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Vendor import of OpenSSH 5.6p1

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This commit is contained in:
Dag-Erling Smørgrav 2010-11-08 10:45:44 +00:00
parent f276912e6f
commit 3a927e69c3
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/; revision=214979
svn path=/vendor-crypto/openssh/5.6p1/; revision=214980; tag=vendor/openssh/5.6p1
99 changed files with 4875 additions and 2287 deletions
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519
ChangeLog
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@ -1,3 +1,522 @@
20100823
- (djm) Release OpenSSH-5.6p1
20100816
- (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/strptime.c] Add strptime to
the compat library which helps on platforms like old IRIX. Based on work
by djm, tested by Tom Christensen.
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/12 21:49:44
[ssh.c]
close any extra file descriptors inherited from parent at start and
reopen stdin/stdout to /dev/null when forking for ControlPersist.
prevents tools that fork and run a captive ssh for communication from
failing to exit when the ssh completes while they wait for these fds to
close. The inherited fds may persist arbitrarily long if a background
mux master has been started by ControlPersist. cvs and scp were effected
by this.
"please commit" markus@
- (djm) [regress/README.regress] typo
20100812
- (tim) [regress/login-timeout.sh regress/reconfigure.sh regress/reexec.sh
regress/test-exec.sh] Under certain conditions when testing with sudo
tests would fail because the pidfile could not be read by a regular user.
"cat: cannot open ...../regress/pidfile: Permission denied (error 13)"
Make sure cat is run by $SUDO. no objection from me. djm@
- (tim) [auth.c] add cast to quiet compiler. Change only affects SVR5 systems.
20100809
- (djm) bz#1561: don't bother setting IFF_UP on tun(4) device if it is
already set. Makes FreeBSD user openable tunnels useful; patch from
richard.burakowski+ossh AT mrburak.net, ok dtucker@
- (dtucker) bug #1530: strip trailing ":" from hostname in ssh-copy-id.
based in part on a patch from Colin Watson, ok djm@
20100809
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/08 16:26:42
[version.h]
crank to 5.6
- (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec]
[contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers
20100805
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/04 05:37:01
[ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8]
Remove mentions of weird "addr/port" alternate address format for IPv6
addresses combinations. It hasn't worked for ages and we have supported
the more commen "[addr]:port" format for a long time. ok jmc@ markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/04 05:40:39
[PROTOCOL.certkeys ssh-keygen.c]
tighten the rules for certificate encoding by requiring that options
appear in lexical order and make our ssh-keygen comply. ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/04 05:42:47
[auth.c auth2-hostbased.c authfile.c authfile.h ssh-keysign.8]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh.c]
enable certificates for hostbased authentication, from Iain Morgan;
"looks ok" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/04 05:49:22
[authfile.c]
commited the wrong version of the hostbased certificate diff; this
version replaces some strlc{py,at} verbosity with xasprintf() at
the request of markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/04 06:07:11
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
Support CA keys in PKCS#11 tokens; feedback and ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/04 06:08:40
[ssh-keysign.c]
clean for -Wuninitialized (Id sync only; portable had this change)
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/05 13:08:42
[channels.c]
Fix a trio of bugs in the local/remote window calculation for datagram
data channels (i.e. TunnelForward):
Calculate local_consumed correctly in channel_handle_wfd() by measuring
the delta to buffer_len(c->output) from when we start to when we finish.
The proximal problem here is that the output_filter we use in portable
modified the length of the dequeued datagram (to futz with the headers
for !OpenBSD).
In channel_output_poll(), don't enqueue datagrams that won't fit in the
peer's advertised packet size (highly unlikely to ever occur) or which
won't fit in the peer's remaining window (more likely).
In channel_input_data(), account for the 4-byte string header in
datagram packets that we accept from the peer and enqueue in c->output.
report, analysis and testing 2/3 cases from wierbows AT us.ibm.com;
"looks good" markus@
20100803
- (dtucker) [monitor.c] Bug #1795: Initialize the values to be returned from
PAM to sane values in case the PAM method doesn't write to them. Spotted by
Bitman Zhou, ok djm@.
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 04:45:30
[ssh-keygen.c]
avoid bogus compiler warning
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 14:07:35
[ssh-rsa.c]
more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted
data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol.
"groovy" deraadt@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/19 03:16:33
[sftp-client.c]
bz#1797: fix swapped args in upload_dir_internal(), breaking recursive
upload depth checks and causing verbose printing of transfers to always
be turned on; patch from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/19 09:15:12
[clientloop.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5]
add a "ControlPersist" option that automatically starts a background
ssh(1) multiplex master when connecting. This connection can stay alive
indefinitely, or can be set to automatically close after a user-specified
duration of inactivity. bz#1330 - patch by dwmw2 AT infradead.org, but
further hacked on by wmertens AT cisco.com, apb AT cequrux.com,
martin-mindrot-bugzilla AT earth.li and myself; "looks ok" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/21 02:10:58
[misc.c]
sync timingsafe_bcmp() with the one dempsky@ committed to sys/lib/libkern
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/23 08:49:25
[ssh.1]
Ciphers is documented in ssh_config(5) these days
20100819
- (dtucker) [contrib/ssh-copy-ud.1] Bug #1786: update ssh-copy-id.1 with more
details about its behaviour WRT existing directories. Patch from
asguthrie at gmail com, ok djm.
20100716
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/02 04:32:44
[misc.c]
unbreak strdelim() skipping past quoted strings, e.g.
AllowUsers "blah blah" blah
was broken; report and fix in bz#1757 from bitman.zhou AT centrify.com
ok dtucker;
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/12 22:38:52
[ssh.c]
Make ExitOnForwardFailure work with fork-after-authentication ("ssh -f")
for protocol 2. ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/12 22:41:13
[ssh.c ssh_config.5]
expand %h to the hostname in ssh_config Hostname options. While this
sounds useless, it is actually handy for working with unqualified
hostnames:
Host *.*
Hostname %h
Host *
Hostname %h.example.org
"I like it" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c]
[packet.c ssh-rsa.c]
implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c]
[ssh-rsa.c]
s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/14 17:06:58
[ssh.1]
finally ssh synopsis looks nice again! this commit just removes a ton of
hacks we had in place to make it work with old groff;
- schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/15 21:20:38
[ssh-keygen.1]
repair incorrect block nesting, which screwed up indentation;
problem reported and fix OK by jmc@
20100714
- (tim) [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] Bug 1796: Test for skip_x11_askpass
(line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass.
20100702
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/26 00:57:07
[ssh_config.5]
tweak previous;
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/26 23:04:04
[ssh.c]
oops, forgot to #include <canohost.h>; spotted and patch from chl@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/29 23:15:30
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
allow import (-i) and export (-e) of PEM and PKCS#8 encoded keys;
bz#1749; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/29 23:16:46
[auth2-pubkey.c sshd_config.5]
allow key options (command="..." and friends) in AuthorizedPrincipals;
ok markus@
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/30 07:24:25
[ssh-keygen.1]
tweak previous;
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/30 07:26:03
[ssh-keygen.c]
sort usage();
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/30 07:28:34
[sshd_config.5]
tweak previous;
- millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/01 13:06:59
[scp.c]
Fix a longstanding problem where if you suspend scp at the
password/passphrase prompt the terminal mode is not restored.
OK djm@
- phessler@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/27 19:19:56
[regress/Makefile]
fix how we run the tests so we can successfully use SUDO='sudo -E'
in our env
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/29 23:59:54
[cert-userkey.sh]
regress tests for key options in AuthorizedPrincipals
20100627
- (tim) [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Reorder includes. auth-options.h now needs
key.h.
20100626
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/21 05:00:36
[misc.c]
colon() returns char*, so s/return (0)/return NULL/
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/08 21:32:19
[ssh-pkcs11.c]
check length of value returned C_GetAttributValue for != 0
from mdrtbugzilla@codefive.co.uk; bugzilla #1773; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/17 07:07:30
[mux.c]
Correct sizing of object to be allocated by calloc(), replacing
sizeof(state) with sizeof(*state). This worked by accident since
the struct contained a single int at present, but could have broken
in the future. patch from hyc AT symas.com
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/18 00:58:39
[sftp.c]
unbreak ls in working directories that contains globbing characters in
their pathnames. bz#1655 reported by vgiffin AT apple.com
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/18 03:16:03
[session.c]
Missing check for chroot_director == "none" (we already checked against
NULL); bz#1564 from Jan.Pechanec AT Sun.COM
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/18 04:43:08
[sftp-client.c]
fix memory leak in do_realpath() error path; bz#1771, patch from
anicka AT suse.cz
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/22 04:22:59
[servconf.c sshd_config.5]
expose some more sshd_config options inside Match blocks:
AuthorizedKeysFile AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly PermitTunnel
bz#1764; feedback from imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/22 04:32:06
[ssh-keygen.c]
standardise error messages when attempting to open private key
files to include "progname: filename: error reason"
bz#1783; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/22 04:49:47
[auth.c]
queue auth debug messages for bad ownership or permissions on the user's
keyfiles. These messages will be sent after the user has successfully
authenticated (where our client will display them with LogLevel=debug).
bz#1554; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/22 04:54:30
[ssh-keyscan.c]
replace verbose and overflow-prone Linebuf code with read_keyfile_line()
based on patch from joachim AT joachimschipper.nl; bz#1565; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/22 04:59:12
[session.c]
include the user name on "subsystem request for ..." log messages;
bz#1571; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/23 02:59:02
[ssh-keygen.c]
fix printing of extensions in v01 certificates that I broke in r1.190
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 07:14:46
[channels.c mux.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.h]
bz#1327: remove hardcoded limit of 100 permitopen clauses and port
forwards per direction; ok markus@ stevesk@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 07:20:04
[channels.c session.c]
bz#1750: fix requirement for /dev/null inside ChrootDirectory for
internal-sftp accidentally introduced in r1.253 by removing the code
that opens and dup /dev/null to stderr and modifying the channels code
to read stderr but discard it instead; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 08:46:17
[auth1.c auth2-none.c]
skip the initial check for access with an empty password when
PermitEmptyPasswords=no; bz#1638; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 23:10:30
[ssh.c]
log the hostname and address that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose
after authentication is successful to mitigate "phishing" attacks by
servers with trusted keys that accept authentication silently and
automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts;
"nice!" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 23:10:30
[ssh.c]
log the hostname and address that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose
after authentication is successful to mitigate "phishing" attacks by
servers with trusted keys that accept authentication silently and
automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts;
"nice!" markus@
20100622
- (djm) [loginrec.c] crank LINFO_NAMESIZE (username length) to 512
bz#1579; ok dtucker
20100618
- (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] Update key file explicitly under ~
rather than assuming that $CWD == $HOME. bz#1500, patch from
timothy AT gelter.com
20100617
- (tim) [contrib/cygwin/README] Remove a reference to the obsolete
minires-devel package, and to add the reference to the libedit-devel
package since CYgwin now provides libedit. Patch from Corinna Vinschen.
20100521
- (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 11:31:26
[regress/Makefile regress/cert-userkey.sh]
regress tests for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile and "principals=" key option.
feedback and ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/11 02:58:04
[auth-rsa.c]
don't accept certificates marked as "cert-authority" here; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/14 00:47:22
[ssh-add.c]
check that the certificate matches the corresponding private key before
grafting it on
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/14 23:29:23
[channels.c channels.h mux.c ssh.c]
Pause the mux channel while waiting for reply from aynch callbacks.
Prevents misordering of replies if new requests arrive while waiting.
Extend channel open confirm callback to allow signalling failure
conditions as well as success. Use this to 1) fix a memory leak, 2)
start using the above pause mechanism and 3) delay sending a success/
failure message on mux slave session open until we receive a reply from
the server.
motivated by and with feedback from markus@
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/16 12:55:51
[PROTOCOL.mux clientloop.h mux.c readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c]
mux support for remote forwarding with dynamic port allocation,
use with
LPORT=`ssh -S muxsocket -R0:localhost:25 -O forward somehost`
feedback and ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/20 11:25:26
[auth2-pubkey.c]
fix logspam when key options (from="..." especially) deny non-matching
keys; reported by henning@ also bz#1765; ok markus@ dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/20 23:46:02
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c ssh-keygen.c]
Move the permit-* options to the non-critical "extensions" field for v01
certificates. The logic is that if another implementation fails to
implement them then the connection just loses features rather than fails
outright.
ok markus@
20100511
- (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Bug #1770: Link libopenbsd-compat twice to solve
circular dependency problem on old or odd platforms. From Tom Lane, ok
djm@.
- (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Fix build breakage on older
libcrypto by defining OPENSSL_[DR]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS if they aren't
already. ok dtucker@
20100510
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/23 01:47:41
[ssh-keygen.c]
bz#1740: display a more helpful error message when $HOME is
inaccessible while trying to create .ssh directory. Based on patch
from jchadima AT redhat.com; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/23 22:27:38
[mux.c]
set "detach_close" flag when registering channel cleanup callbacks.
This causes the channel to close normally when its fds close and
hangs when terminating a mux slave using ~. bz#1758; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/23 22:42:05
[session.c]
set stderr to /dev/null for subsystems rather than just closing it.
avoids hangs if a subsystem or shell initialisation writes to stderr.
bz#1750; ok markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/23 22:48:31
[ssh-keygen.c]
refuse to generate keys longer than OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS,
since we would refuse to use them anyway. bz#1516; ok dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/26 22:28:24
[sshconnect2.c]
bz#1502: authctxt.success is declared as an int, but passed by
reference to function that accepts sig_atomic_t*. Convert it to
the latter; ok markus@ dtucker@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/01 02:50:50
[PROTOCOL.certkeys]
typo; jmeltzer@
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/05 04:22:09
[sftp.c]
restore mput and mget which got lost in the tab-completion changes.
found by Kenneth Whitaker, ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 11:30:30
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c]
[key.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.8 sshd_config.5]
add some optional indirection to matching of principal names listed
in certificates. Currently, a certificate must include the a user's name
to be accepted for authentication. This change adds the ability to
specify a list of certificate principal names that are acceptable.
When authenticating using a CA trusted through ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
this adds a new principals="name1[,name2,...]" key option.
For CAs listed through sshd_config's TrustedCAKeys option, a new config
option "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile" specifies a per-user file containing
the list of acceptable names.
If either option is absent, the current behaviour of requiring the
username to appear in principals continues to apply.
These options are useful for role accounts, disjoint account namespaces
and "user@realm"-style naming policies in certificates.
feedback and ok markus@
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/05/07 12:49:17
[sshd_config.5]
tweak previous;
20100423
- (dtucker) [configure.ac] Bug #1756: Check for the existence of a lib64 dir
in the openssl install directory (some newer openssl versions do this on at
least some amd64 platforms).
20100418
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 06:45:01
[ssh_config.5]
tweak previous; ok djm
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 06:47:04
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
tweak previous; ok djm
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 21:14:27
[sshconnect.c]
oops, %r => remote username, not %u
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:58:45
[regress/cert-hostkey.sh regress/cert-userkey.sh]
regression tests for v01 certificate format
includes interop tests for v00 certs
- (dtucker) [contrib/aix/buildbff.sh] Fix creation of ssh_prng_cmds.default
file.
20100416
- (djm) Release openssh-5.5p1
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/26 03:13:17
[bufaux.c]
allow buffer_get_int_ret/buffer_get_int64_ret to take a NULL pointer
argument to allow skipping past values in a buffer
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/26 06:54:36
[ssh.1]
tweak previous;
- jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/27 14:26:55
[ssh_config.5]
tweak previous; ok dtucker
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/10 00:00:16
[ssh.c]
bz#1746 - suppress spurious tty warning when using -O and stdin
is not a tty; ok dtucker@ markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/10 00:04:30
[sshconnect.c]
fix terminology: we didn't find a certificate in known_hosts, we found
a CA key
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/10 02:08:44
[clientloop.c]
bz#1698: kill channel when pty allocation requests fail. Fixed
stuck client if the server refuses pty allocation.
ok dtucker@ "think so" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/10 02:10:56
[sshconnect2.c]
show the key type that we are offering in debug(), helps distinguish
between certs and plain keys as the path to the private key is usually
the same.
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/10 05:48:16
[mux.c]
fix NULL dereference; from matthew.haub AT alumni.adelaide.edu.au
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/14 22:27:42
[ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
expand %r => remote username in ssh_config:ProxyCommand;
ok deraadt markus
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/15 20:32:55
[ssh-pkcs11.c]
retry lookup for private key if there's no matching key with CKA_SIGN
attribute enabled; this fixes fixes MuscleCard support (bugzilla #1736)
ok djm@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26
[PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c]
[sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the
following changes:
move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can
better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash
Rename "constraints" field to "critical options"
Add a new non-critical "extensions" field
Add a serial number
The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation
(use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate)
ok markus@
20100410
- (dtucker) [configure.ac] Put the check for the existence of getaddrinfo
back so we disable the IPv6 tests if we don't have it.

4
Makefile.in
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.309 2010/03/13 21:41:34 djm Exp $
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.310 2010/05/12 06:51:39 dtucker Exp $
# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh
#SHELL = @SH@
@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readco
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o
$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)

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PROTOCOL.certkeys
View File

@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication.
The certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with
numerous options and complex encoding rules, but something rather
more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage constraints
more minimal: a key, some identity information and usage options
that have been signed with some other trusted key.
A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ of acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability
to specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
Certified keys are represented using two new key types:
ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com that
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com that
include certification information along with the public key that is used
to sign challenges. ssh-keygen performs the CA signing operation.
@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ in RFC4252 section 7.
New public key formats
----------------------
The ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com key
The ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com and ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com key
types take a similar high-level format (note: data types and
encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire encoding of
these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
@ -57,42 +57,55 @@ these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
RSA certificate
string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com"
string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
mpint e
mpint n
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string constraints
string nonce
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
DSA certificate
string "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com"
string "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
mpint p
mpint q
mpint g
mpint y
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string constraints
string nonce
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
field to zero.
type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
@ -112,13 +125,15 @@ certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
valid after <= current time < valid before
constraints is a set of zero or more key constraints encoded as below.
criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
not recognise may safely ignore it.
The reserved field is current unused and is ignored in this version of
The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
the protocol.
signature key contains the CA key used to sign the certificate.
@ -132,22 +147,25 @@ up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss).
Constraints
-----------
Critical options
----------------
The constraints section of the certificate specifies zero or more
constraints on the certificates validity. The format of this field
The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
string name
string data
The name field identifies the constraint and the data field encodes
constraint-specific information (see below). All constraints are
"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a constraint
Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
sequence.
The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
option-specific information (see below). All options are
"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
The supported constraints and the contents and structure of their
The supported options and the contents and structure of their
data fields are:
Name Format Description
@ -157,37 +175,51 @@ force-command string Specifies a command that is executed
ssh command-line) whenever this key is
used for authentication.
permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
be refused if this constraint is absent.
permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
should be allowed. Agent forwarding
must not be permitted unless this
constraint is present.
permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
should be allowed. If this constraint is
not present then no port forwarding will
be allowed.
permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
should be permitted. In the absence of
this constraint PTY allocation will be
disabled.
permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
of this script will not be permitted if
this constraint is not present.
source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses
from which this certificate is accepted
for authentication. Addresses are
specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
If this constraint is not present then
If this option is not present then
certificates may be presented from any
source address.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.3 2010/03/03 22:50:40 djm Exp $
Extensions
----------
The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options.
If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
ignore it.
The supported extensions and the contents and structure of their data
fields are:
Name Format Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
be refused if this option is absent.
permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
should be allowed. Agent forwarding
must not be permitted unless this
option is present.
permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
should be allowed. If this option is
not present then no port forwarding will
be allowed.
permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
should be permitted. In the absence of
this option PTY allocation will be
disabled.
permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
of this script will not be permitted if
this option is not present.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.7 2010/08/04 05:40:39 djm Exp $

13
PROTOCOL.mux
View File

@ -109,8 +109,14 @@ A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
MUX_S_FAILURE.
A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
uint32 MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
uint32 client request id
uint32 allocated remote listen port
5. Requesting closure of port forwards
@ -178,6 +184,7 @@ The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
@ -193,4 +200,4 @@ XXX server->client error/warning notifications
XXX port0 rfwd (need custom response message)
XXX send signals via mux
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.1 2010/01/26 01:28:35 djm Exp $
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.2 2010/05/16 12:55:51 markus Exp $

4
README
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.5 for the release notes.
See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-5.6 for the release notes.
- A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is
- available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html
@ -62,4 +62,4 @@ References -
[6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9
[7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html
$Id: README,v 1.73 2010/03/21 19:11:55 djm Exp $
$Id: README,v 1.74 2010/08/08 16:32:06 djm Exp $

