) (__predict_false((td)->td_pflags & TDP_AUDITREC))
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_ADDR(addr) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_addr((addr)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_ARGV(argv, argc, length) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_argv((argv), (argc), (length)); \
} while (0)
Audit file descriptors passed to fooat(2) system calls, which are used instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record BSM encoding for fooat(2). Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2) auditing. Approved by: re (kib) Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:39:58 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_ATFD1(atfd) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_atfd1((atfd)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_ATFD2(atfd) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_atfd2((atfd)); \
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_AUDITON(udata) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_auditon((udata)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_CMD(cmd) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_cmd((cmd)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_DEV(dev) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_dev((dev)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_egid((egid)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_ENVV(envv, envc, length) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_envv((envv), (envc), (length)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_EXIT(status, retval) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_exit((status), (retval)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_euid((euid)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_fd((fd)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_FILE(p, fp) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_file((p), (fp)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(fflags) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_fflags((fflags)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_GID(gid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_gid((gid)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_GROUPSET(gidset, gidset_size) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_groupset((gidset), (gidset_size)); \
} while (0)
Audit the accepted (or rejected) username argument to setlogin(2). (NB: This was likely a mismerge from XNU in audit support, where the text argument to setlogin(2) is captured -- but as a text token, whereas this change uses the dedicated login-name field in struct audit_record.) MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2016-08-20 20:28:08 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_LOGIN(login) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_login((login)); \
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_mode((mode)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_OWNER(uid, gid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_owner((uid), (gid)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_PID(pid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_pid((pid)); \
} while (0)
Audit arguments to System V IPC system calls implementing sempahores, message queues, and shared memory. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-30 22:26:15 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM(uid, gid, mode) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_posix_ipc_perm((uid), (gid), (mod)); \
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_PROCESS(p) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_process((p)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
Correctly audit real gids following changes to the audit record argument interface. Approved by: re (kib)
2009-08-12 10:45:45 +00:00
audit_arg_rgid((rgid)); \
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
} while (0)
Provide ability to audit cap_rights_t arguments. We wish to be able to audit capability rights arguments; this code provides the necessary infrastructure. This commit does not, of itself, turn on such auditing for any system call; that should follow shortly. Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket) Sponsored by: Google Inc
2011-07-18 12:58:18 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_rights((rights)); \
} while (0)
Merge Capsicum overhaul: - Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor has set of its own capability rights. - The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and should not be used in new code. - The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor without creating a new one. - The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2). - If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall. - If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive them with cap_fcntls_get(2). - To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was heavly modified. - The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to recognize new syscalls. - Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes that are described in detail below: CAP_CREATE old behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. - Allow for linkat(2). - Allow for symlinkat(2). CAP_CREATE new behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. Added CAP_LINKAT: - Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit. - Allow to be target for renameat(2). Added CAP_SYMLINKAT: - Allow for symlinkat(2). Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object. - Allow to be source for renameat(2). Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory. Added CAP_RENAMEAT: - Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall. Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR): - Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object. - Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this call. Removed CAP_MAPEXEC. CAP_MMAP old behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and PROT_WRITE. CAP_MMAP new behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE. Added CAP_MMAP_R: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ). Added CAP_MMAP_W: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_X: - Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RW: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_RX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_WX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RWX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT. Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT. Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT. CAP_READ old behaviour: - Allow pread(2). - Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_READ new behaviour: - Allow read(2), readv(2). - Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required). CAP_WRITE old behaviour: - Allow pwrite(2). - Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_WRITE new behaviour: - Allow write(2), writev(2). - Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required). Added convinient defines: #define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL) #define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W) #define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_RECV CAP_READ #define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE #define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \ (CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \ CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) #define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \ (CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \ CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \ CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) Added defines for backward API compatibility: #define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X #define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT #define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT #define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT #define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de> Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_FCNTL_RIGHTS(fcntlrights) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_fcntl_rights((fcntlrights)); \
