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When the access control on creating raw sockets was modified so that

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processes in jail could create raw sockets, additional access control
checks were added to raw IP sockets to limit the ways in which those
sockets could be used.  Specifically, only the socket option IP_HDRINCL
was permitted in rip_ctloutput().  Other socket options were protected
by a call to suser().  This change was required to prevent processes
in a Jail from modifying system properties such as multicast routing
and firewall rule sets.

However, it also introduced a regression: processes that create a raw
socket with root privilege, but then downgraded credential (i.e., a
daemon giving up root, or a setuid process switching back to the real
uid) could no longer issue other unprivileged generic IP socket option
operations, such as IP_TOS, IP_TTL, and the multicast group membership
options, which prevented multicast routing daemons (and some other
tools) from operating correctly.

This change pushes the access control decision down to the granularity
of individual socket options, rather than all socket options, on raw
IP sockets.  When rip_ctloutput() doesn't implement an option, it will
now pass the request directly to in_control() without an access
control check.  This should restore the functionality of the generic
IP socket options for raw sockets in the above-described scenarios,
which may be confirmed with the ipsockopt regression test.

RELENG_5 candidate.

Reviewed by:	csjp
This commit is contained in:
Robert Watson 2004-10-12 16:47:25 +00:00
parent c6a08cf2d7
commit 6c67b8b695
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=136440
1 changed files with 41 additions and 20 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

61
sys/netinet/raw_ip.c
View File

@ -326,15 +326,20 @@ rip_output(struct mbuf *m, struct socket *so, u_long dst)
/*
* Raw IP socket option processing.
*
* Note that access to all of the IP administrative functions here is
* implicitly protected by suser() as gaining access to a raw socket
* requires either that the thread pass a suser() check, or that it be
* passed a raw socket by another thread that has passed a suser() check.
* If FreeBSD moves to a more fine-grained access control mechanism,
* additional checks will need to be placed here if the raw IP attachment
* check is not equivilent the the check required for these
* administrative operations; in some cases, these checks are already
* present.
* IMPORTANT NOTE regarding access control: Traditionally, raw sockets could
* only be created by a privileged process, and as such, socket option
* operations to manage system properties on any raw socket were allowed to
* take place without explicit additional access control checks. However,
* raw sockets can now also be created in jail(), and therefore explicit
* checks are now required. Likewise, raw sockets can be used by a process
* after it gives up privilege, so some caution is required. For options
* passed down to the IP layer via ip_ctloutput(), checks are assumed to be
* performed in ip_ctloutput() and therefore no check occurs here.
* Unilaterally checking suser() here breaks normal IP socket option
* operations on raw sockets.
*
* When adding new socket options here, make sure to add access control
* checks here as necessary.
*/
int
rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
@ -345,18 +350,7 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
if (sopt->sopt_level != IPPROTO_IP)
return (EINVAL);
/*
* Even though super-user is required to create a raw socket, the
* calling cred could be prison root. If so we want to restrict the
* access to IP_HDRINCL only.
*/
if (sopt->sopt_name != IP_HDRINCL) {
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
}
error = 0;
switch (sopt->sopt_dir) {
case SOPT_GET:
switch (sopt->sopt_name) {
@ -369,6 +363,9 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
case IP_FW_GET:
case IP_FW_TABLE_GETSIZE:
case IP_FW_TABLE_LIST:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if (ip_fw_ctl_ptr != NULL)
error = ip_fw_ctl_ptr(sopt);
else
@ -376,6 +373,9 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
break;
case IP_DUMMYNET_GET:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if (ip_dn_ctl_ptr != NULL)
error = ip_dn_ctl_ptr(sopt);
else
@ -394,6 +394,9 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
case MRT_API_CONFIG:
case MRT_ADD_BW_UPCALL:
case MRT_DEL_BW_UPCALL:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ip_mrouter_get ? ip_mrouter_get(so, sopt) :
EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
@ -425,6 +428,9 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
case IP_FW_TABLE_ADD:
case IP_FW_TABLE_DEL:
case IP_FW_TABLE_FLUSH:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if (ip_fw_ctl_ptr != NULL)
error = ip_fw_ctl_ptr(sopt);
else
@ -434,6 +440,9 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
case IP_DUMMYNET_CONFIGURE:
case IP_DUMMYNET_DEL:
case IP_DUMMYNET_FLUSH:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
if (ip_dn_ctl_ptr != NULL)
error = ip_dn_ctl_ptr(sopt);
else
@ -441,15 +450,24 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
break ;
case IP_RSVP_ON:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ip_rsvp_init(so);
break;
case IP_RSVP_OFF:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ip_rsvp_done();
break;
case IP_RSVP_VIF_ON:
case IP_RSVP_VIF_OFF:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ip_rsvp_vif ?
ip_rsvp_vif(so, sopt) : EINVAL;
break;
@ -466,6 +484,9 @@ rip_ctloutput(struct socket *so, struct sockopt *sopt)
case MRT_API_CONFIG:
case MRT_ADD_BW_UPCALL:
case MRT_DEL_BW_UPCALL:
error = suser(curthread);
if (error != 0)
return (error);
error = ip_mrouter_set ? ip_mrouter_set(so, sopt) :
EOPNOTSUPP;
break;