Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
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/*-
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* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Robert N. M. Watson
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* Copyright (c) 2001, 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
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*
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* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by NAI Labs,
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* the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
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* DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA
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* CHATS research program.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
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* products derived from this software without specific prior written
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* permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* $FreeBSD$
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*/
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/*
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* Kernel interface for MAC policy modules.
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*/
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#ifndef _SYS_MAC_POLICY_H
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#define _SYS_MAC_POLICY_H
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/*-
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* Pluggable access control policy definition structure.
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*
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* List of operations that are performed as part of the implementation
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* of a MAC policy. Policy implementors declare operations with a
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* mac_policy_ops structure, and using the MAC_POLICY_SET() macro.
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* If an entry point is not declared, then then the policy will be ignored
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* during evaluation of that event or check.
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*
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* Operations are sorted first by general class of operation, then
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* alphabetically.
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*/
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struct mac_policy_conf;
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struct mac_policy_ops {
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/*
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* Policy module operations.
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*/
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void (*mpo_destroy)(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
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void (*mpo_init)(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc);
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2002-08-19 17:59:48 +00:00
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/*
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* General policy-directed security system call so that policies
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* may implement new services without reserving explicit
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* system call numbers.
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*/
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int (*mpo_syscall)(struct thread *td, int call, void *arg);
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|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
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/*
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* Label operations.
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*/
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Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
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void (*mpo_init_bpfdesc_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_cred_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_devfsdirent_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_ifnet_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_ipq_label)(struct label *label);
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int (*mpo_init_mbuf_label)(struct label *label, int flag);
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void (*mpo_init_mount_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_mount_fs_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_socket_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_socket_peer_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_pipe_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_temp_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_init_vnode_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_bpfdesc_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_cred_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_devfsdirent_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_ifnet_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_ipq_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_mbuf_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_mount_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_mount_fs_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_socket_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_socket_peer_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_pipe_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_temp_label)(struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_destroy_vnode_label)(struct label *label);
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|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
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int (*mpo_externalize)(struct label *label, struct mac *extmac);
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int (*mpo_internalize)(struct label *label, struct mac *extmac);
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/*
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* Labeling event operations: file system objects, and things that
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* look a lot like file system objects.
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*/
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void (*mpo_create_devfs_device)(dev_t dev, struct devfs_dirent *de,
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struct label *label);
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void (*mpo_create_devfs_directory)(char *dirname, int dirnamelen,
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struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *label);
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2002-10-05 18:40:10 +00:00
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void (*mpo_create_devfs_symlink)(struct ucred *cred,
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struct devfs_dirent *dd, struct label *ddlabel,
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struct devfs_dirent *de, struct label *delabel);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
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void (*mpo_create_devfs_vnode)(struct devfs_dirent *de,
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struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel);
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void (*mpo_create_vnode)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *parent,
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struct label *parentlabel, struct vnode *child,
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struct label *childlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mount)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
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struct label *mntlabel, struct label *fslabel);
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void (*mpo_create_root_mount)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
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struct label *mountlabel, struct label *fslabel);
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void (*mpo_relabel_vnode)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel, struct label *label);
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int (*mpo_stdcreatevnode_ea)(struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel);
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void (*mpo_update_devfsdirent)(struct devfs_dirent *devfs_dirent,
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struct label *direntlabel, struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel);
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void (*mpo_update_procfsvnode)(struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel, struct ucred *cred);
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int (*mpo_update_vnode_from_extattr)(struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel, struct mount *mp,
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struct label *fslabel);
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int (*mpo_update_vnode_from_externalized)(struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel, struct mac *mac);
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void (*mpo_update_vnode_from_mount)(struct vnode *vp,
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struct label *vnodelabel, struct mount *mp,
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struct label *fslabel);
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/*
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* Labeling event operations: IPC objects.
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*/
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_socket)(struct socket *so,
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struct label *socketlabel, struct mbuf *m,
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struct label *mbuflabel);
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void (*mpo_create_socket)(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
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struct label *socketlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_socket_from_socket)(struct socket *oldsocket,
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struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
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struct label *newsocketlabel);
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void (*mpo_relabel_socket)(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *so,
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struct label *oldlabel, struct label *newlabel);
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void (*mpo_relabel_pipe)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
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struct label *oldlabel, struct label *newlabel);
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void (*mpo_set_socket_peer_from_mbuf)(struct mbuf *mbuf,
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struct label *mbuflabel, struct socket *so,
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struct label *socketpeerlabel);
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void (*mpo_set_socket_peer_from_socket)(struct socket *oldsocket,
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struct label *oldsocketlabel, struct socket *newsocket,
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struct label *newsocketpeerlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_pipe)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
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struct label *pipelabel);
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/*
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* Labeling event operations: network objects.
