- Pretend to accelerate various HMAC algorithms, so padlock(4) can be used
with fast_ipsec(4) and geli(8) authentication (comming soon). If consumer requests only for HMAC algorithm (without encryption), return EINVAL. - Add support for the CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT flag, for both encryption and authentication.
This commit is contained in:
Pawel Jakub Dawidek
parent
7365463843
commit
64e18040cc
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=159279
@ -55,14 +55,14 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
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#include <sys/mutex.h>
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#include <sys/malloc.h>
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#include <sys/libkern.h>
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#include <sys/mbuf.h>
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#include <sys/uio.h>
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#if defined(__i386__) && !defined(PC98)
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#include <machine/cpufunc.h>
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#include <machine/cputypes.h>
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#endif
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#include <opencrypto/cryptodev.h>
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#include <opencrypto/cryptosoft.h> /* for hmac_ipad_buffer and hmac_opad_buffer */
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#include <opencrypto/xform.h>
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#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael.h>
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@ -113,6 +113,10 @@ struct padlock_session {
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uint32_t ses_ekey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */
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uint32_t ses_dkey[4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1) + 4] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */
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uint8_t ses_iv[16] __aligned(16); /* 128 bit aligned */
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struct auth_hash *ses_axf;
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uint8_t *ses_ictx;
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uint8_t *ses_octx;
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int ses_mlen;
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int ses_used;
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uint32_t ses_id;
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TAILQ_ENTRY(padlock_session) ses_next;
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@ -194,6 +198,18 @@ padlock_init(void)
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mtx_init(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx, "padlock_mtx", NULL, MTX_DEF);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_AES_CBC, 0, 0, padlock_newsession,
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padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC, 0, 0, padlock_newsession,
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padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC, 0, 0, padlock_newsession,
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padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC, 0, 0,
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padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC, 0, 0,
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padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC, 0, 0,
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padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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crypto_register(sc->sc_cid, CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC, 0, 0,
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padlock_newsession, padlock_freesession, padlock_process, NULL);
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return (0);
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}
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@ -229,20 +245,131 @@ padlock_destroy(void)
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return (0);
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}
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static void
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padlock_setup_enckey(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen)
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{
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union padlock_cw *cw;
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int i;
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cw = &ses->ses_cw;
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if (cw->cw_key_generation == PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW) {
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/* Build expanded keys for both directions */
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rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ses->ses_ekey, key, klen);
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rijndaelKeySetupDec(ses->ses_dkey, key, klen);
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for (i = 0; i < 4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1); i++) {
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ses->ses_ekey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_ekey[i]);
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ses->ses_dkey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_dkey[i]);
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}
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} else {
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bcopy(key, ses->ses_ekey, klen);
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bcopy(key, ses->ses_dkey, klen);
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}
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}
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static void
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padlock_setup_mackey(struct padlock_session *ses, caddr_t key, int klen)
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{
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struct auth_hash *axf;
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int i;
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klen /= 8;
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axf = ses->ses_axf;
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for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
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key[i] ^= HMAC_IPAD_VAL;
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axf->Init(ses->ses_ictx);
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axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, key, klen);
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axf->Update(ses->ses_ictx, hmac_ipad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen);
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for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
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key[i] ^= (HMAC_IPAD_VAL ^ HMAC_OPAD_VAL);
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axf->Init(ses->ses_octx);
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axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, key, klen);
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axf->Update(ses->ses_octx, hmac_opad_buffer, axf->blocksize - klen);
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for (i = 0; i < klen; i++)
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key[i] ^= HMAC_OPAD_VAL;
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}
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/*
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* Compute keyed-hash authenticator.
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*/
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static int
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padlock_authcompute(struct padlock_session *ses, struct cryptodesc *crd,
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caddr_t buf, int flags)
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{
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u_char hash[HASH_MAX_LEN];
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struct auth_hash *axf;
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union authctx ctx;
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int error;
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axf = ses->ses_axf;
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bcopy(ses->ses_ictx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
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error = crypto_apply(flags, buf, crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len,
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(int (*)(void *, void *, unsigned int))axf->Update, (caddr_t)&ctx);
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if (error != 0)
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return (error);
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axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
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bcopy(ses->ses_octx, &ctx, axf->ctxsize);
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axf->Update(&ctx, hash, axf->hashsize);
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axf->Final(hash, &ctx);
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/* Inject the authentication data */
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crypto_copyback(flags, buf, crd->crd_inject,
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ses->ses_mlen == 0 ? axf->hashsize : ses->ses_mlen, hash);
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return (0);
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}
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static int
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padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
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{
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struct padlock_softc *sc = padlock_sc;
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struct padlock_session *ses = NULL;
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struct cryptoini *encini, *macini;
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union padlock_cw *cw;
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int i;
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if (sc == NULL || sidp == NULL || cri == NULL ||
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cri->cri_next != NULL || cri->cri_alg != CRYPTO_AES_CBC) {
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if (sc == NULL || sidp == NULL || cri == NULL)
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return (EINVAL);
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encini = macini = NULL;
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for (; cri != NULL; cri = cri->cri_next) {
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switch (cri->cri_alg) {
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case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
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if (macini != NULL)
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return (EINVAL);
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macini = cri;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
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if (encini != NULL)
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return (EINVAL);
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encini = cri;
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break;
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default:
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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}
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if (cri->cri_klen != 128 && cri->cri_klen != 192 &&
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cri->cri_klen != 256) {
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/*
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* We only support HMAC algorithms to be able to work with
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* fast_ipsec(4), so if we are asked only for authentication without
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* encryption, don't pretend we can accellerate it.