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_ruid((ruid)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SIGNUM(signum) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_signum((signum)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SGID(sgid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_sgid((sgid)); \
} while (0)
Define missing audit argument macro AUDIT_ARG_SOCKET(), and capture the domain, type, and protocol arguments to socket(2) and socketpair(2). Approved by: re (audit argument blanket) MFC after: 3 days
2009-07-01 18:54:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SOCKET(sodomain, sotype, soprotocol) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_socket((sodomain), (sotype), (soprotocol)); \
} while (0)
- Implement two new system calls: int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen); int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'. - Add manual pages for the new syscalls. - Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox. - Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work. - Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor. - Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights. - Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
2013-03-02 21:11:30 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SOCKADDR(td, dirfd, sa) do { \
Add AUDIT_ARG_SOCKADDR() macro so we can start using the audit_arg_sockaddr() function, which is currently unused. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-02-07 00:24:23 +00:00
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
- Implement two new system calls: int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen); int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'. - Add manual pages for the new syscalls. - Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox. - Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work. - Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor. - Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights. - Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
2013-03-02 21:11:30 +00:00
audit_arg_sockaddr((td), (dirfd), (sa)); \
Add AUDIT_ARG_SOCKADDR() macro so we can start using the audit_arg_sockaddr() function, which is currently unused. Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2013-02-07 00:24:23 +00:00
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SUID(suid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_suid((suid)); \
} while (0)
Audit arguments to System V IPC system calls implementing sempahores, message queues, and shared memory. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-30 22:26:15 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_CMD(cmd) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_svipc_cmd((cmd)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_PERM(perm) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_svipc_perm((perm)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_ID(id) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_svipc_id((id)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_ADDR(addr) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_svipc_addr((addr)); \
} while (0)
When handling msgsys(2), semsys(2), and shmsys(2) multiplex system calls, map the 'which' argument into a suitable audit event identifier for the specific operation requested. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-29 23:31:35 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_WHICH(which) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_svipc_which((which)); \
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_TEXT(text) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_text((text)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_UID(uid) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_uid((uid)); \
} while (0)
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1(td, dirfd, upath) do { \
Eliminate ARG_UPATH[12] arguments to AUDIT_ARG_UPATH() and instead provide specific macros, AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() to capture path information for audit records. This allows us to move the definitions of ARG_* out of the public audit header file, as they are an implementation detail of our current kernel-internal audit record, which may change. Approved by: re (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-29 07:44:43 +00:00
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
audit_arg_upath1((td), (dirfd), (upath)); \
Eliminate ARG_UPATH[12] arguments to AUDIT_ARG_UPATH() and instead provide specific macros, AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() to capture path information for audit records. This allows us to move the definitions of ARG_* out of the public audit header file, as they are an implementation detail of our current kernel-internal audit record, which may change. Approved by: re (kensmith) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-29 07:44:43 +00:00
} while (0)
Audit arguments to POSIX message queues, semaphores, and shared memory. This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem root). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 13:43:00 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_CANON(upath) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_upath1_canon((upath)); \
} while (0)
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2(td, dirfd, upath) do { \
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
audit_arg_upath2((td), (dirfd), (upath)); \
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
} while (0)
Audit arguments to POSIX message queues, semaphores, and shared memory. This requires minor changes to the audit framework to allow capturing paths that are not filesystem paths (i.e., will not be canonicalised relative to the process current working directory and/or filesystem root). Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 13:43:00 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2_CANON(upath) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_upath2_canon((upath)); \
} while (0)
audit: provide audit_canon_path variant which accepts vnodes
2020-02-21 01:40:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_VP(td, rdir, cdir, upath) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_upath1_vp((td), (rdir), (cdir), (upath)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2_VP(td, rdir, cdir, upath) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_upath2_vp((td), (rdir), (cdir), (upath)); \
} while (0)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_VALUE(value) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_value((value)); \
} while (0)
Rework vnode argument auditing to follow the same structure, in order to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a system call. Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(vp) do { \
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
Rework vnode argument auditing to follow the same structure, in order to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a system call. Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
audit_arg_vnode1((vp)); \
} while (0)
#define AUDIT_ARG_VNODE2(vp) do { \
if (AUDITING_TD(curthread)) \
audit_arg_vnode2((vp)); \
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
} while (0)
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
Merge audit and systrace checks This further shortens the syscall routine by not having to re-check after the system call.
