freebsd-dev/sys/net/pfkeyv2.h

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/* $FreeBSD$ */
2003-11-14 18:17:07 +00:00
/* $KAME: pfkeyv2.h,v 1.37 2003/09/06 05:15:43 itojun Exp $ */
/*-
* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
*
* Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 WIDE Project.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* This file has been derived rfc 2367,
* And added some flags of SADB_KEY_FLAGS_ as SADB_X_EXT_.
* sakane@ydc.co.jp
*/
#ifndef _NET_PFKEYV2_H_
#define _NET_PFKEYV2_H_
/*
This file defines structures and symbols for the PF_KEY Version 2
key management interface. It was written at the U.S. Naval Research
Laboratory. This file is in the public domain. The authors ask that
you leave this credit intact on any copies of this file.
*/
#ifndef __PFKEY_V2_H
#define __PFKEY_V2_H 1
#define PF_KEY_V2 2
#define PFKEYV2_REVISION 199806L
#define SADB_RESERVED 0
#define SADB_GETSPI 1
#define SADB_UPDATE 2
#define SADB_ADD 3
#define SADB_DELETE 4
#define SADB_GET 5
#define SADB_ACQUIRE 6
#define SADB_REGISTER 7
#define SADB_EXPIRE 8
#define SADB_FLUSH 9
#define SADB_DUMP 10
#define SADB_X_PROMISC 11
#define SADB_X_PCHANGE 12
#define SADB_X_SPDUPDATE 13
#define SADB_X_SPDADD 14
#define SADB_X_SPDDELETE 15 /* by policy index */
#define SADB_X_SPDGET 16
#define SADB_X_SPDACQUIRE 17
#define SADB_X_SPDDUMP 18
#define SADB_X_SPDFLUSH 19
#define SADB_X_SPDSETIDX 20
#define SADB_X_SPDEXPIRE 21
#define SADB_X_SPDDELETE2 22 /* by policy id */
#define SADB_MAX 22
struct sadb_msg {
u_int8_t sadb_msg_version;
u_int8_t sadb_msg_type;
u_int8_t sadb_msg_errno;
u_int8_t sadb_msg_satype;
u_int16_t sadb_msg_len;
u_int16_t sadb_msg_reserved;
u_int32_t sadb_msg_seq;
u_int32_t sadb_msg_pid;
};
struct sadb_ext {
u_int16_t sadb_ext_len;
u_int16_t sadb_ext_type;
};
struct sadb_sa {
u_int16_t sadb_sa_len;
u_int16_t sadb_sa_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_sa_spi;
u_int8_t sadb_sa_replay;
u_int8_t sadb_sa_state;
u_int8_t sadb_sa_auth;
u_int8_t sadb_sa_encrypt;
u_int32_t sadb_sa_flags;
};
struct sadb_lifetime {
u_int16_t sadb_lifetime_len;
u_int16_t sadb_lifetime_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_lifetime_allocations;
u_int64_t sadb_lifetime_bytes;
u_int64_t sadb_lifetime_addtime;
u_int64_t sadb_lifetime_usetime;
};
struct sadb_address {
u_int16_t sadb_address_len;
u_int16_t sadb_address_exttype;
u_int8_t sadb_address_proto;
u_int8_t sadb_address_prefixlen;
u_int16_t sadb_address_reserved;
};
struct sadb_key {
u_int16_t sadb_key_len;
u_int16_t sadb_key_exttype;
u_int16_t sadb_key_bits;
u_int16_t sadb_key_reserved;
};
struct sadb_ident {
u_int16_t sadb_ident_len;
u_int16_t sadb_ident_exttype;
u_int16_t sadb_ident_type;
u_int16_t sadb_ident_reserved;
u_int64_t sadb_ident_id;
};
struct sadb_sens {
u_int16_t sadb_sens_len;
u_int16_t sadb_sens_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_sens_dpd;
u_int8_t sadb_sens_sens_level;
u_int8_t sadb_sens_sens_len;
u_int8_t sadb_sens_integ_level;
u_int8_t sadb_sens_integ_len;
u_int32_t sadb_sens_reserved;
};
struct sadb_prop {
u_int16_t sadb_prop_len;
u_int16_t sadb_prop_exttype;
u_int8_t sadb_prop_replay;
u_int8_t sadb_prop_reserved[3];
};
struct sadb_comb {
u_int8_t sadb_comb_auth;
u_int8_t sadb_comb_encrypt;
u_int16_t sadb_comb_flags;
u_int16_t sadb_comb_auth_minbits;
u_int16_t sadb_comb_auth_maxbits;
u_int16_t sadb_comb_encrypt_minbits;
u_int16_t sadb_comb_encrypt_maxbits;
