freebsd-dev/sys/kern/vfs_acl.c

/*-
 * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Robert N. M. Watson
 * All rights reserved.
 *
 * This software was developed by Robert Watson for the TrustedBSD Project.
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 * SUCH DAMAGE.
 */
/*
 * Developed by the TrustedBSD Project.
 * Support for POSIX.1e access control lists.
 */

#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");

#include "opt_mac.h"

#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/sysproto.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/namei.h>
#include <sys/file.h>
#include <sys/filedesc.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/sysent.h>
#include <sys/errno.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/acl.h>

MALLOC_DEFINE(M_ACL, "acl", "access control list");

static int	vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
		    acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
static int	vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
		    acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);
static int	vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp,
		    acl_type_t type, struct acl *aclp);

/*
 * Implement a version of vaccess() that understands POSIX.1e ACL semantics.
 * Return 0 on success, else an errno value.  Should be merged into
 * vaccess() eventually.
 */
int
vaccess_acl_posix1e(enum vtype type, uid_t file_uid, gid_t file_gid,
    struct acl *acl, mode_t acc_mode, struct ucred *cred, int *privused)
{
	struct acl_entry *acl_other, *acl_mask;
	mode_t dac_granted;
	mode_t cap_granted;
	mode_t acl_mask_granted;
	int group_matched, i;

	/*
	 * Look for a normal, non-privileged way to access the file/directory
	 * as requested.  If it exists, go with that.  Otherwise, attempt
	 * to use privileges granted via cap_granted.  In some cases,
	 * which privileges to use may be ambiguous due to "best match",
	 * in which case fall back on first match for the time being.
	 */
	if (privused != NULL)
		*privused = 0;

	/*
	 * Determine privileges now, but don't apply until we've found
	 * a DAC entry that matches but has failed to allow access.
	 */
#ifndef CAPABILITIES
	if (suser_cred(cred, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL) == 0)
		cap_granted = VALLPERM;
	else
		cap_granted = 0;
#else
	cap_granted = 0;

	if (type == VDIR) {
		if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
		     CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
			cap_granted |= VEXEC;
	} else {
		if ((acc_mode & VEXEC) && !cap_check(cred, NULL,
		    CAP_DAC_EXECUTE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
			cap_granted |= VEXEC;
	}

	if ((acc_mode & VREAD) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
		cap_granted |= VREAD;

	if (((acc_mode & VWRITE) || (acc_mode & VAPPEND)) &&
	    !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_DAC_WRITE, SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
		cap_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);

	if ((acc_mode & VADMIN) && !cap_check(cred, NULL, CAP_FOWNER,
	    SUSER_ALLOWJAIL))
		cap_granted |= VADMIN;
#endif /* CAPABILITIES */

	/*
	 * The owner matches if the effective uid associated with the
	 * credential matches that of the ACL_USER_OBJ entry.  While we're
	 * doing the first scan, also cache the location of the ACL_MASK
	 * and ACL_OTHER entries, preventing some future iterations.
	 */
	acl_mask = acl_other = NULL;
	for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
		switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
		case ACL_USER_OBJ:
			if (file_uid != cred->cr_uid)
				break;
			dac_granted = 0;
			dac_granted |= VADMIN;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
				dac_granted |= VEXEC;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
				dac_granted |= VREAD;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
				dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
			if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
				return (0);
			if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) ==
			    acc_mode) {
				if (privused != NULL)
					*privused = 1;
				return (0);
			}
			goto error;

		case ACL_MASK:
			acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
			break;

		case ACL_OTHER:
			acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
			break;

		default:
			break;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * An ACL_OTHER entry should always exist in a valid access
	 * ACL.  If it doesn't, then generate a serious failure.  For now,
	 * this means a debugging message and EPERM, but in the future
	 * should probably be a panic.
	 */
	if (acl_other == NULL) {
		/*
		 * XXX This should never happen
		 */
		printf("vaccess_acl_posix1e: ACL_OTHER missing\n");
		return (EPERM);
	}

