freebsd-dev/sys/netipsec/keysock.c

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/* $FreeBSD$ */
/* $KAME: keysock.c,v 1.25 2001/08/13 20:07:41 itojun Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "opt_ipsec.h"
/* This code has derived from sys/net/rtsock.c on FreeBSD2.2.5 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/domain.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/signalvar.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <net/raw_cb.h>
#include <net/route.h>
#include <net/pfkeyv2.h>
#include <netipsec/key.h>
#include <netipsec/keysock.h>
#include <netipsec/key_debug.h>
#include <machine/stdarg.h>
struct key_cb {
int key_count;
int any_count;
};
static struct key_cb key_cb;
static struct sockaddr key_dst = { 2, PF_KEY, };
static struct sockaddr key_src = { 2, PF_KEY, };
static int key_sendup0 __P((struct rawcb *, struct mbuf *, int));
struct pfkeystat pfkeystat;
/*
* key_output()
*/
int
#if __STDC__
key_output(struct mbuf *m, ...)
#else
key_output(m, va_alist)
struct mbuf *m;
va_dcl
#endif
{
struct sadb_msg *msg;
int len, error = 0;
int s;
struct socket *so;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, m);
so = va_arg(ap, struct socket *);
va_end(ap);
if (m == 0)
MFp4: portability work, general cleanup, locking fixes change 38496 o add ipsec_osdep.h that holds os-specific definitions for portability o s/KASSERT/IPSEC_ASSERT/ for portability o s/SPLASSERT/IPSEC_SPLASSERT/ for portability o remove function names from ASSERT strings since line#+file pinpints the location o use __func__ uniformly to reduce string storage o convert some random #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC code to assertions o remove some debuggging assertions no longer needed change 38498 o replace numerous bogus panic's with equally bogus assertions that at least go away on a production system change 38502 + 38530 o change explicit mtx operations to #defines to simplify future changes to a different lock type change 38531 o hookup ipv4 ctlinput paths to a noop routine; we should be handling path mtu changes at least o correct potential null pointer deref in ipsec4_common_input_cb chnage 38685 o fix locking for bundled SA's and for when key exchange is required change 38770 o eliminate recursion on the SAHTREE lock change 38804 o cleanup some types: long -> time_t o remove refrence to dead #define change 38805 o correct some types: long -> time_t o add scan generation # to secpolicy to deal with locking issues change 38806 o use LIST_FOREACH_SAFE instead of handrolled code o change key_flush_spd to drop the sptree lock before purging an entry to avoid lock recursion and to avoid holding the lock over a long-running operation o misc cleanups of tangled and twisty code There is still much to do here but for now things look to be working again. Supported by: FreeBSD Foundation
2003-09-29 22:57:43 +00:00
panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
pfkeystat.out_total++;
pfkeystat.out_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
len = m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
pfkeystat.out_tooshort++;
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
if ((m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg))) == 0) {
pfkeystat.out_nomem++;
error = ENOBUFS;
goto end;
}
}
M_ASSERTPKTHDR(m);
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP, kdebug_mbuf(m));
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
pfkeystat.out_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
if (len != PFKEY_UNUNIT64(msg->sadb_msg_len)) {
pfkeystat.out_invlen++;
error = EINVAL;
goto end;
}
/*XXX giant lock*/
s = splnet();
error = key_parse(m, so);
m = NULL;
splx(s);
end:
if (m)
m_freem(m);
return error;
}
/*
* send message to the socket.