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*/
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void (*mpo_create_bpfdesc)(struct ucred *cred, struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
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struct label *bpflabel);
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void (*mpo_create_ifnet)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
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struct label *ifnetlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_ipq)(struct mbuf *fragment,
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struct label *fragmentlabel, struct ipq *ipq,
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struct label *ipqlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_datagram_from_ipq)
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(struct ipq *ipq, struct label *ipqlabel,
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struct mbuf *datagram, struct label *datagramlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_fragment)(struct mbuf *datagram,
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struct label *datagramlabel, struct mbuf *fragment,
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struct label *fragmentlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_mbuf)(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
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struct label *oldlabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
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struct label *newlabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_linklayer)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
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struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *mbuf,
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struct label *mbuflabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_bpfdesc)(struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
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struct label *bpflabel, struct mbuf *mbuf,
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struct label *mbuflabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_from_ifnet)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
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struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *mbuf,
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struct label *mbuflabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_multicast_encap)(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
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struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct ifnet *ifnet,
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struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
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struct label *newmbuflabel);
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void (*mpo_create_mbuf_netlayer)(struct mbuf *oldmbuf,
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struct label *oldmbuflabel, struct mbuf *newmbuf,
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struct label *newmbuflabel);
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int (*mpo_fragment_match)(struct mbuf *fragment,
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struct label *fragmentlabel, struct ipq *ipq,
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struct label *ipqlabel);
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void (*mpo_relabel_ifnet)(struct ucred *cred, struct ifnet *ifnet,
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struct label *ifnetlabel, struct label *newlabel);
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void (*mpo_update_ipq)(struct mbuf *fragment,
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struct label *fragmentlabel, struct ipq *ipq,
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struct label *ipqlabel);
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/*
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* Labeling event operations: processes.
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*/
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void (*mpo_create_cred)(struct ucred *parent_cred,
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struct ucred *child_cred);
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void (*mpo_execve_transition)(struct ucred *old, struct ucred *new,
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struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel);
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int (*mpo_execve_will_transition)(struct ucred *old,
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struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel);
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void (*mpo_create_proc0)(struct ucred *cred);
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void (*mpo_create_proc1)(struct ucred *cred);
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void (*mpo_relabel_cred)(struct ucred *cred,
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struct label *newlabel);
|
2002-10-02 02:42:38 +00:00
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void (*mpo_thread_userret)(struct thread *thread);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
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/*
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|
|
|
|
* Access control checks.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_bpfdesc_receive)(struct bpf_d *bpf_d,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *bpflabel, struct ifnet *ifnet,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *ifnetlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_cred_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_cred_visible)(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_ifnet_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ifnet *ifnet, struct label *ifnetlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_ifnet_transmit)(struct ifnet *ifnet,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *ifnetlabel, struct mbuf *m,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *mbuflabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_mount_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct mount *mp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *mntlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_pipe_ioctl)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel, unsigned long cmd, void *data);
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_pipe_poll)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_pipe_read)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_pipe_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct pipe *pipe, struct label *pipelabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newlabel);
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_pipe_stat)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_pipe_write)(struct ucred *cred, struct pipe *pipe,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *pipelabel);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_proc_debug)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *proc);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_proc_sched)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *proc);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_proc_signal)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct proc *proc, int signum);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_socket_bind)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_socket_connect)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct sockaddr *sockaddr);
|
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_socket_deliver)(struct socket *so,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
struct label *socketlabel, struct mbuf *m,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *mbuflabel);
|