328
auth-options.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.49 2010/03/16 15:46:52 stevesk Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.52 2010/05/20 23:46:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -27,10 +27,10 @@
#include "canohost.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL;
/* "tunnel=" option. */
int forced_tun_device = -1;
/* "principals=" option. */
char *authorized_principals = NULL;
extern ServerOptions options;
void
@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ auth_clear_options(void)
xfree(forced_command);
forced_command = NULL;
}
if (authorized_principals) {
xfree(authorized_principals);
authorized_principals = NULL;
}
forced_tun_device = -1;
channel_clear_permitted_opens();
}
@ -141,6 +148,8 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
cp = "command=\"";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
opts += strlen(cp);
if (forced_command != NULL)
xfree(forced_command);
forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
i = 0;
while (*opts) {
@ -167,6 +176,38 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
opts++;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "principals=\"";
if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
opts += strlen(cp);
if (authorized_principals != NULL)
xfree(authorized_principals);
authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1);
i = 0;
while (*opts) {
if (*opts == '"')
break;
if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') {
opts += 2;
authorized_principals[i++] = '"';
continue;
}
authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++;
}
if (!*opts) {
debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
file, linenum);
auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote",
file, linenum);
xfree(authorized_principals);
authorized_principals = NULL;
goto bad_option;
}
authorized_principals[i] = '\0';
auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s",
authorized_principals);
opts++;
goto next_option;
}
cp = "environment=\"";
if (options.permit_user_env &&
strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) {
@ -376,123 +417,147 @@ auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum)
return 0;
}
/*
* Set options from certificate constraints. These supersede user key options
* so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
*/
int
auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static int
parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw,
u_int which, int crit,
int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
int *cert_no_pty_flag,
int *cert_no_user_rc,
char **cert_forced_command,
int *cert_source_address_done)
{
char *command, *allowed;
const char *remote_ip;
u_char *name = NULL, *data_blob = NULL;
u_int nlen, dlen, clen;
Buffer c, data;
int ret = -1;
int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
int cert_no_pty_flag = 1;
int cert_no_user_rc = 1;
char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
int cert_source_address_done = 0;
int ret = -1, found;
buffer_init(&data);
/* Make copy to avoid altering original */
buffer_init(&c);
buffer_append(&c, buffer_ptr(c_orig), buffer_len(c_orig));
buffer_append(&c, optblob, optblob_len);
while (buffer_len(&c) > 0) {
if ((name = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &nlen)) == NULL ||
(data_blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &dlen)) == NULL) {
error("Certificate constraints corrupt");
error("Certificate options corrupt");
goto out;
}
buffer_append(&data, data_blob, dlen);
debug3("found certificate constraint \"%.100s\" len %u",
debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %u",
name, dlen);
if (strlen(name) != nlen) {
error("Certificate constraint name contains \\0");
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0)
cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
else if (strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
else if (strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0)
cert_no_pty_flag = 0;
else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
cert_no_user_rc = 0;
else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
char *command = buffer_get_string_ret(&data, &clen);
if (command == NULL) {
error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" corrupt",
name);
goto out;
found = 0;
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
*cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
*cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
*cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
*cert_no_pty_flag = 0;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
*cert_no_user_rc = 0;
found = 1;
}
if (strlen(command) != clen) {
error("force-command constraint contains \\0");
goto out;
}
if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
if ((command = buffer_get_string_ret(&data,
&clen)) == NULL) {
error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" "
"corrupt", name);
goto out;
}
if (strlen(command) != clen) {
error("force-command constraint "
"contains \\0");
goto out;
}
if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"force-command options");
xfree(command);
goto out;
}
*cert_forced_command = command;
found = 1;
}
if (cert_forced_command != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"force-command constraints");
xfree(command);
goto out;
if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
if ((allowed = buffer_get_string_ret(&data,
&clen)) == NULL) {
error("Certificate constraint "
"\"%s\" corrupt", name);
goto out;
}
if (strlen(allowed) != clen) {
error("source-address constraint "
"contains \\0");
goto out;
}
if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"source-address options");
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
}
remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
allowed)) {
case 1:
/* accepted */
xfree(allowed);
break;
case 0:
/* no match */
logit("Authentication tried for %.100s "
"with valid certificate but not "
"from a permitted host "
"(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name,
remote_ip);
auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' "
"is not permitted to use this "
"certificate for login.",
remote_ip);
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
case -1:
error("Certificate source-address "
"contents invalid");
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
}
found = 1;
}
cert_forced_command = command;
} else if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
char *allowed = buffer_get_string_ret(&data, &clen);
const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
if (allowed == NULL) {
error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" corrupt",
name);
goto out;
}
if (strlen(allowed) != clen) {
error("source-address constraint contains \\0");
goto out;
}
if (cert_source_address_done++) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"source-address constraints");
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
}
switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, allowed)) {
case 1:
/* accepted */
xfree(allowed);
break;
case 0:
/* no match */
logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with "
"valid certificate but not from a "
"permitted host (ip=%.200s).",
pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this certificate for "
"login.", remote_ip);
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
case -1:
error("Certificate source-address contents "
"invalid");
xfree(allowed);
goto out;
}
} else {
error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" is not supported",
name);
goto out;
}
if (buffer_len(&data) != 0) {
error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" corrupt "
if (!found) {
if (crit) {
error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
goto out;
} else {
logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
}
} else if (buffer_len(&data) != 0) {
error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
"(extra data)", name);
goto out;
}
@ -501,10 +566,73 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
xfree(data_blob);
name = data_blob = NULL;
}
/* successfully parsed all constraints */
/* successfully parsed all options */
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0 &&
cert_forced_command != NULL &&
*cert_forced_command != NULL) {
xfree(*cert_forced_command);
*cert_forced_command = NULL;
}
if (name != NULL)
xfree(name);
if (data_blob != NULL)
xfree(data_blob);
buffer_free(&data);
buffer_free(&c);
return ret;
}
/*
* Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key
* options so this must be called after auth_parse_options().
*/
int
auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw)
{
int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
int cert_no_pty_flag = 1;
int cert_no_user_rc = 1;
char *cert_forced_command = NULL;
int cert_source_address_done = 0;
if (key_cert_is_legacy(k)) {
/* All options are in the one field for v00 certs */
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical),
buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
&cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_pty_flag,
&cert_no_user_rc,
&cert_forced_command,
&cert_source_address_done) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
/* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical),
buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&cert_forced_command,
&cert_source_address_done) == -1)
return -1;
if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions), pw,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1,
&cert_no_port_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag,
&cert_no_pty_flag,
&cert_no_user_rc,
NULL, NULL) == -1)
return -1;
}
no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag;
no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag;
no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag;
@ -516,14 +644,6 @@ auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *c_orig, struct passwd *pw)
xfree(forced_command);
forced_command = cert_forced_command;
}
out:
if (name != NULL)
xfree(name);
if (data_blob != NULL)
xfree(data_blob);
buffer_free(&data);
buffer_free(&c);
return ret;
return 0;
}

5
auth-options.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.18 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.20 2010/05/07 11:30:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ extern char *forced_command;
extern struct envstring *custom_environment;
extern int forced_tun_device;
extern int key_is_cert_authority;
extern char *authorized_principals;
int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *, char *, char *, u_long);
void auth_clear_options(void);
int auth_cert_constraints(Buffer *, struct passwd *);
int auth_cert_options(Key *, struct passwd *);
#endif

9
auth-rsa.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.74 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
if (memcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
/* Wrong answer. */
return (0);
}
@ -256,7 +256,8 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey)
*/
if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum))
continue;
if (key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
/* break out, this key is allowed */
allowed = 1;
break;

48
auth.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.86 2010/03/05 02:58:11 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.89 2010/08/04 05:42:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ allowed_user(struct passwd * pw)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
free(passwd);
free((void *) passwd);
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
@ -366,6 +366,14 @@ authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *pw)
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_keys_file2, pw);
}
char *
authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
return NULL;
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
@ -377,7 +385,7 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
HostStatus host_status;
/* Check if we know the host and its host key. */
found = key_new(key->type);
found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(sysfile, host, key, found, NULL);
if (host_status != HOST_OK && userfile != NULL) {
@ -389,6 +397,8 @@ check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host,
logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
user_hostfile);
} else {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
host_status = check_host_in_hostfile(user_hostfile,
@ -477,21 +487,18 @@ secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
return 0;
}
FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
{
char line[1024];
struct stat st;
int fd;
FILE *f;
/*
* Open the file containing the authorized keys
* Fail quietly if file does not exist
*/
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
debug("Could not open keyfile '%s': %s", file,
if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
@ -501,8 +508,8 @@ auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
return NULL;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s authorized keys %s is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file);
logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
@ -515,12 +522,27 @@ auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
}
FILE *
auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
"authorized principals");
}
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(const char *user)
{

4
auth.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.65 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.66 2010/05/07 11:30:29 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -169,8 +169,10 @@ void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *);
char *authorized_keys_file(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_keys_file2(struct passwd *);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *);
HostStatus

4
auth1.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.73 2008/07/04 23:30:16 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.74 2010/06/25 08:46:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt)
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user);
/* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */
if (options.password_authentication &&
if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication &&
#ifdef KRB5
(!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) &&
#endif

31
auth2-hostbased.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.13 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.14 2010/08/04 05:42:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
Key *key)
{
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup;
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
char *fp;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
@ -174,16 +175,40 @@ hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost,
}
debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
if (key_is_cert(key) &&
key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
if (host_status == HOST_NEW)
if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
}
xfree(fp);
}
return (host_status == HOST_OK);
}

4
auth2-none.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.15 2008/07/02 12:36:39 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.16 2010/06/25 08:46:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
none_enabled = 0;
packet_check_eom();
if (options.password_authentication)
if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, "")));
return (0);
}

145
auth2-pubkey.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.22 2010/03/10 23:27:17 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.26 2010/06/29 23:16:46 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
@ -176,6 +177,83 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
return authenticated;
}
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
result);
xfree(result);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert)
{
FILE *f;
char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts;
u_long linenum = 0;
u_int i;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
*ep = '\0';
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
continue;
/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
*ep-- = '\0';
/*
* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
* key options.
*/
line_opts = NULL;
if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
;;
line_opts = cp;
cp = ep;
}
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
debug3("matched principal from file \"%.100s\"",
cert->principals[i]);
if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts,
file, linenum) != 1)
continue;
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return 1;
}
}
}
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
/* return 1 if user allows given key */
static int
user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
@ -233,26 +311,39 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
continue;
}
}
if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1)
continue;
if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT) {
if (!key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key))
continue;
if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
linenum) != 1)
continue;
if (!key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5,
SSH_FP_HEX);
debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s",
file, linenum, key_type(found), fp);
if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, pw->pw_name,
&reason) != 0) {
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
* their username in the certificate principals list.
*/
if (authorized_principals != NULL &&
!match_principals_option(authorized_principals,
key->cert)) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
"authorized principal";
fail_reason:
xfree(fp);
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
continue;
}
if (auth_cert_constraints(&key->cert->constraints,
pw) != 0) {
if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
&reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) {
xfree(fp);
continue;
}
@ -262,7 +353,12 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
xfree(fp);
found_key = 1;
break;
} else if (!key_is_cert_authority && key_equal(found, key)) {
} else if (key_equal(found, key)) {
if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file,
linenum) != 1)
continue;
if (key_is_cert_authority)
continue;
found_key = 1;
debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu",
file, linenum);
@ -285,7 +381,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file)
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
{
char *ca_fp;
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
const char *reason;
int ret = 0;
@ -302,12 +398,25 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
goto out;
}
if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) {
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
goto out;
/*
* If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
* principals against the names in that file rather than matching
* against the username.
*/
if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an "
"authorized principal";
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
goto out;
}
}
if (auth_cert_constraints(&key->cert->constraints, pw) != 0)
if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0)
goto out;
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s",
@ -316,6 +425,8 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key)
ret = 1;
out:
if (principals_file != NULL)
xfree(principals_file);
if (ca_fp != NULL)
xfree(ca_fp);
return ret;

6
authfd.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.82 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.83 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -483,6 +483,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p);
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q);
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
@ -500,6 +501,7 @@ ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment)
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key);
buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key);
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0)
fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__);
@ -535,8 +537,10 @@ ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key,
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;

62
authfile.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.80 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.82 2010/08/04 05:49:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -693,6 +693,66 @@ key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp)
return NULL;
}
/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
Key *
key_load_cert(const char *filename)
{
Key *pub;
char *file;
pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
xasprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if (key_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL) == 1) {
xfree(file);
return pub;
}
xfree(file);
key_free(pub);
return NULL;
}
/* Load private key and certificate */
Key *
key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
int *perm_ok)
{
Key *key, *pub;
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
break;
default:
error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if ((key = key_load_private_type(type, filename,
passphrase, NULL, perm_ok)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((pub = key_load_cert(filename)) == NULL) {
key_free(key);
return NULL;
}
/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
if (key_equal_public(key, pub) == 0) {
error("%s: certificate does not match private key %s",
__func__, filename);
} else if (key_to_certified(key, key_cert_is_legacy(pub)) != 0) {
error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
} else {
key_cert_copy(pub, key);
key_free(pub);
return key;
}
key_free(key);
key_free(pub);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Returns 1 if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
* 0 if the key is not listed or -1 on error.

4
authfile.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.14 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.15 2010/08/04 05:42:47 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -16,9 +16,11 @@
#define AUTHFILE_H
int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
Key *key_load_cert(const char *);
Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **);
Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *);
Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *);
Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **);
int key_perm_ok(int, const char *);

8
bufaux.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.48 2010/02/02 22:49:34 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.49 2010/03/26 03:13:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -84,7 +84,8 @@ buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer)
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1)
return (-1);
*ret = get_u32(buf);
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = get_u32(buf);
return (0);
}
@ -106,7 +107,8 @@ buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer)
if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1)
return (-1);
*ret = get_u64(buf);
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = get_u64(buf);
return (0);
}

99
channels.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.303 2010/01/30 21:12:08 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.309 2010/08/05 13:08:42 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -114,10 +114,10 @@ typedef struct {
} ForwardPermission;
/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */
static ForwardPermission permitted_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL;
/* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */
static ForwardPermission permitted_adm_opens[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL;
/* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */
static int num_permitted_opens = 0;
@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
c->ctl_chan = -1;
c->mux_rcb = NULL;
c->mux_ctx = NULL;
c->mux_pause = 0;
c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */
TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
@ -703,7 +704,7 @@ channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb,
}
void
channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, void *ctx)
channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(id);
@ -838,8 +839,9 @@ channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)
FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
else if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window)
FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
}
@ -915,7 +917,7 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
}
/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
memcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
return -1;
@ -991,7 +993,7 @@ channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
static void
channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF))
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
@ -1642,13 +1644,14 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct termios tio;
u_char *data = NULL, *buf;
u_int dlen;
u_int dlen, olen = 0;
int len;
/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
if (c->wfd != -1 &&
FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) &&
buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) {
olen = buffer_len(&c->output);
if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
@ -1667,7 +1670,6 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
if (c->datagram) {
/* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
c->local_consumed += dlen + 4;
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
xfree(data);
if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
@ -1680,7 +1682,7 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
chan_write_failed(c);
return -1;
}
return 1;
goto out;
}
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
@ -1722,10 +1724,10 @@ channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
}
#endif
buffer_consume(&c->output, len);
if (compat20 && len > 0) {
c->local_consumed += len;
}
}
out:
if (compat20 && olen > 0)
c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output);
return 1;
}
@ -1755,7 +1757,9 @@ channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
buffer_consume(&c->extended, len);
c->local_consumed += len;
}
} else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
} else if (c->efd != -1 &&
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
(c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) {
len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d",
@ -1768,7 +1772,11 @@ channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
c->self, c->efd);
channel_close_fd(&c->efd);
} else {
buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len);
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
c->self);
} else
buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len);
}
}
}
@ -1840,7 +1848,7 @@ channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
if (!compat20)
fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__);
if (c->rfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) &&
if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) &&
(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) {
/*
@ -2164,6 +2172,14 @@ channel_output_poll(void)
data = buffer_get_string(&c->input,
&dlen);
if (dlen > c->remote_window ||
dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
debug("channel %d: datagram "
"too big for channel",
c->self);
xfree(data);
continue;
}
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA);
packet_put_int(c->remote_id);
packet_put_string(data, dlen);
@ -2249,7 +2265,7 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
int id;
char *data;
u_int data_len;
u_int data_len, win_len;
Channel *c;
/* Get the channel number and verify it. */
@ -2265,6 +2281,9 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
/* Get the data. */
data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len);
win_len = data_len;
if (c->datagram)
win_len += 4; /* string length header */
/*
* Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open.
@ -2275,23 +2294,23 @@ channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
*/
if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
if (compat20) {
c->local_window -= data_len;
c->local_consumed += data_len;
c->local_window -= win_len;
c->local_consumed += win_len;
}
return;
}
if (compat20) {
if (data_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d",
c->self, data_len, c->local_maxpacket);
c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
}
if (data_len > c->local_window) {
if (win_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d",
c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
return;
}
c->local_window -= data_len;
c->local_window -= win_len;
}
if (c->datagram)
buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len);
@ -2463,7 +2482,7 @@ channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int();
if (c->open_confirm) {
debug2("callback start");
c->open_confirm(c->self, c->open_confirm_ctx);
c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
debug2("callback done");
}
debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
@ -2514,6 +2533,11 @@ channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
xfree(msg);
if (lang != NULL)
xfree(lang);
if (c->open_confirm) {
debug2("callback start");
c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
debug2("callback done");
}
}
packet_check_eom();
/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
@ -2832,10 +2856,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
{
int type, success = 0;
/* Record locally that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
fatal("channel_request_remote_forwarding: too many forwards");
/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
if (compat20) {
const char *address_to_bind;
@ -2885,6 +2905,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port,
}
}
if (success) {
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens,
num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = listen_port;
@ -2982,10 +3005,10 @@ channel_permit_all_opens(void)
void
channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
{
if (num_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
fatal("channel_add_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens,
num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens));
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host);
permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
num_permitted_opens++;
@ -2996,10 +3019,10 @@ channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
int
channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port)
{
if (num_adm_permitted_opens >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
fatal("channel_add_adm_permitted_opens: too many forwards");
debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port);
permitted_adm_opens = xrealloc(permitted_adm_opens,
num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens));
permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect
= xstrdup(host);
permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port;
@ -3014,6 +3037,10 @@ channel_clear_permitted_opens(void)
for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++)
if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
xfree(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect);
if (num_permitted_opens > 0) {
xfree(permitted_opens);
permitted_opens = NULL;
}
num_permitted_opens = 0;
}
@ -3025,6 +3052,10 @@ channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void)
for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++)
if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL)
xfree(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect);
if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) {
xfree(permitted_adm_opens);
permitted_adm_opens = NULL;
}
num_adm_permitted_opens = 0;
}

8
channels.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.103 2010/01/26 01:28:35 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.104 2010/05/14 23:29:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
struct Channel;
typedef struct Channel Channel;
typedef void channel_open_fn(int, int, void *);
typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *);
typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int);
typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *);
@ -130,7 +131,7 @@ struct Channel {
char *ctype; /* type */
/* callback */
channel_callback_fn *open_confirm;
channel_open_fn *open_confirm;
void *open_confirm_ctx;
channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
int detach_close;
@ -151,6 +152,7 @@ struct Channel {
/* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb;
void *mux_ctx;
int mux_pause;
};
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
@ -208,7 +210,7 @@ void channel_stop_listening(void);
void channel_send_open(int);
void channel_request_start(int, char *, int);
void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int);
void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_callback_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_open_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *,
channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *,

89
clientloop.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.219 2010/03/13 21:10:38 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.222 2010/07/19 09:15:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -145,6 +145,9 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
/* Common data for the client loop code. */
volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */
@ -155,11 +158,12 @@ static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */
static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */
static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */
static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */
static u_int buffer_high;/* Soft max buffer size. */
static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */
static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
static int session_closed = 0; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
static int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
static void client_init_dispatch(void);
int session_ident = -1;
@ -251,10 +255,38 @@ get_current_time(void)
return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0;
}
/*
* Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
* backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
* ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
* control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
*/
static void
set_control_persist_exit_time(void)
{
if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
|| options.control_persist_timeout == 0)
/* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
else if (channel_still_open()) {
/* some client connections are still open */
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
/* a client connection has recently closed */
control_persist_exit_time = time(NULL) +
(time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
options.control_persist_timeout);
}
/* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
}
#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
void
client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
u_int trusted, char **_proto, char **_data)
u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data)
{
char cmd[1024];
char line[512];
@ -264,6 +296,7 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i;
char *xauthdir, *xauthfile;
struct stat st;
u_int now;
xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL;
*_proto = proto;
@ -299,11 +332,18 @@ client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path,
xauthdir);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd),
"%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO
" untrusted timeout 1200 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
xauth_path, xauthfile, display);
" untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout);
debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
if (system(cmd) == 0)
generated = 1;
if (x11_refuse_time == 0) {
now = time(NULL) + 1;
if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
else
x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
}
}
}
@ -524,6 +564,7 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int timeout_secs;
int ret;
/* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
@ -567,16 +608,27 @@ client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
/*
* Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
* some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
* event pending.
* event pending, or a timeout expires.
*/
if (options.server_alive_interval == 0 || !compat20)
timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20)
timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
set_control_persist_exit_time();
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs,
control_persist_exit_time - time(NULL));
if (timeout_secs < 0)
timeout_secs = 0;
}
if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = options.server_alive_interval;
tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
tvp = &tv;
}
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
if (ret < 0) {
char buf[100];
@ -1469,6 +1521,18 @@ client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id)
*/
if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
packet_write_poll();
/*
* If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
* timeout has expired without any active client
* connections, then quit.
*/
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
if (time(NULL) >= control_persist_exit_time) {
debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
break;
}
}
}
if (readset)
xfree(readset);
@ -1686,6 +1750,11 @@ client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan)
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && time(NULL) >= x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return NULL;
}
originator = packet_get_string(NULL);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) {
debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port");
@ -1912,7 +1981,7 @@ client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1);
client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", 0);
client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", 1);
packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : "");
packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col);
packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row);

5
clientloop.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.23 2010/01/26 01:28:35 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.25 2010/06/25 23:15:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
int client_loop(int, int, int);
void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int,
void client_x11_get_proto(const char *, const char *, u_int, u_int,
char **, char **);
void client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
void client_session2_setup(int, int, int, const char *, struct termios *,
@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *);
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK 2 /* Check master is alive */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE 3 /* Ask master to exit */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD 4 /* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */
#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD 5 /* Forward only, no command */
void muxserver_listen(void);
void muxclient(const char *);

3
config.h.in
View File

@ -900,6 +900,9 @@
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRPTIME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRSEP

10
configure vendored
View File

@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
#! /bin/sh
# From configure.ac Revision: 1.449 .
# From configure.ac Revision: 1.451 .
# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.61 for OpenSSH Portable.
#
@ -13076,6 +13076,7 @@ fi
for ac_func in \
@ -13158,6 +13159,7 @@ for ac_func in \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strnvis \
strptime \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
@ -16492,6 +16494,12 @@ if test "${with_ssl_dir+set}" = set; then
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"

11
configure.ac
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.449 2010/04/10 12:58:01 dtucker Exp $
# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.451 2010/08/16 03:15:23 dtucker Exp $
#
# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
#
@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
AC_INIT(OpenSSH, Portable, openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org)
AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.449 $)
AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.451 $)
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
AC_CONFIG_HEADER(config.h)
@ -1427,6 +1427,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS( \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strnvis \
strptime \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
@ -1906,6 +1907,12 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(ssl-dir,
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"

4
contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
#
# buildbff.sh: Create AIX SMIT-installable OpenSSH packages
# $Id: buildbff.sh,v 1.11 2009/03/06 23:22:10 dtucker Exp $
# $Id: buildbff.sh,v 1.12 2010/04/18 03:35:00 dtucker Exp $
#
# Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
# This file is placed in the public domain and comes with absolutely
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ done
# AIX 5.3 and newer have /dev/random and don't create ssh_prng_cmds
if [ -f $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds ]
then
mv FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds \
mv $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds \
$FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/ssh_prng_cmds.default
fi

5
contrib/caldera/openssh.spec
View File

@ -16,12 +16,11 @@
#old cvs stuff. please update before use. may be deprecated.
%define use_stable 1
%define version 5.6p1
%if %{use_stable}
%define version 5.5p1
%define cvs %{nil}
%define release 1
%else
%define version 5.5p1
%define cvs cvs20050315
%define release 0r1
%endif
@ -360,4 +359,4 @@ fi
* Mon Jan 01 1998 ...
Template Version: 1.31
$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.70 2010/03/21 19:11:58 djm Exp $
$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.71 2010/08/08 16:32:09 djm Exp $

6
contrib/cygwin/README
View File

@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ configure are used for the Cygwin binary distribution:
--mandir='${datadir}/man' \
--infodir='${datadir}/info'
--with-tcp-wrappers
--with-libedit
If you want to create a Cygwin package, equivalent to the one
in the Cygwin binary distribution, install like this:
@ -217,12 +218,15 @@ You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH:
- zlib
- openssl-devel
- minires-devel
If you want to build with --with-tcp-wrappers, you also need the package
- tcp_wrappers
If you want to build with --with-libedit, you also need the package
- libedit-devel
Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com.