2020-02-14 13:09:41 +00:00
#define AUDIT_SYSCALL_ENTER(code, td) ({ \
bool _audit_entered = false; \
Annotate branches in the syscall path This in particular significantly shortens amd64_syscall, which otherwise keeps jumping forward over 2KB of code in total. Note some of these branches should be either eliminated altogether or coalesced.
2020-02-14 13:08:46 +00:00
if (__predict_false(audit_syscalls_enabled)) { \
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
audit_syscall_enter(code, td); \
Merge audit and systrace checks This further shortens the syscall routine by not having to re-check after the system call.
2020-02-14 13:09:41 +00:00
_audit_entered = true; \
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
} \
Merge audit and systrace checks This further shortens the syscall routine by not having to re-check after the system call.
2020-02-14 13:09:41 +00:00
_audit_entered; \
})
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
/*
* Wrap the audit_syscall_exit() function so that it is called only when
In AUDIT_SYSCALL_EXIT(), invoke audit_syscall_exit() only if an audit record is active on the current thread--historically we may always have wanted to enter the audit code if auditing was enabled, but now we just commit the audit record so don't need to enter if there isn't one. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project Sponsored by: Apple, Inc.
2009-01-06 13:59:59 +00:00
* we have a audit record on the thread. Audit records can persist after
Rework the logic around quick checks for auditing that take place at system-call entry and whenever audit arguments or return values are captured: 1. Expose a single global, audit_syscalls_enabled, which controls whether the audit framework is entered, rather than exposing components of the policy -- e.g., if the trail is enabled, suspended, etc. 2. Introduce a new function audit_syscalls_enabled_update(), which is called to update audit_syscalls_enabled whenever an aspect of the policy changes, so that the value can be updated. 3. Remove a check of trail enablement/suspension from audit_new() -- at the point where this function has been entered, we believe that system-call auditing is already in force, or we wouldn't get here, so simply proceed to more expensive policy checks. 4. Use an audit-provided global, audit_dtrace_enabled, rather than a dtaudit-provided global, to provide policy indicating whether dtaudit would like system calls to be audited. 5. Do some minor cosmetic renaming to clarify what various variables are for. These changes collectively arrange it so that traditional audit (trail, pipes) or the DTrace audit provider can enable system-call probes without the other configured. Otherwise, dtaudit cannot capture system-call data without auditd(8) started. Reviewed by: gnn Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL Approved by: re (gjb) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17348
2018-10-02 15:58:17 +00:00
* auditing is disabled, so we don't just check audit_syscalls_enabled here.
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
*/
White space cleanup, no functional change.
2006-09-04 06:06:23 +00:00
#define AUDIT_SYSCALL_EXIT(error, td) do { \
audi: replace open-coded TDP_AUDITREC checks with the macro Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2018-12-11 17:14:12 +00:00
if (AUDITING_TD(td)) \
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
audit_syscall_exit(error, td); \
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
} while (0)
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
/*
* A Macro to wrap the audit_sysclose() function.
