Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
/*-
|
2004-02-22 00:33:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002 Robert N. M. Watson
|
|
|
|
|
* Copyright (c) 2001-2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
* All rights reserved.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
2002-11-04 01:53:12 +00:00
|
|
|
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
|
|
|
|
|
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
|
|
|
|
|
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
|
|
|
|
|
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
|
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
|
|
|
* are met:
|
|
|
|
|
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
|
|
|
|
|
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
|
|
|
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
|
|
|
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
|
|
|
|
|
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
|
|
|
|
|
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
|
|
|
|
|
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
|
|
|
|
|
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
|
|
|
|
|
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
|
|
|
|
|
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
|
|
|
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
|
|
|
|
|
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
|
|
|
|
|
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
|
|
|
|
|
* SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
|
* $FreeBSD$
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
|
|
|
|
|
* Prevent processes owned by a particular uid from seeing various transient
|
|
|
|
|
* kernel objects associated with other uids.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/param.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/conf.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/kernel.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mac.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mount.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/proc.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/systm.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysent.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/vnode.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/file.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socket.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/bpfdesc.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_types.h>
|
|
|
|
|
#include <net/if_var.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <vm/vm.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#include <sys/mac_policy.h>
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_DECL(_security_mac);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_NODE(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, seeotheruids, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
|
|
|
|
|
"TrustedBSD mac_seeotheruids policy controls");
|
|
|
|
|
|
2002-12-10 16:20:34 +00:00
|
|
|
static int mac_seeotheruids_enabled = 1;
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, enabled, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
|
&mac_seeotheruids_enabled, 0, "Enforce seeotheruids policy");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Exception: allow credentials to be aware of other credentials with the
|
|
|
|
|
* same primary gid.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int primarygroup_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, primarygroup_enabled,
|
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RW, &primarygroup_enabled, 0, "Make an exception for credentials "
|
|
|
|
|
"with the same real primary group id");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
|
* Exception: allow processes with a specific gid to be exempt from the
|
|
|
|
|
* policy. One sysctl enables this functionality; the other sets the
|
|
|
|
|
* exempt gid.
|
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
static int specificgid_enabled = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, specificgid_enabled,
|
|
|
|
|
CTLFLAG_RW, &specificgid_enabled, 0, "Make an exception for credentials "
|
|
|
|
|
"with a specific gid as their real primary group id or group set");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static gid_t specificgid = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_seeotheruids, OID_AUTO, specificgid, CTLFLAG_RW,
|
|
|
|
|
&specificgid, 0, "Specific gid to be exempt from seeotheruids policy");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_seeotheruids_check(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!mac_seeotheruids_enabled)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (primarygroup_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (u1->cr_rgid == u2->cr_rgid)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (specificgid_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
|
if (u1->cr_rgid == specificgid || groupmember(specificgid, u1))
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (u1->cr_ruid == u2->cr_ruid)
|
|
|
|
|
return (0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (ESRCH);
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_seeotheruids_check_cred_visible(struct ucred *u1, struct ucred *u2)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(u1, u2));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_signal(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc,
|
|
|
|
|
int signum)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, proc->p_ucred));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_sched(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, proc->p_ucred));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_debug(struct ucred *cred, struct proc *proc)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, proc->p_ucred));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
|
mac_seeotheruids_check_socket_visible(struct ucred *cred, struct socket *socket,
|
|
|
|
|
struct label *socketlabel)
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (mac_seeotheruids_check(cred, socket->so_cred));
|
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:
(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy
with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
a few hundred NULL function pointers.
(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
entry point set.
Both of these no longer apply:
(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.
(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going
rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
complexity.
This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
|
|
|
static struct mac_policy_ops mac_seeotheruids_ops =
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
{
|
Move to C99 sparse structure initialization for the mac_policy_ops
structure definition, rather than using an operation vector
we translate into the structure. Originally, we used a vector
for two reasons:
(1) We wanted to define the structure sparsely, which wasn't
supported by the C compiler for structures. For a policy
with five entry points, you don't want to have to stick in
a few hundred NULL function pointers.
(2) We thought it would improve ABI compatibility allowing modules
to work with kernels that had a superset of the entry points
defined in the module, even if the kernel had changed its
entry point set.
Both of these no longer apply:
(1) C99 gives us a way to sparsely define a static structure.
(2) The ABI problems existed anyway, due to enumeration numbers,
argument changes, and semantic mismatches. Since the going
rule for FreeBSD is that you really need your modules to
pretty closely match your kernel, it's not worth the
complexity.
This submit eliminates the operation vector, dynamic allocation
of the operation structure, copying of the vector to the
structure, and redoes the vectors in each policy to direct
structure definitions. One enourmous benefit of this change
is that we now get decent type checking on policy entry point
implementation arguments.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
2002-10-30 18:48:51 +00:00
|
|
|
.mpo_check_cred_visible = mac_seeotheruids_check_cred_visible,
|
|
|
|
|
.mpo_check_proc_debug = mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_debug,
|
|
|
|
|
.mpo_check_proc_sched = mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_sched,
|
|
|
|
|
.mpo_check_proc_signal = mac_seeotheruids_check_proc_signal,
|
|
|
|
|
.mpo_check_socket_visible = mac_seeotheruids_check_socket_visible,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
2003-03-27 19:26:39 +00:00
|
|
|
MAC_POLICY_SET(&mac_seeotheruids_ops, mac_seeotheruids,
|
Introduce support for Mandatory Access Control and extensible
kernel access control.
Provide implementations of some sample operating system security
policy extensions. These are not yet hooked up to the build as
other infrastructure is still being committed. Most of these
work fairly well and are in daily use in our development and (limited)
production environments. Some are not yet in their final form,
and a number of the labeled policies waste a lot of kernel memory
and will be fixed over the next month or so to be more conservative.
They do give good examples of the flexibility of the MAC framework
for implementing a variety of security policies.
mac_biba: Implementation of fixed-label Biba integrity policy,
similar to those found in a number of commercial
trusted operating systems. All subjects and objects
are assigned integrity levels, and information flow
is controlled based on a read-up, write-down
policy. Currently, purely hierarchal.
mac_bsdextended: Implementation of a "file system firewall",
which allows the administrator to specify a series
of rules limiting access by users and groups to
objects owned by other users and groups. This
policy is unlabeled, relying on existing system
security labeling (file permissions/ownership,
process credentials).
mac_ifoff: Secure interface silencing. Special-purpose module
to limit inappropriate out-going network traffic
for silent monitoring scenarios. Prevents the
various network stacks from generating any output
despite an interface being live for reception.
mac_mls: Implementation of fixed-label Multi-Level Security
confidentiality policy, similar to those found in
a number of commercial trusted operating systems.
All subjects and objects are assigned confidentiality
levels, and information flow is controlled based on
a write-up, read-down policy. Currently, purely
hiearchal, although non-hierarchal support is in the
works.
mac_none: Policy module implementing all MAC policy entry
points with empty stubs. A good place to start if
you want all the prototypes types in for you, and
don't mind a bit of pruning. Can be loaded, but
has no access control impact. Useful also for
performance measurements.
mac_seeotheruids: Policy module implementing a security service
similar to security.bsd.seeotheruids, only a slightly
more detailed policy involving exceptions for members
of specific groups, etc. This policy is unlabeled,
relying on existing system security labeling
(process credentials).
mac_test: Policy module implementing basic sanity tests for
label handling. Attempts to ensure that labels are
not freed multiple times, etc, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
2002-07-31 18:07:45 +00:00
|
|
|
"TrustedBSD MAC/seeotheruids", MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK, NULL);
|