u_int32_t sadb_comb_reserved;
u_int32_t sadb_comb_soft_allocations;
u_int32_t sadb_comb_hard_allocations;
u_int64_t sadb_comb_soft_bytes;
u_int64_t sadb_comb_hard_bytes;
u_int64_t sadb_comb_soft_addtime;
u_int64_t sadb_comb_hard_addtime;
u_int64_t sadb_comb_soft_usetime;
u_int64_t sadb_comb_hard_usetime;
};
struct sadb_supported {
u_int16_t sadb_supported_len;
u_int16_t sadb_supported_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_supported_reserved;
};
struct sadb_alg {
u_int8_t sadb_alg_id;
u_int8_t sadb_alg_ivlen;
u_int16_t sadb_alg_minbits;
u_int16_t sadb_alg_maxbits;
u_int16_t sadb_alg_reserved;
};
struct sadb_spirange {
u_int16_t sadb_spirange_len;
u_int16_t sadb_spirange_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_spirange_min;
u_int32_t sadb_spirange_max;
u_int32_t sadb_spirange_reserved;
};
struct sadb_x_kmprivate {
u_int16_t sadb_x_kmprivate_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_kmprivate_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_x_kmprivate_reserved;
};
/*
* XXX Additional SA Extension.
* mode: tunnel or transport
* reqid: to make SA unique nevertheless the address pair of SA are same.
* Mainly it's for VPN.
*/
struct sadb_x_sa2 {
u_int16_t sadb_x_sa2_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_sa2_exttype;
u_int8_t sadb_x_sa2_mode;
u_int8_t sadb_x_sa2_reserved1;
u_int16_t sadb_x_sa2_reserved2;
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u_int32_t sadb_x_sa2_sequence; /* lowermost 32bit of sequence number */
u_int32_t sadb_x_sa2_reqid;
};
/* XXX Policy Extension */
struct sadb_x_policy {
u_int16_t sadb_x_policy_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_policy_exttype;
u_int16_t sadb_x_policy_type; /* See policy type of ipsec.h */
u_int8_t sadb_x_policy_dir; /* direction, see ipsec.h */
Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope. Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb. Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope. Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked agains inbound packets after IPsec processing. Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope. Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4) interface. And security policies created by application using setsockopt() IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list PCB policies via setkey(8) utility. Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags: '-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces, i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed. To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified. sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested scopes. For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used to keep if_index. After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like: # setkey -DPt 0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any in ipsec esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145 spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0 refcnt=1 # setkey -DPg ::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0 out none spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global refcnt=1 No objection from: #network Obtained from: Yandex LLC MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805
2017-03-07 00:13:53 +00:00
u_int8_t sadb_x_policy_scope; /* scope, see ipsec.h */
u_int32_t sadb_x_policy_id;
u_int32_t sadb_x_policy_priority;