	/*
	 * Checks against ACL_USER, ACL_GROUP_OBJ, and ACL_GROUP fields
	 * are masked by an ACL_MASK entry, if any.  As such, first identify
	 * the ACL_MASK field, then iterate through identifying potential
	 * user matches, then group matches.  If there is no ACL_MASK,
	 * assume that the mask allows all requests to succeed.
	 */
	if (acl_mask != NULL) {
		acl_mask_granted = 0;
		if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
			acl_mask_granted |= VEXEC;
		if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
			acl_mask_granted |= VREAD;
		if (acl_mask->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
			acl_mask_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
	} else
		acl_mask_granted = VEXEC | VREAD | VWRITE | VAPPEND;

	/*
	 * Iterate through user ACL entries.  Do checks twice, first
	 * without privilege, and then if a match is found but failed,
	 * a second time with privilege.
	 */

	/*
	 * Check ACL_USER ACL entries.
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
		switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
		case ACL_USER:
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != cred->cr_uid)
				break;
			dac_granted = 0;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
				dac_granted |= VEXEC;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
				dac_granted |= VREAD;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
				dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
			dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;
			if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
				return (0);
			if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
			    acc_mode)
				goto error;

			if (privused != NULL)
				*privused = 1;
			return (0);
		}
	}

	/*
	 * Group match is best-match, not first-match, so find a 
	 * "best" match.  Iterate across, testing each potential group
	 * match.  Make sure we keep track of whether we found a match
	 * or not, so that we know if we should try again with any
	 * available privilege, or if we should move on to ACL_OTHER.
	 */
	group_matched = 0;
	for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
		switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
		case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
			if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
				break;
			dac_granted = 0;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
				dac_granted |= VEXEC;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
				dac_granted |= VREAD;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
				dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
			dac_granted  &= acl_mask_granted;

			if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
				return (0);

			group_matched = 1;
			break;

		case ACL_GROUP:
			if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id, cred))
				break;
			dac_granted = 0;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
				dac_granted |= VEXEC;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
				dac_granted |= VREAD;
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
				dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
			dac_granted  &= acl_mask_granted;

			if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
				return (0);

			group_matched = 1;
			break;

		default:
			break;
		}
	}

	if (group_matched == 1) {
		/*
		 * There was a match, but it did not grant rights via
		 * pure DAC.  Try again, this time with privilege.
		 */
		for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
			switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
			case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
				if (!groupmember(file_gid, cred))
					break;
				dac_granted = 0;
				if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
					dac_granted |= VEXEC;
				if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
					dac_granted |= VREAD;
				if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
					dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
				dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;

				if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
				    acc_mode)
					break;

				if (privused != NULL)
					*privused = 1;
				return (0);

			case ACL_GROUP:
				if (!groupmember(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id,
				    cred))
					break;
				dac_granted = 0;
				if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
				dac_granted |= VEXEC;
				if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_READ)
					dac_granted |= VREAD;
				if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
					dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);
				dac_granted &= acl_mask_granted;

				if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) !=
				    acc_mode)
					break;

				if (privused != NULL)
					*privused = 1;
				return (0);

			default:
				break;
			}
		}
		/*
		 * Even with privilege, group membership was not sufficient.
		 * Return failure.
		 */
		goto error;
	}
		
	/*
	 * Fall back on ACL_OTHER.  ACL_MASK is not applied to ACL_OTHER.
	 */
	dac_granted = 0;
	if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
		dac_granted |= VEXEC;
	if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
		dac_granted |= VREAD;
	if (acl_other->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
		dac_granted |= (VWRITE | VAPPEND);

	if ((acc_mode & dac_granted) == acc_mode)
		return (0);
	if ((acc_mode & (dac_granted | cap_granted)) == acc_mode) {
		if (privused != NULL)
			*privused = 1;
		return (0);
	}

error:
	return ((acc_mode & VADMIN) ? EPERM : EACCES);
}

/*
 * For the purposes of filesystems maintaining the _OBJ entries in an
 * inode with a mode_t field, this routine converts a mode_t entry
 * to an acl_perm_t.
 */
acl_perm_t
acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(acl_tag_t tag, mode_t mode)
{
	acl_perm_t	perm = 0;