*/
static int
key_sendup0(rp, m, promisc)
struct rawcb *rp;
struct mbuf *m;
int promisc;
{
int error;
if (promisc) {
struct sadb_msg *pmsg;
M_PREPEND(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg), M_DONTWAIT);
if (m && m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg))
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (!m) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
m_freem(m);
return ENOBUFS;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len += sizeof(*pmsg);
pmsg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
bzero(pmsg, sizeof(*pmsg));
pmsg->sadb_msg_version = PF_KEY_V2;
pmsg->sadb_msg_type = SADB_X_PROMISC;
pmsg->sadb_msg_len = PFKEY_UNIT64(m->m_pkthdr.len);
/* pid and seq? */
pfkeystat.in_msgtype[pmsg->sadb_msg_type]++;
}
if (!sbappendaddr(&rp->rcb_socket->so_rcv, (struct sockaddr *)&key_src,
m, NULL)) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
m_freem(m);
error = ENOBUFS;
} else
error = 0;
sorwakeup(rp->rcb_socket);
return error;
}
/* XXX this interface should be obsoleted. */
int
key_sendup(so, msg, len, target)
struct socket *so;
struct sadb_msg *msg;
u_int len;
int target; /*target of the resulting message*/
{
struct mbuf *m, *n, *mprev;
int tlen;
/* sanity check */
if (so == 0 || msg == 0)
MFp4: portability work, general cleanup, locking fixes change 38496 o add ipsec_osdep.h that holds os-specific definitions for portability o s/KASSERT/IPSEC_ASSERT/ for portability o s/SPLASSERT/IPSEC_SPLASSERT/ for portability o remove function names from ASSERT strings since line#+file pinpints the location o use __func__ uniformly to reduce string storage o convert some random #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC code to assertions o remove some debuggging assertions no longer needed change 38498 o replace numerous bogus panic's with equally bogus assertions that at least go away on a production system change 38502 + 38530 o change explicit mtx operations to #defines to simplify future changes to a different lock type change 38531 o hookup ipv4 ctlinput paths to a noop routine; we should be handling path mtu changes at least o correct potential null pointer deref in ipsec4_common_input_cb chnage 38685 o fix locking for bundled SA's and for when key exchange is required change 38770 o eliminate recursion on the SAHTREE lock change 38804 o cleanup some types: long -> time_t o remove refrence to dead #define change 38805 o correct some types: long -> time_t o add scan generation # to secpolicy to deal with locking issues change 38806 o use LIST_FOREACH_SAFE instead of handrolled code o change key_flush_spd to drop the sptree lock before purging an entry to avoid lock recursion and to avoid holding the lock over a long-running operation o misc cleanups of tangled and twisty code There is still much to do here but for now things look to be working again. Supported by: FreeBSD Foundation
2003-09-29 22:57:43 +00:00
panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
KEYDEBUG(KEYDEBUG_KEY_DUMP,
MFp4: portability work, general cleanup, locking fixes change 38496 o add ipsec_osdep.h that holds os-specific definitions for portability o s/KASSERT/IPSEC_ASSERT/ for portability o s/SPLASSERT/IPSEC_SPLASSERT/ for portability o remove function names from ASSERT strings since line#+file pinpints the location o use __func__ uniformly to reduce string storage o convert some random #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC code to assertions o remove some debuggging assertions no longer needed change 38498 o replace numerous bogus panic's with equally bogus assertions that at least go away on a production system change 38502 + 38530 o change explicit mtx operations to #defines to simplify future changes to a different lock type change 38531 o hookup ipv4 ctlinput paths to a noop routine; we should be handling path mtu changes at least o correct potential null pointer deref in ipsec4_common_input_cb chnage 38685 o fix locking for bundled SA's and for when key exchange is required change 38770 o eliminate recursion on the SAHTREE lock change 38804 o cleanup some types: long -> time_t o remove refrence to dead #define change 38805 o correct some types: long -> time_t o add scan generation # to secpolicy to deal with locking issues change 38806 o use LIST_FOREACH_SAFE instead of handrolled code o change key_flush_spd to drop the sptree lock before purging an entry to avoid lock recursion and to avoid holding the lock over a long-running operation o misc cleanups of tangled and twisty code There is still much to do here but for now things look to be working again. Supported by: FreeBSD Foundation
2003-09-29 22:57:43 +00:00
printf("%s: \n", __func__);
kdebug_sadb(msg));
/*
* we increment statistics here, just in case we have ENOBUFS
* in this function.
*/
pfkeystat.in_total++;
pfkeystat.in_bytes += len;
pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
/*
* Get mbuf chain whenever possible (not clusters),
* to save socket buffer. We'll be generating many SADB_ACQUIRE
* messages to listening key sockets. If we simply allocate clusters,
* sbappendaddr() will raise ENOBUFS due to too little sbspace().
* sbspace() computes # of actual data bytes AND mbuf region.
*
* TODO: SADB_ACQUIRE filters should be implemented.