Introduce the concept of IPsec security policies scope. Currently are defined three scopes: global, ifnet, and pcb. Generic security policies that IKE daemon can add via PF_KEY interface or an administrator creates with setkey(8) utility have GLOBAL scope. Such policies can be applied by the kernel to outgoing packets and checked agains inbound packets after IPsec processing. Security policies created by if_ipsec(4) interfaces have IFNET scope. Such policies are applied to packets that are passed through if_ipsec(4) interface. And security policies created by application using setsockopt() IP_IPSEC_POLICY option have PCB scope. Such policies are applied to packets related to specific socket. Currently there is no way to list PCB policies via setkey(8) utility. Modify setkey(8) and libipsec(3) to be able distinguish the scope of security policies in the `setkey -DP` listing. Add two optional flags: '-t' to list only policies related to virtual *tunneling* interfaces, i.e. policies with IFNET scope, and '-g' to list only policies with GLOBAL scope. By default policies from all scopes are listed. To implement this PF_KEY's sadb_x_policy structure was modified. sadb_x_policy_reserved field is used to pass the policy scope from the kernel to userland. SADB_SPDDUMP message extended to support filtering by scope: sadb_msg_satype field is used to specify bit mask of requested scopes. For IFNET policies the sadb_x_policy_priority field of struct sadb_x_policy is used to pass if_ipsec's interface if_index to the userland. For GLOBAL policies sadb_x_policy_priority is used only to manage order of security policies in the SPDB. For IFNET policies it is not used, so it can be used to keep if_index. After this change the output of `setkey -DP` now looks like: # setkey -DPt 0.0.0.0/0[any] 0.0.0.0/0[any] any in ipsec esp/tunnel/87.250.242.144-87.250.242.145/unique:145 spid=7 seq=3 pid=58025 scope=ifnet ifname=ipsec0 refcnt=1 # setkey -DPg ::/0 ::/0 icmp6 135,0 out none spid=5 seq=1 pid=872 scope=global refcnt=1 No objection from: #network Obtained from: Yandex LLC MFC after: 2 weeks Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9805
2017-03-07 00:13:53 +00:00
#define sadb_x_policy_reserved sadb_x_policy_scope
/* Policy with ifnet scope uses priority field to store ifindex */
#define sadb_x_policy_ifindex sadb_x_policy_priority
};
_Static_assert(sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy) == 16, "struct size mismatch");
/*
* When policy_type == IPSEC, it is followed by some of
* the ipsec policy request.
* [total length of ipsec policy requests]
* = (sadb_x_policy_len * sizeof(uint64_t) - sizeof(struct sadb_x_policy))
*/
/* XXX IPsec Policy Request Extension */
/*
* This structure is aligned 8 bytes.
*/
struct sadb_x_ipsecrequest {
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u_int16_t sadb_x_ipsecrequest_len; /* structure length in 64 bits. */
u_int16_t sadb_x_ipsecrequest_proto; /* See ipsec.h */
u_int8_t sadb_x_ipsecrequest_mode; /* See IPSEC_MODE_XX in ipsec.h. */
u_int8_t sadb_x_ipsecrequest_level; /* See IPSEC_LEVEL_XX in ipsec.h */
u_int16_t sadb_x_ipsecrequest_reqid; /* See ipsec.h */
/*
* followed by source IP address of SA, and immediately followed by
* destination IP address of SA. These encoded into two of sockaddr
* structure without any padding. Must set each sa_len exactly.
* Each of length of the sockaddr structure are not aligned to 64bits,
* but sum of x_request and addresses is aligned to 64bits.