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*/
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if (encini == NULL)
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return (EINVAL);
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if (encini->cri_klen != 128 && encini->cri_klen != 192 &&
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encini->cri_klen != 256) {
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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@ -279,7 +406,7 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
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cw->cw_algorithm_type = PADLOCK_ALGORITHM_TYPE_AES;
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cw->cw_key_generation = PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW;
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cw->cw_intermediate = 0;
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switch (cri->cri_klen) {
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switch (encini->cri_klen) {
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case 128:
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cw->cw_round_count = PADLOCK_ROUND_COUNT_AES128;
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cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_128;
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@ -297,20 +424,54 @@ padlock_newsession(void *arg __unused, uint32_t *sidp, struct cryptoini *cri)
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cw->cw_key_size = PADLOCK_KEY_SIZE_256;
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break;
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}
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if (encini->cri_key != NULL)
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padlock_setup_enckey(ses, encini->cri_key, encini->cri_klen);
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arc4rand(ses->ses_iv, sizeof(ses->ses_iv), 0);
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if (cw->cw_key_generation == PADLOCK_KEY_GENERATION_SW) {
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/* Build expanded keys for both directions */
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rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ses->ses_ekey, cri->cri_key, cri->cri_klen);
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rijndaelKeySetupDec(ses->ses_dkey, cri->cri_key, cri->cri_klen);
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for (i = 0; i < 4 * (RIJNDAEL_MAXNR + 1); i++) {
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ses->ses_ekey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_ekey[i]);
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ses->ses_dkey[i] = ntohl(ses->ses_dkey[i]);
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if (macini != NULL) {
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ses->ses_mlen = macini->cri_mlen;
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/* Find software structure which describes HMAC algorithm. */
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switch (macini->cri_alg) {
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case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_null;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_md5;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha1;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_ripemd_160;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_256;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_384;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
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ses->ses_axf = &auth_hash_hmac_sha2_512;
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break;
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}
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/* Allocate memory for HMAC inner and outer contexts. */
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ses->ses_ictx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
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M_NOWAIT);
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ses->ses_octx = malloc(ses->ses_axf->ctxsize, M_CRYPTO_DATA,
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M_NOWAIT);
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if (ses->ses_ictx == NULL || ses->ses_octx == NULL) {
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padlock_freesession(NULL, ses->ses_id);
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return (ENOMEM);
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}
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/* Setup key if given. */
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if (macini->cri_key != NULL) {
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padlock_setup_mackey(ses, macini->cri_key,
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macini->cri_klen);
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}
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} else {
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bcopy(cri->cri_key, ses->ses_ekey, cri->cri_klen);
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bcopy(cri->cri_key, ses->ses_dkey, cri->cri_klen);
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}
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*sidp = ses->ses_id;
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@ -336,6 +497,14 @@ padlock_freesession(void *arg __unused, uint64_t tid)
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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TAILQ_REMOVE(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
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if (ses->ses_ictx != NULL) {
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bzero(ses->ses_ictx, sizeof(ses->ses_ictx));
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free(ses->ses_ictx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
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}
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if (ses->ses_octx != NULL) {
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bzero(ses->ses_octx, sizeof(ses->ses_octx));
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free(ses->ses_octx, M_CRYPTO_DATA);
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}
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bzero(ses, sizeof(ses));
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ses->ses_used = 0;
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TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&sc->sc_sessions, ses, ses_next);
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@ -349,25 +518,46 @@ padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused)
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struct padlock_softc *sc = padlock_sc;
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struct padlock_session *ses;
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union padlock_cw *cw;
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struct cryptodesc *crd = NULL;
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struct cryptodesc *crd, *enccrd, *maccrd;
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uint32_t *key;
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u_char *buf, *abuf;
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int err = 0;
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int error = 0;
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buf = NULL;
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if (crp == NULL || crp->crp_callback == NULL) {
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err = EINVAL;
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if (crp == NULL || crp->crp_callback == NULL || crp->crp_desc == NULL) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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crd = crp->crp_desc;
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if (crd == NULL || crd->crd_next != NULL ||
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crd->crd_alg != CRYPTO_AES_CBC ||
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(crd->crd_len % 16) != 0) {
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err = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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enccrd = maccrd = NULL;
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for (crd = crp->crp_desc; crd != NULL; crd = crd->crd_next) {
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switch (crd->crd_alg) {
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case CRYPTO_NULL_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_MD5_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA1_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_RIPEMD160_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
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case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
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if (maccrd != NULL) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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maccrd = crd;
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break;
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case CRYPTO_AES_CBC:
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if (enccrd != NULL) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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enccrd = crd;
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break;
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default:
