freebsd-dev/sys/kern/sys_getrandom.c

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/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-FreeBSD
*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Conrad Meyer <cem@FreeBSD.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/limits.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/random.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
getrandom(2): Add Linux GRND_INSECURE API flag Treat it as a synonym for GRND_NONBLOCK. The reasoning is this: We have two choices for handling Linux's GRND_INSECURE API flag. 1. We could ignore it completely (like GRND_RANDOM). However, this might produce the surprising result of GRND_INSECURE requests blocking, when the Linux API does not block. 2. Alternatively, we could treat GRND_INSECURE requests as requests for GRND_NONBLOCk. Here, the surprising result for Linux programs is that invocations with unseeded random(4) will produce EAGAIN, rather than garbage. Honoring the flag in the way Linux does seems fraught. If we actually use the output of a random(4) implementation prior to seeding, we leak some entropy (in an information theory and also practical sense) from what will be the initial seed to attackers (or allow attackers to arbitrary DoS initial seeding, if we don't leak). This seems unacceptable -- it defeats the purpose of blocking on initial seeding. Secondary to that concern, before seeding we may have arbitrarily little entropy collected; producing output from zero or a handful of entropy bits does not seem particularly useful to userspace. If userspace can accept garbage, insecure, non-random bytes, they can create their own insecure garbage with srandom(time(NULL)) or similar. Any program which would be satisfied with a 3-bit key CTR stream has no need for CSPRNG bytes. So asking the kernel to produce such an output from the secure getrandom(2) API seems inane. For now, we've elected to emulate GRND_INSECURE as an alternative spelling of GRND_NONBLOCK (2). Consider this API not-quite stable for now. We guarantee it will never block. But we will attempt to monitor actual port uptake of this bizarre API and may revise our plans for the unseeded behavior (prior stable/13 branching). Approved by: csprng(markm), manpages(bcr) See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org/ See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20200107204400.GH3619@mit.edu/ Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23130
2020-01-12 20:47:38 +00:00
#define GRND_VALIDFLAGS (GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE)
/*
* random_read_uio(9) returns EWOULDBLOCK if a nonblocking request would block,
* but the Linux API name is EAGAIN. On FreeBSD, they have the same numeric
* value for now.
*/
CTASSERT(EWOULDBLOCK == EAGAIN);
static int
kern_getrandom(struct thread *td, void *user_buf, size_t buflen,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct uio auio;
struct iovec aiov;
int error;
if ((flags & ~GRND_VALIDFLAGS) != 0)
return (EINVAL);
if (buflen > IOSIZE_MAX)
return (EINVAL);
getrandom(2): Add Linux GRND_INSECURE API flag Treat it as a synonym for GRND_NONBLOCK. The reasoning is this: We have two choices for handling Linux's GRND_INSECURE API flag. 1. We could ignore it completely (like GRND_RANDOM). However, this might produce the surprising result of GRND_INSECURE requests blocking, when the Linux API does not block. 2. Alternatively, we could treat GRND_INSECURE requests as requests for GRND_NONBLOCk. Here, the surprising result for Linux programs is that invocations with unseeded random(4) will produce EAGAIN, rather than garbage. Honoring the flag in the way Linux does seems fraught. If we actually use the output of a random(4) implementation prior to seeding, we leak some entropy (in an information theory and also practical sense) from what will be the initial seed to attackers (or allow attackers to arbitrary DoS initial seeding, if we don't leak). This seems unacceptable -- it defeats the purpose of blocking on initial seeding. Secondary to that concern, before seeding we may have arbitrarily little entropy collected; producing output from zero or a handful of entropy bits does not seem particularly useful to userspace. If userspace can accept garbage, insecure, non-random bytes, they can create their own insecure garbage with srandom(time(NULL)) or similar. Any program which would be satisfied with a 3-bit key CTR stream has no need for CSPRNG bytes. So asking the kernel to produce such an output from the secure getrandom(2) API seems inane. For now, we've elected to emulate GRND_INSECURE as an alternative spelling of GRND_NONBLOCK (2). Consider this API not-quite stable for now. We guarantee it will never block. But we will attempt to monitor actual port uptake of this bizarre API and may revise our plans for the unseeded behavior (prior stable/13 branching). Approved by: csprng(markm), manpages(bcr) See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org/ See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20200107204400.GH3619@mit.edu/ Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23130
2020-01-12 20:47:38 +00:00
/*
* Linux compatibility: We have two choices for handling Linux's
* GRND_INSECURE.