	switch(tag) {
	case ACL_USER_OBJ:
		if (mode & S_IXUSR)
			perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
		if (mode & S_IRUSR)
			perm |= ACL_READ;
		if (mode & S_IWUSR)
			perm |= ACL_WRITE;
		return (perm);

	case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
		if (mode & S_IXGRP)
			perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
		if (mode & S_IRGRP)
			perm |= ACL_READ;
		if (mode & S_IWGRP)
			perm |= ACL_WRITE;
		return (perm);

	case ACL_OTHER:
		if (mode & S_IXOTH)
			perm |= ACL_EXECUTE;
		if (mode & S_IROTH)
			perm |= ACL_READ;
		if (mode & S_IWOTH)
			perm |= ACL_WRITE;
		return (perm);

	default:
		printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
		return (0);
	}
}

/*
 * Given inode information (uid, gid, mode), return an acl entry of the
 * appropriate type.
 */
struct acl_entry
acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry(acl_tag_t tag, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode)
{
	struct acl_entry	acl_entry;

	acl_entry.ae_tag = tag;
	acl_entry.ae_perm = acl_posix1e_mode_to_perm(tag, mode);
	switch(tag) {
	case ACL_USER_OBJ:
		acl_entry.ae_id = uid;
		break;

	case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
		acl_entry.ae_id = gid;
		break;

	case ACL_OTHER:
		acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
		break;

	default:
		acl_entry.ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
		printf("acl_posix1e_mode_to_entry: invalid tag (%d)\n", tag);
	}

	return (acl_entry);
}

/*
 * Utility function to generate a file mode given appropriate ACL entries.
 */
mode_t
acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(struct acl_entry *acl_user_obj_entry,
    struct acl_entry *acl_group_obj_entry, struct acl_entry *acl_other_entry)
{
	mode_t	mode;

	mode = 0;
	if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
		mode |= S_IXUSR;
	if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
		mode |= S_IRUSR;
	if (acl_user_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
		mode |= S_IWUSR;
	if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
		mode |= S_IXGRP;
	if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
		mode |= S_IRGRP;
	if (acl_group_obj_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
		mode |= S_IWGRP;
	if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_EXECUTE)
		mode |= S_IXOTH;
	if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_READ)
		mode |= S_IROTH;
	if (acl_other_entry->ae_perm & ACL_WRITE)
		mode |= S_IWOTH;

	return (mode);
}

/*
 * Utility function to generate a file mode given a complete POSIX.1e
 * access ACL.  Note that if the ACL is improperly formed, this may
 * result in a panic.
 */
mode_t
acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(struct acl *acl)
{
	struct acl_entry *acl_mask, *acl_user_obj, *acl_group_obj, *acl_other;
	int i;

	/*
	 * Find the ACL entries relevant to a POSIX permission mode.
	 */
	acl_user_obj = acl_group_obj = acl_other = acl_mask = NULL;
	for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
		switch (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
		case ACL_USER_OBJ:
			acl_user_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
			break;

		case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
			acl_group_obj = &acl->acl_entry[i];
			break;

		case ACL_OTHER:
			acl_other = &acl->acl_entry[i];
			break;

		case ACL_MASK:
			acl_mask = &acl->acl_entry[i];
			break;

		case ACL_USER:
		case ACL_GROUP:
			break;

		default:
			panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: bad ae_tag");
		}
	}

	if (acl_user_obj == NULL || acl_group_obj == NULL || acl_other == NULL)
		panic("acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode: missing base ae_tags");

	/*
	 * POSIX.1e specifies that if there is an ACL_MASK entry, we replace
	 * the mode "group" bits with its permissions.  If there isn't, we
	 * use the ACL_GROUP_OBJ permissions.
	 */
	if (acl_mask != NULL)
		return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_mask,
		    acl_other));
	else
		return (acl_posix1e_perms_to_mode(acl_user_obj, acl_group_obj,
		    acl_other));
}

/*
 * Perform a syntactic check of the ACL, sufficient to allow an
 * implementing filesystem to determine if it should accept this and
 * rely on the POSIX.1e ACL properties.
 */
int
acl_posix1e_check(struct acl *acl)
{
	int num_acl_user_obj, num_acl_user, num_acl_group_obj, num_acl_group;
	int num_acl_mask, num_acl_other, i;