*/
#define AUDIT_SYSCLOSE(td, fd) do { \
audi: replace open-coded TDP_AUDITREC checks with the macro Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
2018-12-11 17:14:12 +00:00
if (AUDITING_TD(td)) \
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
audit_sysclose(td, fd); \
Merge Perforce change 93581 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Mega-style patch. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 17:34:00 +00:00
} while (0)
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
#else /* !AUDIT */
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_ADDR(addr)
#define AUDIT_ARG_ARGV(argv, argc, length)
Audit file descriptors passed to fooat(2) system calls, which are used instead of the root/current working directory as the starting point for lookups. Up to two such descriptors can be audited. Add audit record BSM encoding for fooat(2). Note: due to an error in the OpenBSM 1.1p1 configuration file, a further change is required to that file in order to fix openat(2) auditing. Approved by: re (kib) Reviewed by: rdivacky (fooat(2) portions) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:39:58 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_ATFD1(atfd)
#define AUDIT_ARG_ATFD2(atfd)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_AUDITON(udata)
#define AUDIT_ARG_CMD(cmd)
#define AUDIT_ARG_DEV(dev)
#define AUDIT_ARG_EGID(egid)
#define AUDIT_ARG_ENVV(envv, envc, length)
#define AUDIT_ARG_EXIT(status, retval)
#define AUDIT_ARG_EUID(euid)
#define AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd)
#define AUDIT_ARG_FILE(p, fp)
#define AUDIT_ARG_FFLAGS(fflags)
#define AUDIT_ARG_GID(gid)
#define AUDIT_ARG_GROUPSET(gidset, gidset_size)
Audit the accepted (or rejected) username argument to setlogin(2). (NB: This was likely a mismerge from XNU in audit support, where the text argument to setlogin(2) is captured -- but as a text token, whereas this change uses the dedicated login-name field in struct audit_record.) MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2016-08-20 20:28:08 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_LOGIN(login)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_MODE(mode)
#define AUDIT_ARG_OWNER(uid, gid)
#define AUDIT_ARG_PID(pid)
Audit arguments to System V IPC system calls implementing sempahores, message queues, and shared memory. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-30 22:26:15 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_POSIX_IPC_PERM(uid, gid, mode)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_PROCESS(p)
#define AUDIT_ARG_RGID(rgid)
Provide ability to audit cap_rights_t arguments. We wish to be able to audit capability rights arguments; this code provides the necessary infrastructure. This commit does not, of itself, turn on such auditing for any system call; that should follow shortly. Approved by: mentor (rwatson), re (Capsicum blanket) Sponsored by: Google Inc
2011-07-18 12:58:18 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights)
Merge Capsicum overhaul: - Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor has set of its own capability rights. - The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and should not be used in new code. - The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor without creating a new one. - The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2). - If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall. - If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive them with cap_fcntls_get(2). - To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was heavly modified. - The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to recognize new syscalls. - Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes that are described in detail below: CAP_CREATE old behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. - Allow for linkat(2). - Allow for symlinkat(2). CAP_CREATE new behaviour: - Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT. Added CAP_LINKAT: - Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit. - Allow to be target for renameat(2). Added CAP_SYMLINKAT: - Allow for symlinkat(2). Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object. - Allow to be source for renameat(2). Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour: - Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory. Added CAP_RENAMEAT: - Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall. Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR): - Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object. - Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this call. Removed CAP_MAPEXEC. CAP_MMAP old behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and PROT_WRITE. CAP_MMAP new behaviour: - Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE. Added CAP_MMAP_R: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ). Added CAP_MMAP_W: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_X: - Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RW: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE). Added CAP_MMAP_RX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_WX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Added CAP_MMAP_RWX: - Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC). Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT. Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT. Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT. CAP_READ old behaviour: - Allow pread(2). - Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_READ new behaviour: - Allow read(2), readv(2). - Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required). CAP_WRITE old behaviour: - Allow pwrite(2). - Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK). CAP_WRITE new behaviour: - Allow write(2), writev(2). - Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required). Added convinient defines: #define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ) #define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE) #define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL) #define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W) #define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X) #define CAP_RECV CAP_READ #define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE #define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \ (CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \ CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) #define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \ (CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \ CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \ CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN) Added defines for backward API compatibility: #define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X #define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT #define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT #define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT #define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT #define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER) Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de> Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
