2005-01-05 20:17:21 +00:00
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/*-
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1997-04-26 11:46:25 +00:00
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* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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* "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
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* <phk@FreeBSD.org> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
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* can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
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* this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
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* ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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*
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1999-08-28 01:08:13 +00:00
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* $FreeBSD$
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1997-04-26 11:46:25 +00:00
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*
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*/
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#ifndef _MACHINE_SMP_H_
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#define _MACHINE_SMP_H_
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2003-11-17 08:58:16 +00:00
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#ifdef _KERNEL
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#ifdef SMP
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#ifndef LOCORE
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2015-12-07 17:41:20 +00:00
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#include <x86/x86_smp.h>
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2003-11-17 08:58:16 +00:00
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/* global symbols in mpboot.S */
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extern char mptramp_start[];
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extern u_int32_t mptramp_pagetables;
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/* IPI handlers */
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inthand_t
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
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IDTVEC(justreturn), /* interrupt CPU with minimum overhead */
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IDTVEC(justreturn1_pti),
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IDTVEC(invltlb_pti),
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Use PCID to optimize PTI.
Use PCID to avoid complete TLB shootdown when switching between user
and kernel mode with PTI enabled.
I use the model close to what I read about KAISER, user-mode PCID has
1:1 correspondence to the kernel-mode PCID, by setting bit 11 in PCID.
Full kernel-mode TLB shootdown is performed on context switches, since
KVA TLB invalidation only works in the current pmap. User-mode part of
TLB is flushed on the pmap activations as well.
Similarly, IPI TLB shootdowns must handle both kernel and user address
spaces for each address. Note that machines which implement PCID but
do not have INVPCID instructions, cause the usual complications in the
IPI handlers, due to the need to switch to the target PCID temporary.
This is racy, but because for PCID/no-INVPCID we disable the
interrupts in pmap_activate_sw(), IPI handler cannot see inconsistent
state of CPU PCID vs PCPU pmap/kcr3/ucr3 pointers.
On the other hand, on kernel/user switches, CR3_PCID_SAVE bit is set
and we do not clear TLB.
I can imagine alternative use of PCID, where there is only one PCID
allocated for the kernel pmap. Then, there is no need to shootdown
kernel TLB entries on context switch. But copyout(3) would need to
either use method similar to proc_rwmem() to access the userspace
data, or (in reverse) provide a temporal mapping for the kernel buffer
into user mode PCID and use trampoline for copy.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Tested by: pho
Discussed with: alc (some aspects)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13985
2018-01-27 11:49:37 +00:00
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IDTVEC(invltlb_pcid_pti),
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IDTVEC(invltlb_pcid), /* TLB shootdowns - global, pcid */
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IDTVEC(invltlb_invpcid_pti_pti),
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IDTVEC(invltlb_invpcid_nopti),
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
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IDTVEC(invlpg_pti),
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Use PCID to optimize PTI.
Use PCID to avoid complete TLB shootdown when switching between user
and kernel mode with PTI enabled.
I use the model close to what I read about KAISER, user-mode PCID has
1:1 correspondence to the kernel-mode PCID, by setting bit 11 in PCID.
Full kernel-mode TLB shootdown is performed on context switches, since
KVA TLB invalidation only works in the current pmap. User-mode part of
TLB is flushed on the pmap activations as well.
Similarly, IPI TLB shootdowns must handle both kernel and user address
spaces for each address. Note that machines which implement PCID but
do not have INVPCID instructions, cause the usual complications in the
IPI handlers, due to the need to switch to the target PCID temporary.
This is racy, but because for PCID/no-INVPCID we disable the
interrupts in pmap_activate_sw(), IPI handler cannot see inconsistent
state of CPU PCID vs PCPU pmap/kcr3/ucr3 pointers.
On the other hand, on kernel/user switches, CR3_PCID_SAVE bit is set
and we do not clear TLB.
I can imagine alternative use of PCID, where there is only one PCID
allocated for the kernel pmap. Then, there is no need to shootdown
kernel TLB entries on context switch. But copyout(3) would need to
either use method similar to proc_rwmem() to access the userspace
data, or (in reverse) provide a temporal mapping for the kernel buffer
into user mode PCID and use trampoline for copy.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Tested by: pho
Discussed with: alc (some aspects)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13985
2018-01-27 11:49:37 +00:00
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IDTVEC(invlpg_invpcid_pti),
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IDTVEC(invlpg_invpcid),
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IDTVEC(invlpg_pcid_pti),
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IDTVEC(invlpg_pcid),
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
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IDTVEC(invlrng_pti),
|
Use PCID to optimize PTI.
Use PCID to avoid complete TLB shootdown when switching between user
and kernel mode with PTI enabled.
I use the model close to what I read about KAISER, user-mode PCID has
1:1 correspondence to the kernel-mode PCID, by setting bit 11 in PCID.
Full kernel-mode TLB shootdown is performed on context switches, since
KVA TLB invalidation only works in the current pmap. User-mode part of
TLB is flushed on the pmap activations as well.