	/*
	 * Verify that the number of entries does not exceed the maximum
	 * defined for acl_t.
	 * Verify that the correct number of various sorts of ae_tags are
	 * present:
	 *   Exactly one ACL_USER_OBJ
	 *   Exactly one ACL_GROUP_OBJ
	 *   Exactly one ACL_OTHER
	 *   If any ACL_USER or ACL_GROUP entries appear, then exactly one
	 *   ACL_MASK entry must also appear.
	 * Verify that all ae_perm entries are in ACL_PERM_BITS.
	 * Verify all ae_tag entries are understood by this implementation.
	 * Note: Does not check for uniqueness of qualifier (ae_id) field.
	 */
	num_acl_user_obj = num_acl_user = num_acl_group_obj = num_acl_group =
	    num_acl_mask = num_acl_other = 0;
	if (acl->acl_cnt > ACL_MAX_ENTRIES || acl->acl_cnt < 0)
		return (EINVAL);
	for (i = 0; i < acl->acl_cnt; i++) {
		/*
		 * Check for a valid tag.
		 */
		switch(acl->acl_entry[i].ae_tag) {
		case ACL_USER_OBJ:
			acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
				return (EINVAL);
			num_acl_user_obj++;
			break;
		case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
			acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
				return (EINVAL);
			num_acl_group_obj++;
			break;
		case ACL_USER:
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
				return (EINVAL);
			num_acl_user++;
			break;
		case ACL_GROUP:
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id == ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
				return (EINVAL);
			num_acl_group++;
			break;
		case ACL_OTHER:
			acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
				return (EINVAL);
			num_acl_other++;
			break;
		case ACL_MASK:
			acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID; /* XXX */
			if (acl->acl_entry[i].ae_id != ACL_UNDEFINED_ID)
				return (EINVAL);
			num_acl_mask++;
			break;
		default:
			return (EINVAL);
		}
		/*
		 * Check for valid perm entries.
		 */
		if ((acl->acl_entry[i].ae_perm | ACL_PERM_BITS) !=
		    ACL_PERM_BITS)
			return (EINVAL);
	}
	if ((num_acl_user_obj != 1) || (num_acl_group_obj != 1) ||
	    (num_acl_other != 1) || (num_acl_mask != 0 && num_acl_mask != 1))
		return (EINVAL);
	if (((num_acl_group != 0) || (num_acl_user != 0)) &&
	    (num_acl_mask != 1))
		return (EINVAL);
	return (0);
}

/*
 * Given a requested mode for a new object, and a default ACL, combine
 * the two to produce a new mode.  Be careful not to clear any bits that
 * aren't intended to be affected by the POSIX.1e ACL.  Eventually,
 * this might also take the cmask as an argument, if we push that down
 * into per-filesystem-code.
 */
mode_t
acl_posix1e_newfilemode(mode_t cmode, struct acl *dacl)
{
	mode_t mode;

	mode = cmode;
	/*
	 * The current composition policy is that a permission bit must
	 * be set in *both* the ACL and the requested creation mode for
	 * it to appear in the resulting mode/ACL.  First clear any
	 * possibly effected bits, then reconstruct.
	 */
	mode &= ACL_PRESERVE_MASK;
	mode |= (ACL_OVERRIDE_MASK & cmode & acl_posix1e_acl_to_mode(dacl));

	return (mode);
}

/*
 * These calls wrap the real vnode operations, and are called by the 
 * syscall code once the syscall has converted the path or file
 * descriptor to a vnode (unlocked).  The aclp pointer is assumed
 * still to point to userland, so this should not be consumed within
 * the kernel except by syscall code.  Other code should directly
 * invoke VOP_{SET,GET}ACL.
 */

/*
 * Given a vnode, set its ACL.
 */
static int
vacl_set_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
    struct acl *aclp)
{
	struct acl inkernacl;
	struct mount *mp;
	int error;

	error = copyin(aclp, &inkernacl, sizeof(struct acl));
	if (error)
		return(error);
	error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
	if (error != 0)
		return (error);
	VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
	vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
#ifdef MAC
	error = mac_check_vnode_setacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type, &inkernacl);
	if (error != 0)
		goto out;
#endif
	error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, &inkernacl, td->td_ucred, td);
#ifdef MAC
out:
#endif
	VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
	vn_finished_write(mp);
	return(error);
}

