Close MAILTO security hole

This commit is contained in:
Andrey A. Chernov 1995-04-12 18:57:37 +00:00
parent 5c613ed190
commit 1cb37d6325
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=7775

View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
*/
#if !defined(lint) && !defined(LINT)
static char rcsid[] = "$Id: do_command.c,v 2.12 1994/01/15 20:43:43 vixie Exp $";
static char rcsid[] = "$Id: do_command.c,v 1.1.1.1 1994/08/27 13:43:03 jkh Exp $";
#endif
@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ child_process(e, u)
*/
usernm = env_get("LOGNAME", e->envp);
mailto = env_get("MAILTO", e->envp);
if (mailto && *mailto == '-') {
log_it("CRON",getpid(), usernm, "attempts to crack");
exit(ERROR_EXIT);
}
#ifdef USE_SIGCHLD
/* our parent is watching for our death by catching SIGCHLD. we
@ -206,12 +210,12 @@ child_process(e, u)
/* set our directory, uid and gid. Set gid first, since once
* we set uid, we've lost root privledges.
*/
setgid(e->gid);
chdir(env_get("HOME", e->envp));
# if defined(BSD)
initgroups(env_get("LOGNAME", e->envp), e->gid);
# endif
setgid(e->gid);
setuid(e->uid); /* we aren't root after this... */
chdir(env_get("HOME", e->envp));
/* exec the command.
*/