7
contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
%define ver 5.5p1
%define ver 5.6p1
%define rel 1
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ Release: %{rel}
%endif
URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
%if ! %{skip_x11_askpass}
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
%endif
License: BSD
@ -407,6 +407,9 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
file using new AddressFamily directive

10
contrib/ssh-copy-id
View File

@ -38,13 +38,17 @@ if [ "$#" -lt 1 ] || [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then
exit 1
fi
{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $1 "umask 077; test -d .ssh || mkdir .ssh ; cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
# strip any trailing colon
host=`echo $1 | sed 's/:$//'`
{ eval "$GET_ID" ; } | ssh $host "umask 077; test -d ~/.ssh || mkdir ~/.ssh ; cat >> ~/.ssh/authorized_keys" || exit 1
cat <<EOF
Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$1'", and check in:
Now try logging into the machine, with "ssh '$host'", and check in:
.ssh/authorized_keys
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
to make sure we haven't added extra keys that you weren't expecting.
EOF

34
contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
View File

@ -25,19 +25,10 @@ ssh-copy-id \- install your public key in a remote machine's authorized_keys
.br
.SH DESCRIPTION
.BR ssh-copy-id
is a script that uses ssh to log into a remote machine (presumably
using a login password, so password authentication should be enabled,
unless you've done some clever use of multiple identities)
.PP
It also changes the permissions of the remote user's home,
.BR ~/.ssh ,
and
is a script that uses ssh to log into a remote machine and
append the indicated identity file to that machine's
.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
to remove group writability (which would otherwise prevent you from logging in, if the remote
.B sshd
has
.B StrictModes
set in its configuration).
file.
.PP
If the
.B -i
@ -59,7 +50,24 @@ produced no output, then it uses the contents of the identity
file. Once it has one or more fingerprints (by whatever means) it
uses ssh to append them to
.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on the remote machine (creating the file, and directory, if necessary)
on the remote machine (creating the file, and directory, if necessary.)
.SH NOTES
This program does not modify the permissions of any
pre-existing files or directories. Therefore, if the remote
.B sshd
has
.B StrictModes
set in its
configuration, then the user's home,
.B ~/.ssh
folder, and
.B ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
file may need to have group writability disabled manually, e.g. via
.B " chmod go-w ~ ~/.ssh ~/.ssh/authorized_keys"
on the remote machine.
.SH "SEE ALSO"
.BR ssh (1),

2
contrib/suse/openssh.spec
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
Version: 5.5p1
Version: 5.6p1
URL: http://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz

4
jpake.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.2 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.4 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
__func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
else if (memcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
else if (timingsafe_bcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
success = 1;
bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);

182
key.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.86 2010/03/15 19:40:02 stevesk Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.90 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* read_bignum():
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
#include "uuencode.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
static struct KeyCert *
@ -61,7 +62,8 @@ cert_new(void)
cert = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cert));
buffer_init(&cert->certblob);
buffer_init(&cert->constraints);
buffer_init(&cert->critical);
buffer_init(&cert->extensions);
cert->key_id = NULL;
cert->principals = NULL;
cert->signature_key = NULL;
@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ key_new(int type)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed");
@ -92,6 +95,7 @@ key_new(int type)
k->rsa = rsa;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed");
@ -124,6 +128,7 @@ key_add_private(Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
@ -139,6 +144,7 @@ key_add_private(Key *k)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed");
@ -165,7 +171,8 @@ cert_free(struct KeyCert *cert)
u_int i;
buffer_free(&cert->certblob);
buffer_free(&cert->constraints);
buffer_free(&cert->critical);
buffer_free(&cert->extensions);
if (cert->key_id != NULL)
xfree(cert->key_id);
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
@ -184,12 +191,14 @@ key_free(Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (k->rsa != NULL)
RSA_free(k->rsa);
k->rsa = NULL;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (k->dsa != NULL)
DSA_free(k->dsa);
@ -219,7 +228,7 @@ cert_compare(struct KeyCert *a, struct KeyCert *b)
return 0;
if (buffer_len(&a->certblob) != buffer_len(&b->certblob))
return 0;
if (memcmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob),
if (timingsafe_bcmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob),
buffer_len(&a->certblob)) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
@ -238,11 +247,13 @@ key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b)
switch (a->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL &&
@ -304,6 +315,8 @@ key_fingerprint_raw(Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length)
case KEY_RSA:
key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len);
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */
@ -631,6 +644,8 @@ key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp)
case KEY_UNSPEC:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
space = strchr(cp, ' ');
@ -757,11 +772,13 @@ key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f)
error("key_write: failed for RSA key");
return 0;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
@ -793,6 +810,10 @@ key_type(const Key *k)
return "RSA";
case KEY_DSA:
return "DSA";
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
return "RSA-CERT-V00";
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
return "DSA-CERT-V00";
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return "RSA-CERT";
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
@ -822,10 +843,14 @@ key_ssh_name(const Key *k)
return "ssh-rsa";
case KEY_DSA:
return "ssh-dss";
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
return "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com";
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
return "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com";
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com";
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com";
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
@ -836,9 +861,11 @@ key_size(const Key *k)
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n);
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
}
@ -882,6 +909,8 @@ key_generate(int type, u_int bits)
case KEY_RSA1:
k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits);
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
fatal("key_generate: cert keys cannot be generated directly");
@ -912,9 +941,12 @@ key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, struct Key *to_key)
buffer_append(&to->certblob, buffer_ptr(&from->certblob),
buffer_len(&from->certblob));
buffer_append(&to->constraints, buffer_ptr(&from->constraints),
buffer_len(&from->constraints));
buffer_append(&to->critical,
buffer_ptr(&from->critical), buffer_len(&from->critical));
buffer_append(&to->extensions,
buffer_ptr(&from->extensions), buffer_len(&from->extensions));
to->serial = from->serial;
to->type = from->type;
to->key_id = from->key_id == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(from->key_id);
to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
@ -940,6 +972,7 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k)
Key *n = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
n = key_new(k->type);
if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) ||
@ -950,6 +983,7 @@ key_from_private(const Key *k)
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA1:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
n = key_new(k->type);
if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) ||
@ -979,8 +1013,12 @@ key_type_from_name(char *name)
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_RSA_CERT;
return KEY_RSA_CERT_V00;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA_CERT_V00;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_RSA_CERT;
} else if (strcmp(name, "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0) {
return KEY_DSA_CERT;
}
debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name);
@ -1012,26 +1050,31 @@ key_names_valid2(const char *names)
static int
cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
{
u_char *principals, *constraints, *sig_key, *sig;
u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen;
u_char *principals, *critical, *exts, *sig_key, *sig;
u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen, elen;
Buffer tmp;
char *principal;
int ret = -1;
int v00 = key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 ||
key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00;
buffer_init(&tmp);
/* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
buffer_append(&key->cert->certblob, blob, blen);
principals = constraints = sig_key = sig = NULL;
if (buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 ||
elen = 0; /* Not touched for v00 certs */
principals = exts = critical = sig_key = sig = NULL;
if ((!v00 && buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->serial, b) != 0) ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 ||
(key->cert->key_id = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &kidlen)) == NULL ||
(principals = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &plen)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_after, b) != 0 ||
buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_before, b) != 0 ||
(constraints = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL ||
/* skip nonce */ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL ||
/* skip reserved */ buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL ||
(critical = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL ||
(!v00 && (exts = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &elen)) == NULL) ||
(v00 && buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL) || /* nonce */
buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */
(sig_key = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &sklen)) == NULL) {
error("%s: parse error", __func__);
goto out;
@ -1078,13 +1121,25 @@ cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
buffer_clear(&tmp);
buffer_append(&key->cert->constraints, constraints, clen);
buffer_append(&tmp, constraints, clen);
buffer_append(&key->cert->critical, critical, clen);
buffer_append(&tmp, critical, clen);
/* validate structure */
while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) {
if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL ||
buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) {
error("%s: Constraints data invalid", __func__);
error("%s: critical option data invalid", __func__);
goto out;
}
}
buffer_clear(&tmp);
buffer_append(&key->cert->extensions, exts, elen);
buffer_append(&tmp, exts, elen);
/* validate structure */
while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) {
if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL ||
buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) {
error("%s: extension data invalid", __func__);
goto out;
}
}
@ -1121,8 +1176,10 @@ cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
buffer_free(&tmp);
if (principals != NULL)
xfree(principals);
if (constraints != NULL)
xfree(constraints);
if (critical != NULL)
xfree(critical);
if (exts != NULL)
xfree(exts);
if (sig_key != NULL)
xfree(sig_key);
if (sig != NULL)
@ -1151,8 +1208,11 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
type = key_type_from_name(ktype);
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
(void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
key = key_new(type);
if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 ||
buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) {
@ -1166,8 +1226,11 @@ key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen)
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
(void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
key = key_new(type);
if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 ||
buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 ||
@ -1213,6 +1276,8 @@ key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp)
}
buffer_init(&b);
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* Use the existing blob */
@ -1255,9 +1320,11 @@ key_sign(
const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen);
@ -1281,9 +1348,11 @@ key_verify(
return -1;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen);
@ -1306,6 +1375,7 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
pk->rsa = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
key_cert_copy(k, pk);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
@ -1318,6 +1388,7 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL)
fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
key_cert_copy(k, pk);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
@ -1344,8 +1415,17 @@ key_demote(const Key *k)
int
key_is_cert(const Key *k)
{
return k != NULL &&
(k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT);
if (k == NULL)
return 0;
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
@ -1353,8 +1433,10 @@ int
key_type_plain(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return KEY_RSA;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return KEY_DSA;
default:
@ -1364,16 +1446,16 @@ key_type_plain(int type)
/* Convert a KEY_RSA or KEY_DSA to their _CERT equivalent */
int
key_to_certified(Key *k)
key_to_certified(Key *k, int legacy)
{
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
k->cert = cert_new();
k->type = KEY_RSA_CERT;
k->type = legacy ? KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_RSA_CERT;
return 0;
case KEY_DSA:
k->cert = cert_new();
k->type = KEY_DSA_CERT;
k->type = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT;
return 0;
default:
error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k));
@ -1386,10 +1468,12 @@ int
key_drop_cert(Key *k)
{
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
cert_free(k->cert);
k->type = KEY_RSA;
return 0;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
cert_free(k->cert);
k->type = KEY_DSA;
@ -1430,13 +1514,21 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob);
buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, key_ssh_name(k));
/* -v01 certs put nonce first */
if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
}
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->p);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->q);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->g);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->pub_key);
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->n);
@ -1448,6 +1540,10 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
return -1;
}
/* -v01 certs have a serial number next */
if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT)
buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->serial);
buffer_put_int(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->type);
buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->key_id);
@ -1461,11 +1557,19 @@ key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca)
buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_after);
buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_before);
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
buffer_ptr(&k->cert->constraints),
buffer_len(&k->cert->constraints));
buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), buffer_len(&k->cert->critical));
/* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */
if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob,
buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions),
buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions));
}
/* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */
if (k->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 || k->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce));
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, NULL, 0); /* reserved */
buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, ca_blob, ca_len);
xfree(ca_blob);
@ -1520,7 +1624,7 @@ key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal,
*reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
return -1;
}
} else {
} else if (name != NULL) {
principal_matches = 0;
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
@ -1536,3 +1640,15 @@ key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal,
}
return 0;
}
int
key_cert_is_legacy(Key *k)
{
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}

11
key.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.29 2010/03/15 19:40:02 stevesk Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.30 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ enum types {
KEY_DSA,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
KEY_RSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_DSA_CERT_V00,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
enum fp_type {
@ -56,11 +58,13 @@ enum fp_rep {
struct KeyCert {
Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
u_int64_t serial;
char *key_id;
u_int nprincipals;
char **principals;
u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
Buffer constraints;
Buffer critical;
Buffer extensions;
Key *signature_key;
};
@ -92,12 +96,13 @@ Key *key_from_private(const Key *);
int key_type_from_name(char *);
int key_is_cert(const Key *);
int key_type_plain(int);
int key_to_certified(Key *);
int key_to_certified(Key *, int);
int key_drop_cert(Key *);
int key_certify(Key *, Key *);
void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *);
int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *,
const char **);
int key_cert_is_legacy(Key *);
Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int);
int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *);

2
loginrec.h
View File

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ union login_netinfo {
/* string lengths - set very long */
#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64
#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64
#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 128
#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 512
#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256
struct logininfo {

19
misc.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.75 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.80 2010/07/21 02:10:58 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ strdelim(char **s)
return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
} else {
*s[0] = '\0';
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
}
@ -425,7 +426,7 @@ colon(char *cp)
int flag = 0;
if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
return (0);
return NULL;
if (*cp == '[')
flag = 1;
@ -437,9 +438,9 @@ colon(char *cp)
if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
return (cp);
if (*cp == '/')
return (0);
return NULL;
}
return (0);
return NULL;
}
/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
@ -849,6 +850,16 @@ ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
}
int
timingsafe_bcmp(const void *b1, const void *b2, size_t n)
{
const unsigned char *p1 = b1, *p2 = b2;
int ret = 0;
for (; n > 0; n--)
ret |= *p1++ ^ *p2++;
return (ret != 0);
}
void
sock_set_v6only(int s)
{

3
misc.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.41 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.43 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ void sanitise_stdfd(void);
void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
void sock_set_v6only(int);
int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);

11
moduli.0
View File

@ -14,11 +14,12 @@ DESCRIPTION
are prime and are safe for use in Diffie Hellman operations by sshd(8).
This moduli format is used as the output from each pass.
The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus, contain-
ing seven space separated fields. These fields are as follows:
The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
containing seven space separated fields. These fields are as follows:
timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYM-
MDDHHMMSS.
timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as
YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of
the prime modulus. Supported types are:
@ -69,4 +70,4 @@ SEE ALSO
Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol, RFC 4419, 2006.
OpenBSD 4.7 June 26, 2008 2
OpenBSD 4.8 June 26, 2008 OpenBSD 4.8

20
monitor.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.106 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.108 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
{
/* make sure key is allowed */
if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
memcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
return (0);
return (1);
}
@ -922,8 +922,8 @@ mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
int
mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *name, *info, **prompts;
u_int i, num, *echo_on;
char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
@ -1103,14 +1103,14 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
len = buffer_len(&b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
} else {
p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
xfree(p);
}
@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(memcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
xfree(p);
@ -1682,9 +1682,9 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex));
kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len) ||
(memcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
if (session_id2 == NULL ||
kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;

181
mux.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.14 2010/01/30 02:54:53 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.21 2010/06/25 23:15:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
@ -106,6 +107,14 @@ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
char *term;
struct termios tio;
char **env;
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for global channel callback */
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
u_int cid; /* channel id */
u_int rid; /* request id */
int fid; /* forward id */
};
/* fd to control socket */
@ -143,13 +152,14 @@ struct mux_master_state {
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
static void mux_session_confirm(int, void *);
static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *);
static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *);
@ -206,7 +216,7 @@ mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused)
fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
if (c->remote_id != -1) {
if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL)
debug2("%s: channel %d n session channel %d",
fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->remote_id);
c->remote_id = -1;
sc->ctl_chan = -1;
@ -301,6 +311,7 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->term = NULL;
cctx->rid = rid;
cmd = reserved = NULL;
if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL ||
buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_tty, m) != 0 ||
@ -454,14 +465,10 @@ process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
channel_send_open(nc->self);
channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 0);
/* prepare reply */
/* XXX defer until mux_session_confirm() fires */
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_int(r, nc->self);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
@ -559,6 +566,61 @@ compare_forward(Forward *a, Forward *b)
return 1;
}
static void
mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
char *failmsg = NULL;
Forward *rfwd;
Channel *c;
Buffer out;
if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
/* no channel for reply */
error("%s: unknown channel", __func__);
return;
}
buffer_init(&out);
if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards) {
xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
goto fail;
}
rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
logit("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
" to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port);
} else {
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
}
goto out;
} else {
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
}
fail:
error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg);
xfree(failmsg);
out:
buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out));
buffer_free(&out);
if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause);
c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
}
static int
process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
{
@ -594,15 +656,16 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
invalid:
xfree(fwd.listen_host);
xfree(fwd.connect_host);
if (fwd.listen_host)
xfree(fwd.listen_host);
if (fwd.connect_host)
xfree(fwd.connect_host);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
/* XXX support rport0 forwarding with reply of port assigned */
if (fwd.listen_port == 0 || fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
if (fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
@ -637,8 +700,17 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i))
goto exists;
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
goto exists;
debug2("%s: found allocated port",
__func__);
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
buffer_put_int(r,
options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port);
goto out;
}
}
break;
}
@ -655,9 +727,7 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (options.num_local_forwards + 1 >=
SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION ||
channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
if (channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port,
options.gateway_ports) < 0) {
fail:
@ -670,14 +740,22 @@ process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
freefwd = 0;
} else {
/* XXX wait for remote to confirm */
if (options.num_remote_forwards + 1 >=
SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION ||
channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host,
fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port) < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
fctx->cid = c->self;
fctx->rid = rid;
fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
fctx);
freefwd = 0;
c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
goto out;
}
buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK);
buffer_put_int(r, rid);
@ -826,7 +904,7 @@ process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r)
debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
__func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 0);
channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
/* prepare reply */
/* XXX defer until channel confirmed */
@ -849,7 +927,7 @@ mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c)
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(state));
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
@ -1000,26 +1078,43 @@ muxserver_listen(void)
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
static void
mux_session_confirm(int id, void *arg)
mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
const char *display;
Channel *c;
Channel *c, *cc;
int i;
Buffer reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication spoofing.");
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data);
/* XXX wait for reply */
}
@ -1033,6 +1128,21 @@ mux_session_confirm(int id, void *arg)
client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
buffer_init(&reply);
buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED);
buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid);
buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self);
done:
/* Send reply */
buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply));
buffer_free(&reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
buffer_free(&cctx->cmd);
xfree(cctx->term);
@ -1365,6 +1475,15 @@ mux_client_request_forward(int fd, u_int ftype, Forward *fwd)
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m);
logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
fwd->allocated_port,
fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
fwd->connect_port);
if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
fprintf(stdout, "%u\n", fwd->allocated_port);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL);
buffer_free(&m);
@ -1731,6 +1850,10 @@ muxclient(const char *path)
mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
if (mux_client_request_forwards(sock) != 0)
fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
if (mux_client_request_forwards(sock) != 0) {
error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);

11
myproposal.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.24 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.25 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -40,9 +40,12 @@
"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
#endif
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
"ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
"ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa,ssh-dss"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \
"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \

4
openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.44 2010/01/15 01:38:30 dtucker Exp $
# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.45 2010/08/16 03:15:23 dtucker Exp $
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o vis.o
OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bindresvport.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o vis.o
COMPAT=bsd-arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o

7
openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.49 2010/01/16 12:58:37 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.50 2010/08/16 03:15:23 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
void strmode(int mode, char *p);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
#include <time.h>
char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
int mkstemp(char *path);

13
openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.14 2009/03/07 11:22:35 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.15 2010/05/12 07:50:02 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
@ -18,6 +18,16 @@
#include "includes.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
/* Only in 0.9.8 */
#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#endif
/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f)
@ -97,3 +107,4 @@ int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int);
int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
void ssh_SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(void);
#endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */

8
openbsd-compat/port-tun.c
View File

@ -173,9 +173,11 @@ sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode)
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
}
close(sock);
return (fd);

