freebsd-dev/crypto/openssh/auth.c

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/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.79 2008/07/02 12:03:51 dtucker Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
#include "includes.h"
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__RCSID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
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#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
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#include <shadow.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
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#include <libgen.h>
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#endif
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#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
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#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
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#include "buffer.h"
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#include "servconf.h"
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#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
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#include "auth.h"
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#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
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#include "uidswap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "packet.h"
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#include "loginrec.h"
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#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
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#include "monitor_wrap.h"
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/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
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extern int use_privsep;
extern Buffer loginmsg;
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extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
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/* Debugging messages */
Buffer auth_debug;
int auth_debug_init;
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/*
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* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
* listed there, false will be returned.
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* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
{
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
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char *shell;
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u_int i;
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
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#endif
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/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
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if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
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return 0;
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (!options.use_pam)
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
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if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 0;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
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#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
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/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
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passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
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#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
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passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
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#endif
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/* check for locked account */
if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
int locked = 0;
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
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free(passwd);
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
return 0;
}
}
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/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
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/* deny if shell does not exists or is not executable */
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if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s does not exist",
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pw->pw_name, shell);
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return 0;
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}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s is not executable",
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pw->pw_name, shell);
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return 0;
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}
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if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
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ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr();
}
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/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++)
if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
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options.deny_users[i])) {
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because listed in DenyUsers",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++)
if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
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options.allow_users[i]))
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break;
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
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if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
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/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
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if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
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* isn't listed there
*/
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if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
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logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because none of user's groups are listed "
"in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
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return 0;
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}
ga_free();
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}
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#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
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if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg))
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return 0;
#endif
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/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
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void
auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, char *method, char *info)
{
void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose;
char *authmsg;
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if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
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/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
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authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
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strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
authlog = logit;
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if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s",
authmsg,
method,
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authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
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authctxt->user,
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get_remote_ipaddr(),
get_remote_port(),
info);
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#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
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if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
(strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
record_failed_login(authctxt->user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
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# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
if (authenticated)
sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg);
# endif
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#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
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if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method));
#endif
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}
/*
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
int
auth_root_allowed(char *method)
{
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0)
return 1;
break;
case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
if (forced_command) {
logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
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return 1;
}
break;
}
logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr());
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return 0;
}
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/*
* Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
* by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
* %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
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static char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
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{
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char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN];
int i;
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file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
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/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
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if (*file == '/')
return (file);
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i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
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fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
xfree(file);
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return (xstrdup(ret));
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}
char *
authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
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return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file, pw);
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}
char *
authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
{
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return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
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}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
Key *found;
char *user_hostfile;
struct stat st;
HostStatus host_status;
/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
found = key_new(key->type);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
if (options.strict_modes &&
(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
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"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
} else {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
host, key, found, NULL);
restore_uid();
}
xfree(user_hostfile);
}
key_free(found);
debug2("check_key_in_hostfiles: key %s for %s", host_status == HOST_OK ?
"ok" : "not found", host);
return host_status;
}
/*
* Check a given file for security. This is defined as all components
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* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
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* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
*
* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
*
* Takes an open file descriptor, the file name, a uid and and
* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
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static int
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secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
uid_t uid = pw->pw_uid;
char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN];
char *cp;
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int comparehome = 0;
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struct stat st;
if (realpath(file, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", file,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
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if (realpath(pw->pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
comparehome = 1;
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/* check the open file to avoid races */
if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
buf);
return -1;
}
/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
for (;;) {
if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
return -1;
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
debug3("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
(st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen,
"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
return -1;
}
/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
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if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
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debug3("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
buf);
break;
}
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
*/
if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
break;
}
return 0;
}
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FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
char line[1024];
struct stat st;
int fd;
FILE *f;
/*
* Open the file containing the authorized keys
* Fail quietly if file does not exist
*/
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
return NULL;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s authorized keys %s is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file);
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (options.strict_modes &&
secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(const char *user)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
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parse_server_match_config(&options, user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), get_remote_ipaddr());
pw = getpwnam(user);
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if (pw == NULL) {
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logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s",
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user, get_remote_ipaddr());
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
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record_failed_login(user,
get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh");
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#endif
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#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER);
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
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return (NULL);
}
if (!allowed_user(pw))
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
if (as != NULL)
auth_close(as);
#endif
#endif
if (pw != NULL)
return (pwcopy(pw));
return (NULL);
}
void
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
if (!auth_debug_init)
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf);
}
void
auth_debug_send(void)
{
char *msg;
if (!auth_debug_init)
return;
while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) {
msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL);
packet_send_debug("%s", msg);
xfree(msg);
}
}
void
auth_debug_reset(void)
{
if (auth_debug_init)
buffer_clear(&auth_debug);
else {
buffer_init(&auth_debug);
auth_debug_init = 1;
}
}
struct passwd *
fakepw(void)
{
static struct passwd fake;
memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_passwd =
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"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_PW_CLASS_IN_PASSWD
fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
return (&fake);
}