Similarly, IPI TLB shootdowns must handle both kernel and user address
spaces for each address. Note that machines which implement PCID but
do not have INVPCID instructions, cause the usual complications in the
IPI handlers, due to the need to switch to the target PCID temporary.
This is racy, but because for PCID/no-INVPCID we disable the
interrupts in pmap_activate_sw(), IPI handler cannot see inconsistent
state of CPU PCID vs PCPU pmap/kcr3/ucr3 pointers.
On the other hand, on kernel/user switches, CR3_PCID_SAVE bit is set
and we do not clear TLB.
I can imagine alternative use of PCID, where there is only one PCID
allocated for the kernel pmap. Then, there is no need to shootdown
kernel TLB entries on context switch. But copyout(3) would need to
either use method similar to proc_rwmem() to access the userspace
data, or (in reverse) provide a temporal mapping for the kernel buffer
into user mode PCID and use trampoline for copy.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Tested by: pho
Discussed with: alc (some aspects)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13985
2018-01-27 11:49:37 +00:00
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IDTVEC(invlrng_invpcid_pti),
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IDTVEC(invlrng_invpcid),
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IDTVEC(invlrng_pcid_pti),
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IDTVEC(invlrng_pcid),
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PTI for amd64.
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
2018-01-17 11:44:21 +00:00
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IDTVEC(invlcache_pti),
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IDTVEC(ipi_intr_bitmap_handler_pti),
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IDTVEC(cpustop_pti),
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IDTVEC(cpususpend_pti),
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IDTVEC(rendezvous_pti);
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2003-11-17 08:58:16 +00:00
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2014-03-11 10:03:29 +00:00
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void invltlb_pcid_handler(void);
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Rewrite amd64 PCID implementation to follow an algorithm described in
the Vahalia' "Unix Internals" section 15.12 "Other TLB Consistency
Algorithms". The same algorithm is already utilized by the MIPS pmap
to handle ASIDs.
The PCID for the address space is now allocated per-cpu during context
switch to the thread using pmap, when no PCID on the cpu was ever
allocated, or the current PCID is invalidated. If the PCID is reused,
bit 63 of %cr3 can be set to avoid TLB flush.
Each cpu has PCID' algorithm generation count, which is saved in the
pmap pcpu block when pcpu PCID is allocated. On invalidation, the
pmap generation count is zeroed, which signals the context switch code
that already allocated PCID is no longer valid. The implication is
the TLB shootdown for the given cpu/address space, due to the
allocation of new PCID.
The pm_save mask is no longer has to be tracked, which (significantly)
reduces the targets of the TLB shootdown IPIs. Previously, pm_save
was reset only on pmap_invalidate_all(), which made it accumulate the
cpuids of all processors on which the thread was scheduled between
full TLB shootdowns.
Besides reducing the amount of TLB shootdowns and removing atomics to
update pm_saves in the context switch code, the algorithm is much
simpler than the maintanence of pm_save and selection of the right
address space in the shootdown IPI handler.
Reviewed by: alc
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
2015-05-09 19:11:01 +00:00
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void invltlb_invpcid_handler(void);
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Use PCID to optimize PTI.
Use PCID to avoid complete TLB shootdown when switching between user
and kernel mode with PTI enabled.
I use the model close to what I read about KAISER, user-mode PCID has
1:1 correspondence to the kernel-mode PCID, by setting bit 11 in PCID.
Full kernel-mode TLB shootdown is performed on context switches, since
KVA TLB invalidation only works in the current pmap. User-mode part of
TLB is flushed on the pmap activations as well.
Similarly, IPI TLB shootdowns must handle both kernel and user address
spaces for each address. Note that machines which implement PCID but
do not have INVPCID instructions, cause the usual complications in the
IPI handlers, due to the need to switch to the target PCID temporary.
This is racy, but because for PCID/no-INVPCID we disable the
interrupts in pmap_activate_sw(), IPI handler cannot see inconsistent
state of CPU PCID vs PCPU pmap/kcr3/ucr3 pointers.
On the other hand, on kernel/user switches, CR3_PCID_SAVE bit is set
and we do not clear TLB.
I can imagine alternative use of PCID, where there is only one PCID
allocated for the kernel pmap. Then, there is no need to shootdown
kernel TLB entries on context switch. But copyout(3) would need to
either use method similar to proc_rwmem() to access the userspace
data, or (in reverse) provide a temporal mapping for the kernel buffer
into user mode PCID and use trampoline for copy.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Tested by: pho
Discussed with: alc (some aspects)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13985
2018-01-27 11:49:37 +00:00
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void invltlb_invpcid_pti_handler(void);
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void invlpg_invpcid_handler(void);
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void invlpg_pcid_handler(void);
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void invlrng_invpcid_handler(void);
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void invlrng_pcid_handler(void);
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2014-03-11 10:27:57 +00:00
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int native_start_all_aps(void);
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2018-04-05 14:39:51 +00:00
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void mp_bootaddress(vm_paddr_t *, unsigned int *);
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2003-11-17 08:58:16 +00:00
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#endif /* !LOCORE */
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#endif /* SMP */
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#endif /* _KERNEL */
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1997-04-26 11:46:25 +00:00
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#endif /* _MACHINE_SMP_H_ */
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