*/
};
/* NAT-Traversal type, see RFC 3948 (and drafts). */
struct sadb_x_nat_t_type {
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_type_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_type_exttype;
u_int8_t sadb_x_nat_t_type_type;
u_int8_t sadb_x_nat_t_type_reserved[3];
};
_Static_assert(sizeof(struct sadb_x_nat_t_type) == 8, "struct size mismatch");
/* NAT-Traversal source or destination port. */
struct sadb_x_nat_t_port {
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_port_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_port_exttype;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_port_port;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_port_reserved;
};
_Static_assert(sizeof(struct sadb_x_nat_t_port) == 8, "struct size mismatch");
/* ESP fragmentation size. */
struct sadb_x_nat_t_frag {
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_frag_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_frag_exttype;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_frag_fraglen;
u_int16_t sadb_x_nat_t_frag_reserved;
};
_Static_assert(sizeof(struct sadb_x_nat_t_frag) == 8, "struct size mismatch");
/* Additional large replay window support
*/
struct sadb_x_sa_replay {
u_int16_t sadb_x_sa_replay_len;
u_int16_t sadb_x_sa_replay_exttype;
u_int32_t sadb_x_sa_replay_replay; /* in packets */
};
_Static_assert(sizeof(struct sadb_x_sa_replay) == 8, "struct size mismatch");
#define SADB_EXT_RESERVED 0
#define SADB_EXT_SA 1
#define SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT 2
#define SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD 3
#define SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT 4
#define SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC 5
#define SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST 6
#define SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY 7
#define SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH 8
#define SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT 9
#define SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC 10
#define SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST 11
#define SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY 12
#define SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL 13
#define SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH 14
#define SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT 15
#define SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE 16
#define SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE 17
#define SADB_X_EXT_POLICY 18
#define SADB_X_EXT_SA2 19
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_TYPE 20
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT 21
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT 22
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OA 23 /* Deprecated. */
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OAI 23 /* Peer's NAT_OA for src of SA. */
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OAR 24 /* Peer's NAT_OA for dst of SA. */
#define SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_FRAG 25 /* Manual MTU override. */
#define SADB_X_EXT_SA_REPLAY 26 /* Replay window override. */
Merge projects/ipsec into head/. Small summary ------------- o Almost all IPsec releated code was moved into sys/netipsec. o New kernel modules added: ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko. New kernel option IPSEC_SUPPORT added. It enables support for loading and unloading of ipsec.ko and tcpmd5.ko kernel modules. o IPSEC_NAT_T option was removed. Now NAT-T support is enabled by default. The UDP_ENCAP_ESPINUDP_NON_IKE encapsulation type support was removed. Added TCP/UDP checksum handling for inbound packets that were decapsulated by transport mode SAs. setkey(8) modified to show run-time NAT-T configuration of SA. o New network pseudo interface if_ipsec(4) added. For now it is build as part of ipsec.ko module (or with IPSEC kernel). It implements IPsec virtual tunnels to create route-based VPNs. o The network stack now invokes IPsec functions using special methods. The only one header file <netipsec/ipsec_support.h> should be included to declare all the needed things to work with IPsec. o All IPsec