2013-03-02 00:53:12 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_FCNTL_RIGHTS(fcntlrights)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_RUID(ruid)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SIGNUM(signum)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SGID(sgid)
Define missing audit argument macro AUDIT_ARG_SOCKET(), and capture the domain, type, and protocol arguments to socket(2) and socketpair(2). Approved by: re (audit argument blanket) MFC after: 3 days
2009-07-01 18:54:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SOCKET(sodomain, sotype, soprotocol)
- Implement two new system calls: int bindat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen); int connectat(int fd, int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen); which allow to bind and connect respectively to a UNIX domain socket with a path relative to the directory associated with the given file descriptor 'fd'. - Add manual pages for the new syscalls. - Make the new syscalls available for processes in capability mode sandbox. - Add capability rights CAP_BINDAT and CAP_CONNECTAT that has to be present on the directory descriptor for the syscalls to work. - Update audit(4) to support those two new syscalls and to handle path in sockaddr_un structure relative to the given directory descriptor. - Update procstat(1) to recognize the new capability rights. - Document the new capability rights in cap_rights_limit(2). Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Discussed with: rwatson, jilles, kib, des
2013-03-02 21:11:30 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SOCKADDR(td, dirfd, sa)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SUID(suid)
Audit arguments to System V IPC system calls implementing sempahores, message queues, and shared memory. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-30 22:26:15 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_CMD(cmd)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_PERM(perm)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_ID(id)
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_ADDR(addr)
When handling msgsys(2), semsys(2), and shmsys(2) multiplex system calls, map the 'which' argument into a suitable audit event identifier for the specific operation requested. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-29 23:31:35 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_SVIPC_WHICH(which)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_TEXT(text)
#define AUDIT_ARG_UID(uid)
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1(td, dirfd, upath)
Correct macro names and signatures for !AUDIT versions of canonical path auditing. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 14:13:13 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_CANON(upath)
IFp4 @208451: Fix path handling for *at() syscalls. Before the change directory descriptor was totally ignored, so the relative path argument was appended to current working directory path and not to the path provided by descriptor, thus wrong paths were stored in audit logs. Now that we use directory descriptor in vfs_lookup, move AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1() and AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2() calls to the place where we hold file descriptors table lock, so we are sure paths will be resolved according to the same directory in audit record and in actual operation. Sponsored by: FreeBSD Foundation (auditdistd) Reviewed by: rwatson MFC after: 2 weeks
2012-11-30 23:18:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2(td, dirfd, upath)
Correct macro names and signatures for !AUDIT versions of canonical path auditing. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 3 weeks Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
2017-03-31 14:13:13 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2_CANON(upath)
audit: provide audit_canon_path variant which accepts vnodes
2020-02-21 01:40:49 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH1_VP(td, rdir, cdir, upath)
#define AUDIT_ARG_UPATH2_VP(td, rdir, cdir, upath)
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_VALUE(value)
Rework vnode argument auditing to follow the same structure, in order to avoid exposing ARG_ macros/flag values outside of the audit code in order to name which one of two possible vnodes will be audited for a system call. Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 month
2009-07-28 21:52:24 +00:00
#define AUDIT_ARG_VNODE1(vp)
#define AUDIT_ARG_VNODE2(vp)
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
audit: provide AUDITING_TD for !AUDIT case
2020-07-04 06:21:20 +00:00
#define AUDITING_TD(td) 0
Merge audit and systrace checks This further shortens the syscall routine by not having to re-check after the system call.
2020-02-14 13:09:41 +00:00
#define AUDIT_SYSCALL_ENTER(code, td) 0
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_SYSCALL_EXIT(error, td)
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
Replace AUDIT_ARG() with variable argument macros with a set more more specific macros for each audit argument type. This makes it easier to follow call-graphs, especially for automated analysis tools (such as fxr). In MFC, we should leave the existing AUDIT_ARG() macros as they may be used by third-party kernel modules. Suggested by: brooks Approved by: re (kib) Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project MFC after: 1 week
2009-06-27 13:58:44 +00:00
#define AUDIT_SYSCLOSE(p, fd)
Import kernel audit framework: - Management of audit state on processes. - Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state. - Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel thread to asynchronously store records on disk. - Audit event argument. - Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library. - Audit event pre-selection. - Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd of kernel audit events. Much work by: wsalamon Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
2006-02-01 20:01:18 +00:00
#endif /* AUDIT */
Merge Perforce change 93568 from TrustedBSD audit3 branch: Normalize nested include guards. Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
2006-03-19 15:37:04 +00:00
#endif /* !_SECURITY_AUDIT_KERNEL_H_ */
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