A more complete fix for the "land" attack, removing the "quick fix" from
rev 1.66. This fix contains both belt and suspenders. Belt: ignore packets where src == dst and srcport == dstport in TCPS_LISTEN. These packets can only legitimately occur when connecting a socket to itself, which doesn't go through TCPS_LISTEN (it goes CLOSED->SYN_SENT->SYN_RCVD-> ESTABLISHED). This prevents the "standard" "land" attack, although doesn't prevent the multi-homed variation. Suspenders: send a RST in response to a SYN/ACK in SYN_RECEIVED state. The only packets we should get in SYN_RECEIVED are 1. A retransmitted SYN, or 2. An ack of our SYN/ACK. The "land" attack depends on us accepting our own SYN/ACK as an ACK; in SYN_RECEIVED state; this should prevent all "land" attacks. We also move up the sequence number check for the ACK in SYN_RECEIVED. This neither helps nor hurts with respect to the "land" attack, but puts more of the validation checking in one spot. PR: kern/5103
This commit is contained in:
Bill Fenner
parent
5ec0ebbb0d
commit
764d8cef56
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=32662
@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* @(#)tcp_input.c 8.12 (Berkeley) 5/24/95
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* $Id: tcp_input.c,v 1.66 1997/11/20 20:04:49 wollman Exp $
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* $Id: tcp_input.c,v 1.67 1997/12/19 23:46:15 bde Exp $
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*/
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#include "opt_tcpdebug.h"
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@ -316,19 +316,6 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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}
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#endif /* TUBA_INCLUDE */
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/*
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* Reject attempted self-connects. XXX This actually masks
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* a bug elsewhere, since self-connect should work.
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* However, a urrently-active DoS attack in the Internet
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* sends a phony self-connect request which causes an infinite
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* loop.
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*/
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if (ti->ti_src.s_addr == ti->ti_dst.s_addr
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&& ti->ti_sport == ti->ti_dport) {
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tcpstat.tcps_badsyn++;
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goto drop;
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}
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/*
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* Check that TCP offset makes sense,
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* pull out TCP options and adjust length. XXX
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@ -626,6 +613,7 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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* If the state is LISTEN then ignore segment if it contains an RST.
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* If the segment contains an ACK then it is bad and send a RST.
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* If it does not contain a SYN then it is not interesting; drop it.
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* If it is from this socket, drop it, it must be forged.
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* Don't bother responding if the destination was a broadcast.
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* Otherwise initialize tp->rcv_nxt, and tp->irs, select an initial
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* tp->iss, and send a segment:
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@ -644,6 +632,9 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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goto dropwithreset;
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if ((tiflags & TH_SYN) == 0)
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goto drop;
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if ((ti->ti_dport == ti->ti_sport) &&
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(ti->ti_dst.s_addr == ti->ti_src.s_addr))
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goto drop;
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/*
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* RFC1122 4.2.3.10, p. 104: discard bcast/mcast SYN
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* in_broadcast() should never return true on a received
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@ -761,6 +752,23 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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goto trimthenstep6;
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}
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/*
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* If the state is SYN_RECEIVED:
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* if seg contains SYN/ACK, send a RST.
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* if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN/ACK, send a RST.
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*/
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case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
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if (tiflags & TH_ACK) {
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if (tiflags & TH_SYN) {
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tcpstat.tcps_badsyn++;
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goto dropwithreset;
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}
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if (SEQ_LEQ(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_una) ||
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SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
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goto dropwithreset;
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}
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break;
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/*
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* If the state is SYN_SENT:
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* if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN, drop the input.
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@ -1176,14 +1184,11 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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switch (tp->t_state) {
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/*
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* In SYN_RECEIVED state if the ack ACKs our SYN then enter
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* ESTABLISHED state and continue processing, otherwise
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* send an RST.
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* In SYN_RECEIVED state, the ack ACKs our SYN, so enter
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* ESTABLISHED state and continue processing.
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* The ACK was checked above.
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*/
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case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
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if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_una, ti->ti_ack) ||
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SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
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goto dropwithreset;
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tcpstat.tcps_connects++;
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soisconnected(so);
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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* @(#)tcp_input.c 8.12 (Berkeley) 5/24/95
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* $Id: tcp_input.c,v 1.66 1997/11/20 20:04:49 wollman Exp $
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* $Id: tcp_input.c,v 1.67 1997/12/19 23:46:15 bde Exp $
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*/
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#include "opt_tcpdebug.h"
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@ -316,19 +316,6 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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}
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#endif /* TUBA_INCLUDE */
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/*
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* Reject attempted self-connects. XXX This actually masks
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* a bug elsewhere, since self-connect should work.
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* However, a urrently-active DoS attack in the Internet
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* sends a phony self-connect request which causes an infinite
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* loop.
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*/
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if (ti->ti_src.s_addr == ti->ti_dst.s_addr
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&& ti->ti_sport == ti->ti_dport) {
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tcpstat.tcps_badsyn++;
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goto drop;
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}
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/*
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* Check that TCP offset makes sense,
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* pull out TCP options and adjust length. XXX
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@ -626,6 +613,7 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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* If the state is LISTEN then ignore segment if it contains an RST.
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* If the segment contains an ACK then it is bad and send a RST.
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* If it does not contain a SYN then it is not interesting; drop it.
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* If it is from this socket, drop it, it must be forged.
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* Don't bother responding if the destination was a broadcast.
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* Otherwise initialize tp->rcv_nxt, and tp->irs, select an initial
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* tp->iss, and send a segment:
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@ -644,6 +632,9 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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goto dropwithreset;
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if ((tiflags & TH_SYN) == 0)
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goto drop;
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if ((ti->ti_dport == ti->ti_sport) &&
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(ti->ti_dst.s_addr == ti->ti_src.s_addr))
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goto drop;
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/*
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* RFC1122 4.2.3.10, p. 104: discard bcast/mcast SYN
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* in_broadcast() should never return true on a received
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@ -761,6 +752,23 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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goto trimthenstep6;
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}
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/*
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* If the state is SYN_RECEIVED:
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* if seg contains SYN/ACK, send a RST.
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* if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN/ACK, send a RST.
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*/
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case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
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if (tiflags & TH_ACK) {
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if (tiflags & TH_SYN) {
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tcpstat.tcps_badsyn++;
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goto dropwithreset;
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}
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if (SEQ_LEQ(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_una) ||
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SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
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goto dropwithreset;
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}
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break;
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/*
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* If the state is SYN_SENT:
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* if seg contains an ACK, but not for our SYN, drop the input.
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@ -1176,14 +1184,11 @@ tcp_input(m, iphlen)
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switch (tp->t_state) {
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/*
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* In SYN_RECEIVED state if the ack ACKs our SYN then enter
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* ESTABLISHED state and continue processing, otherwise
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* send an RST.
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* In SYN_RECEIVED state, the ack ACKs our SYN, so enter
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* ESTABLISHED state and continue processing.
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* The ACK was checked above.
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*/
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case TCPS_SYN_RECEIVED:
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if (SEQ_GT(tp->snd_una, ti->ti_ack) ||
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SEQ_GT(ti->ti_ack, tp->snd_max))
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goto dropwithreset;
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tcpstat.tcps_connects++;
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soisconnected(so);
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