/*
 * Given a vnode, get its ACL.
 */
static int
vacl_get_acl(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
    struct acl *aclp)
{
	struct acl inkernelacl;
	int error;

	VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
	vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
#ifdef MAC
	error = mac_check_vnode_getacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type);
	if (error != 0)
		goto out;
#endif
	error = VOP_GETACL(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
#ifdef MAC
out:
#endif
	VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
	if (error == 0)
		error = copyout(&inkernelacl, aclp, sizeof(struct acl));
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a vnode, delete its ACL.
 */
static int
vacl_delete(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type)
{
	struct mount *mp;
	int error;

	error = vn_start_write(vp, &mp, V_WAIT | PCATCH);
	if (error)
		return (error);
	VOP_LEASE(vp, td, td->td_ucred, LEASE_WRITE);
	vn_lock(vp, LK_EXCLUSIVE | LK_RETRY, td);
#ifdef MAC
	error = mac_check_vnode_deleteacl(td->td_ucred, vp, type);
	if (error)
		goto out;
#endif
	error = VOP_SETACL(vp, type, 0, td->td_ucred, td);
#ifdef MAC
out:
#endif
	VOP_UNLOCK(vp, 0, td);
	vn_finished_write(mp);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a vnode, check whether an ACL is appropriate for it
 */
static int
vacl_aclcheck(struct thread *td, struct vnode *vp, acl_type_t type,
    struct acl *aclp)
{
	struct acl inkernelacl;
	int error;

	error = copyin(aclp, &inkernelacl, sizeof(struct acl));
	if (error)
		return(error);
	error = VOP_ACLCHECK(vp, type, &inkernelacl, td->td_ucred, td);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * syscalls -- convert the path/fd to a vnode, and call vacl_whatever.
 * Don't need to lock, as the vacl_ code will get/release any locks
 * required.
 */

/*
 * Given a file path, get an ACL for it
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_get_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_file_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata nd;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_get_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, get an ACL for it; don't follow links.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_get_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_link_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata nd;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_get_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, set an ACL for it
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_set_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_file_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata nd;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_set_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, set an ACL for it; don't follow links.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_set_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_link_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata nd;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_set_acl(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file descriptor, get an ACL for it
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_get_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_get_fd_args *uap)
{
	struct file *fp;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_get_acl(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		fdrop(fp, td);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file descriptor, set an ACL for it
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_set_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_set_fd_args *uap)
{
	struct file *fp;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_set_acl(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		fdrop(fp, td);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_delete_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_file_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata nd;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_delete(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it; don't follow links.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_delete_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_link_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata nd;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_delete(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, delete an ACL from it.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_delete_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_delete_fd_args *uap)
{
	struct file *fp;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_delete(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type);
		fdrop(fp, td);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, check an ACL for it
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_aclcheck_file(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_file_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata	nd;
	int	error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, FOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_aclcheck(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file path, check an ACL for it; don't follow links.
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_aclcheck_link(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_link_args *uap)
{
	struct nameidata	nd;
	int	error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	NDINIT(&nd, LOOKUP, NOFOLLOW, UIO_USERSPACE, uap->path, td);
	error = namei(&nd);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_aclcheck(td, nd.ni_vp, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		NDFREE(&nd, 0);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}

/*
 * Given a file descriptor, check an ACL for it
 *
 * MPSAFE
 */
int
__acl_aclcheck_fd(struct thread *td, struct __acl_aclcheck_fd_args *uap)
{
	struct file *fp;
	int error;

	mtx_lock(&Giant);
	error = getvnode(td->td_proc->p_fd, uap->filedes, &fp);
	if (error == 0) {
		error = vacl_aclcheck(td, fp->f_vnode, uap->type, uap->aclp);
		fdrop(fp, td);
	}
	mtx_unlock(&Giant);
	return (error);
}