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_socket_listen)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_socket_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_socket_visible)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct socket *so, struct label *socketlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_access)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int flags);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_chdir)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_chroot)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_create)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp, struct vattr *vap);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_delete)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, void *label, struct componentname *cnp);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_deleteacl)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, acl_type_t type);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_exec)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_getacl)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, acl_type_t type);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_getextattr)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int attrnamespace,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *name, struct uio *uio);
|
2002-10-05 18:11:36 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_link)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *dvp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, struct componentname *cnp);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_lookup)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp);
|
2002-08-02 20:33:05 +00:00
|
|
|
vm_prot_t (*mpo_check_vnode_mmap_perms)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int newmapping);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_open)(struct ucred *cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, mode_t acc_mode);
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_poll)(struct ucred *active_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct label *label);
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_read)(struct ucred *active_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct label *label);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_readdir)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_readlink)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_relabel)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *vnodelabel,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *newlabel);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_rename_from)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, struct componentname *cnp);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_rename_to)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *dvp, struct label *dlabel, struct vnode *vp,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *label, int samedir,
|
|
|
|
|
struct componentname *cnp);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_revoke)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setacl)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, acl_type_t type,
|
|
|
|
|
struct acl *acl);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setextattr)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, int attrnamespace,
|
|
|
|
|
const char *name, struct uio *uio);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setflags)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, u_long flags);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setmode)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, mode_t mode);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setowner)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label, uid_t uid,
|
|
|
|
|
gid_t gid);
|
|
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_setutimes)(struct ucred *cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct vnode *vp, struct label *label,
|
|
|
|
|
struct timespec atime, struct timespec mtime);
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_stat)(struct ucred *active_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
struct label *label);
|
2002-08-19 19:04:53 +00:00
|
|
|
int (*mpo_check_vnode_write)(struct ucred *active_cred,
|
|
|
|
|
struct ucred *file_cred, struct vnode *vp,
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
struct label *label);
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-08-01 17:32:01 +00:00
|
|
|
typedef const void *macop_t;
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
enum mac_op_constant {
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_OP_LAST,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT,
|
2002-08-19 17:59:48 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_SYSCALL,
|
Begin another merge from the TrustedBSD MAC branch:
- Change mpo_init_foo(obj, label) and mpo_destroy_foo(obj, label) policy
entry points to mpo_init_foo_label(label) and
mpo_destroy_foo_label(label). This will permit the use of the same
entry points for holding temporary type-specific label during
internalization and externalization, as well as for caching purposes.
- Because of this, break out mpo_{init,destroy}_socket() and
mpo_{init,destroy}_mount() into seperate entry points for socket
main/peer labels and mount main/fs labels.
- Since the prototype for label initialization is the same across almost
all entry points, implement these entry points using common
implementations for Biba, MLS, and Test, reducing the number of
almost identical looking functions.
This simplifies policy implementation, as well as preparing us for the
merge of the new flexible userland API for managing labels on objects.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-05 15:10:00 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_BPFDESC_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_CRED_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_DEVFSDIRENT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_IFNET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_IPQ_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_MBUF_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_MOUNT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_MOUNT_FS_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_PIPE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_SOCKET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_SOCKET_PEER_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_TEMP_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INIT_VNODE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_BPFDESC_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_CRED_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_DEVFSDIRENT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_IFNET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_IPQ_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_MBUF_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_MOUNT_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_MOUNT_FS_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_PIPE_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_SOCKET_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_SOCKET_PEER_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_TEMP_LABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_DESTROY_VNODE_LABEL,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_EXTERNALIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_INTERNALIZE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_DEVICE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_DIRECTORY,
|
2002-10-05 18:40:10 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_SYMLINK,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CREATE_DEVFS_VNODE,
|
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|
|
|
MAC_CREATE_VNODE,
|
|
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MAC_CREATE_MOUNT,
|
|
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|
MAC_CREATE_ROOT_MOUNT,
|
|
|
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MAC_RELABEL_VNODE,
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MAC_STDCREATEVNODE_EA,
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MAC_UPDATE_DEVFSDIRENT,
|
|
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MAC_UPDATE_PROCFSVNODE,
|
|
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MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_EXTATTR,
|
|
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MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_EXTERNALIZED,
|
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MAC_UPDATE_VNODE_FROM_MOUNT,
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MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_SOCKET,
|
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MAC_CREATE_PIPE,
|
|
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MAC_CREATE_SOCKET,
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MAC_CREATE_SOCKET_FROM_SOCKET,
|
|
|
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MAC_RELABEL_PIPE,
|