*
* 1. We could ignore it completely (like GRND_RANDOM). However, this
* might produce the surprising result of GRND_INSECURE requests
* blocking, when the Linux API does not block.
*
* 2. Alternatively, we could treat GRND_INSECURE requests as requests
* for GRND_NONBLOCK. Here, the surprising result for Linux programs
getrandom(2): Add Linux GRND_INSECURE API flag Treat it as a synonym for GRND_NONBLOCK. The reasoning is this: We have two choices for handling Linux's GRND_INSECURE API flag. 1. We could ignore it completely (like GRND_RANDOM). However, this might produce the surprising result of GRND_INSECURE requests blocking, when the Linux API does not block. 2. Alternatively, we could treat GRND_INSECURE requests as requests for GRND_NONBLOCk. Here, the surprising result for Linux programs is that invocations with unseeded random(4) will produce EAGAIN, rather than garbage. Honoring the flag in the way Linux does seems fraught. If we actually use the output of a random(4) implementation prior to seeding, we leak some entropy (in an information theory and also practical sense) from what will be the initial seed to attackers (or allow attackers to arbitrary DoS initial seeding, if we don't leak). This seems unacceptable -- it defeats the purpose of blocking on initial seeding. Secondary to that concern, before seeding we may have arbitrarily little entropy collected; producing output from zero or a handful of entropy bits does not seem particularly useful to userspace. If userspace can accept garbage, insecure, non-random bytes, they can create their own insecure garbage with srandom(time(NULL)) or similar. Any program which would be satisfied with a 3-bit key CTR stream has no need for CSPRNG bytes. So asking the kernel to produce such an output from the secure getrandom(2) API seems inane. For now, we've elected to emulate GRND_INSECURE as an alternative spelling of GRND_NONBLOCK (2). Consider this API not-quite stable for now. We guarantee it will never block. But we will attempt to monitor actual port uptake of this bizarre API and may revise our plans for the unseeded behavior (prior stable/13 branching). Approved by: csprng(markm), manpages(bcr) See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/cover.1577088521.git.luto@kernel.org/ See also: https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20200107204400.GH3619@mit.edu/ Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23130
2020-01-12 20:47:38 +00:00
* is that invocations with unseeded random(4) will produce EAGAIN,
* rather than garbage.
*
* Honoring the flag in the way Linux does seems fraught. If we
* actually use the output of a random(4) implementation prior to
* seeding, we leak some entropy about the initial seed to attackers.
* This seems unacceptable -- it defeats the purpose of blocking on
* initial seeding.
*
* Secondary to that concern, before seeding we may have arbitrarily
* little entropy collected; producing output from zero or a handful of
* entropy bits does not seem particularly useful to userspace.
*
* If userspace can accept garbage, insecure non-random bytes, they can
* create their own insecure garbage with srandom(time(NULL)) or
* similar. Asking the kernel to produce it from the secure
* getrandom(2) API seems inane.
*
* We elect to emulate GRND_INSECURE as an alternative spelling of
* GRND_NONBLOCK (2).
*/
if ((flags & GRND_INSECURE) != 0)
flags |= GRND_NONBLOCK;
if (buflen == 0) {
td->td_retval[0] = 0;
return (0);
}
aiov.iov_base = user_buf;
aiov.iov_len = buflen;
auio.uio_iov = &aiov;
auio.uio_iovcnt = 1;
auio.uio_offset = 0;
auio.uio_resid = buflen;
auio.uio_segflg = UIO_USERSPACE;
auio.uio_rw = UIO_READ;
auio.uio_td = td;
error = read_random_uio(&auio, (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) != 0);
if (error == 0)
td->td_retval[0] = buflen - auio.uio_resid;
return (error);
}
#ifndef _SYS_SYSPROTO_H_
struct getrandom_args {
void *buf;
size_t buflen;
unsigned int flags;
};
#endif
int
sys_getrandom(struct thread *td, struct getrandom_args *uap)
{
return (kern_getrandom(td, uap->buf, uap->buflen, uap->flags));
}