Remove a workaround for GCM requests with an empty payload.

This was copied from ccr(4) (which does require the workaround), but
is reportedly not needed for ccp(4).

Discussed with:	cem
Sponsored by:	Netflix
This commit is contained in:
John Baldwin 2020-05-22 20:52:36 +00:00
parent e1a6e0e33e
commit 016fc6ddb3
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=361404

View File

@ -113,67 +113,6 @@ ccp_populate_sglist(struct sglist *sg, struct cryptop *crp)
return (error);
}
/*
* Handle a GCM request with an empty payload by performing the
* operation in software.
*/
static void
ccp_gcm_soft(struct ccp_session *s, struct cryptop *crp)
{
struct aes_gmac_ctx gmac_ctx;
char block[GMAC_BLOCK_LEN];
char digest[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
char iv[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
int i, len;
/*
* This assumes a 12-byte IV from the crp. See longer comment
* above in ccp_gcm() for more details.
*/
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE) == 0) {
crp->crp_etype = EINVAL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(iv, crp->crp_iv, 12);
*(uint32_t *)&iv[12] = htobe32(1);
/* Initialize the MAC. */
AES_GMAC_Init(&gmac_ctx);
AES_GMAC_Setkey(&gmac_ctx, s->blkcipher.enckey, s->blkcipher.key_len);
AES_GMAC_Reinit(&gmac_ctx, iv, sizeof(iv));
/* MAC the AAD. */
for (i = 0; i < crp->crp_aad_length; i += sizeof(block)) {
len = imin(crp->crp_aad_length - i, sizeof(block));
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_aad_start + i, len, block);
bzero(block + len, sizeof(block) - len);
AES_GMAC_Update(&gmac_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
}
/* Length block. */
bzero(block, sizeof(block));
((uint32_t *)block)[1] = htobe32(crp->crp_aad_length * 8);
AES_GMAC_Update(&gmac_ctx, block, sizeof(block));
AES_GMAC_Final(digest, &gmac_ctx);
if (CRYPTO_OP_IS_ENCRYPT(crp->crp_op)) {
crypto_copyback(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest),
digest);
crp->crp_etype = 0;
} else {
char digest2[GMAC_DIGEST_LEN];
crypto_copydata(crp, crp->crp_digest_start, sizeof(digest2),
digest2);
if (timingsafe_bcmp(digest, digest2, sizeof(digest)) == 0)
crp->crp_etype = 0;
else
crp->crp_etype = EBADMSG;
}
out:
crypto_done(crp);
}
static int
ccp_probe(device_t dev)
{
@ -643,11 +582,6 @@ ccp_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
error = ccp_authenc(qp, s, crp);
break;
case GCM:
if (crp->crp_payload_length == 0) {
mtx_unlock(&qp->cq_lock);
ccp_gcm_soft(s, crp);
return (0);
}
if (s->pending != 0) {
error = EAGAIN;
break;