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|
MAC_RELABEL_SOCKET,
|
|
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|
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MAC_SET_SOCKET_PEER_FROM_MBUF,
|
|
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|
|
MAC_SET_SOCKET_PEER_FROM_SOCKET,
|
|
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MAC_CREATE_BPFDESC,
|
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MAC_CREATE_DATAGRAM_FROM_IPQ,
|
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MAC_CREATE_IFNET,
|
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MAC_CREATE_IPQ,
|
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MAC_CREATE_FRAGMENT,
|
|
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|
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MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_MBUF,
|
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|
MAC_CREATE_MBUF_LINKLAYER,
|
|
|
|
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MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_BPFDESC,
|
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|
|
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MAC_CREATE_MBUF_FROM_IFNET,
|
|
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|
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MAC_CREATE_MBUF_MULTICAST_ENCAP,
|
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MAC_CREATE_MBUF_NETLAYER,
|
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MAC_FRAGMENT_MATCH,
|
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MAC_RELABEL_IFNET,
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MAC_UPDATE_IPQ,
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MAC_CREATE_CRED,
|
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MAC_EXECVE_TRANSITION,
|
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MAC_EXECVE_WILL_TRANSITION,
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MAC_CREATE_PROC0,
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MAC_CREATE_PROC1,
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MAC_RELABEL_CRED,
|
2002-10-02 02:42:38 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_THREAD_USERRET,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_BPFDESC_RECEIVE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_CRED_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
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MAC_CHECK_CRED_VISIBLE,
|
|
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|
|
MAC_CHECK_IFNET_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
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MAC_CHECK_IFNET_TRANSMIT,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_MOUNT_STAT,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_IOCTL,
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_POLL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_READ,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_RELABEL,
|
2002-08-19 16:59:37 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_STAT,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PIPE_WRITE,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PROC_DEBUG,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PROC_SCHED,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_PROC_SIGNAL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_BIND,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_CONNECT,
|
2002-08-15 18:51:27 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_DELIVER,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_LISTEN,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_SOCKET_VISIBLE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_ACCESS,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHDIR,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CHROOT,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_CREATE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_DELETE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_DELETEACL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_EXEC,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_GETACL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_GETEXTATTR,
|
2002-10-05 18:11:36 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_LINK,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_LOOKUP,
|
2002-08-02 20:33:05 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_MMAP_PERMS,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_OPEN,
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_POLL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READ,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READDIR,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_READLINK,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RELABEL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RENAME_FROM,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_RENAME_TO,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_REVOKE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETACL,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETEXTATTR,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETFLAGS,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETMODE,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETOWNER,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_SETUTIMES,
|
|
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_STAT,
|
2002-08-19 16:43:25 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_CHECK_VNODE_WRITE,
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_policy_op_entry {
|
|
|
|
|
enum mac_op_constant mpe_constant; /* what this hook implements */
|
2002-08-01 17:32:01 +00:00
|
|
|
macop_t mpe_function; /* hook's implementation */
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_policy_conf {
|
|
|
|
|
char *mpc_name; /* policy name */
|
|
|
|
|
char *mpc_fullname; /* policy full name */
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_policy_ops *mpc_ops; /* policy operations */
|
|
|
|
|
struct mac_policy_op_entry *mpc_entries; /* ops to fill in */
|
|
|
|
|
int mpc_loadtime_flags; /* flags */
|
|
|
|
|
int *mpc_field_off; /* security field */
|
|
|
|
|
int mpc_runtime_flags; /* flags */
|
|
|
|
|
LIST_ENTRY(mac_policy_conf) mpc_list; /* global list */
|
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Flags for the mpc_loadtime_flags field. */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE 0x00000001
|
|
|
|
|
#define MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK 0x00000002
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Flags for the mpc_runtime_flags field. */
|
|
|
|
|
#define MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED 0x00000001
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define MAC_POLICY_SET(mpents, mpname, mpfullname, mpflags, privdata_wanted) \
|
|
|
|
|
static struct mac_policy_conf mpname##_mac_policy_conf = { \
|
|
|
|
|
#mpname, \
|
|
|
|
|
mpfullname, \
|
|
|
|
|
NULL, \
|
|
|
|
|
mpents, \
|
|
|
|
|
mpflags, \
|
|
|
|
|
privdata_wanted, \
|
|
|
|
|
0, \
|
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
|
|
|
|
static moduledata_t mpname##_mod = { \
|
|
|
|
|
#mpname, \
|
|
|
|
|
mac_policy_modevent, \
|
|
|
|
|
&mpname##_mac_policy_conf \
|
|
|
|
|
}; \
|
2002-08-12 02:00:21 +00:00
|
|
|
MODULE_DEPEND(mpname, kernel_mac_support, 1, 1, 1); \
|
Begin committing support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control. The MAC framework permits loadable kernel
modules to link to the kernel at compile-time, boot-time, or run-time,
and augment the system security policy. This commit includes the
initial kernel implementation, although the interface with the userland
components of the oeprating system is still under work, and not all
kernel subsystems are supported. Later in this commit sequence,
documentation of which kernel subsystems will not work correctly with
a kernel compiled with MAC support will be added.
Include files to declare MAC userland interface (mac.h), MAC subsystem
entry points (mac.h), and MAC policy entry points (mac_policy.h). These
files define the interface between the kernel and the MAC framework,
and between the MAC framework and each registered policy module. These
APIs and ABIs may not be assumed to be stable until following FreeBSD
5.1-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-30 21:32:34 +00:00
|
|
|
DECLARE_MODULE(mpname, mpname##_mod, SI_SUB_MAC_POLICY, \
|
|
|
|
|
SI_ORDER_MIDDLE)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#define LABEL_TO_SLOT(l, s) (l)->l_perpolicy[s]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* !_SYS_MAC_POLICY_H */
|