2
openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
View File

@ -39,10 +39,10 @@
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh.h"

401
openbsd-compat/strptime.c Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
/* $OpenBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 2008/06/26 05:42:05 ray Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 1998/01/20 21:39:40 mycroft Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This code was contributed to The NetBSD Foundation by Klaus Klein.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
* ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
* BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/time/strptime.c */
#include "includes.h"
#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
#define TM_YEAR_BASE 1900 /* from tzfile.h */
#include <ctype.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
/* #define _ctloc(x) (_CurrentTimeLocale->x) */
/*
* We do not implement alternate representations. However, we always
* check whether a given modifier is allowed for a certain conversion.
*/
#define _ALT_E 0x01
#define _ALT_O 0x02
#define _LEGAL_ALT(x) { if (alt_format & ~(x)) return (0); }
static int _conv_num(const unsigned char **, int *, int, int);
static char *_strptime(const char *, const char *, struct tm *, int);
char *
strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm)
{
return(_strptime(buf, fmt, tm, 1));
}
static char *
_strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm, int initialize)
{
unsigned char c;
const unsigned char *bp;
size_t len;
int alt_format, i;
static int century, relyear;
if (initialize) {
century = TM_YEAR_BASE;
relyear = -1;
}
bp = (unsigned char *)buf;
while ((c = *fmt) != '\0') {
/* Clear `alternate' modifier prior to new conversion. */
alt_format = 0;
/* Eat up white-space. */
if (isspace(c)) {
while (isspace(*bp))
bp++;
fmt++;
continue;
}
if ((c = *fmt++) != '%')
goto literal;
again: switch (c = *fmt++) {
case '%': /* "%%" is converted to "%". */
literal:
if (c != *bp++)
return (NULL);
break;
/*
* "Alternative" modifiers. Just set the appropriate flag
* and start over again.
*/
case 'E': /* "%E?" alternative conversion modifier. */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
alt_format |= _ALT_E;
goto again;
case 'O': /* "%O?" alternative conversion modifier. */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
alt_format |= _ALT_O;
goto again;
/*
* "Complex" conversion rules, implemented through recursion.
*/
#if 0
case 'c': /* Date and time, using the locale's format. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_t_fmt), tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
#endif
case 'D': /* The date as "%m/%d/%y". */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%m/%d/%y", tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'R': /* The time as "%H:%M". */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M", tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'r': /* The time as "%I:%M:%S %p". */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%I:%M:%S %p", tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'T': /* The time as "%H:%M:%S". */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M:%S", tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
#if 0
case 'X': /* The time, using the locale's format. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(t_fmt), tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'x': /* The date, using the locale's format. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_fmt), tm, 0)))
return (NULL);
break;
#endif
/*
* "Elementary" conversion rules.
*/
#if 0
case 'A': /* The day of week, using the locale's form. */
case 'a':
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
/* Full name. */
len = strlen(_ctloc(day[i]));
if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(day[i]), bp, len) == 0)
break;
/* Abbreviated name. */
len = strlen(_ctloc(abday[i]));
if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abday[i]), bp, len) == 0)
break;
}
/* Nothing matched. */
if (i == 7)
return (NULL);
tm->tm_wday = i;
bp += len;
break;
case 'B': /* The month, using the locale's form. */
case 'b':
case 'h':
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
/* Full name. */
len = strlen(_ctloc(mon[i]));
if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(mon[i]), bp, len) == 0)
break;
/* Abbreviated name. */
len = strlen(_ctloc(abmon[i]));
if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abmon[i]), bp, len) == 0)
break;
}
/* Nothing matched. */
if (i == 12)
return (NULL);
tm->tm_mon = i;
bp += len;
break;
#endif
case 'C': /* The century number. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 99)))
return (NULL);
century = i * 100;
break;
case 'd': /* The day of month. */
case 'e':
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mday, 1, 31)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'k': /* The hour (24-hour clock representation). */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'H':
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 0, 23)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'l': /* The hour (12-hour clock representation). */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'I':
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 1, 12)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'j': /* The day of year. */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_yday, 1, 366)))
return (NULL);
tm->tm_yday--;
break;
case 'M': /* The minute. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_min, 0, 59)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'm': /* The month. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mon, 1, 12)))
return (NULL);
tm->tm_mon--;
break;
#if 0
case 'p': /* The locale's equivalent of AM/PM. */
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
/* AM? */
len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[0]));
if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[0]), bp, len) == 0) {
if (tm->tm_hour > 12) /* i.e., 13:00 AM ?! */
return (NULL);
else if (tm->tm_hour == 12)
tm->tm_hour = 0;
bp += len;
break;
}
/* PM? */
len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[1]));
if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[1]), bp, len) == 0) {
if (tm->tm_hour > 12) /* i.e., 13:00 PM ?! */
return (NULL);
else if (tm->tm_hour < 12)
tm->tm_hour += 12;
bp += len;
break;
}
/* Nothing matched. */
return (NULL);
#endif
case 'S': /* The seconds. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_sec, 0, 61)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'U': /* The week of year, beginning on sunday. */
case 'W': /* The week of year, beginning on monday. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
/*
* XXX This is bogus, as we can not assume any valid
* information present in the tm structure at this
* point to calculate a real value, so just check the
* range for now.
*/
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 53)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'w': /* The day of week, beginning on sunday. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_wday, 0, 6)))
return (NULL);
break;
case 'Y': /* The year. */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 9999)))
return (NULL);
relyear = -1;
tm->tm_year = i - TM_YEAR_BASE;
break;
case 'y': /* The year within the century (2 digits). */
_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E | _ALT_O);
if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &relyear, 0, 99)))
return (NULL);
break;
/*
* Miscellaneous conversions.
*/
case 'n': /* Any kind of white-space. */
case 't':
_LEGAL_ALT(0);
while (isspace(*bp))
bp++;
break;
default: /* Unknown/unsupported conversion. */
return (NULL);
}
}
/*
* We need to evaluate the two digit year spec (%y)
* last as we can get a century spec (%C) at any time.
*/
if (relyear != -1) {
if (century == TM_YEAR_BASE) {
if (relyear <= 68)
tm->tm_year = relyear + 2000 - TM_YEAR_BASE;
else
tm->tm_year = relyear + 1900 - TM_YEAR_BASE;
} else {
tm->tm_year = relyear + century - TM_YEAR_BASE;
}
}
return ((char *)bp);
}
static int
_conv_num(const unsigned char **buf, int *dest, int llim, int ulim)
{
int result = 0;
int rulim = ulim;
if (**buf < '0' || **buf > '9')
return (0);
/* we use rulim to break out of the loop when we run out of digits */
do {
result *= 10;
result += *(*buf)++ - '0';
rulim /= 10;
} while ((result * 10 <= ulim) && rulim && **buf >= '0' && **buf <= '9');
if (result < llim || result > ulim)
return (0);
*dest = result;
return (1);
}
#endif /* HAVE_STRPTIME */

4
packet.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.166 2009/06/27 09:29:06 andreas Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.168 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
if (memcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
mac->mac_len) != 0) {
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)

71
readconf.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.183 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.187 2010/07/19 09:15:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -110,8 +110,8 @@
typedef enum {
oBadOption,
oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oGatewayPorts,
oExitOnForwardFailure,
oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
@ -128,7 +128,8 @@ typedef enum {
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oHashKnownHosts,
oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
oDeprecated, oUnsupported
@ -143,6 +144,7 @@ static struct {
{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
{ "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
@ -224,6 +226,7 @@ static struct {
{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
{ "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
@ -255,8 +258,9 @@ add_local_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
if (newfwd->listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0)
fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root.");
#endif
if (options->num_local_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
fatal("Too many local forwards (max %d).", SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
options->local_forwards = xrealloc(options->local_forwards,
options->num_local_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
@ -274,15 +278,17 @@ void
add_remote_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd)
{
Forward *fwd;
if (options->num_remote_forwards >= SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION)
fatal("Too many remote forwards (max %d).",
SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION);
options->remote_forwards = xrealloc(options->remote_forwards,
options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->allocated_port = 0;
}
static void
@ -295,12 +301,20 @@ clear_forwardings(Options *options)
xfree(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
xfree(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
}
if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
xfree(options->local_forwards);
options->local_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host != NULL)
xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
xfree(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
}
if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
xfree(options->remote_forwards);
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
}
@ -403,6 +417,10 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
case oForwardX11Trusted:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
goto parse_flag;
case oForwardX11Timeout:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
goto parse_time;
case oGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->gateway_ports;
@ -866,6 +884,30 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, const char *host,
*intptr = value;
break;
case oControlPersist:
/* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
intptr = &options->control_persist;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
" argument.", filename, linenum);
value = 0;
value2 = 0; /* timeout */
if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
value = 0;
else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
value = 1;
else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
value = 1;
else
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
}
break;
case oHashKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
goto parse_flag;
@ -1007,6 +1049,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->forward_agent = -1;
options->forward_x11 = -1;
options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->gateway_ports = -1;
@ -1047,7 +1090,9 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->user_hostfile = NULL;
options->system_hostfile2 = NULL;
options->user_hostfile2 = NULL;
options->local_forwards = NULL;
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->clear_forwardings = -1;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
@ -1064,6 +1109,8 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->num_send_env = 0;
options->control_path = NULL;
options->control_master = -1;
options->control_persist = -1;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
options->tun_open = -1;
options->tun_local = -1;
@ -1091,6 +1138,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->forward_x11 = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
@ -1197,6 +1246,10 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->control_master == -1)
options->control_master = 0;
if (options->control_persist == -1) {
options->control_persist = 0;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
}
if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->tun_open == -1)

10
readconf.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.82 2010/02/08 10:50:20 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.86 2010/07/19 09:15:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ typedef struct {
int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
} Forward;
/* Data structure for representing option data. */
@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ typedef struct {
typedef struct {
int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */
int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
@ -93,11 +95,11 @@ typedef struct {
/* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_local_forwards;
Forward local_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
Forward *local_forwards;
/* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_remote_forwards;
Forward remote_forwards[SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION];
Forward *remote_forwards;
int clear_forwardings;
int enable_ssh_keysign;
@ -112,6 +114,8 @@ typedef struct {
char *control_path;
int control_master;
int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
int hash_known_hosts;

9
regress/Makefile
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.52 2010/02/26 20:33:21 djm Exp $
# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.54 2010/06/27 19:19:56 phessler Exp $
REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t-exec
tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ CLEANFILES= t2.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \
scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \
sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \
known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* \
putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig
putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig \
authorized_principals_${USER}
# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX"
@ -112,13 +113,13 @@ t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO=${SUDO} TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} sh ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} sh ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO=${SUDO} TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} sh ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} sh ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done

4
regress/README.regress
View File

@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x=SSH,SSHD,SSHAGENT,SSHADD
OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir.
TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOTPS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config
TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config
before running each test.
TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOTPS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
before running each test.
@ -105,4 +105,4 @@ Known Issues.
test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and
exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests.
$Id: README.regress,v 1.10 2005/10/03 10:14:18 dtucker Exp $
$Id: README.regress,v 1.11 2010/08/16 21:04:29 djm Exp $

174
regress/cert-hostkey.sh
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.3 2010/03/04 10:38:23 djm Exp $
# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.4 2010/04/16 01:58:45 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="certified host keys"
@ -28,11 +28,17 @@ for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
cp $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00
cp $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -t v00 -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00 ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}_v00"
done
# Basic connect tests
for privsep in yes no ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa rsa_v00 dsa_v00; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
@ -61,9 +67,15 @@ done
echon '@revoked '
echon "* "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_dsa.pub
echon '@revoked '
echon "* "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_rsa_v00.pub
echon '@revoked '
echon "* "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_dsa_v00.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for privsep in yes no ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa rsa_v00 dsa_v00; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
@ -90,7 +102,7 @@ done
echon "* "
cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
@ -116,32 +128,39 @@ test_one() {
ident=$1
result=$2
sign_opts=$3
for kt in rsa rsa_v00 ; do
case $kt in
*_v00) args="-t v00" ;;
*) args="" ;;
esac
verbose "$tid: host cert connect $ident $kt expect $result"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
$sign_opts $args \
$OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
verbose "$tid: test host cert connect $ident expect $result"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key -I "regress host key for $USER" \
$sign_opts \
$OBJ/cert_host_key_rsa ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_rsa"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_rsa
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_rsa-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
done
}
test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS"
@ -153,32 +172,35 @@ test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert downgrade to raw key"
# Generate and sign a host key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
-f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key -I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
(
echon "$HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
for v in v01 v00 ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
# Generate and sign a host key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
-f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -t ${v} -h -q -s $OBJ/host_ca_key \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
(
echon "$HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
done
# Wrong certificate
@ -187,25 +209,31 @@ done
echon "$HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
# Self-sign key
${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
for v in v01 v00 ; do
for kt in rsa dsa ; do
rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
# Self-sign key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} \
-f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -t ${v} -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -2 -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
done
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*

221
regress/cert-userkey.sh
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.3 2010/03/04 10:38:23 djm Exp $
# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.6 2010/06/29 23:59:54 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="certified user keys"
@ -18,8 +18,128 @@ for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I \
"regress user key for $USER" \
-n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
-n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00
cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -t v00 -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I \
"regress user key for $USER" \
-n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00 ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}_v00"
done
# Test explicitly-specified principals
for ktype in rsa dsa rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
for privsep in yes no ; do
_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep"
# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
"$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Missing authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Empty authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Wrong authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# authorized_principals with bad key option
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=false
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=true
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Setup for principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Wrong principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
(
echon 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
(
echon 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
done
basic_tests() {
@ -35,7 +155,7 @@ basic_tests() {
extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
fi
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
for ktype in rsa dsa rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
for privsep in yes no ; do
_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth"
# Simple connect
@ -102,45 +222,50 @@ test_one() {
result=$2
sign_opts=$3
auth_choice=$4
auth_opt=$5
if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
fi
for auth in $auth_choice ; do
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
# Add CA to authorized_keys
(
echon 'cert-authority '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
else
echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" >> \
$OBJ/sshd_proxy
for ktype in rsa rsa_v00 ; do
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
# Add CA to authorized_keys
(
echon "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
else
echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
>> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
fi
fi
verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
-I "regress user key for $USER" \
$sign_opts \
$OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
fi
verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
-I "regress user key for $USER" \
$sign_opts \
$OBJ/cert_user_key_rsa ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_rsa"
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_rsa -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
done
done
}
@ -157,10 +282,33 @@ test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys
test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
# should always be refused.
# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
# principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
# Wrong certificate
for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
for ktype in rsa dsa rsa_v00 dsa_v00 ; do
case $ktype in
*_v00) args="-t v00" ;;
*) args="" ;;
esac
# Self-sign
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
${SSHKEYGEN} $args -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
"regress user key for $USER" \
-n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
@ -173,4 +321,5 @@ for ktype in rsa dsa ; do
done
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER

2
regress/login-timeout.sh
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed with privsep"
fi
$SUDO kill `cat $PIDFILE`
$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
trace "test login grace without privsep"
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config

2
regress/reconfigure.sh
View File

@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ esac
start_sshd
PID=`cat $PIDFILE`
PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
rm -f $PIDFILE
$SUDO kill -HUP $PID

6
regress/reexec.sh
View File

@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
copy_tests
$SUDO kill `cat $PIDFILE`
$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
rm -f $PIDFILE
cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ rm -f $SSHD_COPY
copy_tests
$SUDO kill `cat $PIDFILE`
$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
rm -f $PIDFILE
verbose "test reexec fallback without privsep"
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ rm -f $SSHD_COPY
copy_tests
$SUDO kill `cat $PIDFILE`
$SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
rm -f $PIDFILE

2
regress/test-exec.sh
View File

@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ have_prog()
cleanup ()
{
if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
pid=`cat $PIDFILE`
pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
echo no sshd running
else

20
scp.0
View File

@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ NAME
SYNOPSIS
scp [-1246BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
[-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]
[[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2
[[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2
DESCRIPTION
scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data
@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
they are needed for authentication.
File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the
file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made ex-
plicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file
file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made
explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file
names containing `:' as host specifiers. Copies between two remote hosts
are also permitted.
@ -30,11 +30,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
-6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
-B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphras-
es).
-B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
passphrases).
-C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable com-
pression.
-C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
compression.
-c cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This
@ -120,8 +120,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows sym-
bolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows
symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-S program
Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program
@ -145,4 +145,4 @@ AUTHORS
Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
OpenBSD 4.7 February 8, 2010 3
OpenBSD 4.8 February 8, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

20
scp.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.165 2009/12/20 07:28:36 guenther Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.166 2010/07/01 13:06:59 millert Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@ -156,6 +156,20 @@ killchild(int signo)
exit(1);
}
static void
suspchild(int signo)
{
int status;
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
errno == EINTR)
;
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
}
static int
do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
{
@ -232,6 +246,10 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
close(reserved[0]);
close(reserved[1]);
signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
do_cmd_pid = fork();
if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {

31
servconf.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.207 2010/03/25 23:38:28 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.209 2010/06/22 04:22:59 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@ -131,6 +131,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->zero_knowledge_password_authentication = -1;
options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
}
void
@ -310,7 +311,7 @@ typedef enum {
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
sZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication, sHostCertificate,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sDeprecated, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@ -345,7 +346,7 @@ static struct {
{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
@ -420,11 +421,11 @@ static struct {
{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sAuthorizedKeysFile2, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
@ -432,6 +433,7 @@ static struct {
{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@ -1218,10 +1220,14 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
* AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
*/
case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
charptr = &options->authorized_keys_file;
goto parse_tilde_filename;
case sAuthorizedKeysFile2:
charptr = (opcode == sAuthorizedKeysFile) ?
&options->authorized_keys_file :
&options->authorized_keys_file2;
charptr = &options->authorized_keys_file2;
goto parse_tilde_filename;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
parse_tilde_filename:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
@ -1440,6 +1446,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(zero_knowledge_password_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
@ -1447,6 +1454,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
M_CP_INTOPT(gateway_ports);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
@ -1461,6 +1469,9 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys);
M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file);
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_file);
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_file2);
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file);
}
#undef M_CP_INTOPT
@ -1682,6 +1693,8 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
o->authorized_principals_file);
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));

3
servconf.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.92 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.93 2010/05/07 11:30:30 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ typedef struct {
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
char *authorized_principals_file;
} ServerOptions;
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);

46
session.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.252 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.256 2010/06/25 07:20:04 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
@ -104,7 +105,7 @@
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int);
void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
void session_proctitle(Session *);
int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *);
@ -447,6 +448,9 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
if (pipe(pin) < 0) {
error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
@ -459,7 +463,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
return -1;
}
if (pipe(perr) < 0) {
error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
@ -469,22 +474,23 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
#else
int inout[2], err[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) {
error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) {
error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
return -1;
}
#endif
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
session_proctitle(s);
/* Fork the child. */
@ -595,11 +601,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
close(perr[1]);
if (compat20) {
if (s->is_subsystem) {
close(perr[0]);
perr[0] = -1;
}
session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], 0);
session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
} else {
/* Enter the interactive session. */
server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]);
@ -615,10 +618,8 @@ do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
*/
if (compat20) {
session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1],
s->is_subsystem ? -1 : err[1], 0);
if (s->is_subsystem)
close(err[1]);
session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
} else {
server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]);
/* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */
@ -740,7 +741,7 @@ do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command)
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
packet_set_interactive(1);
if (compat20) {
session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1);
session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
} else {
server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1);
/* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */
@ -1792,7 +1793,8 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command)
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
#endif
if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL)
if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
"directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
strerror(errno));
@ -2137,7 +2139,8 @@ session_subsystem_req(Session *s)
u_int i;
packet_check_eom();
logit("subsystem request for %.100s", subsys);
logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", subsys,
s->pw->pw_name);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
if (strcmp(subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
@ -2319,7 +2322,8 @@ session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype)
}
void
session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int is_tty)
session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr,
int is_tty)
{
if (!compat20)
fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0");
@ -2331,7 +2335,7 @@ session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int is_tty)
fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
channel_set_fds(s->chanid,
fdout, fdin, fderr,
fderr == -1 ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
}

7
sftp-client.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.90 2009/10/11 10:41:26 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.92 2010/07/19 03:16:33 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -713,7 +713,8 @@ do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path)
u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg);
error("Couldn't canonicalise: %s", fx2txt(status));
return(NULL);
buffer_free(&msg);
return NULL;
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
@ -1522,7 +1523,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst,
continue;
if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
pflag, depth + 1, printflag) == -1)
pflag, printflag, depth + 1) == -1)
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, pflag) == -1) {

29
sftp-server.0
View File

@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not in-
tended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem op-
tion.
stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not
intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
option.
Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information.
@ -29,15 +29,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
-h Displays sftp-server usage information.
-l log_level
Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The pos-
sible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DE-
BUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and DEBUG1
are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of
debugging output. The default is ERROR.
Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The
possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and
DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR.
-R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode. At-
tempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
-R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
-u umask
@ -51,8 +51,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
SEE ALSO
sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
T. Ylonen, S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol,
draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress
material.
HISTORY
sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
@ -60,4 +61,4 @@ HISTORY
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
OpenBSD 4.7 January 9, 2010 1
OpenBSD 4.8 January 9, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