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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}
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if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0) {
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err = EINVAL;
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if (enccrd == NULL || (enccrd->crd_len % AES_BLOCK_LEN) != 0) {
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error = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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@ -378,103 +568,88 @@ padlock_process(void *arg __unused, struct cryptop *crp, int hint __unused)
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}
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mtx_unlock(&sc->sc_sessions_mtx);
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if (ses == NULL) {
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err = EINVAL;
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error = EINVAL;
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goto out;
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}
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buf = malloc(crd->crd_len + 16, M_DEVBUF, M_NOWAIT);
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buf = malloc(enccrd->crd_len + 16, M_DEVBUF, M_NOWAIT);
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if (buf == NULL) {
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err = ENOMEM;
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error = ENOMEM;
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goto out;
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}
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/* Buffer has to be 16 bytes aligned. */
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abuf = buf + 16 - ((uintptr_t)buf % 16);
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if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0)
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padlock_setup_enckey(ses, enccrd->crd_key, enccrd->crd_klen);
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if (maccrd != NULL && (maccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_KEY_EXPLICIT) != 0)
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padlock_setup_mackey(ses, maccrd->crd_key, maccrd->crd_klen);
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cw = &ses->ses_cw;
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cw->cw_filler0 = 0;
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cw->cw_filler1 = 0;
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cw->cw_filler2 = 0;
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cw->cw_filler3 = 0;
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if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
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if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
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cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT;
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key = ses->ses_ekey;
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if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
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bcopy(crd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16);
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if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
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bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16);
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if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) {
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if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
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m_copyback((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf,
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crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
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} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
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cuio_copyback((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf,
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crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
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} else {
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bcopy(ses->ses_iv,
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crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_inject, 16);
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}
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if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_PRESENT) == 0) {
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crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
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enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv);
|
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}
|
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} else {
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cw->cw_direction = PADLOCK_DIRECTION_DECRYPT;
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key = ses->ses_dkey;
|
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if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
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bcopy(crd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, 16);
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if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_IV_EXPLICIT) != 0)
|
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bcopy(enccrd->crd_iv, ses->ses_iv, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
|
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else {
|
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if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
|
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m_copydata((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
|
||||
cuio_copydata((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
crd->crd_inject, 16, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
bcopy(crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_inject,
|
||||
ses->ses_iv, 16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
enccrd->crd_inject, AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
|
||||
m_copydata((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
|
||||
crd->crd_len, abuf);
|
||||
} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
|
||||
cuio_copydata((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
|
||||
crd->crd_len, abuf);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
bcopy(crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_skip, abuf, crd->crd_len);
|
||||
/* Perform data authentication if requested before encryption. */
|
||||
if (maccrd != NULL && maccrd->crd_next == enccrd) {
|
||||
error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
crp->crp_flags);
|
||||
if (error != 0)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
padlock_cbc(abuf, abuf, crd->crd_len / 16, key, cw, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip,
|
||||
enccrd->crd_len, abuf);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
|
||||
m_copyback((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
|
||||
crd->crd_len, abuf);
|
||||
} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
|
||||
cuio_copyback((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf, crd->crd_skip,
|
||||
crd->crd_len, abuf);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
bcopy(abuf, crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_skip, crd->crd_len);
|
||||
padlock_cbc(abuf, abuf, enccrd->crd_len / 16, key, cw, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
|
||||
crypto_copyback(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf, enccrd->crd_skip,
|
||||
enccrd->crd_len, abuf);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Perform data authentication if requested after encryption. */
|
||||
if (maccrd != NULL && enccrd->crd_next == maccrd) {
|
||||
error = padlock_authcompute(ses, maccrd, crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
crp->crp_flags);
|
||||
if (error != 0)
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* copy out last block for use as next session IV */
|
||||
if ((crd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
|
||||
if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IMBUF) != 0) {
|
||||
m_copydata((struct mbuf *)crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
crd->crd_skip + crd->crd_len - 16, 16, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
} else if ((crp->crp_flags & CRYPTO_F_IOV) != 0) {
|
||||
cuio_copydata((struct uio *)crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
crd->crd_skip + crd->crd_len - 16, 16, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
bcopy(crp->crp_buf + crd->crd_skip + crd->crd_len - 16,
|
||||
ses->ses_iv, 16);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((enccrd->crd_flags & CRD_F_ENCRYPT) != 0) {
|
||||
crypto_copydata(crp->crp_flags, crp->crp_buf,
|
||||
enccrd->crd_skip + enccrd->crd_len - AES_BLOCK_LEN,
|
||||
AES_BLOCK_LEN, ses->ses_iv);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
if (buf != NULL) {
|
||||
bzero(buf, crd->crd_len + 16);
|
||||
bzero(buf, enccrd->crd_len + 16);
|
||||
free(buf, M_DEVBUF);
|
||||
}
|
||||
crp->crp_etype = err;
|
||||
crp->crp_etype = error;
|
||||
crypto_done(crp);
|
||||
return (err);
|
||||
return (error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user