From 6b4da9c8353d12338eaa078ca550597c0b4ba0d3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: guido <guido@FreeBSD.org>
Date: Tue, 10 Mar 1998 19:43:27 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] mktemp -> mkstemp as pointed out on bugtraq Obtained from:
 Theo de Raadt

---
 gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/perl.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/perl.c b/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/perl.c
index d41280bc708e..00cdb34af006 100644
--- a/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/perl.c
+++ b/gnu/usr.bin/perl/perl/perl.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-char rcsid[] = "$RCSfile: perl.c,v $$Revision: 1.7 $$Date: 1996/06/30 09:47:56 $\nPatch level: ###\n";
+char rcsid[] = "$RCSfile: perl.c,v $$Revision: 1.8 $$Date: 1997/03/01 12:58:48 $\nPatch level: ###\n";
 /*
  *    Copyright (c) 1991, Larry Wall
  *
@@ -6,6 +6,15 @@ char rcsid[] = "$RCSfile: perl.c,v $$Revision: 1.7 $$Date: 1996/06/30 09:47:56 $
  *    License or the Artistic License, as specified in the README file.
  *
  * $Log: perl.c,v $
+ * Revision 1.8  1997/03/01 12:58:48  joerg
+ * Plug an old security hole: suidperl didn't honor MNT_NOSUID.
+ *
+ * Strong 2.2 and 2.1.x candidate.  Someone should review the patch before,
+ * however.
+ *
+ * The maintainer of the Perl5 port should probably introduce a similar patch
+ * there.
+ *
  * Revision 1.7  1996/06/30 09:47:56  joerg
  * Back out Nate's changes from rev. 1.6; our Perl has not been
  * vulnerable since it used setreuid() as opposed to Posix saved IDs.
@@ -207,13 +216,17 @@ setuid perl scripts securely.\n");
 		fatal("No -e allowed in setuid scripts");
 #endif
 	    if (!e_fp) {
+		int fd;
+
 	        e_tmpname = savestr(TMPPATH);
-		(void)mktemp(e_tmpname);
-		if (!*e_tmpname)
-		    fatal("Can't mktemp()");
-		e_fp = fopen(e_tmpname,"w");
-		if (!e_fp)
+		fd = mkstemp(e_tmpname);
+		if (fd == -1)
+		    fatal("Can't mkstemp()");
+		e_fp = fdopen(fd,"w");
+		if (!e_fp) {
+		    close(fd);
 		    fatal("Cannot open temporary file");
+		}
 	    }
 	    if (argv[1]) {
 		fputs(argv[1],e_fp);