97
sftp.0
View File

@ -15,20 +15,20 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
sftp is an interactive file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which
performs all operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also
use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compres-
sion. sftp connects and logs into the specified host, then enters an in-
teractive command mode.
use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
compression. sftp connects and logs into the specified host, then enters
an interactive command mode.
The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-inter-
active authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after suc-
cessful interactive authentication.
The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-
interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
successful interactive authentication.
The third usage format allows sftp to start in a remote directory.
The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the -b option.
In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentica-
tion to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details). The options are as follows:
In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive
authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time
(see sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details). The options are as follows:
-1 Specify the use of protocol version 1.
@ -44,8 +44,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes.
-b batchfile
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile in-
stead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be
used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication. A
batchfile of `-' may be used to indicate standard input. sftp
will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
@ -144,9 +144,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and download-
ing. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links encountered
in the tree traversal.
-r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
encountered in the tree traversal.
-S program
Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The
@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-s subsystem | sftp_server
Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over protocol
version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp sub-
system configured.
version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp
subsystem configured.
-v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh.
@ -173,16 +173,18 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Change remote directory to path.
chgrp grp path
Change group of file path to grp. path may contain glob(3) char-
acters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric GID.
Change group of file path to grp. path may contain glob(3)
characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric
GID.
chmod mode path
Change permissions of file path to mode. path may contain
glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
chown own path
Change owner of file path to own. path may contain glob(3) char-
acters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric UID.
Change owner of file path to own. path may contain glob(3)
characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric
UID.
df [-hi] [path]
Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
@ -198,14 +200,15 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If
the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(3)
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and local-
path is specified, then local-path must specify a directory.
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
directory.
If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file permis-
sions and access times are copied too.
If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
permissions and access times are copied too.
If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied re-
cursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
performing recursive transfers.
help Display help text.
@ -214,10 +217,10 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Change local directory to path.
lls [ls-options [path]]
Display local directory listing of either path or current direc-
tory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any flags
supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may contain
glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
Display local directory listing of either path or current
directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any
flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may
contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files.
lmkdir path
Create local directory specified by path.
@ -239,8 +242,8 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
-a List files beginning with a dot (`.').
-f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is lexi-
cographical.
-f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is
lexicographical.
-h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
@ -248,8 +251,8 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
M=1048576, etc.).
-l Display additional details including permissions and own-
ership information.
-l Display additional details including permissions and
ownership information.
-n Produce a long listing with user and group information
presented numerically.
@ -270,17 +273,18 @@ INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Toggle display of progress meter.
put [-Ppr] local-path [remote-path]
Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the re-
mote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(3) characters
and may match multiple files. If it does and remote-path is
specified, then remote-path must specify a directory.
Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the
remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(3)
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
directory.
If ether the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file permis-
sions and access times are copied too.
If ether the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file
permissions and access times are copied too.
If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied re-
cursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied
recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
performing recursive transfers.
pwd Display remote working directory.
@ -313,7 +317,8 @@ SEE ALSO
ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), glob(3),
ssh_config(5), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
T. Ylonen, S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol,
draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress
material.
OpenBSD 4.7 February 8, 2010 5
OpenBSD 4.8 February 8, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

6
sftp.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.123 2010/01/27 19:21:39 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.125 2010/06/18 00:58:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -181,6 +181,8 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
{ "ls", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS },
{ "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE },
{ "mget", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS },
{ "put", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE },
@ -1366,7 +1368,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
break;
case I_LS:
if (!path1) {
do_globbed_ls(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
break;
}

38
ssh-add.0
View File

@ -11,31 +11,33 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
ssh-add adds RSA or DSA identities to the authentication agent,
ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files
~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa and ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a pri-
vate key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information
from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the pri-
vate key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa and ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a
private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate
information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name
of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given on the
command line.
If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries
the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environ-
ment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to work.
The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
work.
The options are as follows:
-c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed
by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below. Successful confirma-
tion is signaled by a zero exit status from the SSH_ASKPASS pro-
gram, rather than text entered into the requester.
by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below. Successful
confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the
SSH_ASKPASS program, rather than text entered into the requester.
-D Deletes all identities from the agent.
-d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the de-
fault identities will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list
If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
default identities will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list
will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files and
matching keys will be removed from the agent. If no public key
is found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.
@ -43,8 +45,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-e pkcs11
Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently repre-
sented by the agent.
-L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
represented by the agent.
-l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
agent.
@ -54,8 +56,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-t life
Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The
lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format speci-
fied in sshd_config(5).
lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
specified in sshd_config(5).
-X Unlock the agent.
@ -102,8 +104,8 @@ SEE ALSO
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
ated OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
OpenBSD 4.7 March 5, 2010 2
OpenBSD 4.8 March 5, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

50
ssh-add.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.94 2010/03/01 11:07:06 otto Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.96 2010/05/14 00:47:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
"Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
if (confirm != 0)
fprintf(stderr,
"The user has to confirm each use of the key\n");
"The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename);
}
@ -202,29 +202,37 @@ add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename)
/* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) != NULL) {
/* Graft with private bits */
if (key_to_certified(private) != 0)
fatal("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
key_cert_copy(cert, private);
if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) == NULL)
goto out;
if (!key_equal_public(cert, private)) {
error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
key_free(cert);
goto out;
}
if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment,
lifetime, confirm)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n",
certpath, private->cert->key_id);
if (lifetime != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n",
lifetime);
if (confirm != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "The user has to confirm each "
"use of the key\n");
} else {
error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
}
/* Graft with private bits */
if (key_to_certified(private, key_cert_is_legacy(cert)) != 0) {
error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__);
key_free(cert);
goto out;
}
key_cert_copy(cert, private);
key_free(cert);
if (!ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment,
lifetime, confirm)) {
error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
if (lifetime != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
if (confirm != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n");
out:
xfree(certpath);
xfree(comment);
key_free(private);

56
ssh-agent.0
View File

@ -8,18 +8,18 @@ SYNOPSIS
ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
DESCRIPTION
ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key authenti-
cation (RSA, DSA). The idea is that ssh-agent is started in the begin-
ning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or pro-
grams are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of
ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key
authentication (RSA, DSA). The idea is that ssh-agent is started in the
beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or
programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of
environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for
authentication when logging in to other machines using ssh(1).
The options are as follows:
-a bind_address
Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The de-
fault is /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The
default is /tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
-c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
@ -50,15 +50,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
one or from a small X11 program if running under X11. If neither of
these is the case then the authentication will fail. It then sends the
identity to the agent. Several identities can be stored in the agent;
the agent can automatically use any of these identities. ssh-add -l dis-
plays the identities currently held by the agent.
the agent can automatically use any of these identities. ssh-add -l
displays the identities currently held by the agent.
The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or ter-
minal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, and
authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the con-
nection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user
can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the net-
work in a secure way.
The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine,
and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the
connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user
can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the
network in a secure way.
There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the
agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are
@ -68,18 +68,18 @@ DESCRIPTION
Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for
csh(1) and derivatives.
Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a con-
nection to the agent.
Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a
connection to the agent.
The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. In-
stead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the
agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, pri-
vate keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the
agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way,
private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in
the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible
only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or anoth-
er instance of the same user.
only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or
another instance of the same user.
The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
@ -100,9 +100,9 @@ FILES
the user.
/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authen-
tication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the
owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the
UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by
the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the
agent exits.
SEE ALSO
@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ SEE ALSO
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
ated OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
OpenBSD 4.7 January 17, 2010 2
OpenBSD 4.8 January 17, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

5
ssh-agent.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.165 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.166 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->pub_key);
buffer_get_bignum2(&e->request, k->dsa->priv_key);
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len);
if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
@ -520,6 +521,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
/* Generate additional parameters */
rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa);
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
cert = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &len);
if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL)
@ -540,6 +542,7 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version)
/* enable blinding */
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA1:
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {

12
ssh-dss.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.25 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.26 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -53,9 +53,8 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen;
Buffer b;
if (key == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_DSA && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT) ||
key->dsa == NULL) {
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_DSA &&
key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_dss_sign: no DSA key");
return -1;
}
@ -118,9 +117,8 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
int rlen, ret;
Buffer b;
if (key == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_DSA && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT) ||
key->dsa == NULL) {
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_DSA &&
key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_DSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_dss_verify: no DSA key");
return -1;
}

254
ssh-keygen.0
View File

@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ SYNOPSIS
ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] -t type [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment]
[-f output_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]
ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]
ssh-keygen -l [-f input_keyfile]
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ SYNOPSIS
ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a num_trials]
[-W generator]
ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]
[-O constraint] [-V validity_interval] file ...
[-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...
ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
DESCRIPTION
@ -46,14 +46,14 @@ DESCRIPTION
name but ``.pub'' appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The
passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A
passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a se-
ries of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of charac-
ters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not sim-
ple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2
bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and
contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-alphanu-
meric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the -p
option.
passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-
2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and
contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using
the -p option.
There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost
or forgotten, a new key must be generated and copied to the corresponding
@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
For RSA1 keys, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only
for convenience to the user to help identify the key. The comment can
tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. The comment is initial-
ized to ``user@host'' when the key is created, but can be changed using
the -c option.
tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. The comment is
initialized to ``user@host'' when the key is created, but can be changed
using the -c option.
After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should
be placed to be activated.
@ -79,26 +79,29 @@ DESCRIPTION
-b bits
Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys,
the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits. Gen-
erally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be ex-
actly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits.
Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be
exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
-C comment
Provides a new comment.
-c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The pro-
gram will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The
program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
-D pkcs11
Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared li-
brary pkcs11.
Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared
library pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option
indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
CERTIFICATES section for details).
-e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
print the key in RFC 4716 SSH Public Key File Format to stdout.
This option allows exporting keys for use by several commercial
SSH implementations.
print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the -m
option. The default export format is ``RFC4716''. This option
allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
including several commercial SSH implementations.
-F hostname
Search for the specified hostname in a known_hosts file, listing
@ -116,8 +119,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
using the -r command.
-H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and ad-
dresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
-H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and
addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
@ -133,41 +136,48 @@ DESCRIPTION
the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in SSH2-compatible format and print an OpenSSH compatible private
(or public) key to stdout. ssh-keygen also reads the RFC 4716
SSH Public Key File Format. This option allows importing keys
from several commercial SSH implementations.
in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows
importing keys from other software, including several commercial
SSH implementations. The default import format is ``RFC4716''.
-L Prints the contents of a certificate.
-l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys
are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to
find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If
combined with -v, an ASCII art representation of the key is sup-
plied with the fingerprint.
combined with -v, an ASCII art representation of the key is
supplied with the fingerprint.
-M memory
Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generat-
ing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
-m key_format
Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export)
conversion options. The supported key formats are: ``RFC4716''
(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), ``PKCS8'' (PEM PKCS8
public key) or ``PEM'' (PEM public key). The default conversion
format is ``RFC4716''.
-N new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
-n principals
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be includ-
ed in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may
be specified, separated by commas. Please see the CERTIFICATES
section for details.
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple
principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the
CERTIFICATES section for details.
-O constraint
Specify a certificate constraint when signing a key. This option
may be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES
section for details. The constraints that are valid for user
certificates are:
-O option
Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may
be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES section
for details. The options that are valid for user certificates
are:
clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clear-
ing the default set of permissions so permissions may be
added individually.
clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for
clearing the default set of permissions so permissions
may be added individually.
force-command=command
Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or
@ -206,11 +216,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
source-address=address_list
Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate
is considered valid. The address_list is a comma-sepa-
rated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
format.
is considered valid. The address_list is a comma-
separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in
CIDR format.
At present, no constraints are valid for host keys.
At present, no options are valid for host keys.
-P passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
@ -245,21 +255,21 @@ DESCRIPTION
-t type
Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are
``rsa1'' for protocol version 1 and ``rsa'' or ``dsa'' for proto-
col version 2.
``rsa1'' for protocol version 1 and ``rsa'' or ``dsa'' for
protocol version 2.
-V validity_interval
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A valid-
ity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or
may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an ex-
plicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a date
in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative
time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
a relative time in the format described in the TIME FORMATS sec-
tion of sshd_config(5). The end time may be specified as a
YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time starting
with a plus character.
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A
validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a
date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a
relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign
followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME
FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The end time may be specified
as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time
starting with a plus character.
For example: ``+52w1d'' (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day
from now), ``-4w:+4w'' (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks
@ -269,9 +279,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
2011).
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli genera-
tion. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum
is 3.
about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli
generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
maximum is 3.
-W generator
Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-
@ -280,12 +290,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
-y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
OpenSSH public key to stdout.
-z serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The
default serial number is zero.
MODULI GENERATION
ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step pro-
cess: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory in-
tensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability
(a CPU-intensive process).
Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step
process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for
suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
Generation of primes is performed using the -G option. The desired
length of the primes may be specified by the -b option. For example:
@ -293,8 +308,8 @@ MODULI GENERATION
# ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which speci-
fies a different start point (in hex).
length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which
specifies a different start point (in hex).
Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be tested for
suitability. This may be performed using the -T option. In this mode
@ -317,15 +332,15 @@ CERTIFICATES
ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public
key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
names and an optional set of constraints that are signed by a Certifica-
tion Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA
key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many
user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much
simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
(CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User cer-
tificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates au-
thenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User
certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
$ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
@ -334,83 +349,90 @@ CERTIFICATES
$ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub. In
both cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
providing its public half as an argument to -s:
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id host_key.pub
In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
when the certificate is used for authentication.
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (us-
er/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of princi-
pals:
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
(user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of
principals:
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate constraints. A constrained certificate
may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific com-
mand. For a list of valid certificate constraints, see the documentation
be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may
disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation
for the -O option above.
Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V
option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A cer-
tificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be con-
sidered valid. By default, certificates have a maximum validity inter-
val.
option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A
certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
considered valid. By default, certificates have a maximum validity
interval.
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA pub-
lic key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those man-
ual pages for details.
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those
manual pages for details.
FILES
~/.ssh/identity
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the us-
er. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically ac-
cessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically
accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
is made.
~/.ssh/identity.pub
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentica-
tion. The contents of this file should be added to
Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for
authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the
contents of this file secret.
~/.ssh/id_dsa
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the us-
er. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically ac-
cessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically
accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
is made.
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA public key for authentica-
tion. The contents of this file should be added to
Contains the protocol version 2 DSA public key for
authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep
the contents of this file secret.
~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the us-
er. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically ac-
cessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically
accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
is made.
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA public key for authentica-
tion. The contents of this file should be added to
Contains the protocol version 2 RSA public key for
authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep
the contents of this file secret.
@ -431,4 +453,4 @@ AUTHORS
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
OpenBSD 4.7 March 13, 2010 7
OpenBSD 4.8 August 4, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

89
ssh-keygen.1
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.92 2010/03/13 23:38:13 jmc Exp $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.98 2010/08/04 06:07:11 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" -*- nroff -*-
.\"
@ -37,15 +37,15 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 13 2010 $
.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Bk -words
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Op Fl q
.Op Fl b Ar bits
.Fl t Ar type
@ -59,9 +59,11 @@
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl i
.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl e
.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl y
@ -110,8 +112,9 @@
.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
.Op Fl h
.Op Fl n Ar principals
.Op Fl O Ar constraint
.Op Fl O Ar option
.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl L
@ -212,13 +215,20 @@ the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details).
.It Fl e
This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
print the key in
RFC 4716 SSH Public Key File Format
to stdout.
This option allows exporting keys for use by several commercial
SSH implementations.
print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the
.Fl m
option.
The default export format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
several commercial SSH implementations.
.It Fl F Ar hostname
Search for the specified
.Ar hostname
@ -269,13 +279,14 @@ Please see the
section for details.
.It Fl i
This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in SSH2-compatible format and print an OpenSSH compatible private
in the format specified by the
.Fl m
option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
(or public) key to stdout.
.Nm
also reads the
RFC 4716 SSH Public Key File Format.
This option allows importing keys from several commercial
SSH implementations.
This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
commercial SSH implementations.
The default import format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
.It Fl L
Prints the contents of a certificate.
.It Fl l
@ -290,6 +301,22 @@ an ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
.It Fl M Ar memory
Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Fl m Ar key_format
Specify a key format for the
.Fl i
(import) or
.Fl e
(export) conversion options.
The supported key formats are:
.Dq RFC4716
(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
.Dq PKCS8
(PEM PKCS8 public key)
or
.Dq PEM
(PEM public key).
The default conversion format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
.It Fl n Ar principals
@ -299,13 +326,13 @@ Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl O Ar constraint
Specify a certificate constraint when signing a key.
.It Fl O Ar option
Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
This option may be specified multiple times.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
The constraints that are valid for user certificates are:
The options that are valid for user certificates are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ic clear
Clear all enabled permissions.
@ -355,7 +382,7 @@ is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
format.
.El
.Pp
At present, no constraints are valid for host keys.
At present, no options are valid for host keys.
.It Fl P Ar passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
.It Fl p
@ -441,6 +468,10 @@ Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Fl y
This option will read a private
OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
.It Fl z Ar serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
this certificate from others from the same CA.
The default serial number is zero.
.El
.Sh MODULI GENERATION
.Nm
@ -501,7 +532,7 @@ that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
user or host authentication.
Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
more principal (user or host) names and an optional set of constraints that
more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
@ -527,7 +558,17 @@ option:
.Pp
The host certificate will be output to
.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
In both cases,
.Pp
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using
.Fl D
and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
to
.Fl s :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id host_key.pub
.Pp
In all cases,
.Ar key_id
is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
is used for authentication.
@ -541,11 +582,11 @@ To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub"
.Pp
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate constraints.
A constrained certificate may disable features of the SSH session, may be
be specified through certificate options.
A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
force the use of a specific command.
For a list of valid certificate constraints, see the documentation for the
For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the
.Fl O
option above.
.Pp

767
ssh-keygen.c
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

33
ssh-keyscan.0
View File

@ -8,17 +8,17 @@ SYNOPSIS
[host | addrlist namelist] ...
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a num-
ber of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a
number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
ssh_known_hosts files. ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable
for use by shell and perl scripts.
ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as pos-
sible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of
ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of
1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need login
access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning pro-
cess involve any encryption.
access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning
process involve any encryption.
The options are as follows:
@ -32,8 +32,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
read hosts or addrlist namelist pairs from the standard input.
-H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may
be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal identi-
fying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal
identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
-p port
Port to connect to on the remote host.
@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have
elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
last time anything was read from that host, then the connection
is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. De-
fault is 5 seconds.
is closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
Default is 5 seconds.
-t type
Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
@ -56,11 +56,12 @@ DESCRIPTION
about its progress.
SECURITY
If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without veri-
fying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle attacks.
On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, ssh-keyscan
can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle at-
tacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
created.
FILES
Input format:
@ -104,4 +105,4 @@ BUGS
This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public
key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key.
OpenBSD 4.7 January 9, 2010 2
OpenBSD 4.8 January 9, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

165
ssh-keyscan.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.81 2010/01/09 23:04:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.82 2010/06/22 04:54:30 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
@ -104,122 +104,6 @@ typedef struct Connection {
TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
con *fdcon;
/*
* This is just a wrapper around fgets() to make it usable.
*/
/* Stress-test. Increase this later. */
#define LINEBUF_SIZE 16
typedef struct {
char *buf;
u_int size;
int lineno;
const char *filename;
FILE *stream;
void (*errfun) (const char *,...);
} Linebuf;
static Linebuf *
Linebuf_alloc(const char *filename, void (*errfun) (const char *,...))
{
Linebuf *lb;
if (!(lb = malloc(sizeof(*lb)))) {
if (errfun)
(*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n",
filename ? filename : "(stdin)");
return (NULL);
}
if (filename) {
lb->filename = filename;
if (!(lb->stream = fopen(filename, "r"))) {
xfree(lb);
if (errfun)
(*errfun) ("%s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
return (NULL);
}
} else {
lb->filename = "(stdin)";
lb->stream = stdin;
}
if (!(lb->buf = malloc((lb->size = LINEBUF_SIZE)))) {
if (errfun)
(*errfun) ("linebuf (%s): malloc failed\n", lb->filename);
xfree(lb);
return (NULL);
}
lb->errfun = errfun;
lb->lineno = 0;
return (lb);
}
static void
Linebuf_free(Linebuf * lb)
{
fclose(lb->stream);
xfree(lb->buf);
xfree(lb);
}
#if 0
static void
Linebuf_restart(Linebuf * lb)
{
clearerr(lb->stream);
rewind(lb->stream);
lb->lineno = 0;
}
static int
Linebuf_lineno(Linebuf * lb)
{
return (lb->lineno);
}
#endif
static char *
Linebuf_getline(Linebuf * lb)
{
size_t n = 0;
void *p;
lb->lineno++;
for (;;) {
/* Read a line */
if (!fgets(&lb->buf[n], lb->size - n, lb->stream)) {
if (ferror(lb->stream) && lb->errfun)
(*lb->errfun)("%s: %s\n", lb->filename,
strerror(errno));
return (NULL);
}
n = strlen(lb->buf);
/* Return it or an error if it fits */
if (n > 0 && lb->buf[n - 1] == '\n') {
lb->buf[n - 1] = '\0';
return (lb->buf);
}
if (n != lb->size - 1) {
if (lb->errfun)
(*lb->errfun)("%s: skipping incomplete last line\n",
lb->filename);
return (NULL);
}
/* Double the buffer if we need more space */
lb->size *= 2;
if ((p = realloc(lb->buf, lb->size)) == NULL) {
lb->size /= 2;
if (lb->errfun)
(*lb->errfun)("linebuf (%s): realloc failed\n",
lb->filename);
return (NULL);
}
lb->buf = p;
}
}
static int
fdlim_get(int hard)
{
@ -724,8 +608,10 @@ int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
int opt, fopt_count = 0;
char *tname;
int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
char *tname, *cp, line[NI_MAXHOST];
FILE *fp;
u_long linenum;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
@ -826,19 +712,40 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
if (fopt_count) {
Linebuf *lb;
char *line;
int j;
for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
if (argv[j] == NULL)
fp = stdin;
else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
strerror(errno));
linenum = 0;
for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
lb = Linebuf_alloc(argv[j], error);
if (!lb)
while (read_keyfile_line(fp,
argv[j] == NULL ? "(stdin)" : argv[j], line, sizeof(line),
&linenum) != -1) {
/* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
while (cp >= line) {
if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
*cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
*cp-- = '\0';
else
break;
}
/* Skip empty lines */
if (*line == '\0')
continue;
while ((line = Linebuf_getline(lb)) != NULL)
do_host(line);
Linebuf_free(lb);
do_host(line);
}
if (ferror(fp))
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
strerror(errno));
fclose(fp);
}
while (optind < argc)