*/
tlen = len;
m = mprev = NULL;
while (tlen > 0) {
if (tlen == len) {
MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
n->m_len = MHLEN;
} else {
MGET(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_DATA);
n->m_len = MLEN;
}
if (!n) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
if (tlen >= MCLBYTES) { /*XXX better threshold? */
MCLGET(n, M_DONTWAIT);
if ((n->m_flags & M_EXT) == 0) {
m_free(n);
m_freem(m);
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
n->m_len = MCLBYTES;
}
if (tlen < n->m_len)
n->m_len = tlen;
n->m_next = NULL;
if (m == NULL)
m = mprev = n;
else {
mprev->m_next = n;
mprev = n;
}
tlen -= n->m_len;
n = NULL;
}
m->m_pkthdr.len = len;
m->m_pkthdr.rcvif = NULL;
m_copyback(m, 0, len, (caddr_t)msg);
/* avoid duplicated statistics */
pfkeystat.in_total--;
pfkeystat.in_bytes -= len;
pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]--;
return key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target);
}
/* so can be NULL if target != KEY_SENDUP_ONE */
int
key_sendup_mbuf(so, m, target)
struct socket *so;
struct mbuf *m;
int target;
{
struct mbuf *n;
struct keycb *kp;
int sendup;
struct rawcb *rp;
int error = 0;
if (m == NULL)
panic("key_sendup_mbuf: NULL pointer was passed.\n");
if (so == NULL && target == KEY_SENDUP_ONE)
MFp4: portability work, general cleanup, locking fixes change 38496 o add ipsec_osdep.h that holds os-specific definitions for portability o s/KASSERT/IPSEC_ASSERT/ for portability o s/SPLASSERT/IPSEC_SPLASSERT/ for portability o remove function names from ASSERT strings since line#+file pinpints the location o use __func__ uniformly to reduce string storage o convert some random #ifdef DIAGNOSTIC code to assertions o remove some debuggging assertions no longer needed change 38498 o replace numerous bogus panic's with equally bogus assertions that at least go away on a production system change 38502 + 38530 o change explicit mtx operations to #defines to simplify future changes to a different lock type change 38531 o hookup ipv4 ctlinput paths to a noop routine; we should be handling path mtu changes at least o correct potential null pointer deref in ipsec4_common_input_cb chnage 38685 o fix locking for bundled SA's and for when key exchange is required change 38770 o eliminate recursion on the SAHTREE lock change 38804 o cleanup some types: long -> time_t o remove refrence to dead #define change 38805 o correct some types: long -> time_t o add scan generation # to secpolicy to deal with locking issues change 38806 o use LIST_FOREACH_SAFE instead of handrolled code o change key_flush_spd to drop the sptree lock before purging an entry to avoid lock recursion and to avoid holding the lock over a long-running operation o misc cleanups of tangled and twisty code There is still much to do here but for now things look to be working again. Supported by: FreeBSD Foundation
2003-09-29 22:57:43 +00:00
panic("%s: NULL pointer was passed.\n", __func__);
pfkeystat.in_total++;
pfkeystat.in_bytes += m->m_pkthdr.len;
if (m->m_len < sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
#if 1
m = m_pullup(m, sizeof(struct sadb_msg));
if (m == NULL) {
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
#else
/* don't bother pulling it up just for stats */
#endif
}
if (m->m_len >= sizeof(struct sadb_msg)) {
struct sadb_msg *msg;
msg = mtod(m, struct sadb_msg *);
pfkeystat.in_msgtype[msg->sadb_msg_type]++;
}
LIST_FOREACH(rp, &rawcb_list, list)
{
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_family != PF_KEY)
continue;
if (rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol
&& rp->rcb_proto.sp_protocol != PF_KEY_V2) {
continue;
}
kp = (struct keycb *)rp;
/*
* If you are in promiscuous mode, and when you get broadcasted
* reply, you'll get two PF_KEY messages.