protocols handlers (ESP/AH/IPCOMP protosw) were removed. Now these protocols are handled directly via IPsec methods. o TCP_SIGNATURE support was reworked to be more close to RFC. o PF_KEY SADB was reworked: - now all security associations stored in the single SPI namespace, and all SAs MUST have unique SPI. - several hash tables added to speed up lookups in SADB. - SADB now uses rmlock to protect access, and concurrent threads can do SA lookups in the same time. - many PF_KEY message handlers were reworked to reflect changes in SADB. - SADB_UPDATE message was extended to support new PF_KEY headers: SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC and SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST. They can be used by IKE daemon to change SA addresses. o ipsecrequest and secpolicy structures were cardinally changed to avoid locking protection for ipsecrequest. Now we support only limited number (4) of bundled SAs, but they are supported for both INET and INET6. o INPCB security policy cache was introduced. Each PCB now caches used security policies to avoid SP lookup for each packet. o For inbound security policies added the mode, when the kernel does check for full history of applied IPsec transforms. o References counting rules for security policies and security associations were changed. The proper SA locking added into xform code. o xform code was also changed. Now it is possible to unregister xforms. tdb_xxx structures were changed and renamed to reflect changes in SADB/SPDB, and changed rules for locking and refcounting. Reviewed by: gnn, wblock Obtained from: Yandex LLC Relnotes: yes Sponsored by: Yandex LLC Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9352
2017-02-06 08:49:57 +00:00
#define SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_SRC 27
#define SADB_X_EXT_NEW_ADDRESS_DST 28
#define SADB_EXT_MAX 28
#define SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC 0
#define SADB_SATYPE_AH 2
#define SADB_SATYPE_ESP 3
#define SADB_SATYPE_RSVP 5
#define SADB_SATYPE_OSPFV2 6
#define SADB_SATYPE_RIPV2 7
#define SADB_SATYPE_MIP 8
#define SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP 9
/*#define SADB_X_SATYPE_POLICY 10 obsolete, do not reuse */
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#define SADB_X_SATYPE_TCPSIGNATURE 11
#define SADB_SATYPE_MAX 12
#define SADB_SASTATE_LARVAL 0
#define SADB_SASTATE_MATURE 1
#define SADB_SASTATE_DYING 2
#define SADB_SASTATE_DEAD 3
#define SADB_SASTATE_MAX 3
#define SADB_SAFLAGS_PFS 1
/* SADB_X_SAFLAGS_ESN was defined in sys/net/pfkeyv2.h in OpenBSD sources */
#define SADB_X_SAFLAGS_ESN 0x400
/*
* Though some of these numbers (both _AALG and _EALG) appear to be
* IKEv2 numbers and others original IKE numbers, they have no meaning.
* These are constants that the various IKE daemons use to tell the kernel
* what cipher to use.
*
* Do not use these constants directly to decide which Transformation ID
* to send. You are responsible for mapping them yourself.
*/
#define SADB_AALG_NONE 0
#define SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC 2
#define SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC 3
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#define SADB_AALG_MAX 252
#define SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256 5
#define SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384 6
#define SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512 7
#define SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC 8
#define SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC 9 /* RFC3566 */
#define SADB_X_AALG_AES128GMAC 11 /* RFC4543 + Errata1821 */
#define SADB_X_AALG_AES192GMAC 12
#define SADB_X_AALG_AES256GMAC 13
#define SADB_X_AALG_CHACHA20POLY1305 14
#define SADB_X_AALG_MD5 249 /* Keyed MD5 */
#define SADB_X_AALG_SHA 250 /* Keyed SHA */
#define SADB_X_AALG_NULL 251 /* null authentication */