11
ssh-keysign.0
View File

@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
to ``yes''.
ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1).
See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based authentica-
tion.
See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based
authentication.
FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
@ -30,6 +30,11 @@ FILES
are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if
host-based authentication is used.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public
certificate information corresponding with the private keys
above.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
@ -39,4 +44,4 @@ HISTORY
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
OpenBSD 4.7 May 31, 2007 1
OpenBSD 4.8 August 4, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

7
ssh-keysign.8
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.9 2007/05/31 19:20:16 jmc Exp $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.10 2010/08/04 05:42:47 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.Dd $Mdocdate: May 31 2007 $
.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,

4
ssh-keysign.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.30 2010/01/13 01:20:20 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.32 2010/08/04 06:08:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (keys[i] != NULL &&
key_equal(key, keys[i])) {
key_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
found = 1;
break;
}

2
ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
View File

@ -22,4 +22,4 @@ HISTORY
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
OpenBSD 4.7 February 10, 2010 1
OpenBSD 4.8 February 10, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

53
ssh-pkcs11.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.4 2010/02/24 06:12:53 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.6 2010/06/08 21:32:19 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -187,6 +187,34 @@ pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa)
return (rv);
}
/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
static int
pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_ULONG nfound = 0;
CK_RV rv;
int ret = -1;
f = p->function_list;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
return (-1);
}
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
nfound != 1) {
debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
nfound, nattr, rv);
} else
ret = 0;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
return (ret);
}
/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
static int
pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
@ -196,7 +224,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG tlen = 0, nfound = 0;
CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE;
@ -247,13 +275,10 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
}
key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(si->session, key_filter, 3)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(si->session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
nfound != 1) {
error("C_FindObjects failed (%lu nfound): %lu", nfound, rv);
/* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
error("cannot find private key");
} else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
} else {
@ -265,8 +290,6 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
else
error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
}
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(si->session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
return (rval);
}
@ -410,7 +433,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, Key ***keysp,
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
continue;
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes, XXX check ulValueLen? */
/* check that none of the attributes are zero length */
if (attribs[0].ulValueLen == 0 ||
attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
continue;
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(attribs[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */

6
ssh-rand-helper.0
View File

@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
random numbers from a EGD/PRNGd server via a unix domain or localhost tcp
socket.
This program is not intended to be run by the end-user, so the few com-
mandline options are for debugging purposes only.
This program is not intended to be run by the end-user, so the few
commandline options are for debugging purposes only.
-b bytes
Specify the number of random bytes to include in the output.
@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ AUTHORS
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
OpenBSD 4.7 April 14, 2002 1
OpenBSD 4.8 April 14, 2002 OpenBSD 4.8

21
ssh-rsa.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.40 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2010/07/16 14:07:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include "buffer.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *);
@ -46,9 +47,8 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
int ok, nid;
Buffer b;
if (key == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
key->rsa == NULL) {
if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_RSA &&
key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_rsa_sign: no RSA key");
return -1;
}
@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen,
u_int len, dlen, modlen;
int rlen, ret, nid;
if (key == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
key->rsa == NULL) {
if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || (key->type != KEY_RSA &&
key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT_V00)) {
error("ssh_rsa_verify: no RSA key");
return -1;
}
@ -212,7 +211,7 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
int len;
int len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
const u_char *oid = NULL;
u_char *decrypted = NULL;
@ -251,11 +250,13 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
goto done;
}
if (memcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
if (!oidmatch) {
error("oid mismatch");
goto done;
}
if (memcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
if (!hashmatch) {
error("hash mismatch");
goto done;
}

478
ssh.0
View File

@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin
and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrust-
ed hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP
ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two
untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary
TCP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user
name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using
one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see be-
low).
one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see
below).
If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
login shell.
@ -52,8 +52,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
-b bind_address
Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one ad-
dress.
the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one
address.
-C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections). The
@ -69,17 +69,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The
supported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'', and ``des''. 3des
(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three dif-
ferent keys. It is believed to be secure. blowfish is a fast
(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three
different keys. It is believed to be secure. blowfish is a fast
block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than
3des. des is only supported in the ssh client for interoperabil-
ity with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support
the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to crypto-
graphic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''.
3des. des is only supported in the ssh client for
interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do
not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due
to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''.
For protocol version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of
ciphers listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword
for more information.
in ssh_config(5) for more information.
-D [bind_address:]port
Specifies a local ``dynamic'' application-level port forwarding.
@ -89,19 +89,18 @@ DESCRIPTION
the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dy-
namic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration
file.
as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
configuration file.
IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
[bind_address/]port or by enclosing the address in square brack-
ets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By de-
fault, the local port is bound in accordance with the
GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be
used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port
be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indi-
cates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*'
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-e escape_char
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: `~').
@ -113,21 +112,21 @@ DESCRIPTION
fully transparent.
-F configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a con-
figuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a
configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.
-f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphras-
es, but the user wants it in the background. This implies -n.
The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is
with something like ssh -f host xterm.
This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to
``yes'', then a client started with -f will wait for all remote
port forwards to be successfully established before placing it-
self in the background.
port forwards to be successfully established before placing
itself in the background.
-g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
@ -138,13 +137,13 @@ DESCRIPTION
-i identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for RSA or
DSA authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for
protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_dsa for pro-
tocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a per-
host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have
multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in config-
uration files). ssh will also try to load certificate informa-
tion from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to identi-
ty filenames.
protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_dsa for
protocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a
per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have
multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files). ssh will also try to load certificate
information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to
identity filenames.
-K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
@ -156,60 +155,62 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be
forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This
works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side,
optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a con-
nection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port
hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be
specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be spec-
ified with an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port/host/host-
port or by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the
specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the
superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local
port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. How-
ever, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection
to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indi-
cates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while
an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be avail-
able from all interfaces.
port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting.
However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the
connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for
local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the
port should be available from all interfaces.
-l login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-M Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection shar-
ing. Multiple -M options places ssh into ``master'' mode with
confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Re-
fer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for de-
tails.
-M Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection
sharing. Multiple -M options places ssh into ``master'' mode
with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted.
Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
details.
-m mac_spec
Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of
MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in
order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information.
-N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just for-
warding ports (protocol version 2 only).
-N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just
forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only).
-n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote ma-
chine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start
an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be au-
tomatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh program
will be put in the background. (This does not work if ssh needs
to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f option.)
common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
option.)
-O ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: ``check''
(check that the master process is running) and ``exit'' (request
the master to exit).
(check that the master process is running), ``forward'' (request
forwardings without command execution) and ``exit'' (request the
master to exit).
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configura-
tion file. This is useful for specifying options for which there
is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the op-
tions listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5).
Can be used to give options in the format used in the
configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
@ -287,61 +288,64 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to
be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This
works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote
side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connec-
tion is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
made to host port hostport from the local machine.
side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
is made to host port hostport from the local machine.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
the address in square braces or using an alternative syntax:
[bind_address/]host/port/hostport.
the address in square braces.
By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to
the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specify-
ing a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address `*',
indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the serv-
er's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)).
the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by
specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address
`*', indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
sshd_config(5)).
If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically
allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
printed to the standard output.
-S ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing
or the string ``none'' to disable connection sharing. Refer to
the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in ssh_config(5)
for details.
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
sharing, or the string ``none'' to disable connection sharing.
Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
ssh_config(5) for details.
-s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which fa-
cilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applica-
tions (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote
command.
system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which
facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other
applications (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the
remote command.
-T Disable pseudo-tty allocation.
-t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute arbi-
trary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
-t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute
arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
-V Display the version number and exit.
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentica-
tion, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase
the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options
increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-W host:port
Requests that standard input and output on the client be forward-
ed to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N, -T,
ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings and works with Pro-
tocol version 2 only.
Requests that standard input and output on the client be
forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N,
-T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings and works with
Protocol version 2 only.
-w local_tun[:remote_tun]
Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) de-
vices between the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun).
Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
(remote_tun).
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
``any'', which uses the next available tunnel device. If
@ -359,9 +363,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY ex-
tension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y op-
tion and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
more information.
-x Disables X11 forwarding.
@ -369,12 +373,12 @@ DESCRIPTION
-Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
-y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By de-
fault this information is sent to stderr.
-y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By
default this information is sent to stderr.
ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configura-
tion file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and con-
figuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format
and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
error occurred.
@ -385,15 +389,16 @@ AUTHENTICATION
in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above). Both protocols
support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default
since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic
is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integri-
ty (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a
strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.
is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and
integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1
lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.
The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentica-
tion, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-re-
sponse authentication, and password authentication. Authentication meth-
ods are tried in the order specified above, though protocol 2 has a con-
figuration option to change the default order: PreferredAuthentications.
The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order:
PreferredAuthentications.
Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
@ -403,22 +408,22 @@ AUTHENTICATION
the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login.
Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key
(see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes se-
curity holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes
security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
[Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the
rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
disabled if security is desired.]
Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on pub-
lic-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption
are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryp-
tion key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a
public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows
the public key, and only the user knows the private key. ssh implements
public key authentication protocol automatically, using either the RSA or
DSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, but
protocol 2 may use either. The HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a
brief discussion of the two algorithms.
Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user
creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
either the RSA or DSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is restricted to using only
RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use either. The HISTORY section of ssl(8)
contains a brief discussion of the two algorithms.
The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
@ -430,48 +435,49 @@ AUTHENTICATION
the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol
2 DSA), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in
~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA), or
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory. The us-
er should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her
home directory on the remote machine. The authorized_keys file corre-
sponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line,
though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in with-
out giving the password.
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory. The
user should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her
home directory on the remote machine. The authorized_keys file
corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line,
though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in
without giving the password.
A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of cer-
tificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed
certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted cer-
tification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys.
See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for more information.
A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single
trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
more information.
The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more informa-
tion.
may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more
information.
Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2 al-
lows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to just
one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response authentication
include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD
systems).
arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2
allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to
just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response
authentication include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM
(some non-OpenBSD systems).
Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
someone listening on the network.
ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identifica-
tion for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in
~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any
new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's iden-
tification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables password au-
thentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
whose host key is not known or has changed.
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server ei-
ther executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the
user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the
remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
@ -487,14 +493,14 @@ AUTHENTICATION
exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
ESCAPE CHARACTERS
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of func-
tions through the use of an escape character.
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
functions through the use of an escape character.
A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
character other than those described below. The escape character must
always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape charac-
ter can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar configura-
tion directive or on the command line by the -e option.
always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
The supported escapes (assuming the default `~') are:
@ -531,8 +537,8 @@ TCP FORWARDING
In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC
client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support
encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to
the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward con-
nections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the
the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward
connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the
service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the
same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection.
@ -543,11 +549,11 @@ TCP FORWARDING
$ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1
This tunnels a connection to IRC server ``server.example.com'', joining
channel ``#users'', nickname ``pinky'', using port 1234. It doesn't mat-
ter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only
root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any
ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the
remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services.
channel ``#users'', nickname ``pinky'', using port 1234. It doesn't
matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember,
only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with
any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on
the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services.
The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command ``sleep 10'' is
specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
@ -557,13 +563,13 @@ TCP FORWARDING
X11 FORWARDING
If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is auto-
matically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 pro-
grams started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted
channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the
local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of
X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration
files.
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
configuration files.
The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
@ -579,8 +585,8 @@ X11 FORWARDING
If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of
the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the re-
mote side.
agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
remote side.
VERIFYING HOST KEYS
When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
@ -597,8 +603,8 @@ VERIFYING HOST KEYS
``yes'', a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server,
no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the
pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host
key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Be-
cause these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed.
Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
@ -634,15 +640,15 @@ VERIFYING HOST KEYS
SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined se-
curely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traf-
fic).
the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
traffic).
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with re-
mote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1
to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the
remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
On the client:
@ -665,8 +671,8 @@ SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More perma-
nent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More
permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
isakmpd(8).
ENVIRONMENT
@ -685,13 +691,13 @@ ENVIRONMENT
HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with sys-
tems that use this variable.
LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
systems that use this variable.
MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compil-
ing ssh.
PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when
compiling ssh.
SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
@ -699,49 +705,50 @@ ENVIRONMENT
associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
set, it will execute the program specified by
SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
passphrase. This is particularly useful when call-
ing ssh from a .xsession or related script. (Note
that on some machines it may be necessary to redi-
rect the input from /dev/null to make this work.)
passphrase. This is particularly useful when
calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
(Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
work.)
SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
communicate with the agent.
SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the con-
nection. The variable contains four space-separat-
ed values: client IP address, client port number,
server IP address, and server port number.
SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the
connection. The variable contains four space-
separated values: client IP address, client port
number, server IP address, and server port number.
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if
a forced command is executed. It can be used to
extract the original arguments.
SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the de-
vice) associated with the current shell or command.
If the current session has no tty, this variable is
not set.
SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
device) associated with the current shell or
command. If the current session has no tty, this
variable is not set.
TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time
zone if it was set when the daemon was started
(i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connec-
tions).
(i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
connections).
USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file exists and users are al-
lowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file exists and users are
allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
FILES
~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On
some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the us-
er's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) reads
it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recom-
mended permission for most machines is read/write for the user,
and not accessible by others.
some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the
user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The
recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
@ -749,18 +756,18 @@ FILES
rlogin/rsh.
~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific con-
figuration and authentication information. There is no general
requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret,
but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the
user, and not accessible by others.
This directory is the default location for all user-specific
configuration and authentication information. There is no
general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
for the user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in
as this user. The format of this file is described in the
sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the
recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not ac-
cessible by others.
recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
@ -776,11 +783,12 @@ FILES
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain
sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not acces-
sible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply ignore a
private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible
to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be
used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES.
sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply
ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is
possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
3DES.
~/.ssh/identity.pub
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
@ -804,8 +812,8 @@ FILES
should only be writable by root.
/etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but al-
lows host-based authentication without permitting login with
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
@ -817,11 +825,11 @@ FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These three files contain the private parts of the host keys and
are used for host-based authentication. If protocol version 1 is
used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable on-
ly by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to
access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be se-
tuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default ssh
is not setuid root.
used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable
only by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to
access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be
setuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default
ssh is not setuid root.
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
@ -866,7 +874,7 @@ SEE ALSO
The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
A. Perrig, D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
@ -877,4 +885,4 @@ AUTHORS
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
OpenBSD 4.7 March 26, 2010 14
OpenBSD 4.8 August 4, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

76
ssh.1
View File

@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.303 2010/03/26 00:26:58 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2010 $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.308 2010/08/04 05:37:01 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -43,46 +43,28 @@
.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh
.Bk -words
.Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
.Oo Fl D\ \&
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Oc
.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
.Op Fl F Ar configfile
.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
.Bk -words
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Ek
.Oo Fl L\ \&
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Oc
.Bk -words
.Op Fl L Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
.Op Fl l Ar login_name
.Ek
.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Oo Fl R\ \&
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Oc
.Op Fl R Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
.Oo Fl w Ar local_tun Ns
.Op : Ns Ar remote_tun Oc
.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname
.Op Ar command
.Ek
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
@ -194,7 +176,9 @@ is a comma-separated list of ciphers
listed in order of preference.
See the
.Cm Ciphers
keyword for more information.
keyword in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.It Fl D Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
@ -218,14 +202,7 @@ will act as a SOCKS server.
Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
.Sm off
.Xo
.Op Ar bind_address No /
.Ar port
.Xc
.Sm on
or by enclosing the address in square brackets.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
@ -336,15 +313,7 @@ port
.Ar hostport
from the remote machine.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
.Sm off
.Xo
.Op Ar bind_address No /
.Ar port No / Ar host No /
.Ar hostport
.Xc
.Sm on
or by enclosing the address in square brackets.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
@ -421,7 +390,9 @@ option is specified, the
argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
Valid commands are:
.Dq check
(check that the master process is running) and
(check that the master process is running),
.Dq forward
(request forwardings without command execution) and
.Dq exit
(request the master to exit).
.It Fl o Ar option
@ -525,15 +496,7 @@ from the local machine.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square braces or
using an alternative syntax:
.Sm off
.Xo
.Op Ar bind_address No /
.Ar host No / Ar port No /
.Ar hostport
.Xc .
.Sm on
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square braces.
.Pp
By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback
interface only.
@ -557,8 +520,11 @@ argument is
.Ql 0 ,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
When used together with
.Ic -O forward
the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
or the string
.Dq none
to disable connection sharing.

199
ssh.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.335 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.346 2010/08/12 21:49:44 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "packet.h"
@ -126,6 +127,15 @@ int no_shell_flag = 0;
*/
int stdin_null_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
* a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
*/
int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */
int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, ono_tty_flag, otty_flag;
/*
* Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
* so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
@ -227,6 +237,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
init_rng();
/*
* Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
* with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/*
* Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping
* may clobber the real uid).
@ -327,6 +343,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
else
@ -620,7 +638,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
tty_flag = 1;
/* Force no tty */
if (no_tty_flag)
if (no_tty_flag || muxclient_command != 0)
tty_flag = 0;
/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && !force_tty_flag) {
@ -676,6 +694,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
options.port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
}
if (options.hostname != NULL) {
host = percent_expand(options.hostname,
"h", host, (char *)NULL);
}
if (options.local_command != NULL) {
char thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
@ -685,16 +708,12 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
cp = options.local_command;
options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", options.hostname? options.hostname : host,
"l", thishost, "n", host, "r", options.user, "p", buf,
"u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
"h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host, "r", options.user,
"p", buf, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
xfree(cp);
}
if (options.hostname != NULL)
host = options.hostname;
/* force lowercase for hostkey matching */
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
for (p = options.host_key_alias; *p; p++)
@ -761,26 +780,34 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0;
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication ||
options.hostbased_authentication) {
sensitive_data.nkeys = 3;
sensitive_data.nkeys = 5;
sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
sizeof(Key));
PRIV_START;
sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1,
_PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA,
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA,
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL);
PRIV_END;
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 &&
sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL &&
sensitive_data.keys[1] == NULL &&
sensitive_data.keys[2] == NULL) {
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_public(
sensitive_data.keys[3] == NULL &&
sensitive_data.keys[4] == NULL) {
sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert(
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE);
sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert(
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE);
sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_public(
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_public(
sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_public(
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL);
sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1;
}
@ -827,6 +854,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
pw, timeout_ms);
if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
} else {
verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
}
/* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
@ -866,6 +900,61 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
return exit_status;
}
static void
control_persist_detach(void)
{
pid_t pid;
int devnull;
debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
/*
* master (current process) into the background, and make the
* foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
*/
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
case 0:
/* Child: master process continues mainloop */
break;
default:
/* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */
debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag;
no_shell_flag = ono_shell_flag;
no_tty_flag = ono_tty_flag;
tty_flag = otty_flag;
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
muxclient(options.control_path);
/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
}
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
} else {
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
}
/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
static void
fork_postauth(void)
{
if (need_controlpersist_detach)
control_persist_detach();
debug("forking to background");
fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
static void
ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
@ -877,9 +966,10 @@ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int();
logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
packet_get_int(),
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
rfwd->allocated_port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
}
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
@ -892,12 +982,8 @@ ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
}
if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) {
debug("All remote forwarding requests processed");
if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s",
strerror(errno));
}
if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
fork_postauth();
}
}
@ -1093,7 +1179,9 @@ ssh_session(void)
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
options.forward_x11_trusted,
options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
@ -1139,12 +1227,13 @@ ssh_session(void)
* If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
* forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
*/
if (fork_after_authentication_flag &&
(!options.exit_on_forward_failure ||
options.num_remote_forwards == 0)) {
fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
"confirmation received");
} else
fork_postauth();
}
/*
@ -1175,18 +1264,22 @@ ssh_session(void)
/* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */
static void
ssh_session2_setup(int id, void *arg)
ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg)
{
extern char **environ;
const char *display;
int interactive = tty_flag;
if (!success)
return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, &proto, &data);
options.forward_x11_trusted,
options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data);
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
@ -1263,6 +1356,31 @@ ssh_session2(void)
/* XXX should be pre-session */
ssh_init_forwarding();
/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
muxserver_listen();
/*
* If we are in control persist mode, then prepare to background
* ourselves and have a foreground client attach as a control
* slave. NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
* the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until
* after the connection is fully established (in particular,
* async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag;
ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag;
ono_tty_flag = no_tty_flag;
otty_flag = tty_flag;
stdin_null_flag = 1;
no_shell_flag = 1;
no_tty_flag = 1;
tty_flag = 0;
if (!fork_after_authentication_flag)
need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
}
if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN))
id = ssh_session2_open();
@ -1281,14 +1399,17 @@ ssh_session2(void)
options.permit_local_command)
ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
muxserver_listen();
/* If requested, let ssh continue in the background. */
/*
* If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
* forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
*/
if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
if (daemon(1, 1) < 0)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
"confirmation received");
} else
fork_postauth();
}
if (options.use_roaming)

5
ssh.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.78 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.79 2010/06/25 07:14:46 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -18,9 +18,6 @@
/* Default port number. */
#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT 22
/* Maximum number of TCP/IP ports forwarded per direction. */
#define SSH_MAX_FORWARDS_PER_DIRECTION 100
/*
* Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
* in configuration files or on the command line.