* (based on pf_key@inner.net message on 14 Oct 1998)
*/
if (((struct keycb *)rp)->kp_promisc) {
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) != NULL) {
(void)key_sendup0(rp, n, 1);
n = NULL;
}
}
/* the exact target will be processed later */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
continue;
sendup = 0;
switch (target) {
case KEY_SENDUP_ONE:
/* the statement has no effect */
if (so && sotorawcb(so) == rp)
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_ALL:
sendup++;
break;
case KEY_SENDUP_REGISTERED:
if (kp->kp_registered)
sendup++;
break;
}
pfkeystat.in_msgtarget[target]++;
if (!sendup)
continue;
if ((n = m_copy(m, 0, (int)M_COPYALL)) == NULL) {
m_freem(m);
pfkeystat.in_nomem++;
return ENOBUFS;
}
if ((error = key_sendup0(rp, n, 0)) != 0) {
m_freem(m);
return error;
}
n = NULL;
}
if (so) {
error = key_sendup0(sotorawcb(so), m, 0);
m = NULL;
} else {
error = 0;
m_freem(m);
}
return error;
}
/*
* key_abort()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_abort()
*/
static int
key_abort(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_abort(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_attach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_attach()
*/
static int
key_attach(struct socket *so, int proto, struct thread *td)
{
struct keycb *kp;
int s, error;
if (sotorawcb(so) != 0)
return EISCONN; /* XXX panic? */
kp = (struct keycb *)malloc(sizeof *kp, M_PCB, M_WAITOK|M_ZERO); /* XXX */
if (kp == 0)
return ENOBUFS;
/*
* The splnet() is necessary to block protocols from sending
* error notifications (like RTM_REDIRECT or RTM_LOSING) while
* this PCB is extant but incompletely initialized.
* Probably we should try to do more of this work beforehand and
* eliminate the spl.
*/
s = splnet();
so->so_pcb = (caddr_t)kp;
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_attach(so, proto, td);
kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
if (error) {
free(kp, M_PCB);
so->so_pcb = (caddr_t) 0;
splx(s);
return error;
}
kp->kp_promisc = kp->kp_registered = 0;
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol == PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count++;
key_cb.any_count++;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_laddr = &key_src;
kp->kp_raw.rcb_faddr = &key_dst;
soisconnected(so);
so->so_options |= SO_USELOOPBACK;
splx(s);
return 0;
}
/*
* key_bind()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_bind()
*/
static int
key_bind(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_bind(so, nam, td); /* xxx just EINVAL */
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_connect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_connect()
*/
static int
key_connect(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr *nam, struct thread *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_connect(so, nam, td); /* XXX just EINVAL */
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_detach()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_detach()
*/
static int
key_detach(struct socket *so)
{
struct keycb *kp = (struct keycb *)sotorawcb(so);
int s, error;
s = splnet();
if (kp != 0) {
if (kp->kp_raw.rcb_proto.sp_protocol
== PF_KEY) /* XXX: AF_KEY */
key_cb.key_count--;
key_cb.any_count--;
key_freereg(so);
}
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_detach(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_disconnect()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:key_disconnect()
*/
static int
key_disconnect(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_disconnect(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_peeraddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_peeraddr()
*/
static int
key_peeraddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_peeraddr(so, nam);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_send()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_send()
*/
static int
key_send(struct socket *so, int flags, struct mbuf *m, struct sockaddr *nam,
struct mbuf *control, struct thread *td)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_send(so, flags, m, nam, control, td);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_shutdown()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_shutdown()
*/
static int
key_shutdown(struct socket *so)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_shutdown(so);
splx(s);
return error;
}
/*
* key_sockaddr()
* derived from net/rtsock.c:rts_sockaddr()
*/
static int
key_sockaddr(struct socket *so, struct sockaddr **nam)
{
int s, error;
s = splnet();
error = raw_usrreqs.pru_sockaddr(so, nam);
splx(s);
return error;
}
struct pr_usrreqs key_usrreqs = {
key_abort, pru_accept_notsupp, key_attach, key_bind,
key_connect,
pru_connect2_notsupp, pru_control_notsupp, key_detach,
key_disconnect, pru_listen_notsupp, key_peeraddr,
pru_rcvd_notsupp,
pru_rcvoob_notsupp, key_send, pru_sense_null, key_shutdown,
key_sockaddr, sosend, soreceive, sopoll,
pru_sosetlabel_null
};
/* sysctl */
SYSCTL_NODE(_net, PF_KEY, key, CTLFLAG_RW, 0, "Key Family");
/*
* Definitions of protocols supported in the KEY domain.
*/
extern struct domain keydomain;
struct protosw keysw[] = {
{ SOCK_RAW, &keydomain, PF_KEY_V2, PR_ATOMIC|PR_ADDR,
0, (pr_output_t *)key_output, raw_ctlinput, 0,
0,
raw_init, 0, 0, 0,
&key_usrreqs
}
};
static void
key_init0(void)
{
bzero((caddr_t)&key_cb, sizeof(key_cb));
key_init();
}
struct domain keydomain =
{ PF_KEY, "key", key_init0, 0, 0,
keysw, &keysw[sizeof(keysw)/sizeof(keysw[0])] };
DOMAIN_SET(key);