Fix NFS credential

The commit f74b821 caused a regression where creating file through NFS will
always create a file owned by root. This is because the patch enables the KSID
code in zfs_acl_ids_create, which it would use euid and egid of the current
process. However, on Linux, we should use fsuid and fsgid for file operations,
which is the original behaviour. So we revert this part of code.

The patch also enables secpolicy_vnode_*, since they are also used in file
operations, we change them to use fsuid and fsgid.

Signed-off-by: Chunwei Chen <david.chen@osnexus.com>
Signed-off-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Closes #4772
Closes #4758
This commit is contained in:
Chunwei Chen 2016-06-17 17:36:01 -07:00 committed by Brian Behlendorf
parent ab9f4b0b82
commit 100a91aa3e
3 changed files with 10 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_access2(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner,
int
secpolicy_vnode_any_access(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner)
{
if (crgetuid(cr) == owner)
if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
return (0);
if (zpl_inode_owner_or_capable(ip))
@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_any_access(const cred_t *cr, struct inode *ip, uid_t owner)
int
secpolicy_vnode_chown(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
{
if (crgetuid(cr) == owner)
if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
return (0);
return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_FOWNER, B_FALSE, EPERM));
@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_remove(const cred_t *cr)
int
secpolicy_vnode_setdac(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
{
if (crgetuid(cr) == owner)
if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
return (0);
return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_FOWNER, B_FALSE, EPERM));
@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ secpolicy_vnode_setid_retain(const cred_t *cr, boolean_t issuidroot)
int
secpolicy_vnode_setids_setgids(const cred_t *cr, gid_t gid)
{
if (!groupmember(gid, cr))
if (crgetfsgid(cr) != gid && !groupmember(gid, cr))
return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_FSETID, B_FALSE, EPERM));
return (0);
@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ secpolicy_setid_clear(vattr_t *vap, cred_t *cr)
static int
secpolicy_vnode_setid_modify(const cred_t *cr, uid_t owner)
{
if (crgetuid(cr) == owner)
if (crgetfsuid(cr) == owner)
return (0);
return (priv_policy(cr, CAP_FSETID, B_FALSE, EPERM));

View File

@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ zfs_acl_ids_create(znode_t *dzp, int flag, vattr_t *vap, cred_t *cr,
int error;
zfs_sb_t *zsb = ZTOZSB(dzp);
zfs_acl_t *paclp;
gid_t gid;
gid_t gid = vap->va_gid;
boolean_t need_chmod = B_TRUE;
boolean_t inherited = B_FALSE;
@ -1758,6 +1758,7 @@ zfs_acl_ids_create(znode_t *dzp, int flag, vattr_t *vap, cred_t *cr,
acl_ids->z_fuid = vap->va_uid;
acl_ids->z_fgid = vap->va_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_KSID
/*
* Determine uid and gid.
*/
@ -1809,6 +1810,7 @@ zfs_acl_ids_create(znode_t *dzp, int flag, vattr_t *vap, cred_t *cr,
}
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_KSID */
/*
* If we're creating a directory, and the parent directory has the

View File

@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ zfs_fuid_node_add(zfs_fuid_info_t **fuidpp, const char *domain, uint32_t rid,
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_KSID
/*
* Create a file system FUID, based on information in the users cred
*
@ -500,7 +501,6 @@ uint64_t
zfs_fuid_create_cred(zfs_sb_t *zsb, zfs_fuid_type_t type,
cred_t *cr, zfs_fuid_info_t **fuidp)
{
#ifdef HAVE_KSID
uint64_t idx;
ksid_t *ksid;
uint32_t rid;
@ -540,12 +540,8 @@ zfs_fuid_create_cred(zfs_sb_t *zsb, zfs_fuid_type_t type,
zfs_fuid_node_add(fuidp, kdomain, rid, idx, id, type);
return (FUID_ENCODE(idx, rid));
#else
VERIFY(type == ZFS_OWNER || type == ZFS_GROUP);
return ((uint64_t)((type == ZFS_OWNER) ? crgetuid(cr) : crgetgid(cr)));
#endif /* HAVE_KSID */
}
#endif /* HAVE_KSID */
/*
* Create a file system FUID for an ACL ace