540
ssh_config.0
View File

@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ SYNOPSIS
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
DESCRIPTION
ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the fol-
lowing order:
ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
following order:
1. command-line options
2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configu-
ration files contain sections separated by ``Host'' specifications, and
that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns
given in the specification. The matched host name is the one given on
the command line.
For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The
configuration files contain sections separated by ``Host''
specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one
of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is the
one given on the command line.
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-spe-
cific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
general defaults at the end.
The configuration file has the following format:
@ -30,29 +30,29 @@ DESCRIPTION
Empty lines and lines starting with `#' are comments. Otherwise a line
is of the format ``keyword arguments''. Configuration options may be
separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one `='; the
latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when speci-
fying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option. Ar-
guments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to rep-
resent arguments containing spaces.
latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when
specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to
represent arguments containing spaces.
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that key-
words are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host key-
word) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided,
they should be separated by whitespace. A single `*' as a pat-
tern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The
host is the hostname argument given on the command line (i.e. the
name is not converted to a canonicalized host name before match-
ing).
Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host
keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is
provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single `*'
as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
hosts. The host is the hostname argument given on the command
line (i.e. the name is not converted to a canonicalized host name
before matching).
See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid ar-
guments are ``any'', ``inet'' (use IPv4 only), or ``inet6'' (use
IPv6 only).
Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid
arguments are ``any'', ``inet'' (use IPv4 only), or ``inet6''
(use IPv6 only).
BatchMode
If set to ``yes'', passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
BindAddress
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source ad-
dress of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than
one address. Note that this option does not work if
UsePrivilegedPort is set to ``yes''.
@ -78,20 +78,21 @@ DESCRIPTION
is set to ``no'', the check will not be executed. The default is
``yes''.
Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in proto-
col version 1. Currently, ``blowfish'', ``3des'', and ``des''
are supported. des is only supported in the ssh(1) client for
interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do
not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due
to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''.
Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in
protocol version 1. Currently, ``blowfish'', ``3des'', and
``des'' are supported. des is only supported in the ssh(1)
client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1
implementations that do not support the 3des cipher. Its use is
strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The
default is ``3des''.
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of
preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The sup-
ported ciphers are ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'',
``aes256-cbc'', ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'',
``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'',
and ``cast128-cbc''. The default is:
preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The
supported ciphers are ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'',
``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'', ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'',
``aes256-ctr'', ``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'',
``blowfish-cbc'', and ``cast128-cbc''. The default is:
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128,
aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc,
@ -101,9 +102,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in configura-
tion files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and sftp(1). The
argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
sftp(1). The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is
``no''.
Compression
Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be
@ -117,37 +119,37 @@ DESCRIPTION
option applies to protocol version 1 only.
ConnectionAttempts
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before ex-
iting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in
scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1.
ConnectTimeout
Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
This value is used only when the target is down or really un-
reachable, not when it refuses the connection.
This value is used only when the target is down or really
unreachable, not when it refuses the connection.
ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
connection. When set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will listen for connec-
tions on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argu-
ment. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the
same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to ``no'' (the default).
These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network
connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to
connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is
not listening.
connection. When set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will listen for
connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath
argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using
the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to ``no'' (the
default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's
network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall
back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist,
or is not listening.
Setting this to ``ask'' will cause ssh to listen for control con-
nections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS program
before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details). If the
ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connect-
ing to a master instance.
Setting this to ``ask'' will cause ssh to listen for control
connections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS
program before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details).
If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without
connecting to a master instance.
X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these multi-
plexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will
be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not pos-
sible to forward multiple displays or agents.
X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
@ -156,14 +158,30 @@ DESCRIPTION
option.
ControlPath
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection shar-
ing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the string
``none'' to disable connection sharing. In the path, `%l' will
be substituted by the local host name, `%h' will be substituted
by the target host name, `%p' the port, and `%r' by the remote
login username. It is recommended that any ControlPath used for
opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r.
This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
string ``none'' to disable connection sharing. In the path, `%l'
will be substituted by the local host name, `%h' will be
substituted by the target host name, `%p' the port, and `%r' by
the remote login username. It is recommended that any
ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at
least %h, %p, and %r. This ensures that shared connections are
uniquely identified.
ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
for future client connections) after the initial client
connection has been closed. If set to ``no'', then the master
connection will not be placed into the background, and will close
as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to
``yes'', then the master connection will remain in the background
indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
ssh(1) ``-O exit'' option). If set to a time in seconds, or a
time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the
backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after
it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
@ -171,14 +189,13 @@ DESCRIPTION
determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or by using
an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port. By default, the lo-
cal port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting.
However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connec-
tion to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost''
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only,
while an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be
available from all interfaces.
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default,
the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for
local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the
port should be available from all interfaces.
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be
@ -196,9 +213,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default: `~'). The escape character
can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a
single character, `^' followed by a letter, or ``none'' to dis-
able the escape character entirely (making the connection trans-
parent for binary data).
single character, `^' followed by a letter, or ``none'' to
disable the escape character entirely (making the connection
transparent for binary data).
ExitOnForwardFailure
Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
@ -220,26 +237,34 @@ DESCRIPTION
the agent.
ForwardX11
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirect-
ed over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument must be
``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument
must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 dis-
play through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be
able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then
be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11
connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
minutes has elapsed.
ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to ``yes'', remote X11 clients will have
full access to the original X11 display.
If this option is set to ``no'', remote X11 clients will be con-
sidered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with
data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the xauth(1)
token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 min-
utes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
If this option is set to ``no'', remote X11 clients will be
considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering
with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the
xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after
20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this
time.
The default is ``no''.
@ -250,11 +275,11 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from
connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to spec-
ify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard
address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded
ports. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is
``no''.
connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to
specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
forwarded ports. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
default is ``no''.
GlobalKnownHostsFile
Specifies a file to use for the global host key database instead
@ -267,23 +292,23 @@ DESCRIPTION
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is
``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 on-
ly.
``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2
only.
HashKnownHosts
Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be
used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal iden-
tifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. The
default is ``no''. Note that existing names and addresses in
used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
The default is ``no''. Note that existing names and addresses in
known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be
manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
key authentication. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 2 on-
ly and is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication.
default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 2
only and is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication.
HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the
@ -293,15 +318,18 @@ DESCRIPTION
HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connec-
tions or for multiple servers running on a single host.
database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH
connections or for multiple servers running on a single host.
HostName
Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to
specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. The default is the
name given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also
permitted (both on the command line and in HostName specifica-
tions).
specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname
contains the character sequence `%h', then this will be replaced
with the host name specified on the commandline (this is useful
for manipulating unqualified names). The default is the name
given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also
permitted (both on the command line and in HostName
specifications).
IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity
@ -314,90 +342,91 @@ DESCRIPTION
IdentityFile
Specifies a file from which the user's RSA or DSA authentication
identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for protocol
version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_dsa for protocol ver-
sion 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the authen-
tication agent will be used for authentication. ssh(1) will try
to load certificate information from the filename obtained by ap-
pending -cert.pub to the path of a specified IdentityFile.
version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_rsa and ~/.ssh/id_dsa for protocol
version 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the
authentication agent will be used for authentication. ssh(1)
will try to load certificate information from the filename
obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a specified
IdentityFile.
The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
directory or one of the following escape characters: `%d' (local
user's home directory), `%u' (local user name), `%l' (local host
name), `%h' (remote host name) or `%r' (remote user name).
It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in con-
figuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence.
It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
sequence.
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The de-
fault is ``yes''.
The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
default is ``yes''.
KbdInteractiveDevices
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive au-
thentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list. The methods
available vary depending on what the server supports. For an
OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: ``bsdauth'', ``pam'',
and ``skey''.
LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after suc-
cessfully connecting to the server. The command string extends
to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell.
The following escape character substitutions will be performed:
`%d' (local user's home directory), `%h' (remote host name), `%l'
(local host name), `%n' (host name as provided on the command
line), `%p' (remote port), `%r' (remote user name) or `%u' (local
user name).
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. The following escape character substitutions will be
performed: `%d' (local user's home directory), `%h' (remote host
name), `%l' (local host name), `%n' (host name as provided on the
command line), `%p' (remote port), `%r' (remote user name) or
`%u' (local user name).
The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for
interactive commands.
This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been en-
abled.
This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
enabled.
LocalForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or by using
an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port and host/hostport.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings
can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward
privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accor-
dance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit
bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific ad-
dress. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the lis-
tening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address
or `*' indicates that the port should be available from all in-
terfaces.
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward
privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in
accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit
bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific
address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the
listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
address or `*' indicates that the port should be available from
all interfaces.
LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VER-
BOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
higher levels of verbose output.
MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in or-
der of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version
2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be
comma-separated. The default is:
MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol
version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms
must be comma-separated. The default is:
hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
This option can be used if the home directory is shared across
machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different ma-
chine on each of the machines and the user will get many warnings
about changed host keys. However, this option disables host au-
thentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword must be
``yes'' or ``no''. The default is to check the host key for lo-
calhost.
machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different
machine on each of the machines and the user will get many
warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables
host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword
must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is to check the host key
for localhost.
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The
@ -409,43 +438,47 @@ DESCRIPTION
``yes''.
PermitLocalCommand
Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or us-
ing the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must be
``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must
be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''.
PKCS11Provider
Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this
keyword is the PKCS#11 shared libary ssh(1) should use to commu-
nicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key.
keyword is the PKCS#11 shared libary ssh(1) should use to
communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA
key.
Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The de-
fault is 22.
Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The
default is 22.
PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 au-
thentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method
(e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password)
The default for this option is: ``gssapi-with-
mic,hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password''.
Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2
authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one
method (e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g.
password). The default is:
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
Protocol
Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of
preference. The possible values are `1' and `2'. Multiple ver-
sions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to
``2,1'' ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if ver-
sion 2 is not available. The default is `2'.
preference. The possible values are `1' and `2'. Multiple
versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to
``2,1'' ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if
version 2 is not available. The default is `2'.
ProxyCommand
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The com-
mand string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell. In the command string, `%h' will be substitut-
ed by the host name to connect and `%p' by the port. The command
can be basically anything, and should read from its standard in-
put and write to its standard output. It should eventually con-
nect an sshd(8) server running on some machine, or execute sshd
-i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the Host-
Name of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by
the user). Setting the command to ``none'' disables this option
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The
command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
with the user's shell. In the command string, any occurrence of
`%h' will be substituted by the host name to connect, `%p' by the
port, and `%r' by the remote user name. The command can be
basically anything, and should read from its standard input and
write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an
sshd(8) server running on some machine, or execute sshd -i
somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName
of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the
user). Setting the command to ``none'' disables this option
entirely. Note that CheckHostIP is not available for connects
with a proxy command.
@ -461,32 +494,32 @@ DESCRIPTION
``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted be-
fore the session key is renegotiated. The argument is the number
of bytes, with an optional suffix of `K', `M', or `G' to indicate
Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is
between `1G' and `4G', depending on the cipher. This option ap-
plies to protocol version 2 only.
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
before the session key is renegotiated. The argument is the
number of bytes, with an optional suffix of `K', `M', or `G' to
indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The
default is between `1G' and `4G', depending on the cipher. This
option applies to protocol version 2 only.
RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local
machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or by using
an alternative syntax: [bind_address/]port and host/hostport.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings
can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be for-
warded only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded
only when logging in as root on the remote machine.
If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically
allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is `*' or an empty
string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all inter-
faces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the
server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)).
string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
sshd_config(5)).
RhostsRSAAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA
@ -497,9 +530,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
RSAAuthentication
Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to
this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. RSA authentication will
only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentica-
tion agent is running. The default is ``yes''. Note that this
option applies to protocol version 1 only.
only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an
authentication agent is running. The default is ``yes''. Note
that this option applies to protocol version 1 only.
SendEnv
Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
@ -507,25 +540,25 @@ DESCRIPTION
for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server
must be configured to accept these environment variables. Refer
to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard char-
acters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. The de-
fault is not to send any environment variables.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard
characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. The
default is not to send any environment variables.
See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are be-
ing sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
session. It is important to note that the use of server alive
messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server
alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and there-
fore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by
TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valu-
able when the client or server depend on knowing when a connec-
tion has become inactive.
alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism
is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
connection has become inactive.
The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
@ -542,27 +575,27 @@ DESCRIPTION
StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will never automatically
add host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to con-
nect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum
protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoy-
ing when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained
or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This op-
tion forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag
is set to ``no'', ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
user known hosts files. If this flag is set to ``ask'', new host
keys will be added to the user known host files only after the
user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh
will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The
host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all
cases. The argument must be ``yes'', ``no'', or ``ask''. The
default is ``ask''.
add host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to
connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides
maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be
annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If
this flag is set to ``no'', ssh will automatically add new host
keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to
``ask'', new host keys will be added to the user known host files
only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want
to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has
changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified
automatically in all cases. The argument must be ``yes'',
``no'', or ``ask''. The default is ``ask''.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
this means that connections will die if the route is down tem-
porarily, and some people find it annoying.
this means that connections will die if the route is down
temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
The default is ``yes'' (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
@ -571,32 +604,32 @@ DESCRIPTION
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
``no''.
Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the serv-
er. The argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer 3),
``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes'' requests
the default tunnel mode, which is ``point-to-point''. The de-
fault is ``no''.
Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
server. The argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer
3), ``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes''
requests the default tunnel mode, which is ``point-to-point''.
The default is ``no''.
TunnelDevice
Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
and the server (remote_tun).
The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be
The argument must be local_tun [:remote_tun]. The devices may be
specified by numerical ID or the keyword ``any'', which uses the
next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it
defaults to ``any''. The default is ``any:any''.
UsePrivilegedPort
Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connec-
tions. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is
``no''. If set to ``yes'', ssh(1) must be setuid root. Note
that this option must be set to ``yes'' for
Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing
connections. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
default is ``no''. If set to ``yes'', ssh(1) must be setuid
root. Note that this option must be set to ``yes'' for
RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers.
User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a dif-
ferent user name is used on different machines. This saves the
trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the com-
mand line.
User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a
different user name is used on different machines. This saves
the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
command line.
UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies a file to use for the user host key database instead of
@ -620,9 +653,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
If this flag is set to ``yes'', an ASCII art representation of
the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the hex
fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this
flag is set to ``no'', no fingerprint strings are printed at lo-
gin and only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for un-
known host keys. The default is ``no''.
flag is set to ``no'', no fingerprint strings are printed at
login and only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for
unknown host keys. The default is ``no''.
XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
@ -631,9 +664,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
PATTERNS
A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, `*' (a
wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or `?' (a wildcard that
matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of decla-
rations for any host in the ``.co.uk'' set of domains, the following pat-
tern could be used:
matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of
declarations for any host in the ``.co.uk'' set of domains, the following
pattern could be used:
Host *.co.uk
@ -645,17 +678,18 @@ PATTERNS
A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within
pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
(`!'). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
organisation except from the ``dialup'' pool, the following entry (in au-
thorized_keys) could be used:
organisation except from the ``dialup'' pool, the following entry (in
authorized_keys) could be used:
from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
FILES
~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file
is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Be-
cause of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict per-
missions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
is described above. This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by
others.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for
@ -669,8 +703,8 @@ SEE ALSO
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
ated OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
OpenBSD 4.7 March 26, 2010 11
OpenBSD 4.8 August 4, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

75
ssh_config.5
View File

@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.130 2010/03/26 01:06:13 dtucker Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 26 2010 $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.138 2010/08/04 05:37:01 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -319,6 +319,28 @@ It is recommended that any
used for opportunistic connection sharing include
at least %h, %p, and %r.
This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
.It Cm ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with
.Cm ControlMaster ,
specifies that the master connection should remain open
in the background (waiting for future client connections)
after the initial client connection has been closed.
If set to
.Dq no ,
then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
If set to
.Dq yes ,
then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
.Xr ssh 1
.Dq Fl O No exit
option).
If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
.It Cm DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
over the secure channel, and the application
@ -329,9 +351,7 @@ The argument must be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
.Sm on
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or
by using an alternative syntax:
.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
@ -432,6 +452,17 @@ An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
if the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
option is also enabled.
.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
using the format described in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
X11 connections received by
.Xr ssh 1
after this time will be refused.
The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
elapsed.
.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to
.Dq yes ,
@ -526,6 +557,10 @@ or for multiple servers running on a single host.
.It Cm HostName
Specifies the real host name to log into.
This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
If the hostname contains the character sequence
.Ql %h ,
then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the commandline
(this is useful for manipulating unqualified names).
The default is the name given on the command line.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
.Cm HostName
@ -641,11 +676,7 @@ The first argument must be
.Sm on
and the second argument must be
.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets or
by using an alternative syntax:
.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port
and
.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
@ -732,10 +763,12 @@ authentication methods.
This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
.Cm keyboard-interactive )
over another method (e.g.\&
.Cm password )
The default for this option is:
.Do gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,keyboard-interactive,password
.Dc .
.Cm password ) .
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
.Ed
.It Cm Protocol
Specifies the protocol versions
.Xr ssh 1
@ -757,12 +790,14 @@ Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
The command
string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
In the command string,
In the command string, any occurrence of
.Ql %h
will be substituted by the host name to
connect and
connect,
.Ql %p
by the port.
by the port, and
.Ql %r
by the remote user name.
The command can be basically anything,
and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
It should eventually connect an
@ -821,11 +856,7 @@ The first argument must be
.Sm on
and the second argument must be
.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets
or by using an alternative syntax:
.Oo Ar bind_address Ns / Oc Ns Ar port
and
.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar hostport .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when

14
sshconnect.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.220 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.224 2010/04/16 21:14:27 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -101,8 +101,8 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
* (e.g. Solaris)
*/
xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
command_string = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host,
"p", strport, (char *)NULL);
command_string = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport,
"r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
xfree(tmp);
/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
@ -586,9 +586,9 @@ check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key)
error("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->constraints) != 0) {
error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported constraint(s)",
host);
if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->critical) != 0) {
error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
"critical options(s)", host);
return 0;
}
return 1;
@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
debug("Found %s in %s:%d",
want_cert ? "certificate" : "key", host_file, host_line);
want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_file, host_line);
if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key))
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {

12
sshconnect2.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.180 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.183 2010/04/26 22:28:24 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
const char *host;
const char *service;
Authmethod *method;
int success;
sig_atomic_t success;
char *authlist;
/* pubkey */
Idlist keys;
@ -1140,8 +1140,11 @@ sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id)
u_int skip = 0;
int ret = -1;
int have_sig = 1;
char *fp;
debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey");
fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp);
xfree(fp);
if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
@ -1398,7 +1401,8 @@ userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt)
* private key instead
*/
if (id->key && id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) {
debug("Offering public key: %s", id->filename);
debug("Offering %s public key: %s", key_type(id->key),
id->filename);
sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id);
} else if (id->key == NULL) {
debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);