Initial import of RFC 2385 (TCP-MD5) digest support. This is the first of two commits; bringing in the kernel support first. This can be enabled by compiling a kernel with options TCP_SIGNATURE and FAST_IPSEC. For the uninitiated, this is a TCP option which provides for a means of authenticating TCP sessions which came into being before IPSEC. It is still relevant today, however, as it is used by many commercial router vendors, particularly with BGP, and as such has become a requirement for interconnect at many major Internet points of presence. Several parts of the TCP and IP headers, including the segment payload, are digested with MD5, including a shared secret. The PF_KEY interface is used to manage the secrets using security associations in the SADB. There is a limitation here in that as there is no way to map a TCP flow per-port back to an SPI without polluting tcpcb or using the SPD; the code to do the latter is unstable at this time. Therefore this code only supports per-host keying granularity. Whilst FAST_IPSEC is mutually exclusive with KAME IPSEC (and thus IPv6), TCP_SIGNATURE applies only to IPv4. For the vast majority of prospective users of this feature, this will not pose any problem. This implementation is output-only; that is, the option is honoured when responding to a host initiating a TCP session, but no effort is made [yet] to authenticate inbound traffic. This is, however, sufficient to interwork with Cisco equipment. Tested with a Cisco 2501 running IOS 12.0(27), and Quagga 0.96.4 with local patches. Patches for tcpdump to validate TCP-MD5 sessions are also available from me upon request. Sponsored by: sentex.net
2004-02-11 04:26:04 +00:00
#define SADB_X_AALG_TCP_MD5 252 /* Keyed TCP-MD5 (RFC2385) */
#define SADB_EALG_NONE 0
#define SADB_EALG_DESCBC 2
#define SADB_EALG_3DESCBC 3
#define SADB_X_EALG_CAST128CBC 6
#define SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC 7
#define SADB_EALG_NULL 11
#define SADB_X_EALG_RIJNDAELCBC 12
#define SADB_X_EALG_AES 12
#define SADB_X_EALG_AESCBC 12
#define SADB_X_EALG_AESCTR 13
#define SADB_X_EALG_CHACHA20POLY1305 15
#define SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM8 18 /* RFC4106 */
#define SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM12 19
#define SADB_X_EALG_AESGCM16 20
#define SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC 22
#define SADB_X_EALG_AESGMAC 23 /* RFC4543 + Errata1821 */
#define SADB_EALG_MAX 23 /* !!! keep updated !!! */
/* private allocations - based on RFC2407/IANA assignment */
#define SADB_X_CALG_NONE 0
#define SADB_X_CALG_OUI 1
#define SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE 2
#define SADB_X_CALG_LZS 3
#define SADB_X_CALG_MAX 4
#define SADB_IDENTTYPE_RESERVED 0
#define SADB_IDENTTYPE_PREFIX 1
#define SADB_IDENTTYPE_FQDN 2
#define SADB_IDENTTYPE_USERFQDN 3
#define SADB_X_IDENTTYPE_ADDR 4
#define SADB_IDENTTYPE_MAX 4
/* `flags' in sadb_sa structure holds followings */
#define SADB_X_EXT_NONE 0x0000 /* i.e. new format. */
#define SADB_X_EXT_OLD 0x0001 /* old format. */
#define SADB_X_EXT_IV4B 0x0010 /* IV length of 4 bytes in use */
#define SADB_X_EXT_DERIV 0x0020 /* DES derived */
#define SADB_X_EXT_CYCSEQ 0x0040 /* allowing to cyclic sequence. */
/* three of followings are exclusive flags each them */
#define SADB_X_EXT_PSEQ 0x0000 /* sequencial padding for ESP */
#define SADB_X_EXT_PRAND 0x0100 /* random padding for ESP */
#define SADB_X_EXT_PZERO 0x0200 /* zero padding for ESP */
#define SADB_X_EXT_PMASK 0x0300 /* mask for padding flag */
#if 1
#define SADB_X_EXT_RAWCPI 0x0080 /* use well known CPI (IPComp) */
#endif
#define SADB_KEY_FLAGS_MAX 0x0fff
/* SPI size for PF_KEYv2 */
#define PFKEY_SPI_SIZE sizeof(u_int32_t)
/* Identifier for menber of lifetime structure */
#define SADB_X_LIFETIME_ALLOCATIONS 0
#define SADB_X_LIFETIME_BYTES 1
#define SADB_X_LIFETIME_ADDTIME 2
#define SADB_X_LIFETIME_USETIME 3
/* The rate for SOFT lifetime against HARD one. */
#define PFKEY_SOFT_LIFETIME_RATE 80
/* Utilities */
#define PFKEY_ALIGN8(a) (1 + (((a) - 1) | (8 - 1)))
#define PFKEY_EXTLEN(msg) \
PFKEY_UNUNIT64(((struct sadb_ext *)(msg))->sadb_ext_len)
#define PFKEY_ADDR_PREFIX(ext) \
(((struct sadb_address *)(ext))->sadb_address_prefixlen)
#define PFKEY_ADDR_PROTO(ext) \
(((struct sadb_address *)(ext))->sadb_address_proto)
#define PFKEY_ADDR_SADDR(ext) \
((struct sockaddr *)((caddr_t)(ext) + sizeof(struct sadb_address)))
/* in 64bits */
#define PFKEY_UNUNIT64(a) ((a) << 3)
#define PFKEY_UNIT64(a) ((a) >> 3)
#endif /* __PFKEY_V2_H */
#endif /* _NET_PFKEYV2_H_ */