389
sshd.0
View File

@ -10,19 +10,19 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these
programs replace rlogin(1) and rsh(1), and provide secure encrypted com-
munications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
programs replace rlogin(1) and rsh(1), and provide secure encrypted
communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at
boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection.
The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, com-
mand execution, and data exchange.
The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication,
command execution, and data exchange.
sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
(by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values speci-
fied in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file when
it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name
and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
(by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values
specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file
when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the
name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
The options are as follows:
@ -38,87 +38,89 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address
will be set before the configuration is written to standard out-
put. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value
will be set before the configuration is written to standard
output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value
pairs. The keywords are ``user'', ``host'', and ``addr''. All
are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multi-
ple -C options or as a comma-separated list.
are required and may be supplied in any order, either with
multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list.
-c host_certificate_file
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file
specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration direc-
tive.
specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration
directive.
-D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd.
-d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard
error, and does not put itself in the background. The server al-
so will not fork and will only process one connection. This op-
tion is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple -d
options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3.
error, and does not put itself in the background. The server
also will not fork and will only process one connection. This
option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple
-d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3.
-e When this option is specified, sshd will send the output to the
standard error instead of the system log.
-f config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is
/etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no con-
figuration file.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no
configuration file.
-g login_grace_time
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (de-
fault 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user
within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A
value of zero indicates no limit.
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves
(default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the
user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
A value of zero indicates no limit.
-h host_key_file
Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must
be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key for pro-
tocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key files
for the different protocol versions and host key algorithms.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key for
protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key
files for the different protocol versions and host key
algorithms.
-i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). sshd is normally
not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key
before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of
seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was re-
generated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512)
seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was
regenerated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512)
using sshd from inetd may be feasible.
-k key_gen_time
Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key
is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motiva-
tion for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not
stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to
recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if
the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of ze-
ro indicates that the key will never be regenerated.
is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The
motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key
is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes
impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted
communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically
seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be
regenerated.
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configura-
tion file. This is useful for specifying options for which there
is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the op-
tions, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
Can be used to give options in the format used in the
configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
-p port
Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
(default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports speci-
fied in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored
when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the
ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
(default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports
specified in the configuration file with the Port option are
ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified
using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
-q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the be-
ginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
-q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the
beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
logged.
-T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration
file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the connec-
tion parameters using one or more -C options.
Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the
connection parameters using one or more -C options.
-t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and
sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
@ -127,76 +129,76 @@ DESCRIPTION
-u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host
name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that over-
flow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying -u0
indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into
the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from making
DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration
requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS in-
clude RhostsRSAAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, and using
a from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration op-
tions that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in
AllowUsers or DenyUsers.
instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying
-u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put
into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from
making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or
configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may
require DNS include RhostsRSAAuthentication,
HostbasedAuthentication, and using a from="pattern-list" option
in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include
using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers or DenyUsers.
AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to
use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option
in sshd_config(5). Protocol 2 supports both RSA and DSA keys; protocol 1
only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a host-specif-
ic key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host.
only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a host-
specific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host.
Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server
key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is
normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored
on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its
own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then gener-
ates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both
the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the
server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is
used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of
the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish
or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects the encryp-
tion algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then
generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using
both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to
the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key
which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The
rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently
Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects
the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest
of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit
AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The
client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the
server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a crypto-
graphic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64 or
hmac-ripemd160).
server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a
cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64
or hmac-ripemd160).
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The
client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, pub-
lic key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication,
public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
authentication.
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked,
listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The defini-
tion of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their
own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( `*LK*'
on Solaris and UnixWare, `*' on HP-UX, containing `Nologin' on Tru64, a
leading `*LOCKED*' on FreeBSD and a leading `!' on most Linuxes). If
there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account
while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to
something other than these values (eg `NP' or `*NP*' ).
listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The
definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have
their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
`*LK*' on Solaris and UnixWare, `*' on HP-UX, containing `Nologin' on
Tru64, a leading `*LOCKED*' on FreeBSD and a leading `!' on most
Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg `NP' or `*NP*' ).
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like
allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP con-
nections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the se-
cure channel.
allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP
connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
secure channel.
After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command
on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connec-
tions have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
client, and both sides exit.
LOGIN PROCESS
@ -230,11 +232,12 @@ LOGIN PROCESS
SSHRC
If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not pro-
duce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forward-
ing is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard
input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call xauth(1)
because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not
produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11
forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its
standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call
xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11
cookies.
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
@ -263,33 +266,33 @@ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
~/.ssh/authorized_keys. Each line of the file contains one key (empty
lines and lines starting with a `#' are ignored as comments). Protocol 1
public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options,
bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of: op-
tions, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is op-
tional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a num-
ber or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, ex-
ponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version
1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for
the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the keytype is
``ssh-dss'' or ``ssh-rsa''.
bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of:
options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is
optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a
number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits,
exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol
version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be
convenient for the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the
keytype is ``ssh-dss'' or ``ssh-rsa''.
Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (be-
cause of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilo-
bytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16
Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long
(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8
kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16
kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
identity.pub, id_dsa.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it.
sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol
2 keys of 768 bits.
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifica-
tions. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The fol-
lowing option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are
case-insensitive):
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option
keywords are case-insensitive):
cert-authority
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authen-
tication.
that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user
authentication.
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are
@ -299,19 +302,19 @@ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is
ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean chan-
nel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify no-
pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a
backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain pub-
lic keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might
be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that
the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are
explicitly prohibited. The command originally supplied by the
client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment vari-
able. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsys-
tem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by
either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive or a command em-
bedded in a certificate.
pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean
channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict
certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An
example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing
else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding
unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally
supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell,
command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may
be superseded by either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive
or a command embedded in a certificate.
environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
@ -327,9 +330,9 @@ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in
ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to host-
names or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses using
CIDR address/masklen notation.
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to
hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses
using CIDR address/masklen notation.
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
@ -358,17 +361,25 @@ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
permitopen="host:port"
Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only con-
nect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be spec-
ified with an alternative syntax: host/port. Multiple permitopen
options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching
is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal do-
mains or addresses.
Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only
connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple
permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No
pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they
must be literal domains or addresses.
principals="principals"
On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for
certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least
one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of
principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is
ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the cert-authority option.
tunnel="n"
Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the
next available device will be used if the client requests a tun-
nel.
next available device will be used if the client requests a
tunnel.
An example authorized_keys file:
@ -386,13 +397,13 @@ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by
the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained auto-
matically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key is
added to the per-user file.
the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key
is added to the per-user file.
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (option-
al), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are sepa-
rated by spaces.
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
(optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are
separated by spaces.
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
``@cert-authority'', to indicate that the line contains a certification
@ -400,20 +411,20 @@ SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker
should be used on a key line.
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (`*' and `?' act as wild-
cards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name
(when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when
authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to indi-
cate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not ac-
cepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A
hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within `[' and `]' brack-
ets then followed by `:' and a non-standard port number.
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (`*' and `?' act as
wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host
name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name
(when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to
indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not
accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line.
A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within `[' and `]'
brackets then followed by `:' and a non-standard port number.
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed
hostnames start with a `|' character. Only one hashed hostname may ap-
pear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard opera-
tors may be applied.
hostnames start with a `|' character. Only one hashed hostname may
appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard
operators may be applied.
Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key;
they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub. The
@ -431,23 +442,24 @@ SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the ``@revoked'' marker
at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentica-
tion or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning
from ssh(1) when they are encountered.
at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce
a warning from ssh(1) when they are encountered.
It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or differ-
ent host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short
forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is
possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication
is accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or
different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when
short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It
is possible that the files contain conflicting information;
authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either
file.
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front.
ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for
~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and con-
verting all host names to their hashed representations.
~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and
converting all host names to their hashed representations.
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
@ -465,18 +477,19 @@ SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
FILES
~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
/etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are en-
abled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
Banner.
/etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
by Banner.
~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
more information). On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS parti-
tion, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this file
must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions
for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is
read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS
partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this
file must be owned by the user, and must not have write
permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most
machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by
others.
~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
@ -484,11 +497,11 @@ FILES
rlogin/rsh.
~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific con-
figuration and authentication information. There is no general
requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret,
but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the
user, and not accessible by others.
This directory is the default location for all user-specific
configuration and authentication information. There is no
general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
for the user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (RSA/DSA) that can be used for logging in
@ -499,8 +512,8 @@ FILES
If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not al-
low it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not
allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
``no''.
~/.ssh/environment
@ -525,8 +538,8 @@ FILES
/etc/hosts.allow
/etc/hosts.deny
Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are de-
fined here. Further details are described in hosts_access(5).
Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are
defined here. Further details are described in hosts_access(5).
/etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It
@ -546,8 +559,8 @@ FILES
world-readable.
/etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but al-
lows host-based authentication without permitting login with
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
@ -571,13 +584,13 @@ FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
all machines in the organization. The format of this file is de-
scribed above. This file should be writable only by root/the
all machines in the organization. The format of this file is
described above. This file should be writable only by root/the
owner and should be world-readable.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and con-
figuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and
configuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
/etc/ssh/sshrc
Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
@ -594,8 +607,8 @@ FILES
Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
there are several daemons running concurrently for different
ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-read-
able.
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
readable.
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
@ -605,13 +618,13 @@ SEE ALSO
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
ated OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
CAVEATS
System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are dis-
abled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).
System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are
disabled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine).
OpenBSD 4.7 March 5, 2010 10
OpenBSD 4.8 August 4, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

18
sshd.8
View File

@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.255 2010/03/05 06:50:35 jmc Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2010 $
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.257 2010/08/04 05:37:01 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: August 4 2010 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -595,13 +595,23 @@ Limit local
.Li ``ssh -L''
port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and
port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified with an alternative syntax:
.Ar host Ns / Ns Ar port .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitopen
options may be applied separated by commas.
No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
they must be literal domains or addresses.
.It Cm principals="principals"
On a
.Cm cert-authority
line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
comma-separated list.
At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the
.Cm cert-authority
option.
.It Cm tunnel="n"
Force a
.Xr tun 4

15
sshd.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.374 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.375 2010/04/16 01:47:26 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -744,6 +744,8 @@ list_hostkey_types(void)
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
@ -767,10 +769,17 @@ get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int need_private)
Key *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (type == KEY_RSA_CERT || type == KEY_DSA_CERT)
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
else
break;
default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
break;
}
if (key != NULL && key->type == type)
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;

449
sshd_config.0
View File

@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTION
sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file
specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argu-
ment pairs, one per line. Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are
interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double
quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword-
argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with `#' and empty lines
are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in
double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that key-
words are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
AcceptEnv
Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be
copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv in
ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. Note that envi-
ronment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables are
specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters `*'
and `?'. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. Note that
environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables
are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
`*' and `?'. Multiple environment variables may be separated by
whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be
warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass
restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be
@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
(use IPv6 only). The default is ``any''.
AllowAgentForwarding
Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The de-
fault is ``yes''. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not
improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
they can always install their own forwarders.
Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The
default is ``yes''. Note that disabling agent forwarding does
not improve security unless users are also denied shell access,
as they can always install their own forwarders.
AllowGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
@ -54,17 +54,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The default is
``yes''. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve se-
curity unless users are also denied shell access, as they can al-
ways install their own forwarders.
``yes''. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve
security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can
always install their own forwarders.
AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for us-
er names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are
separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are
valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login
is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form US-
ER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form
USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny
directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers,
AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
@ -73,14 +73,42 @@ DESCRIPTION
AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
for user authentication. AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens
of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup.
The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal
'%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being au-
thenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
After expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute
path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default
is ``.ssh/authorized_keys''.
for user authentication. The format is described in the
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8).
AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are
substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are
defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the
home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
replaced by the username of that user. After expansion,
AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one
relative to the user's home directory. The default is
``.ssh/authorized_keys''.
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a
key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of
which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for
authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key
options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)).
Empty lines and comments starting with `#' are ignored.
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which
are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens
are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by
the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
replaced by the username of that user. After expansion,
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one
relative to the user's home directory.
The default is not to use a principals file - in this case, the
username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals
list for it to be accepted. Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification
authorities trusted via ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the
principals= key option offers a similar facility (see sshd(8) for
details).
Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user
before authentication is allowed. If the argument is ``none''
@ -93,27 +121,27 @@ DESCRIPTION
login.conf(5)) The default is ``yes''.
ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after au-
thentication. All components of the pathname must be root-owned
directories that are not writable by any other user or group.
After the chroot, sshd(8) changes the working directory to the
user's home directory.
Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after
authentication. All components of the pathname must be root-
owned directories that are not writable by any other user or
group. After the chroot, sshd(8) changes the working directory
to the user's home directory.
The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded
at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is
replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory
of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the user-
name of that user.
of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the
username of that user.
The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directo-
ries to support the user's session. For an interactive session
this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and basic /dev
nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4), stderr(4),
arandom(4) and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using
``sftp'', no additional configuration of the environment is nec-
essary if the in-process sftp server is used, though sessions
which use logging do require /dev/log inside the chroot directory
(see sftp-server(8) for details).
The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and
directories to support the user's session. For an interactive
session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
stderr(4), arandom(4) and tty(4) devices. For file transfer
sessions using ``sftp'', no additional configuration of the
environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used,
though sessions which use logging do require /dev/log inside the
chroot directory (see sftp-server(8) for details).
The default is not to chroot(2).
@ -132,28 +160,28 @@ DESCRIPTION
ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client.
If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are be-
ing sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the ses-
sion. It is important to note that the use of client alive mes-
sages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The client
alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and there-
fore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by
TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valu-
able when the client or server depend on knowing when a connec-
tion has become inactive.
If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are
being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the
session. It is important to note that the use of client alive
messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The client
alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism
is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
connection has become inactive.
The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval (see below) is
set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unre-
sponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45
seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default,
unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately
45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only.
ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message
through the encrypted channel to request a response from the
client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will
not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol ver-
sion 2 only.
not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol
version 2 only.
Compression
Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the
@ -164,9 +192,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recog-
nized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The al-
low/deny directives are processed in the following order:
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not
recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The
allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
@ -174,20 +202,20 @@ DESCRIPTION
DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that
match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numeri-
cal user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for
all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and
HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are pro-
cessed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups,
and finally AllowGroups.
match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a
numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is
allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST
then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to
particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny
directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers,
AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
ForceCommand
Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand,
ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if pre-
sent. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if
present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem
execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command
originally supplied by the client is available in the
@ -202,10 +230,10 @@ DESCRIPTION
forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote
hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be
used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to
bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to con-
nect. The argument may be ``no'' to force remote port forward-
ings to be available to the local host only, ``yes'' to force re-
mote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to
connect. The argument may be ``no'' to force remote port
forwardings to be available to the local host only, ``yes'' to
force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
``clientspecified'' to allow the client to select the address to
which the forwarding is bound. The default is ``no''.
@ -220,15 +248,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
applies to protocol version 2 only.
HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication to-
gether with successful public key client host authentication is
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
together with successful public key client host authentication is
allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to
RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only.
The default is ``no''.
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a re-
verse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a
reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during
HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of ``yes'' means that sshd(8)
uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to
@ -236,17 +264,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
``no''.
HostCertificate
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The cer-
tificate's public key must match a private host key already spec-
ified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The
certificate's public key must match a private host key already
specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
load any certificates.
HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The
default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key for pro-
tocol version 2. Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if
it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key for
protocol version 2. Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file
if it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple
host key files. ``rsa1'' keys are used for version 1 and ``dsa''
or ``rsa'' are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol.
@ -254,8 +282,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in
RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication.
/etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The de-
fault is ``yes''.
/etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The
default is ``yes''.
IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's
@ -275,9 +303,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
The default is ``no''.
KerberosOrLocalPasswd
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the pass-
word will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as
/etc/passwd. The default is ``yes''.
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the
password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as /etc/passwd. The default is ``yes''.
KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
@ -286,17 +314,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
KeyRegenerationInterval
In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically
regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The
purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured ses-
sions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys.
The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is
never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds).
purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured
sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the
keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the
key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds).
ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The fol-
lowing forms may be used:
Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The
following forms may be used:
ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr
ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port
ListenAddress host | IPv4_addr | IPv6_addr
ListenAddress host | IPv4_addr:port
ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port
If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all
@ -306,9 +334,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
port qualified addresses.
LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not suc-
cessfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
The default is 120 seconds.
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time
limit. The default is 120 seconds.
LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
@ -318,18 +346,18 @@ DESCRIPTION
higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level
violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algo-
rithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data
integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separat-
ed. The default is:
MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code)
algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for
data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-
separated. The default is:
hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,
hmac-ripemd160,hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96
Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the
Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
override those set in the global section of the config file, un-
til either another Match line or the end of the file.
override those set in the global section of the config file,
until either another Match line or the end of the file.
The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs.
The available criteria are User, Group, Host, and Address. The
@ -337,8 +365,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described
in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain ad-
dresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.
The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain
addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.
``192.0.2.0/24'' or ``3ffe:ffff::/32''. Note that the mask
length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an
error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
@ -347,13 +375,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
Match keyword. Available keywords are AllowAgentForwarding,
AllowTcpForwarding, Banner, ChrootDirectory, ForceCommand,
GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,
KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication,
MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication,
PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin,
PubkeyAuthentication, RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication,
X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost.
AllowTcpForwarding, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
Banner, ChrootDirectory, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts,
GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication,
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
KerberosAuthentication, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions,
PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen,
PermitRootLogin, PermitTunnel, PubkeyAuthentication,
RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, X11DisplayOffset,
X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost.
MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted
@ -361,26 +391,26 @@ DESCRIPTION
value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6.
MaxSessions
Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per net-
work connection. The default is 10.
Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per
network connection. The default is 10.
MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated con-
nections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be
dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime ex-
pires for a connection. The default is 10.
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be
dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection. The default is 10.
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
three colon separated values ``start:rate:full'' (e.g.
"10:30:60"). sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a
probability of ``rate/100'' (30%) if there are currently
``start'' (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability in-
creases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the
``start'' (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability
increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the
number of unauthenticated connections reaches ``full'' (60).
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The de-
fault is ``yes''.
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
default is ``yes''.
PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
@ -388,17 +418,17 @@ DESCRIPTION
default is ``no''.
PermitOpen
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is per-
mitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the follow-
ing forms:
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is
permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the
following forms:
PermitOpen host:port
PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port
PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
PermitOpen [ IPv6_addr ]:port
Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
whitespace. An argument of ``any'' can be used to remove all re-
strictions and permit any forwarding requests. By default all
whitespace. An argument of ``any'' can be used to remove all
restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. By default all
port forwarding requests are permitted.
PermitRootLogin
@ -406,8 +436,8 @@ DESCRIPTION
must be ``yes'', ``without-password'', ``forced-commands-only'',
or ``no''. The default is ``yes''.
If this option is set to ``without-password'', password authenti-
cation is disabled for root.
If this option is set to ``without-password'', password
authentication is disabled for root.
If this option is set to ``forced-commands-only'', root login
with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
@ -418,21 +448,21 @@ DESCRIPTION
If this option is set to ``no'', root is not allowed to log in.
PermitTunnel
Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The argu-
ment must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer 3), ``ethernet''
(layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes'' permits both ``point-
to-point'' and ``ethernet''. The default is ``no''.
Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The
argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer 3),
``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes'' permits
both ``point-to-point'' and ``ethernet''. The default is ``no''.
PermitUserEnvironment
Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in
~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). The default is
``no''. Enabling environment processing may enable users to by-
pass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms
such as LD_PRELOAD.
``no''. Enabling environment processing may enable users to
bypass access restrictions in some configurations using
mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD.
PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH dae-
mon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid.
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH
daemon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid.
Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default
is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also
@ -450,16 +480,16 @@ DESCRIPTION
Protocol
Specifies the protocol versions sshd(8) supports. The possible
values are `1' and `2'. Multiple versions must be comma-separat-
ed. The default is `2'. Note that the order of the protocol
list does not indicate preference, because the client selects
among multiple protocol versions offered by the server. Specify-
ing ``2,1'' is identical to ``1,2''.
values are `1' and `2'. Multiple versions must be comma-
separated. The default is `2'. Note that the order of the
protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client
selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server.
Specifying ``2,1'' is identical to ``1,2''.
PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The de-
fault is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol ver-
sion 2 only.
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The
default is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol
version 2 only.
RevokedKeys
Specifies a list of revoked public keys. Keys listed in this
@ -468,15 +498,15 @@ DESCRIPTION
refused for all users.
RhostsRSAAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication to-
gether with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The
default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1 on-
ly.
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The
default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1
only.
RSAAuthentication
Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The de-
fault is ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 1 on-
ly.
Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The
default is ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 1
only.
ServerKeyBits
Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1
@ -502,24 +532,24 @@ DESCRIPTION
``sftp'' server. This may simplify configurations using
ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients.
By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option ap-
plies to protocol version 2 only.
By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option
applies to protocol version 2 only.
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The de-
fault is AUTH.
LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
default is AUTH.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
this means that connections will die if the route is down tem-
porarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand,
if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on
the server, leaving ``ghost'' users and consuming server re-
sources.
this means that connections will die if the route is down
temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other
hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang
indefinitely on the server, leaving ``ghost'' users and consuming
server resources.
The default is ``yes'' (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
server will notice if the network goes down or the client host
@ -529,34 +559,34 @@ DESCRIPTION
``no''.
TrustedUserCAKeys
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authori-
ties that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentica-
tion. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments
starting with `#' are allowed. If a certificate is presented for
authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file,
then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the
certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack
a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication us-
ing TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the
CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate
authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for
authentication. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and
comments starting with `#' are allowed. If a certificate is
presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in
this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that
certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
for authentication using TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on
certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name and
check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps
back to the very same IP address. The default is ``yes''.
UseLogin
Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login ses-
sions. The default is ``no''. Note that login(1) is never used
for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is en-
abled, X11Forwarding will be disabled because login(1) does not
Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login
sessions. The default is ``no''. Note that login(1) is never
used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is
enabled, X11Forwarding will be disabled because login(1) does not
know how to handle xauth(1) cookies. If UsePrivilegeSeparation
is specified, it will be disabled after authentication.
UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to
``yes'' this will enable PAM authentication using
ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in ad-
dition to PAM account and session module processing for all au-
thentication types.
ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in
addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
authentication types.
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
@ -566,12 +596,12 @@ DESCRIPTION
non-root user. The default is ``no''.
UsePrivilegeSeparation
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an un-
privileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an
unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic.
After successful authentication, another process will be created
that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by con-
taining any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by
containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The
default is ``yes''.
X11DisplayOffset
@ -586,15 +616,16 @@ DESCRIPTION
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure
to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display
is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default. Addi-
tionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
verification and substitution occur on the client side. The se-
curity risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 dis-
play server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A
system administrator may have a stance in which they want to pro-
tect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a ``no'' setting.
X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default.
Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
verification and substitution occur on the client side. The
security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client
requests forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in
ssh_config(5)). A system administrator may have a stance in
which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to
attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can
warrant a ``no'' setting.
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own
@ -609,19 +640,19 @@ DESCRIPTION
``localhost''. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the
proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function
with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to ``no'' to
specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wild-
card address. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The de-
fault is ``yes''.
specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the
wildcard address. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The
default is ``yes''.
XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
TIME FORMATS
sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that speci-
fy time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: time[qualifier],
where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is one of the fol-
lowing:
sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that
specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: time
[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is one
of the following:
<none> seconds
s | S seconds
@ -642,8 +673,8 @@ TIME FORMATS
FILES
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be
writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not neces-
sary) that it be world-readable.
writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not
necessary) that it be world-readable.
SEE ALSO
sshd(8)
@ -651,9 +682,9 @@ SEE ALSO
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and cre-
ated OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
OpenBSD 4.7 March 4, 2010 10
OpenBSD 4.8 June 30, 2010 OpenBSD 4.8

53
sshd_config.5
View File

@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.120 2010/03/04 23:17:25 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 4 2010 $
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.125 2010/06/30 07:28:34 jmc Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: June 30 2010 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -155,6 +155,10 @@ for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used
for user authentication.
The format is described in the
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
section of
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
setup.
@ -167,6 +171,47 @@ is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
directory.
The default is
.Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication.
When using certificates signed by a key listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
to be accepted for authentication.
Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described
in
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
Empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are ignored.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection
setup.
The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%',
%h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and
%u is replaced by the username of that user.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
directory.
.Pp
The default is not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
accepted.
Note that
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
though the
.Cm principals=
key option offers a similar facility (see
.Xr sshd 8
for details).
.It Cm Banner
The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
authentication is allowed.
@ -608,12 +653,15 @@ keyword.
Available keywords are
.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
.Cm Banner ,
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
.Cm ForceCommand ,
.Cm GatewayPorts ,
.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
@ -622,6 +670,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
.Cm PermitOpen ,
.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
.Cm PermitTunnel ,
.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication ,
.Cm RSAAuthentication ,

4
version.h
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.58 2010/03/16 16:36:49 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.59 2010/08/08 16:26:42 djm Exp $ */
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_5.5"
#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_5.6"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE