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Merge OpenSSL 1.0.2e.

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This commit is contained in:
Jung-uk Kim 2015-12-03 21:13:35 +00:00
commit 80815a778e
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=291719
570 changed files with 3615 additions and 3184 deletions
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242
crypto/openssl/CHANGES
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@ -2,6 +2,64 @@
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
*) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck.
(CVE-2015-3193)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter
The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer
dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS
algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these
routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be
used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a
DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is
vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client
authentication.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG).
(CVE-2015-3194)
[Stephen Henson]
*) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak
When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak
memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any
application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is
affected. SSL/TLS is not affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using
libFuzzer.
(CVE-2015-3195)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs.
This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages,
though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and
legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible.
[Emilia Käsper]
*) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
return an error
[Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
*) Alternate chains certificate forgery
@ -15,8 +73,18 @@
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin
(Google/BoringSSL).
(CVE-2015-1793)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Race condition handling PSK identify hint
If PSK identity hints are received by a multi-threaded client then
the values are wrongly updated in the parent SSL_CTX structure. This can
result in a race condition potentially leading to a double free of the
identify hint data.
(CVE-2015-3196)
[Stephen Henson]
Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]
*) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI
@ -55,9 +123,9 @@
callbacks.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and
independently by Hanno Böck.
independently by Hanno Böck.
(CVE-2015-1789)
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
*) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent
@ -71,7 +139,7 @@
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-1790)
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
*) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function
@ -201,7 +269,7 @@
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google).
(CVE-2015-0289)
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
*) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix
@ -209,10 +277,10 @@
servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending
a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper
(OpenSSL development team).
(CVE-2015-0293)
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix
@ -272,6 +340,10 @@
Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]
*) Change RSA and DH/DSA key generation apps to generate 2048-bit
keys by default.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g.
ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one.
So far those who have to target multiple plaforms would compromise
@ -717,12 +789,12 @@
version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different
version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable
sanity and breaks all known clients.
[David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
[David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper]
*) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject
early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because
renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.)
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
@ -733,7 +805,7 @@
Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one
was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message.
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
@ -813,10 +885,10 @@
with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this
issue.
(CVE-2014-3510)
[Emilia Käsper]
[Emilia Käsper]
*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
@ -853,7 +925,7 @@
properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
Denial of Service attack.
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for
discovering and researching this issue.
(CVE-2014-5139)
[Steve Henson]
@ -865,7 +937,7 @@
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
(CVE-2014-3508)
[Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
[Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson]
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
@ -895,22 +967,22 @@
client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
code on a vulnerable client or server.
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
[Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
[Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson]
*) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
are subject to a denial of service attack.
Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
[Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
[Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
*) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
compilation flags.
[mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
*) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue.
[mancha <mancha1@zoho.com>]
*) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
@ -982,9 +1054,9 @@
Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
Emilia Käsper for the initial patch.
(CVE-2013-0169)
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
*) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
@ -1159,7 +1231,7 @@
EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while
EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible
implementations).
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
[Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)]
*) Use type ossl_ssize_t instad of ssize_t which isn't available on
all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public
@ -1435,7 +1507,7 @@
[Adam Langley (Google)]
*) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c.
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
*) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different
interpretations of the '..._len' fields).
@ -1449,7 +1521,7 @@
lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of
BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously,
the last update always remained unused).
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
[Emilia Käsper (Google)]
*) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf.
[Bob Buckholz (Google)]
@ -2258,7 +2330,7 @@
*) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation
and response verification functionality.
[Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
[Zoltán Glózik <zglozik@opentsa.org>, The OpenTSA Project]
*) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name
extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now
@ -3426,7 +3498,7 @@
*) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same
initialised value as BN_new().
[Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
[Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller]
*) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension.
[Steve Henson]
@ -3445,7 +3517,7 @@
some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve
maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only
in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details.
[Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
[Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller]
*) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure
that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly
@ -3512,7 +3584,7 @@
[Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)]
*) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO.
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babin-ebell@trustcenter.de> via Richard Levitte]
*) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better
control of the error stack.
@ -4227,7 +4299,7 @@
[Steve Henson]
*) Undo Cygwin change.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820.
Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications,
@ -4260,11 +4332,11 @@
[Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC]
*) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed
prematurely by EGD/PRNGD.
[Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
[Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014]
*) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format.
[Steve Henson]
@ -4726,7 +4798,7 @@
pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible
the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string
data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values.
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
[Götz Babin-Ebell <babinebell@trustcenter.de>]
*) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests.
[Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>]
@ -6831,7 +6903,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) BN_sqr() bug fix.
[Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
[Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis <jim.ellis@cavium.com>]
*) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses,
so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand()
@ -6991,7 +7063,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Fix OAEP check.
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5
RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5
@ -7253,10 +7325,10 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Use better test patterns in bntest.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) rand_win.c fix for Borland C.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0.
[Bodo Moeller]
@ -7401,14 +7473,14 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR
BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs).
[Bodo Möller]
[Bodo Möller]
*) Add DSO method for VMS.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the
wrong sign.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three
packages. The default package contains applications, application
@ -7426,7 +7498,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a
random number < q in the DSA library.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default
behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if
@ -7692,7 +7764,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in:
Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong
Random Numbers.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing
DSA key.
@ -7912,7 +7984,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was
rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present
@ -7944,7 +8016,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default
RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already.
@ -8033,7 +8105,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix.
[Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
[Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where
the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear <shadow@DEMENTIA.ORG>]
*) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly
@ -8134,7 +8206,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Rolf Haberrecker <rolf@suse.de>]
*) Assembler module support for Mingw32.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/).
[Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> and Anonymous]
@ -8153,7 +8225,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n]
case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl
assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set
@ -8183,14 +8255,14 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf().
[Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
[Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem
pointed out by David Sacerdote <das33@cornell.edu>]
*) Support EGD <http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/>. New functions
RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application,
the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE
or -rand.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures.
Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form.
@ -8223,7 +8295,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
#define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
defines all pertinent NO_<algo> symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc.
[Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
[Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller]
*) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS
record layer.
@ -8274,17 +8346,17 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of
bits.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) ./config recognizes MacOS X now.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are
equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0).
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line
options to produce them.
@ -8292,11 +8364,11 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to
get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont()
for p == 0.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and
include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent
@ -8320,7 +8392,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts,
use void * instead of char * in lhash.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable
(the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of
@ -8365,13 +8437,13 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) New function BN_pseudo_rand().
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable)
bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from
SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up
the comments.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that
made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in
@ -8381,25 +8453,25 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained
by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file
to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required).
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
[Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller]
*) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes
used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place.
[Steve Henson]
*) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro:
BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses
BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of
Rabin-Miller iterations.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to
DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME.
(Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".)
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program
"dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys
@ -8455,7 +8527,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl
as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of
NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c.
[Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
[Kris Kennaway <kris@hub.freebsd.org>, modified by Ulf Möller]
*) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now
has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data
@ -8464,7 +8536,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like
RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate
(RAND_seed always assumes full entropy).
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically,
3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes
@ -8494,7 +8566,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword,
unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from
@ -9328,7 +9400,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and
delete an unused file.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32,
since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain.
@ -9417,7 +9489,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
worked.
*) Fix problems with no-hmac etc.
[Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
[Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington <bwelling@tislabs.com>]
*) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and
RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having
@ -9534,7 +9606,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Ben Laurie]
*) DES library cleanups.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be
used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit
@ -9577,7 +9649,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Christian Forster <fo@hawo.stw.uni-erlangen.de>]
*) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress).
File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license.
@ -9690,7 +9762,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall
-Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes
@ -9747,10 +9819,10 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Ben Laurie]
*) Support Borland C++ builder.
[Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
[Janez Jere <jj@void.si>, modified by Ulf Möller]
*) Support Mingw32.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements.
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
@ -9759,7 +9831,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
*) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Update HPUX configuration.
[Anonymous]
@ -9792,7 +9864,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Bodo Moeller]
*) OAEP decoding bug fix.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by
David Harris.
@ -9815,21 +9887,21 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
*) New Configure option no-<cipher> (rsa, idea, rc5, ...).
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for
extension adding in x509 utility.
[Steve Henson]
*) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI
prototypes.
[Steve Henson]
*) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled
by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering,
@ -9858,7 +9930,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of
8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix
@ -9876,13 +9948,13 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
*) Change functions to ANSI C.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Fix typos in error codes.
[Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
[Martin Kraemer <Martin.Kraemer@MchP.Siemens.De>, Ulf Möller]
*) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation.
[Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se>]
@ -9919,7 +9991,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) New Configure option "rsaref".
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Don't auto-generate pem.h.
[Bodo Moeller]
@ -9967,7 +10039,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to
the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Tweaks to Configure
[Niels Poppe <niels@netbox.org>]
@ -9977,11 +10049,11 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386.
The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486.
[Ulf Möller]
[Ulf Möller]
*) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and
SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the
@ -10520,7 +10592,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
Hagino <itojun@kame.net>]
*) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c.
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print
functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or
@ -10530,7 +10602,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
[Steve Henson]
*) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config.
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
[Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca.
[Anonymous <nobody@replay.com>]
@ -10677,7 +10749,7 @@ des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k
*) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but
was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems.
[Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
[Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller <ulf@fitug.de>]
*) Autodetect FreeBSD3.
[Ben Laurie]

38
crypto/openssl/CONTRIBUTING Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
----------------------------
Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
would like to submit a patch, send it to rt@openssl.org with
the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
textual explanation of what your patch does.
You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
mail to rt@openssl.org with a brief description and a link to the PR so
that we can more easily keep track of it.
If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow our coding style
(see https://www.openssl.org/policies/codingstyle.html) and compile without
warnings using the --strict-warnings flag. OpenSSL compiles on many varied
platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features.
Our preferred format for patch files is "git format-patch" output. For example
to provide a patch file containing the last commit in your local git repository
use the following command:
# git format-patch --stdout HEAD^ >mydiffs.patch
Another method of creating an acceptable patch file without using git is as
follows:
# cd openssl-work
# [your changes]
# ./Configure dist; make clean
# cd ..
# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch

11
crypto/openssl/Configure
View File

@ -416,6 +416,7 @@ my %table=(
"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
"linux-x86_64", "gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"debug-linux-x86_64-clang", "clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
"linux-x32", "gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
"linux64-s390x", "gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
@ -1646,21 +1647,22 @@ if ($shlib_version_number =~ /(^[0-9]*)\.([0-9\.]*)/)
$shlib_minor=$2;
}
my $ecc = $cc;
$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
if ($strict_warnings)
{
my $ecc = $cc;
$ecc = "clang" if `$cc --version 2>&1` =~ /clang/;
my $wopt;
die "ERROR --strict-warnings requires gcc or clang" unless ($ecc =~ /gcc$/ or $ecc =~ /clang$/);
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $gcc_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
}
if ($ecc eq "clang")
{
foreach $wopt (split /\s+/, $clang_devteam_warn)
{
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /$wopt/)
$cflags .= " $wopt" unless ($cflags =~ /(^|\s)$wopt(\s|$)/)
}
}
}
@ -1713,6 +1715,7 @@ while (<IN>)
s/^AR=\s*ar/AR= $ar/;
s/^RANLIB=.*/RANLIB= $ranlib/;
s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $cc eq "gcc";
s/^MAKEDEPPROG=.*$/MAKEDEPPROG= $cc/ if $ecc eq "gcc" || $ecc eq "clang";
}
s/^CFLAG=.*$/CFLAG= $cflags/;
s/^DEPFLAG=.*$/DEPFLAG=$depflags/;

1055
crypto/openssl/FAQ
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

37
crypto/openssl/Makefile
View File

@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
## Makefile for OpenSSL
##
VERSION=1.0.2d
VERSION=1.0.2e
MAJOR=1
MINOR=0.2
SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=1.0.0
@ -205,7 +205,9 @@ CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
# LC_ALL=C ensures that error [and other] messages are delivered in
# same language for uniform treatment.
BUILDENV= LC_ALL=C PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)'\
CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
@ -499,25 +501,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
tar:
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
--owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
--transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
-cvf -
../$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
\! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
| sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
tar-snap:
@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
dist:

35
crypto/openssl/Makefile.org
View File

@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \
$${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \
$${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS}
BUILDENV= PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)' \
# LC_ALL=C ensures that error [and other] messages are delivered in
# same language for uniform treatment.
BUILDENV= LC_ALL=C PLATFORM='$(PLATFORM)' PROCESSOR='$(PROCESSOR)'\
CC='$(CC)' CFLAG='$(CFLAG)' \
AS='$(CC)' ASFLAG='$(CFLAG) -c' \
AR='$(AR)' NM='$(NM)' RANLIB='$(RANLIB)' \
@ -497,25 +499,28 @@ TABLE: Configure
# would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file
# and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal
# tar does not support the --files-from option.
tar:
TAR_COMMAND=$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list \
--owner openssl:0 --group openssl:0 \
--transform 's|^|openssl-$(VERSION)/|' \
-cvf -
../$(TARFILE).list:
find * \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \
\! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \
\! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' \
| sort > ../$(TARFILE).list
tar: ../$(TARFILE).list
find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755
find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r
find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x
find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \
$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\
gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \
$(TAR_COMMAND) | gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz
tar-snap:
@$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \
`find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\
tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \
--group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \
--prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\
tar-snap: ../$(TARFILE).list
$(TAR_COMMAND) > ../$(TARFILE)
rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list
ls -l ../$(TARFILE)
dist:

10
crypto/openssl/NEWS
View File

@ -5,9 +5,19 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015]
o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193)
o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194)
o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195)
o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs
o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
return an error
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)
o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015]

176
crypto/openssl/README
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
OpenSSL 1.0.2d 9 Jul 2015
OpenSSL 1.0.2e 3 Dec 2015
Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
All rights reserved.
@ -10,17 +10,17 @@
The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust,
commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1)
protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library.
The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the
Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its
related documentation.
Secure Sockets Layer (SSLv3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols as
well as a full-strength general purpose cryptograpic library. The project is
managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to
communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related
documentation.
OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young
OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young
and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the
OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license) situation, which basically means
that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial
purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to
get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you
fulfill the conditions of both licenses.
OVERVIEW
--------
@ -28,90 +28,39 @@
The OpenSSL toolkit includes:
libssl.a:
Implementation of SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1 and the required code to support
both SSLv2, SSLv3 and TLSv1 in the one server and client.
Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS.
libcrypto.a:
General encryption and X.509 v1/v3 stuff needed by SSL/TLS but not
actually logically part of it. It includes routines for the following:
Ciphers
libdes - EAY's libdes DES encryption package which was floating
around the net for a few years, and was then relicensed by
him as part of SSLeay. It includes 15 'modes/variations'
of DES (1, 2 and 3 key versions of ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb;
pcbc and a more general form of cfb and ofb) including desx
in cbc mode, a fast crypt(3), and routines to read
passwords from the keyboard.
RC4 encryption,
RC2 encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
Blowfish encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
IDEA encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb.
Digests
MD5 and MD2 message digest algorithms, fast implementations,
SHA (SHA-0) and SHA-1 message digest algorithms,
MDC2 message digest. A DES based hash that is popular on smart cards.
Public Key
RSA encryption/decryption/generation.
There is no limit on the number of bits.
DSA encryption/decryption/generation.
There is no limit on the number of bits.
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange/key generation.
There is no limit on the number of bits.
X.509v3 certificates
X509 encoding/decoding into/from binary ASN1 and a PEM
based ASCII-binary encoding which supports encryption with a
private key. Program to generate RSA and DSA certificate
requests and to generate RSA and DSA certificates.
Systems
The normal digital envelope routines and base64 encoding. Higher
level access to ciphers and digests by name. New ciphers can be
loaded at run time. The BIO io system which is a simple non-blocking
IO abstraction. Current methods supported are file descriptors,
sockets, socket accept, socket connect, memory buffer, buffering, SSL
client/server, file pointer, encryption, digest, non-blocking testing
and null.
Data structures
A dynamically growing hashing system
A simple stack.
A Configuration loader that uses a format similar to MS .ini files.
Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but
not logically part of it.
openssl:
A command line tool that can be used for:
Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters
Creation of key parameters
Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
Calculation of Message Digests
Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
Calculation of message digests
Encryption and decryption
SSL/TLS client and server tests
Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
And more...
INSTALLATION
------------
To install this package under a Unix derivative, read the INSTALL file. For
a Win32 platform, read the INSTALL.W32 file. For OpenVMS systems, read
INSTALL.VMS.
Read the documentation in the doc/ directory. It is quite rough, but it
lists the functions; you will probably have to look at the code to work out
how to use them. Look at the example programs.
PROBLEMS
--------
For some platforms, there are some known problems that may affect the user
or application author. We try to collect those in doc/PROBLEMS, with current
thoughts on how they should be solved in a future of OpenSSL.
See the appropriate file:
INSTALL Linux, Unix, etc.
INSTALL.DJGPP DOS platform with DJGPP
INSTALL.NW Netware
INSTALL.OS2 OS/2
INSTALL.VMS VMS
INSTALL.W32 Windows (32bit)
INSTALL.W64 Windows (64bit)
INSTALL.WCE Windows CE
SUPPORT
-------
See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details of how to obtain
See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain
commercial technical support.
If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps
@ -137,56 +86,33 @@
Email the report to:
openssl-bugs@openssl.org
rt@openssl.org
Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance
or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect
does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
In order to avoid spam, this is a moderated mailing list, and it might
take a day for the ticket to show up. (We also scan posts to make sure
that security disclosures aren't publically posted by mistake.) Mail to
this address is recorded in the public RT (request tracker) database (see
https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html for details) and also forwarded
the public openssl-dev mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to
openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers).
Note that mail to openssl-bugs@openssl.org is recorded in the public
request tracker database (see https://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html
for details) and also forwarded to a public mailing list. Confidential
mail may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from
the key servers).
Please do NOT use this for general assistance or support queries.
Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it
is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL.
You can also make GitHub pull requests. If you do this, please also send
mail to rt@openssl.org with a link to the PR so that we can more easily
keep track of it.
HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL
----------------------------
Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see
http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you
would like to submit a patch, send it to openssl-bugs@openssl.org with
the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a
textual explanation of what your patch does.
See CONTRIBUTING
If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general
OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first.
Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good
reason as to why that feature isn't implemented.
Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the
current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of
OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets
can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL
compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable
features.
Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only
if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt@bis.doc.gov
(formerly BXA) with a copy to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator;
please take some time to look at
http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html [sic]
and
http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (EAR Section 740.13(e))
for the details. If "your encryption source code is too large to serve as
an email attachment", they are glad to receive it by fax instead; hope you
have a cheap long-distance plan.
Our preferred format for changes is "diff -u" output. You might
generate it like this:
# cd openssl-work
# [your changes]
# ./Configure dist; make clean
# cd ..
# diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch
LEGALITIES
----------
A number of nations, in particular the U.S., restrict the use or export
of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions
you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to
develop or distribute cryptographic code.

2
crypto/openssl/apps/Makefile
View File

@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ update: openssl-vms.cnf local_depend
depend: local_depend
@if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi
local_depend:
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC); \
@[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(SRC)
dclean:
$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new

3
crypto/openssl/apps/app_rand.c
View File

@ -124,10 +124,7 @@ int app_RAND_load_file(const char *file, BIO *bio_e, int dont_warn)
char buffer[200];
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS
BIO_printf(bio_e, "Loading 'screen' into random state -");
BIO_flush(bio_e);
RAND_screen();
BIO_printf(bio_e, " done\n");
#endif
if (file == NULL)

9
crypto/openssl/apps/apps.c
View File

@ -119,9 +119,6 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WINCE) && !defined(NETWARE_CLIB)
# include <strings.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
@ -1352,7 +1349,11 @@ int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg)
{"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL},
{NULL, 0, 0}
};
return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl);
if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0)
return 0;
if ((*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0)
*flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC;
return 1;
}
int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg)

4
crypto/openssl/apps/asn1pars.c
View File

@ -313,9 +313,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
typ = ASN1_TYPE_get(at);
if ((typ == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
|| (typ == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)
|| (typ == V_ASN1_NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n",
typ == V_ASN1_NULL ? "NULL" : "OBJECT");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse %s type\n", ASN1_tag2str(typ));
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}

14
crypto/openssl/apps/ca.c
View File

@ -99,25 +99,19 @@
#undef PROG
#define PROG ca_main
#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
#define BASE_SECTION "ca"
#define CONFIG_FILE "openssl.cnf"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_CA "default_ca"
#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
#define STRING_MASK "string_mask"
#define UTF8_IN "utf8"
#define ENV_DIR "dir"
#define ENV_CERTS "certs"
#define ENV_CRL_DIR "crl_dir"
#define ENV_CA_DB "CA_DB"
#define ENV_NEW_CERTS_DIR "new_certs_dir"
#define ENV_CERTIFICATE "certificate"
#define ENV_SERIAL "serial"
#define ENV_CRLNUMBER "crlnumber"
#define ENV_CRL "crl"
#define ENV_PRIVATE_KEY "private_key"
#define ENV_RANDFILE "RANDFILE"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_DAYS "default_days"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_STARTDATE "default_startdate"
#define ENV_DEFAULT_ENDDATE "default_enddate"
@ -2538,6 +2532,8 @@ static int do_updatedb(CA_DB *db)
char **rrow, *a_tm_s;
a_tm = ASN1_UTCTIME_new();
if (a_tm == NULL)
return -1;
/* get actual time and make a string */
a_tm = X509_gmtime_adj(a_tm, 0);

7
crypto/openssl/apps/ecparam.c
View File

@ -416,14 +416,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (check) {
if (group == NULL)
BIO_printf(bio_err, "no elliptic curve parameters\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
} else
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
goto end;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
}

5
crypto/openssl/apps/engine.c
View File

@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ static void identity(char *ptr)
static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
{
int l = strlen(s);
if (*buf == NULL) {
*size = step;
*buf = OPENSSL_malloc(*size);
@ -109,9 +107,6 @@ static int append_buf(char **buf, const char *s, int *size, int step)
**buf = '\0';
}
if (**buf != '\0')
l += 2; /* ", " */
if (strlen(*buf) + strlen(s) >= (unsigned int)*size) {
*size += step;
*buf = OPENSSL_realloc(*buf, *size);

4
crypto/openssl/apps/ocsp.c
View File

@ -1261,8 +1261,8 @@ static OCSP_RESPONSE *query_responder(BIO *err, BIO *cbio, const char *path,
return NULL;
}
if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) <= 0) {
BIO_puts(err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
if (BIO_get_fd(cbio, &fd) < 0) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "Can't get connection fd\n");
goto err;
}

14
crypto/openssl/apps/pkcs12.c
View File

@ -134,13 +134,6 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
apps_startup();
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
# endif
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
enc = EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
if (bio_err == NULL)
bio_err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
@ -148,6 +141,13 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
if (!load_config(bio_err, NULL))
goto end;
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC;
else
# endif
cert_pbe = NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC;
args = argv + 1;
while (*args) {

5
crypto/openssl/apps/s_cb.c
View File

@ -981,6 +981,11 @@ void MS_CALLBACK tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type,
extname = "next protocol";
break;
#endif
#ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation
case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation:
extname = "application layer protocol negotiation";
break;
#endif
case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding:
extname = "TLS padding";

11
crypto/openssl/apps/s_client.c
View File

@ -424,6 +424,14 @@ static void sc_usage(void)
" -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -serverinfo types - send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -curves arg - Elliptic curves to advertise (colon-separated list)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n");
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@ -2065,6 +2073,9 @@ int MAIN(int argc, char **argv)
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (pass)
OPENSSL_free(pass);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin);
#endif
if (vpm)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm);
ssl_excert_free(exc);

51
crypto/openssl/apps/s_server.c
View File

@ -652,6 +652,12 @@ static void sv_usage(void)
" -no_ticket - disable use of RFC4507bis session tickets\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -legacy_renegotiation - enable use of legacy renegotiation (dangerous)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support (colon-separated list)\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -client_sigalgs arg - Signature algorithms to support for client \n");
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" certificate authentication (colon-separated list)\n");
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
BIO_printf(bio_err,
" -nextprotoneg arg - set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)\n");
@ -2881,6 +2887,21 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
goto err;
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
else
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
continue;
}
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
delay(1000);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)
@ -3211,6 +3232,21 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n");
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
else
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
continue;
}
#endif
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n");
print_ssl_summary(bio_err, con);
@ -3224,6 +3260,21 @@ static int rev_body(char *hostname, int s, int stype, unsigned char *context)
goto err;
} else {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n");
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
if (BIO_should_io_special(io)
&& BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) {
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n");
srp_callback_parm.user =
SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb,
srp_callback_parm.login);
if (srp_callback_parm.user)
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n",
srp_callback_parm.user->info);
else
BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n");
continue;
}
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
delay(1000);
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(__DJGPP__)

60
crypto/openssl/appveyor.yml Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
platform:
- x86
- x64
environment:
matrix:
- VSVER: 9
- VSVER: 10
- VSVER: 11
- VSVER: 12
- VSVER: 14
configuration:
- plain
- shared
matrix:
allow_failures:
- platform: x64
VSVER: 9
- platform: x64
VSVER: 10
- platform: x64
VSVER: 11
before_build:
- ps: >-
If ($env:Platform -Match "x86") {
$env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="x86"
$env:TARGET="VC-WIN32"
$env:DO="do_ms"
} Else {
$env:VCVARS_PLATFORM="amd64"
$env:TARGET="VC-WIN64A"
$env:DO="do_win64a"
}
- ps: >-
If ($env:Configuration -Like "*shared*") {
$env:MAK="ntdll.mak"
} Else {
$env:MAK="nt.mak"
}
- ps: $env:VSCOMNTOOLS=(Get-Content ("env:VS" + "$env:VSVER" + "0COMNTOOLS"))
- call "%VSCOMNTOOLS%\..\..\VC\vcvarsall.bat" %VCVARS_PLATFORM%
- perl Configure %TARGET% no-asm
- call ms\%DO%
build_script:
- nmake /f ms\%MAK%
test_script:
- nmake /f ms\%MAK% test
notifications:
- provider: Email
to:
- openssl-commits@openssl.org
on_build_success: false
on_build_failure: true
on_build_status_changed: true

6
crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aes-586.pl
View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
# the undertaken effort was that it appeared that in tight IA-32
# register window little-endian flavor could achieve slightly higher
# Instruction Level Parallelism, and it indeed resulted in up to 15%
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
# better performance on most recent µ-archs...
#
# Third version adds AES_cbc_encrypt implementation, which resulted in
# up to 40% performance imrovement of CBC benchmark results. 40% was
@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sub _data_word() { my $i; while(defined($i=shift)) { &data_word($i,$i); } }
$speed_limit=512; # chunks smaller than $speed_limit are
# processed with compact routine in CBC mode
$small_footprint=1; # $small_footprint=1 code is ~5% slower [on
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
# recent µ-archs], but ~5 times smaller!
# I favor compact code to minimize cache
# contention and in hope to "collect" 5% back
# in real-life applications...
@ -565,7 +565,7 @@ sub enctransform()
# Performance is not actually extraordinary in comparison to pure
# x86 code. In particular encrypt performance is virtually the same.
# Decrypt performance on the other hand is 15-20% better on newer
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
# µ-archs [but we're thankful for *any* improvement here], and ~50%
# better on PIII:-) And additionally on the pros side this code
# eliminates redundant references to stack and thus relieves/
# minimizes the pressure on the memory bus.

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10);
$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1

9
crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
@ -139,11 +139,8 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($avx>1);
je ${func}_avx2
___
$code.=<<___;
and \$`1<<30`,%eax # mask "Intel CPU" bit
and \$`1<<28|1<<9`,%r10d # mask AVX+SSSE3 bits
or %eax,%r10d
cmp \$`1<<28|1<<9|1<<30`,%r10d
je ${func}_avx
and \$`1<<28`,%r10d # check for AVX
jnz ${func}_avx
ud2
___
}

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86.pl
View File

@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ $inout3="xmm5"; $in1="xmm5";
$inout4="xmm6"; $in0="xmm6";
$inout5="xmm7"; $ivec="xmm7";
# AESNI extenstion
# AESNI extension
sub aeskeygenassist
{ my($dst,$src,$imm)=@_;
if ("$dst:$src" =~ /xmm([0-7]):xmm([0-7])/)

200
crypto/openssl/crypto/aes/asm/vpaes-ppc.pl
View File

@ -337,24 +337,27 @@ Lenc_entry:
addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo
?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out
?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key # prepare for unaligned access
vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp # redundant in aligned case
?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
bl _vpaes_encrypt_core
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
vsel v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
vmr $outhead, v0
stvx v1, 0, $out
addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not a typo
########
andi. r8, $out, 15
li r9, 16
beq Lenc_out_aligned
lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
stvx v1, 0, $out
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
mtctr r9
Lenc_out_unaligned:
stvebx v0, 0, $out
addi $out, $out, 1
bdnz Lenc_out_unaligned
b Lenc_done
.align 4
Lenc_out_aligned:
stvx v0, 0, $out
Lenc_done:
li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
@ -566,24 +569,27 @@ Ldec_entry:
addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo
?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out
?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key
vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp # redundant in aligned case
?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
bl _vpaes_decrypt_core
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
vsel v1, $outhead, v0, $outmask
vmr $outhead, v0
stvx v1, 0, $out
addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not a typo
########
andi. r8, $out, 15
li r9, 16
beq Ldec_out_aligned
lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
stvx v1, 0, $out
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
mtctr r9
Ldec_out_unaligned:
stvebx v0, 0, $out
addi $out, $out, 1
bdnz Ldec_out_unaligned
b Ldec_done
.align 4
Ldec_out_aligned:
stvx v0, 0, $out
Ldec_done:
li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
li r11,`31+6*$SIZE_T`
@ -658,11 +664,11 @@ Ldec_entry:
$PUSH r0, `$FRAME+$SIZE_T*2+$LRSAVE`($sp)
and r30, r5, r9 # copy length&-16
andi. r9, $out, 15 # is $out aligned?
mr r5, r6 # copy pointer to key
mr r31, r7 # copy pointer to iv
blt Lcbc_abort
cmpwi r8, 0 # test direction
li r6, -1
mcrf cr1, cr0 # put aside $out alignment flag
mr r7, r12 # copy vrsave
mtspr 256, r6 # preserve all AltiVec registers
@ -672,6 +678,7 @@ Ldec_entry:
lvx v25, r9, r31
?vperm v24, v24, v25, $inpperm
cmpwi r8, 0 # test direction
neg r8, $inp # prepare for unaligned access
vxor v7, v7, v7
?lvsl $keyperm, 0, $key
@ -681,13 +688,37 @@ Ldec_entry:
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
addi $inp, $inp, 15 # 15 is not a typo
lvx $outhead, 0, $out
beq Lcbc_decrypt
bl _vpaes_encrypt_preheat
li r0, 16
beq cr1, Lcbc_enc_loop # $out is aligned
vmr v0, $inptail
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
addi $inp, $inp, 16
?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv
bl _vpaes_encrypt_core
andi. r8, $out, 15
vmr v24, v0 # put aside iv
sub r9, $out, r8
vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
Lcbc_enc_head:
stvebx $outhead, r8, r9
cmpwi r8, 15
addi r8, r8, 1
bne Lcbc_enc_head
sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16
addi $out, $out, 16
beq Lcbc_unaligned_done
Lcbc_enc_loop:
vmr v0, $inptail
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
@ -713,6 +744,32 @@ Lcbc_decrypt:
bl _vpaes_decrypt_preheat
li r0, 16
beq cr1, Lcbc_dec_loop # $out is aligned
vmr v0, $inptail
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
addi $inp, $inp, 16
?vperm v0, v0, $inptail, $inpperm
vmr v25, v0 # put aside input
bl _vpaes_decrypt_core
andi. r8, $out, 15
vxor v0, v0, v24 # ^= iv
vmr v24, v25
sub r9, $out, r8
vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
Lcbc_dec_head:
stvebx $outhead, r8, r9
cmpwi r8, 15
addi r8, r8, 1
bne Lcbc_dec_head
sub. r30, r30, r0 # len -= 16
addi $out, $out, 16
beq Lcbc_unaligned_done
Lcbc_dec_loop:
vmr v0, $inptail
lvx $inptail, 0, $inp
@ -733,23 +790,29 @@ Lcbc_dec_loop:
bne Lcbc_dec_loop
Lcbc_done:
addi $out, $out, -1
lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
stvx v1, 0, $out
beq cr1, Lcbc_write_iv # $out is aligned
Lcbc_unaligned_done:
andi. r8, $out, 15
sub $out, $out, r8
li r9, 0
Lcbc_tail:
stvebx $outhead, r9, $out
addi r9, r9, 1
cmpw r9, r8
bne Lcbc_tail
Lcbc_write_iv:
neg r8, r31 # write [potentially unaligned] iv
li r10, 4
?lvsl $outperm, 0, r8
li r6, 15
vnor $outmask, v7, v7 # 0xff..ff
?vperm $outmask, v7, $outmask, $outperm
lvx $outhead, 0, r31
li r11, 8
li r12, 12
vperm v24, v24, v24, $outperm # rotate right/left
vsel v0, $outhead, v24, $outmask
lvx v1, r6, r31
stvx v0, 0, r31
vsel v1, v24, v1, $outmask
stvx v1, r6, r31
stvewx v24, 0, r31 # ivp is at least 32-bit aligned
stvewx v24, r10, r31
stvewx v24, r11, r31
stvewx v24, r12, r31
mtspr 256, r7 # restore vrsave
li r10,`15+6*$SIZE_T`
@ -872,18 +935,21 @@ _vpaes_schedule_core:
# encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform
li r8, 0x30 # mov \$0x30,%r8d
addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
li r9, 4
li r10, 8
li r11, 12
?lvsr $outperm, 0, $out # prepare for unaligned access
vnor $outmask, v9, v9 # 0xff..ff
lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm $outmask, v9, $outmask, $outperm
#stvx v0, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx)
vperm v1, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
vsel v2, $outhead, v1, $outmask
vmr $outhead, v1
stvx v2, 0, $out
vperm $outhead, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
stvewx $outhead, 0, $out # some are superfluous
stvewx $outhead, r9, $out
stvewx $outhead, r10, $out
addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
stvewx $outhead, r11, $out
b Lschedule_go
Lschedule_am_decrypting:
@ -893,20 +959,24 @@ Lschedule_am_decrypting:
addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
# decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows
lvx v1, r8, r10 # vmovdqa (%r8,%r10), %xmm1
li r9, 4
li r10, 8
li r11, 12
vperm v4, v3, v3, v1 # vpshufb %xmm1, %xmm3, %xmm3
neg r0, $out # prepare for unaligned access
?lvsl $outperm, 0, r0
addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo
vnor $outmask, v9, v9 # 0xff..ff
lvx $outhead, 0, $out
?vperm $outmask, $outmask, v9, $outperm
#stvx v4, 0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm3, (%rdx)
vperm v4, v4, v4, $outperm # rotate right/left
vsel v2, $outhead, v4, $outmask
vmr $outhead, v4
stvx v2, 0, $out
vperm $outhead, v4, v4, $outperm # rotate right/left
stvewx $outhead, 0, $out # some are superfluous
stvewx $outhead, r9, $out
stvewx $outhead, r10, $out
addi r10, r12, 0x80 # lea .Lk_sr(%rip),%r10
stvewx $outhead, r11, $out
addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo
xori r8, r8, 0x30 # xor \$0x30, %r8
Lschedule_go:
@ -1038,14 +1108,15 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last:
#stvx v0, r0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
li r10, 4
vsel v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
vmr $outhead, v0
li r11, 8
stvx v2, 0, $out
addi $out, $out, 15 # 15 is not typo
lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
stvx v1, 0, $out
li r12, 12
stvewx v0, 0, $out # some (or all) are redundant
stvewx v0, r10, $out
stvewx v0, r11, $out
stvewx v0, r12, $out
b Lschedule_mangle_done
.align 4
@ -1057,15 +1128,18 @@ Lschedule_mangle_last_dec:
bl _vpaes_schedule_transform # output transform
#stvx v0, r0, $out # vmovdqu %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key
addi r9, $out, -15 # -15 is not typo
vperm v0, v0, v0, $outperm # rotate right/left
li r10, 4
vsel v2, $outhead, v0, $outmask
vmr $outhead, v0
li r11, 8
stvx v2, 0, $out
li r12, 12
stvewx v0, 0, r9 # some (or all) are redundant
stvewx v0, r10, r9
stvewx v0, r11, r9
stvewx v0, r12, r9
addi $out, $out, -15 # -15 is not typo
lvx v1, 0, $out # redundant in aligned case
vsel v1, $outhead, v1, $outmask
stvx v1, 0, $out
Lschedule_mangle_done:
mtlr r7

10
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
View File

@ -62,6 +62,10 @@
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#ifndef ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH
#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
#endif
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
int indent);
static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
@ -128,6 +132,12 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
#else
dump_indent = 6; /* Because we know BIO_dump_indent() */
#endif
if (depth > ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH) {
BIO_puts(bp, "BAD RECURSION DEPTH\n");
return 0;
}
p = *pp;
tot = p + length;
op = p - 1;

15
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/d2i_pr.c
View File

@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
long length)
{
EVP_PKEY *ret;
const unsigned char *p = *pp;
if ((a == NULL) || (*a == NULL)) {
if ((ret = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
@ -94,21 +95,23 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey(int type, EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
if (!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode ||
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, pp, length)) {
!ret->ameth->old_priv_decode(ret, &p, length)) {
if (ret->ameth->priv_decode) {
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = NULL;
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
if (!p8)
goto err;
EVP_PKEY_free(ret);
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (ret == NULL)
goto err;
} else {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
}
*pp = p;
if (a != NULL)
(*a) = ret;
return (ret);
@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
* input is surrounded by an ASN1 SEQUENCE.
*/
inkey = d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY(NULL, &p, length);
p = *pp;
/*
* Since we only need to discern "traditional format" RSA and DSA keys we
* can just count the elements.
@ -146,7 +150,7 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
keytype = EVP_PKEY_EC;
else if (sk_ASN1_TYPE_num(inkey) == 3) { /* This seems to be PKCS8, not
* traditional format */
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, pp, length);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8 = d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO(NULL, &p, length);
EVP_PKEY *ret;
sk_ASN1_TYPE_pop_free(inkey, ASN1_TYPE_free);
@ -157,6 +161,9 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_AutoPrivateKey(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp,
}
ret = EVP_PKCS82PKEY(p8);
PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
*pp = p;
if (a) {
*a = ret;
}

11
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
View File

@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
int otag;
int ret = 0;
ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval;
int combine = aclass & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
aclass &= ~ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE;
if (!pval)
return 0;
if (aux && aux->asn1_cb)
@ -350,9 +352,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
}
asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it);
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE:
@ -489,9 +491,9 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
/* Save encoding */
if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it, NULL))
goto auxerr;
*in = p;
return 1;
default:
@ -500,7 +502,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
auxerr:
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR);
err:
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (combine == 0)
ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it);
if (errtt)
ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name,
", Type=", it->sname);
@ -689,7 +692,7 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
} else {
/* Nothing special */
ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-1, 0, opt, ctx);
-1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
if (!ret) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
goto err;

5
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_bignum.c
View File

@ -141,8 +141,9 @@ static int bn_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len,
int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it)
{
BIGNUM *bn;
if (!*pval)
bn_new(pval, it);
if (*pval == NULL && !bn_new(pval, it))
return 0;
bn = (BIGNUM *)*pval;
if (!BN_bin2bn(cont, len, bn)) {
bn_free(pval, it);

5
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c
View File

@ -188,13 +188,16 @@ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
{
X509_PUBKEY *xpk;
EVP_PKEY *pktmp;
xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, pp, length);
const unsigned char *q;
q = *pp;
xpk = d2i_X509_PUBKEY(NULL, &q, length);
if (!xpk)
return NULL;
pktmp = X509_PUBKEY_get(xpk);
X509_PUBKEY_free(xpk);
if (!pktmp)
return NULL;
*pp = q;
if (a) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*a);
*a = pktmp;

9
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509.c
View File

@ -180,16 +180,15 @@ X509 *d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length)
if (!a || *a == NULL) {
freeret = 1;
}
ret = d2i_X509(a, pp, length);
ret = d2i_X509(a, &q, length);
/* If certificate unreadable then forget it */
if (!ret)
return NULL;
/* update length */
length -= *pp - q;
if (!length)
return ret;
if (!d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, pp, length))
length -= q - *pp;
if (length > 0 && !d2i_X509_CERT_AUX(&ret->aux, &q, length))
goto err;
*pp = q;
return ret;
err:
if (freeret) {

7
crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/x_x509a.c
View File

@ -163,10 +163,13 @@ int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj)
if (!(objtmp = OBJ_dup(obj)))
return 0;
if (!(aux = aux_get(x)))
return 0;
goto err;
if (!aux->reject && !(aux->reject = sk_ASN1_OBJECT_new_null()))
return 0;
goto err;
return sk_ASN1_OBJECT_push(aux->reject, objtmp);
err:
ASN1_OBJECT_free(objtmp);
return 0;
}
void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x)

1
crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/b_dump.c
View File

@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ int BIO_dump_indent_cb(int (*cb) (const void *data, size_t len, void *u),
if ((rows * dump_width) < len)
rows++;
for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
buf[0] = '\0'; /* start with empty string */
BUF_strlcpy(buf, str, sizeof buf);
BIO_snprintf(tmp, sizeof tmp, "%04x - ", i * dump_width);
BUF_strlcat(buf, tmp, sizeof buf);

13
crypto/openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
View File

@ -115,9 +115,8 @@ static BIO_METHOD methods_filep = {
NULL,
};
BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
static FILE *file_fopen(const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
BIO *ret;
FILE *file = NULL;
# if defined(_WIN32) && defined(CP_UTF8)
@ -164,6 +163,14 @@ BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
# else
file = fopen(filename, mode);
# endif
return (file);
}
BIO *BIO_new_file(const char *filename, const char *mode)
{
BIO *ret;
FILE *file = file_fopen(filename, mode);
if (file == NULL) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
@ -386,7 +393,7 @@ static long MS_CALLBACK file_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
else
strcat(p, "t");
# endif
fp = fopen(ptr, p);
fp = file_fopen(ptr, p);
if (fp == NULL) {
SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", ptr, "','", p, "')");

10
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/armv4-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
# referred below, which improves ECDH and ECDSA verify benchmarks
# by 18-40%.
#
# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
# Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
#
# http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ ___
################
# void bn_GF2m_mul_2x2(BN_ULONG *r,
# BN_ULONG a1,BN_ULONG a0,
# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
# BN_ULONG b1,BN_ULONG b0); # r[3..0]=a1a0·b1b0
{
$code.=<<___;
.global bn_GF2m_mul_2x2
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $mask,#7<<2
sub sp,sp,#32 @ allocate tab[8]
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a1·b1
str $lo,[$ret,#8]
str $hi,[$ret,#12]
@ -169,13 +169,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
eor r2,r2,$a
eor $b,$b,r3
eor $a,$a,r2
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ a0·b0
str $lo,[$ret]
str $hi,[$ret,#4]
eor $a,$a,r2
eor $b,$b,r3
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
bl mul_1x1_ialu @ (a1+a0)·(b1+b0)
___
@r=map("r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;

4
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ia64.S
View File

@ -422,7 +422,7 @@ bn_mul_add_words:
// This loop spins in 3*(n+10) ticks on Itanium and in 2*(n+10) on
// Itanium 2. Yes, unlike previous versions it scales:-) Previous
// version was peforming *all* additions in IALU and was starving
// version was performing *all* additions in IALU and was starving
// for those even on Itanium 2. In this version one addition is
// moved to FPU and is folded with multiplication. This is at cost
// of propogating the result from previous call to this subroutine
@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ bn_sqr_comba8:
// I've estimated this routine to run in ~120 ticks, but in reality
// (i.e. according to ar.itc) it takes ~160 ticks. Are those extra
// cycles consumed for instructions fetch? Or did I misinterpret some
// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
// clause in Itanium µ-architecture manual? Comments are welcomed and
// highly appreciated.
//
// On Itanium 2 it takes ~190 ticks. This is because of stalls on

174
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/ppc64-mont.pl
View File

@ -94,6 +94,8 @@ if ($flavour =~ /32/) {
$POP= "ld";
} else { die "nonsense $flavour"; }
$LITTLE_ENDIAN = ($flavour=~/le$/) ? 4 : 0;
$0 =~ m/(.*[\/\\])[^\/\\]+$/; $dir=$1;
( $xlate="${dir}ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate ) or
( $xlate="${dir}../../perlasm/ppc-xlate.pl" and -f $xlate) or
@ -294,12 +296,12 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
extrdi $t0,$a0,32,32 ; lwz $t0,4($ap)
extrdi $t1,$a0,32,0 ; lwz $t1,0($ap)
lwz $t2,12($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t3,8($ap)
lwz $t4,4($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t5,0($np)
lwz $t6,12($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t7,8($np)
lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[0] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
lwz $a0,0($ap) ; pull ap[0,1] value
@ -463,14 +465,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
L1st:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==8);
lwz $t0,4($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t1,0($ap)
lwz $t2,12($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t3,8($ap)
lwz $t4,4($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t5,0($np)
lwz $t6,12($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t7,8($np)
lwz $t0,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t1,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
lwz $t2,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap) ; load a[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t3,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($ap)
lwz $t4,`4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t5,`0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
lwz $t6,`12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np) ; load n[j+1] as 32-bit word pair
lwz $t7,`8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($np)
___
$code.=<<___ if ($SIZE_T==4);
lwz $t0,0($ap) ; load a[j..j+3] as 32-bit word pairs
@ -505,14 +507,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
___
}
$code.=<<___;
@ -651,8 +653,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
addc $t4,$t4,$carry
adde $t5,$t5,$c1
srwi $carry,$t4,16
@ -673,8 +675,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N0,$nc,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N0,$nd,$T1b
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
@ -686,8 +688,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
fmadd $T3a,$N2,$nc,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N2,$nd,$T3b
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
@ -699,8 +701,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fctid $T0a,$T0a
fctid $T0b,$T0b
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
@ -787,14 +789,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
@ -823,14 +825,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw $t0,12($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,8($tp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
@ -857,10 +859,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw $t2,20($tp) ; tp[j]
stwu $t0,16($tp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
@ -1165,23 +1167,23 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
fmadd $T1a,$N1,$na,$T1a
fmadd $T1b,$N1,$nb,$T1b
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
fmadd $T2a,$N2,$na,$T2a
fmadd $T2b,$N2,$nb,$T2b
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
fmadd $T3a,$N3,$na,$T3a
fmadd $T3b,$N3,$nb,$T3b
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addc $t0,$t0,$carry
adde $t1,$t1,$c1
srwi $carry,$t0,16
fmadd $T0a,$N0,$na,$T0a
fmadd $T0b,$N0,$nb,$T0b
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
srwi $c1,$t1,16
insrwi $carry,$t1,16,0
@ -1218,8 +1220,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
fctid $T1a,$T1a
addc $t0,$t0,$t2
adde $t4,$t4,$t3
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
fctid $T1b,$T1b
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
@ -1229,19 +1231,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
srwi $carry,$t2,16
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
fctid $T2b,$T2b
srwi $c1,$t3,16
insrwi $carry,$t3,16,0
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
fctid $T3a,$T3a
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1
srwi $carry,$t6,16
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
fctid $T3b,$T3b
insrwi $t2,$t6,16,0 ; 64..95 bits
@ -1354,14 +1356,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
___
} else {
$code.=<<___;
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28`($sp)
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+0^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+4^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+8^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+12^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+16^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+20^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+24^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+28^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
stfd $dota,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
stfd $dotb,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
@ -1397,14 +1399,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
stw $t0,4($tp) ; tp[j-1]
stw $t4,0($tp)
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60`($sp) ; permuted $t6
lwz $t3,`$FRAME+32^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t1
lwz $t2,`$FRAME+36^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t0
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+40^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t3
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+44^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t2
lwz $t1,`$FRAME+48^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t5
lwz $t0,`$FRAME+52^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t4
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+56^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t7
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+60^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp) ; permuted $t6
addc $t2,$t2,$carry
adde $t3,$t3,$c1
@ -1433,12 +1435,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
addc $t2,$t2,$t6
adde $t0,$t0,$t7
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68`($sp)
lwz $t7,`$FRAME+64^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t6,`$FRAME+68^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addze $carry,$carry
addze $c1,$c1
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76`($sp)
lwz $t5,`$FRAME+72^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
lwz $t4,`$FRAME+76^$LITTLE_ENDIAN`($sp)
addc $t6,$t6,$carry
adde $t7,$t7,$c1

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}

6
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/s390x-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -172,19 +172,19 @@ ___
if ($SIZE_T==8) {
my @r=map("%r$_",(6..9));
$code.=<<___;
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a1·b1
stmg $lo,$hi,16($rp)
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # a0·b0
stmg $lo,$hi,0($rp)
lg $a,`$stdframe+128+3*$SIZE_T`($sp)
lg $b,`$stdframe+128+5*$SIZE_T`($sp)
xg $a,`$stdframe+128+4*$SIZE_T`($sp)
xg $b,`$stdframe+128+6*$SIZE_T`($sp)
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
bras $ra,_mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
lmg @r[0],@r[3],0($rp)
xgr $lo,$hi

115
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
View File

@ -18,71 +18,106 @@
.align 4
bn_mul_add_words:
lghi zero,0 // zero = 0
la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside
lghi %r2,0 // i=0;
la %r1,0(%r2) // put rp aside [to give way to]
lghi %r2,0 // return value
ltgfr %r4,%r4
bler %r14 // if (len<=0) return 0;
stmg %r6,%r10,48(%r15)
lghi %r10,3
lghi %r8,0 // carry = 0
nr %r10,%r4 // len%4
stmg %r6,%r13,48(%r15)
lghi %r2,3
lghi %r12,0 // carry = 0
slgr %r1,%r3 // rp-=ap
nr %r2,%r4 // len%4
sra %r4,2 // cnt=len/4
jz .Loop1_madd // carry is incidentally cleared if branch taken
algr zero,zero // clear carry
.Loop4_madd:
lg %r7,0(%r2,%r3) // ap[i]
lg %r7,0(%r3) // ap[0]
lg %r9,8(%r3) // ap[1]
mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w
alcgr %r7,%r8 // +=carry
alcgr %r6,zero
alg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // +=rp[i]
stg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // rp[i]=
brct %r4,.Loop4_madd
j .Loop4_madd_tail
lg %r9,8(%r2,%r3)
.Loop4_madd:
mlgr %r8,%r5
lg %r11,16(%r3) // ap[i+2]
alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry
alcgr %r6,zero
alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i]
stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]=
mlgr %r10,%r5
lg %r13,24(%r3)
alcgr %r9,%r6
alcgr %r8,zero
alg %r9,8(%r2,%r1)
stg %r9,8(%r2,%r1)
alg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
stg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
mlgr %r12,%r5
lg %r7,32(%r3)
alcgr %r11,%r8
alcgr %r10,zero
alg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
stg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
lg %r7,16(%r2,%r3)
mlgr %r6,%r5
alcgr %r7,%r8
alcgr %r6,zero
alg %r7,16(%r2,%r1)
stg %r7,16(%r2,%r1)
lg %r9,40(%r3)
alcgr %r13,%r10
alcgr %r12,zero
alg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
stg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
lg %r9,24(%r2,%r3)
mlgr %r8,%r5
alcgr %r9,%r6
alcgr %r8,zero
alg %r9,24(%r2,%r1)
stg %r9,24(%r2,%r1)
la %r2,32(%r2) // i+=4
la %r3,32(%r3) // i+=4
brct %r4,.Loop4_madd
la %r10,1(%r10) // see if len%4 is zero ...
brct %r10,.Loop1_madd // without touching condition code:-)
.Loop4_madd_tail:
mlgr %r8,%r5
lg %r11,16(%r3)
alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry
alcgr %r6,zero
alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i]
stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]=
mlgr %r10,%r5
lg %r13,24(%r3)
alcgr %r9,%r6
alcgr %r8,zero
alg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
stg %r9,8(%r3,%r1)
mlgr %r12,%r5
alcgr %r11,%r8
alcgr %r10,zero
alg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
stg %r11,16(%r3,%r1)
alcgr %r13,%r10
alcgr %r12,zero
alg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
stg %r13,24(%r3,%r1)
la %r3,32(%r3) // i+=4
la %r2,1(%r2) // see if len%4 is zero ...
brct %r2,.Loop1_madd // without touching condition code:-)
.Lend_madd:
alcgr %r8,zero // collect carry bit
lgr %r2,%r8
lmg %r6,%r10,48(%r15)
lgr %r2,zero // return value
alcgr %r2,%r12 // collect even carry bit
lmg %r6,%r13,48(%r15)
br %r14
.Loop1_madd:
lg %r7,0(%r2,%r3) // ap[i]
lg %r7,0(%r3) // ap[i]
mlgr %r6,%r5 // *=w
alcgr %r7,%r8 // +=carry
alcgr %r7,%r12 // +=carry
alcgr %r6,zero
alg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // +=rp[i]
stg %r7,0(%r2,%r1) // rp[i]=
alg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // +=rp[i]
stg %r7,0(%r3,%r1) // rp[i]=
lgr %r8,%r6
la %r2,8(%r2) // i++
brct %r10,.Loop1_madd
lgr %r12,%r6
la %r3,8(%r3) // i++
brct %r2,.Loop1_madd
j .Lend_madd
.size bn_mul_add_words,.-bn_mul_add_words

16
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
# the time being... Except that it has three code paths: pure integer
# code suitable for any x86 CPU, MMX code suitable for PIII and later
# and PCLMULQDQ suitable for Westmere and later. Improvement varies
# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
# from one benchmark and µ-arch to another. Below are interval values
# for 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks relative to compiler-generated
# code:
#
@ -226,22 +226,22 @@ if ($sse2) {
&push ("edi");
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a1·b1
&movq ("mm7",$R);
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # a0·b0
&movq ("mm6",$R);
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&call ("_mul_1x1_mmx"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&pxor ($R,"mm7");
&mov ($a,&wparam(0));
&pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
&pxor ($R,"mm6"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a1·b1-a0·b0
&movq ($A,$R);
&psllq ($R,32);
@ -266,13 +266,13 @@ if ($sse2) {
&mov ($a,&wparam(1));
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a1·b1
&mov (&DWP(8,"esp"),$lo);
&mov (&DWP(12,"esp"),$hi);
&mov ($a,&wparam(2));
&mov ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # a0·b0
&mov (&DWP(0,"esp"),$lo);
&mov (&DWP(4,"esp"),$hi);
@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ if ($sse2) {
&mov ($b,&wparam(3));
&xor ($a,&wparam(2));
&xor ($b,&wparam(4));
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&call ("_mul_1x1_ialu"); # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
&mov ("ebp",&wparam(0));
@r=("ebx","ecx","edi","esi");

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
View File

@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
# undef mul_add
/*-
* "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
* "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
* "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it
* want to keep the value of zero;
*/

16
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gf2m.pl
View File

@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
# in bn_gf2m.c. It's kind of low-hanging mechanical port from C for
# the time being... Except that it has two code paths: code suitable
# for any x86_64 CPU and PCLMULQDQ one suitable for Westmere and
# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
# later. Improvement varies from one benchmark and µ-arch to another.
# Vanilla code path is at most 20% faster than compiler-generated code
# [not very impressive], while PCLMULQDQ - whole 85%-160% better on
# 163- and 571-bit ECDH benchmarks on Intel CPUs. Keep in mind that
@ -184,13 +184,13 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
movdqa %xmm0,%xmm4
movdqa %xmm1,%xmm5
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm1,%xmm0 # a1·b1
pxor %xmm2,%xmm4
pxor %xmm3,%xmm5
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm3,%xmm2 # a0·b0
pclmulqdq \$0,%xmm5,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
xorps %xmm0,%xmm4
xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
xorps %xmm2,%xmm4 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)-a0·b0-a1·b1
movdqa %xmm4,%xmm5
pslldq \$8,%xmm4
psrldq \$8,%xmm5
@ -225,13 +225,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov \$0xf,$mask
mov $a1,$a
mov $b1,$b
call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1
call _mul_1x1 # a1·b1
mov $lo,16(%rsp)
mov $hi,24(%rsp)
mov 48(%rsp),$a
mov 64(%rsp),$b
call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0
call _mul_1x1 # a0·b0
mov $lo,0(%rsp)
mov $hi,8(%rsp)
@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 56(%rsp),$b
xor 48(%rsp),$a
xor 64(%rsp),$b
call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
call _mul_1x1 # (a0+a1)·(b0+b1)
___
@r=("%rbx","%rcx","%rdi","%rsi");
$code.=<<___;

5
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
View File

@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
# int bn_mul_mont(
$rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp,
$ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap,

27
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
View File

@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
# int bn_mul_mont_gather5(
$rp="%rdi"; # BN_ULONG *rp,
$ap="%rsi"; # const BN_ULONG *ap,
@ -1779,6 +1784,15 @@ sqr8x_reduction:
.align 32
.L8x_tail_done:
add (%rdx),%r8 # can this overflow?
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
adc \$0,%r11
adc \$0,%r12
adc \$0,%r13
adc \$0,%r14
adc \$0,%r15 # can't overflow, because we
# started with "overhung" part
# of multiplication
xor %rax,%rax
neg $carry
@ -3125,6 +3139,15 @@ sqrx8x_reduction:
.align 32
.Lsqrx8x_tail_done:
add 24+8(%rsp),%r8 # can this overflow?
adc \$0,%r9
adc \$0,%r10
adc \$0,%r11
adc \$0,%r12
adc \$0,%r13
adc \$0,%r14
adc \$0,%r15 # can't overflow, because we
# started with "overhung" part
# of multiplication
mov $carry,%rax # xor %rax,%rax
sub 16+8(%rsp),$carry # mov 16(%rsp),%cf
@ -3168,13 +3191,11 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
my @ri=map("%r$_",(10..13));
my @ni=map("%r$_",(14..15));
$code.=<<___;
xor %rbx,%rbx
xor %ebx,%ebx
sub %r15,%rsi # compare top-most words
adc %rbx,%rbx
mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num
.byte 0x67
or %rbx,%rax
.byte 0x67
mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num
xor \$1,%rax
sar \$3+2,%rcx # cf=0

7
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
View File

@ -662,12 +662,13 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
bn_check_top(p);
bn_check_top(m);
top = m->top;
if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) {
if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP_MONT_CONSTTIME, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
return (0);
}
top = m->top;
bits = BN_num_bits(p);
if (bits == 0) {
ret = BN_one(rr);

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
View File

@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
*/
pB = &local_B;
local_B.flags = 0;
BN_with_flags(pB, B, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!BN_nnmod(B, pB, A, ctx))
goto err;
@ -610,6 +611,7 @@ static BIGNUM *BN_mod_inverse_no_branch(BIGNUM *in,
* BN_div_no_branch will be called eventually.
*/
pA = &local_A;
local_A.flags = 0;
BN_with_flags(pA, A, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* (D, M) := (A/B, A%B) ... */

11
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
View File

@ -575,7 +575,7 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const int p[],
bn_check_top(a);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((s = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
return 0;
goto err;
if (!bn_wexpand(s, 2 * a->top))
goto err;
@ -699,18 +699,21 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
int top = p->top;
BN_ULONG *udp, *bdp, *vdp, *cdp;
bn_wexpand(u, top);
if (!bn_wexpand(u, top))
goto err;
udp = u->d;
for (i = u->top; i < top; i++)
udp[i] = 0;
u->top = top;
bn_wexpand(b, top);
if (!bn_wexpand(b, top))
goto err;
bdp = b->d;
bdp[0] = 1;
for (i = 1; i < top; i++)
bdp[i] = 0;
b->top = top;
bn_wexpand(c, top);
if (!bn_wexpand(c, top))
goto err;
cdp = c->d;
for (i = 0; i < top; i++)
cdp[i] = 0;

9
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_mont.c
View File

@ -361,9 +361,9 @@ void BN_MONT_CTX_free(BN_MONT_CTX *mont)
if (mont == NULL)
return;
BN_free(&(mont->RR));
BN_free(&(mont->N));
BN_free(&(mont->Ni));
BN_clear_free(&(mont->RR));
BN_clear_free(&(mont->N));
BN_clear_free(&(mont->Ni));
if (mont->flags & BN_FLG_MALLOCED)
OPENSSL_free(mont);
}
@ -373,6 +373,9 @@ int BN_MONT_CTX_set(BN_MONT_CTX *mont, const BIGNUM *mod, BN_CTX *ctx)
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *Ri, *R;
if (BN_is_zero(mod))
return 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((Ri = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;

4
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_recp.c
View File

@ -152,8 +152,10 @@ int BN_div_recp(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m,
if (BN_ucmp(m, &(recp->N)) < 0) {
BN_zero(d);
if (!BN_copy(r, m))
if (!BN_copy(r, m)) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 0;
}
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return (1);
}

7
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bn_x931p.c
View File

@ -213,14 +213,14 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
* exceeded.
*/
if (!BN_rand(Xp, nbits, 1, 0))
return 0;
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
t = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
if (!BN_rand(Xq, nbits, 1, 0))
return 0;
goto err;
/* Check that |Xp - Xq| > 2^(nbits - 100) */
BN_sub(t, Xp, Xq);
if (BN_num_bits(t) > (nbits - 100))
@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ int BN_X931_generate_Xpq(BIGNUM *Xp, BIGNUM *Xq, int nbits, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return 0;
}
/*

74
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/bntest.c
View File

@ -441,6 +441,14 @@ int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
BN_init(&d);
BN_init(&e);
BN_one(&a);
BN_zero(&b);
if (BN_div(&d, &c, &a, &b, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Division by zero succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < num0 + num1; i++) {
if (i < num1) {
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 400, 0, 0);
@ -516,9 +524,9 @@ int test_div_word(BIO *bp)
do {
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 512, -1, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(&b, BN_BITS2, -1, 0);
s = b.d[0];
} while (!s);
} while (BN_is_zero(&b));
s = b.d[0];
BN_copy(&b, &a);
r = BN_div_word(&b, s);
@ -781,6 +789,18 @@ int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
if (mont == NULL)
return 0;
BN_zero(&n);
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for zero modulus!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_set_word(&n, 16);
if (BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, &n, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_MONT_CTX_set succeeded for even modulus!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(&a, 100, 0, 0);
BN_bntest_rand(&b, 100, 0, 0);
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
@ -887,6 +907,14 @@ int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_mul(e, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_mul with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
BN_bntest_rand(c, 1024, 0, 0);
for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) {
@ -952,6 +980,14 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp with zero modulus succeeded!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);
@ -980,6 +1016,24 @@ int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
return 0;
}
}
/* Regression test for carry propagation bug in sqr8x_reduction */
BN_hex2bn(&a, "050505050505");
BN_hex2bn(&b, "02");
BN_hex2bn(&c,
"4141414141414141414141274141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
"4141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141414141"
"4141414141414141414141800000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
"0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001");
BN_mod_exp(d, a, b, c, ctx);
BN_mul(e, a, a, ctx);
if (BN_cmp(d, e)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp and BN_mul produce different results!\n");
return 0;
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
@ -999,6 +1053,22 @@ int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
d = BN_new();
e = BN_new();
BN_one(a);
BN_one(b);
BN_zero(c);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with zero modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_set_word(c, 16);
if (BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(d, a, b, c, ctx, NULL)) {
fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime with even modulus "
"succeeded\n");
return 0;
}
BN_bntest_rand(c, 30, 0, 1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i = 0; i < num2; i++) {
BN_bntest_rand(a, 20 + i * 5, 0, 0);

68
crypto/openssl/crypto/bn/rsaz_exp.h
View File

@ -1,32 +1,44 @@
/******************************************************************************
* Copyright(c) 2012, Intel Corp.
* Developers and authors:
* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1)
* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel
* (2) University of Haifa, Israel
/*****************************************************************************
* *
* Copyright (c) 2012, Intel Corporation *
* *
* All rights reserved. *
* *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without *
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are *
* met: *
* *
* * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright *
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. *
* *
* * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright *
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the *
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the *
* distribution. *
* *
* * Neither the name of the Intel Corporation nor the names of its *
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from *
* this software without specific prior written permission. *
* *
* *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY INTEL CORPORATION ""AS IS"" AND ANY *
* EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE *
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR *
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTEL CORPORATION OR *
* CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, *
* EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, *
* PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR *
* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF *
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING *
* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS *
* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. *
* *
******************************************************************************
* LICENSE:
* This submission to OpenSSL is to be made available under the OpenSSL
* license, and only to the OpenSSL project, in order to allow integration
* into the publicly distributed code.
* The use of this code, or portions of this code, or concepts embedded in
* this code, or modification of this code and/or algorithm(s) in it, or the
* use of this code for any other purpose than stated above, requires special
* licensing.
******************************************************************************
* DISCLAIMER:
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE CONTRIBUTORS AND THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS
* ``AS IS''. ANY EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
* TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE CONTRIBUTORS OR THE COPYRIGHT
* OWNERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY,
* OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
******************************************************************************/
* Developers and authors: *
* Shay Gueron (1, 2), and Vlad Krasnov (1) *
* (1) Intel Corporation, Israel Development Center, Haifa, Israel *
* (2) University of Haifa, Israel *
*****************************************************************************/
#ifndef RSAZ_EXP_H
# define RSAZ_EXP_H

21
crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buf_str.c
View File

@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <limits.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
@ -72,7 +73,7 @@ size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str)
{
if (str == NULL)
return (NULL);
return NULL;
return BUF_strndup(str, strlen(str));
}
@ -81,16 +82,22 @@ char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz)
char *ret;
if (str == NULL)
return (NULL);
return NULL;
siz = BUF_strnlen(str, siz);
if (siz >= INT_MAX)
return NULL;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_STRNDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
return NULL;
}
BUF_strlcpy(ret, str, siz + 1);
memcpy(ret, str, siz);
ret[siz] = '\0';
return (ret);
}
@ -98,13 +105,13 @@ void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz)
{
void *ret;
if (data == NULL)
return (NULL);
if (data == NULL || siz >= INT_MAX)
return NULL;
ret = OPENSSL_malloc(siz);
if (ret == NULL) {
BUFerr(BUF_F_BUF_MEMDUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return (NULL);
return NULL;
}
return memcpy(ret, data, siz);
}

6
crypto/openssl/crypto/buffer/buffer.h
View File

@ -86,7 +86,13 @@ int BUF_MEM_grow(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
int BUF_MEM_grow_clean(BUF_MEM *str, size_t len);
size_t BUF_strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen);
char *BUF_strdup(const char *str);
/*
* Like strndup, but in addition, explicitly guarantees to never read past the
* first |siz| bytes of |str|.
*/
char *BUF_strndup(const char *str, size_t siz);
void *BUF_memdup(const void *data, size_t siz);
void BUF_reverse(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t siz);

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_enc.c
View File

@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ BIO *cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec)
ok = 1;
err:
if (ec->key && !keep_key) {
if (ec->key && (!keep_key || !ok)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(ec->key, ec->keylen);
OPENSSL_free(ec->key);
ec->key = NULL;

3
crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_pwri.c
View File

@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_password(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
/* Setup algorithm identifier for cipher */
encalg = X509_ALGOR_new();
if (encalg == NULL) {
goto merr;
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
if (EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, kekciph, NULL, NULL, NULL) <= 0) {

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_sd.c
View File

@ -857,6 +857,8 @@ int CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content(CMS_SignerInfo *si, BIO *chain)
} else {
const EVP_MD *md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(&mctx);
pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(si->pkey, NULL);
if (pkctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_verify_init(pkctx) <= 0)
goto err;
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_signature_md(pkctx, md) <= 0)

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/cms/cms_smime.c
View File

@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ int CMS_final(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, BIO *data, BIO *dcont, unsigned int flags)
BIO *cmsbio;
int ret = 0;
if (!(cmsbio = CMS_dataInit(cms, dcont))) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_FINAL, CMS_R_CMS_LIB);
return 0;
}

3
crypto/openssl/crypto/comp/c_zlib.c
View File

@ -404,8 +404,9 @@ COMP_METHOD *COMP_zlib(void)
void COMP_zlib_cleanup(void)
{
#ifdef ZLIB_SHARED
if (zlib_dso)
if (zlib_dso != NULL)
DSO_free(zlib_dso);
zlib_dso = NULL;
#endif
}

3
crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_def.c
View File

@ -225,12 +225,11 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
goto err;
}
section = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(10);
section = BUF_strdup("default");
if (section == NULL) {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
BUF_strlcpy(section, "default", 10);
if (_CONF_new_data(conf) == 0) {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);

1
crypto/openssl/crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
View File

@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ void OPENSSL_config(const char *config_name)
CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, config_name,
CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION |
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
openssl_configured = 1;
}
void OPENSSL_no_config()

26
crypto/openssl/crypto/cryptlib.c
View File

@ -953,13 +953,29 @@ void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)
# if defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT>=0x0333
/* this -------------v--- guards NT-specific calls */
if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0) {
HANDLE h = RegisterEventSource(0, _T("OPENSSL"));
const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
ReportEvent(h, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, &pmsg, 0);
DeregisterEventSource(h);
HANDLE hEventLog = RegisterEventSource(NULL, _T("OpenSSL"));
if (hEventLog != NULL) {
const TCHAR *pmsg = buf;
if (!ReportEvent(hEventLog, EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE, 0, 0, NULL,
1, 0, &pmsg, NULL)) {
#if defined(DEBUG)
/*
* We are in a situation where we tried to report a critical
* error and this failed for some reason. As a last resort,
* in debug builds, send output to the debugger or any other
* tool like DebugView which can monitor the output.
*/
OutputDebugString(pmsg);
#endif
}
(void)DeregisterEventSource(hEventLog);
}
} else
# endif
MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONSTOP);
MessageBox(NULL, buf, _T("OpenSSL: FATAL"), MB_OK | MB_ICONERROR);
}
#else
void OPENSSL_showfatal(const char *fmta, ...)

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dh.h
View File

@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ struct dh_st {
BIGNUM *p;
BIGNUM *g;
long length; /* optional */
BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x */
BIGNUM *pub_key; /* g^x % p */
BIGNUM *priv_key; /* x */
int flags;
BN_MONT_CTX *method_mont_p;

4
crypto/openssl/crypto/dh/dhtest.c
View File

@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ static int run_rfc5114_tests(void)
* Work out shared secrets using both sides and compare with expected
* values.
*/
if (!DH_compute_key(Z1, dhB->pub_key, dhA))
if (DH_compute_key(Z1, dhB->pub_key, dhA) == -1)
goto bad_err;
if (!DH_compute_key(Z2, dhA->pub_key, dhB))
if (DH_compute_key(Z2, dhA->pub_key, dhB) == -1)
goto bad_err;
if (memcmp(Z1, td->Z, td->Z_len))

1
crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_ameth.c
View File

@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ static int dsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp);
ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey);
prkey = NULL;
if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dsa), 0,
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen))

21
crypto/openssl/crypto/dsa/dsa_gen.c
View File

@ -114,16 +114,8 @@ int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *ret, int bits,
}
# endif
else {
const EVP_MD *evpmd;
size_t qbits = bits >= 2048 ? 256 : 160;
if (bits >= 2048) {
qbits = 256;
evpmd = EVP_sha256();
} else {
qbits = 160;
evpmd = EVP_sha1();
}
const EVP_MD *evpmd = bits >= 2048 ? EVP_sha256() : EVP_sha1();
size_t qbits = EVP_MD_size(evpmd) * 8;
return dsa_builtin_paramgen(ret, bits, qbits, evpmd,
seed_in, seed_len, NULL, counter_ret,
@ -176,13 +168,14 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
if (seed_in != NULL)
memcpy(seed, seed_in, seed_len);
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
g = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
W = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@ -203,7 +196,7 @@ int dsa_builtin_paramgen(DSA *ret, size_t bits, size_t qbits,
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 0, m++))
goto err;
if (!seed_len) {
if (!seed_len || !seed_in) {
if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(seed, qsize) < 0)
goto err;
seed_is_random = 1;

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/Makefile
View File

@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ dclean:
mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
clean:
rm -f *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
rm -f *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/asm/ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec.h
View File

@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ typedef enum {
/** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies
* which solution of the quadratic equation y is */
POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2,
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x02 */
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */
POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4,
/** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies
* which solution of the quadratic equation y is */

8
crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
View File

@ -970,8 +970,9 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
{
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = *in;
if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE);
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
return NULL;
@ -989,6 +990,7 @@ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
*a = group;
ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params);
*in = p;
return (group);
}
@ -1016,8 +1018,9 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
int ok = 0;
EC_KEY *ret = NULL;
EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL;
const unsigned char *p = *in;
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, in, len)) == NULL) {
if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return NULL;
}
@ -1096,6 +1099,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
if (a)
*a = ret;
*in = p;
ok = 1;
err:
if (!ok) {

12
crypto/openssl/crypto/ec/ec_key.c
View File

@ -366,7 +366,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *tx, *ty;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
int ok = 0, tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
int ok = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
int tmp_nid, is_char_two = 0;
#endif
if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
@ -382,14 +385,15 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
if (!point)
goto err;
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
tmp_nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(key->group));
if (tmp_nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field)
is_char_two = 1;
tx = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
ty = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
if (is_char_two) {
if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(key->group, point,
x, y, ctx))

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.h
View File

@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ void *ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx);
* \return pointer to a ECDSA_METHOD structure or NULL if an error occurred
*/
ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method);
ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(const ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_method);
/** frees a ECDSA_METHOD structure
* \param ecdsa_method pointer to the ECDSA_METHOD structure

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_lib.c
View File

@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ void *ECDSA_get_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx)
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ecdsa->ex_data, idx));
}
ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth)
ECDSA_METHOD *ECDSA_METHOD_new(const ECDSA_METHOD *ecdsa_meth)
{
ECDSA_METHOD *ret;

7
crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_cryptodev.c
View File

@ -1292,15 +1292,18 @@ static DSA_SIG *cryptodev_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
if (cryptodev_asym(&kop, BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), r,
BN_num_bytes(dsa->q), s) == 0) {
dsaret = DSA_SIG_new();
if (dsaret == NULL)
goto err;
dsaret->r = r;
dsaret->s = s;
r = s = NULL;
} else {
const DSA_METHOD *meth = DSA_OpenSSL();
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
dsaret = (meth->dsa_do_sign) (dgst, dlen, dsa);
}
err:
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
kop.crk_param[0].crp_p = NULL;
zapparams(&kop);
return (dsaret);

1
crypto/openssl/crypto/engine/eng_list.c
View File

@ -260,6 +260,7 @@ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e)
}
if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) {
ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING);
return 0;
}
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
if (!engine_list_add(e)) {

13
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha256.c
View File

@ -498,7 +498,18 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
iv = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
# if defined(STITCHED_CALL)
/*
* Assembly stitch handles AVX-capable processors, but its
* performance is not optimal on AMD Jaguar, ~40% worse, for
* unknown reasons. Incidentally processor in question supports
* AVX, but not AMD-specific XOP extension, which can be used
* to identify it and avoid stitch invocation. So that after we
* establish that current CPU supports AVX, we even see if it's
* either even XOP-capable Bulldozer-based or GenuineIntel one.
*/
if (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (60 - 32)) && /* AVX? */
((OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (43 - 32))) /* XOP? */
| (OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[0] & (1<<30))) && /* "Intel CPU"? */
plen > (sha_off + iv) &&
(blocks = (plen - (sha_off + iv)) / SHA256_CBLOCK)) {
SHA256_Update(&key->md, in + iv, sha_off);
@ -816,8 +827,6 @@ static int aesni_cbc_hmac_sha256_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
return -1;
len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1];
if (ctx->encrypt) {
key->payload_length = len;
if ((key->aux.tls_ver =

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/e_des3.c
View File

@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ static int des_ede_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
# endif
# ifdef EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY
if (DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1)
! !DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2))
|| DES_set_key_checked(&deskey[1], &dat->ks2))
return 0;
# else
DES_set_key_unchecked(&deskey[0], &dat->ks1);

206
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/encode.c
View File

@ -60,9 +60,9 @@
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a);
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[(a)&0x7f])
#else
/*
* We assume that PEM encoded files are EBCDIC files (i.e., printable text
@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
* as the underlying textstring data_bin2ascii[] is already EBCDIC)
*/
# define conv_bin2ascii(a) (data_bin2ascii[(a)&0x3f])
# define conv_ascii2bin(a) (data_ascii2bin[os_toascii[a]&0x7f])
#endif
/*-
@ -103,6 +102,7 @@ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
#define B64_WS 0xE0
#define B64_ERROR 0xFF
#define B64_NOT_BASE64(a) (((a)|0x13) == 0xF3)
#define B64_BASE64(a) !B64_NOT_BASE64(a)
static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
@ -123,6 +123,23 @@ static const unsigned char data_ascii2bin[128] = {
0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
};
#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
{
if (a & 0x80)
return B64_ERROR;
return data_ascii2bin[a];
}
#else
static unsigned char conv_ascii2bin(unsigned char a)
{
a = os_toascii[a];
if (a & 0x80)
return B64_ERROR;
return data_ascii2bin[a];
}
#endif
void EVP_EncodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
{
ctx->length = 48;
@ -218,8 +235,9 @@ int EVP_EncodeBlock(unsigned char *t, const unsigned char *f, int dlen)
void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
{
ctx->length = 30;
/* Only ctx->num is used during decoding. */
ctx->num = 0;
ctx->length = 0;
ctx->line_num = 0;
ctx->expect_nl = 0;
}
@ -228,139 +246,123 @@ void EVP_DecodeInit(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx)
* -1 for error
* 0 for last line
* 1 for full line
*
* Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate attempts to detect and report end of
* content, the context doesn't currently remember it and will accept more data
* in the next call. Therefore, the caller is responsible for checking and
* rejecting a 0 return value in the middle of content.
*
* Note: even though EVP_DecodeUpdate has historically tried to detect end of
* content based on line length, this has never worked properly. Therefore,
* we now return 0 when one of the following is true:
* - Padding or B64_EOF was detected and the last block is complete.
* - Input has zero-length.
* -1 is returned if:
* - Invalid characters are detected.
* - There is extra trailing padding, or data after padding.
* - B64_EOF is detected after an incomplete base64 block.
*/
int EVP_DecodeUpdate(EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
const unsigned char *in, int inl)
{
int seof = -1, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, ln, exp_nl;
int seof = 0, eof = 0, rv = -1, ret = 0, i, v, tmp, n, decoded_len;
unsigned char *d;
n = ctx->num;
d = ctx->enc_data;
ln = ctx->line_num;
exp_nl = ctx->expect_nl;
/* last line of input. */
if ((inl == 0) || ((n == 0) && (conv_ascii2bin(in[0]) == B64_EOF))) {
if (n > 0 && d[n - 1] == '=') {
eof++;
if (n > 1 && d[n - 2] == '=')
eof++;
}
/* Legacy behaviour: an empty input chunk signals end of input. */
if (inl == 0) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
}
/* We parse the input data */
for (i = 0; i < inl; i++) {
/* If the current line is > 80 characters, scream a lot */
if (ln >= 80) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
/* Get char and put it into the buffer */
tmp = *(in++);
v = conv_ascii2bin(tmp);
/* only save the good data :-) */
if (!B64_NOT_BASE64(v)) {
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++] = tmp;
ln++;
} else if (v == B64_ERROR) {
if (v == B64_ERROR) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
/*
* have we seen a '=' which is 'definitly' the last input line. seof
* will point to the character that holds it. and eof will hold how
* many characters to chop off.
*/
if (tmp == '=') {
if (seof == -1)
seof = n;
eof++;
} else if (eof > 0 && B64_BASE64(v)) {
/* More data after padding. */
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
if (v == B64_CR) {
ln = 0;
if (exp_nl)
continue;
if (eof > 2) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
/* eoln */
if (v == B64_EOLN) {
ln = 0;
if (exp_nl) {
exp_nl = 0;
continue;
}
}
exp_nl = 0;
/*
* If we are at the end of input and it looks like a line, process
* it.
*/
if (((i + 1) == inl) && (((n & 3) == 0) || eof)) {
v = B64_EOF;
/*
* In case things were given us in really small records (so two
* '=' were given in separate updates), eof may contain the
* incorrect number of ending bytes to skip, so let's redo the
* count
*/
eof = 0;
if (d[n - 1] == '=')
eof++;
if (d[n - 2] == '=')
eof++;
/* There will never be more than two '=' */
if (v == B64_EOF) {
seof = 1;
goto tail;
}
if ((v == B64_EOF && (n & 3) == 0) || (n >= 64)) {
/*
* This is needed to work correctly on 64 byte input lines. We
* process the line and then need to accept the '\n'
*/
if ((v != B64_EOF) && (n >= 64))
exp_nl = 1;
if (n > 0) {
v = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (v < 0) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
}
if (eof > v) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += (v - eof);
} else {
eof = 1;
v = 0;
}
/*
* This is the case where we have had a short but valid input
* line
*/
if ((v < ctx->length) && eof) {
rv = 0;
goto end;
} else
ctx->length = v;
if (seof >= 0) {
rv = 0;
/* Only save valid base64 characters. */
if (B64_BASE64(v)) {
if (n >= 64) {
/*
* We increment n once per loop, and empty the buffer as soon as
* we reach 64 characters, so this can only happen if someone's
* manually messed with the ctx. Refuse to write any more data.
*/
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
out += v;
OPENSSL_assert(n < (int)sizeof(ctx->enc_data));
d[n++] = tmp;
}
if (n == 64) {
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += decoded_len - eof;
out += decoded_len - eof;
}
}
rv = 1;
end:
/*
* Legacy behaviour: if the current line is a full base64-block (i.e., has
* 0 mod 4 base64 characters), it is processed immediately. We keep this
* behaviour as applications may not be calling EVP_DecodeFinal properly.
*/
tail:
if (n > 0) {
if ((n & 3) == 0) {
decoded_len = EVP_DecodeBlock(out, d, n);
n = 0;
if (decoded_len < 0 || eof > decoded_len) {
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
ret += (decoded_len - eof);
} else if (seof) {
/* EOF in the middle of a base64 block. */
rv = -1;
goto end;
}
}
rv = seof || (n == 0 && eof) ? 0 : 1;
end:
/* Legacy behaviour. This should probably rather be zeroed on error. */
*outl = ret;
ctx->num = n;
ctx->line_num = ln;
ctx->expect_nl = exp_nl;
return (rv);
}

6
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_key.c
View File

@ -104,6 +104,8 @@ int EVP_read_pw_string_min(char *buf, int min, int len, const char *prompt,
if ((prompt == NULL) && (prompt_string[0] != '\0'))
prompt = prompt_string;
ui = UI_new();
if (ui == NULL)
return -1;
UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, 0, buf, min,
(len >= BUFSIZ) ? BUFSIZ - 1 : len);
if (verify)
@ -137,7 +139,7 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
for (;;) {
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c, md, NULL))
return 0;
goto err;
if (addmd++)
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, &(md_buf[0]), mds))
goto err;
@ -188,6 +190,6 @@ int EVP_BytesToKey(const EVP_CIPHER *type, const EVP_MD *md,
rv = type->key_len;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&(md_buf[0]), EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
OPENSSL_cleanse(md_buf, sizeof(md_buf));
return rv;
}

36
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
View File

@ -72,11 +72,22 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
if (c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->set_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) {
ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(c) == NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap)
ASN1_TYPE_set(type, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
ret = 1;
} else
break;
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
ret = -1;
break;
default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv(c, type);
}
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);
@ -89,9 +100,22 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type)
if (c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters != NULL)
ret = c->cipher->get_asn1_parameters(c, type);
else if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE)
return 1;
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(c)) {
case EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE:
ret = 1;
break;
case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE:
case EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE:
ret = -1;
break;
default:
ret = EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv(c, type);
break;
}
} else
ret = -1;
return (ret);

16
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/evp_pbe.c
View File

@ -228,12 +228,16 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
int md_nid, EVP_PBE_KEYGEN *keygen)
{
EVP_PBE_CTL *pbe_tmp;
if (!pbe_algs)
if (pbe_algs == NULL) {
pbe_algs = sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_new(pbe_cmp);
if (!(pbe_tmp = (EVP_PBE_CTL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_PBE_CTL)))) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
if (pbe_algs == NULL)
goto err;
}
if ((pbe_tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*pbe_tmp))) == NULL)
goto err;
pbe_tmp->pbe_type = pbe_type;
pbe_tmp->pbe_nid = pbe_nid;
pbe_tmp->cipher_nid = cipher_nid;
@ -242,6 +246,10 @@ int EVP_PBE_alg_add_type(int pbe_type, int pbe_nid, int cipher_nid,
sk_EVP_PBE_CTL_push(pbe_algs, pbe_tmp);
return 1;
err:
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PBE_ALG_ADD_TYPE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
int EVP_PBE_alg_add(int nid, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const EVP_MD *md,

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/p_lib.c
View File

@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len)
int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key)
{
if (!EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type))
return 0;
pkey->pkey.ptr = key;
return (key != NULL);

9
crypto/openssl/crypto/evp/pmeth_gn.c
View File

@ -96,12 +96,17 @@ int EVP_PKEY_paramgen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
return -1;
}
if (!ppkey)
if (ppkey == NULL)
return -1;
if (!*ppkey)
if (*ppkey == NULL)
*ppkey = EVP_PKEY_new();
if (*ppkey == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_PARAMGEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
ret = ctx->pmeth->paramgen(ctx, *ppkey);
if (ret <= 0) {
EVP_PKEY_free(*ppkey);

9
crypto/openssl/crypto/hmac/hm_ameth.c
View File

@ -108,9 +108,14 @@ static int old_hmac_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os;
os = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (!os || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(os, *pder, derlen))
return 0;
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os);
goto err;
if (!EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, os))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
return 0;
}
static int old_hmac_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder)

4
crypto/openssl/crypto/jpake/jpake.c
View File

@ -219,6 +219,9 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
BIGNUM *t3 = BN_new();
int ret = 0;
if (h == NULL || t1 == NULL || t2 == NULL || t3 == NULL)
goto end;
zkp_hash(h, zkpg, p, ctx->p.peer_name);
/* t1 = g^b */
@ -234,6 +237,7 @@ static int verify_zkp(const JPAKE_STEP_PART *p, const BIGNUM *zkpg,
else
JPAKEerr(JPAKE_F_VERIFY_ZKP, JPAKE_R_ZKP_VERIFY_FAILED);
end:
/* cleanup */
BN_free(t3);
BN_free(t2);

4
crypto/openssl/crypto/mem_clr.c
View File

@ -66,6 +66,10 @@ void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *p = ptr;
size_t loop = len, ctr = cleanse_ctr;
if (ptr == NULL)
return;
while (loop--) {
*(p++) = (unsigned char)ctr;
ctr += (17 + ((size_t)p & 0xF));

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/aesni-gcm-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}

13
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-armv4.pl
View File

@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
# processes one byte in 8.45 cycles, A9 - in 10.2, Snapdragon S4 -
# in 9.33.
#
# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
# Câmara, D.; Gouvêa, C. P. L.; López, J. & Dahab, R.: Fast Software
# Polynomial Multiplication on ARM Processors using the NEON Engine.
#
# http://conradoplg.cryptoland.net/files/2010/12/mocrysen13.pdf
@ -126,6 +126,11 @@ $code=<<___;
.text
.code 32
#ifdef __clang__
#define ldrplb ldrbpl
#define ldrneb ldrbne
#endif
.type rem_4bit,%object
.align 5
rem_4bit:
@ -432,12 +437,12 @@ gcm_ghash_neon:
veor $IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi
.Lgmult_neon:
___
&clmul64x64 ($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo"); # H.lo·Xi.lo
&clmul64x64 ($Xl,$Hlo,"$IN#lo"); # H.lo·Xi.lo
$code.=<<___;
veor $IN#lo,$IN#lo,$IN#hi @ Karatsuba pre-processing
___
&clmul64x64 ($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo"); # (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
&clmul64x64 ($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi"); # H.hi·Xi.hi
&clmul64x64 ($Xm,$Hhl,"$IN#lo"); # (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
&clmul64x64 ($Xh,$Hhi,"$IN#hi"); # H.hi·Xi.hi
$code.=<<___;
veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xl @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $Xm,$Xm,$Xh

18
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-sparcv9.pl
View File

@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ gcm_init_vis3:
or $V,%lo(0xA0406080),$V
or %l0,%lo(0x20C0E000),%l0
sllx $V,32,$V
or %l0,$V,$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
or %l0,$V,$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
stx $V,[%i0+16]
ret
@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
mov 0xE1,%l7
sllx %l7,57,$xE1 ! 57 is not a typo
ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
xor $Hhi,$Hlo,$Hhl ! Karatsuba pre-processing
xmulx $Xlo,$Hlo,$C0
@ -411,9 +411,9 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
xmulx $Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
sll $C0,3,$sqr
srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
xor $C0,$sqr,$sqr
sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
xor $C0,$C1,$C1 ! Karatsuba post-processing
xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2
@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ gcm_gmult_vis3:
xor $Xhi,$C2,$C2
xor $Xhi,$C1,$C1
xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56
xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56
xor $C0,$C2,$C2
xmulx $C1,$xE1,$C0
xor $C1,$C3,$C3
@ -453,7 +453,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
mov 0xE1,%l7
sllx %l7,57,$xE1 ! 57 is not a typo
ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
ldx [$Htable+16],$V ! (0xE0·i)&0xff=0xA040608020C0E000
and $inp,7,$shl
andn $inp,7,$inp
@ -490,9 +490,9 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
xmulx $Xhi,$Hhi,$Xhi
sll $C0,3,$sqr
srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
srlx $V,$sqr,$sqr ! ·0xE0 [implicit &(7<<3)]
xor $C0,$sqr,$sqr
sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
sllx $sqr,57,$sqr ! ($C0·0xE1)<<1<<56 [implicit &0x7f]
xor $C0,$C1,$C1 ! Karatsuba post-processing
xor $Xlo,$C2,$C2
@ -502,7 +502,7 @@ gcm_ghash_vis3:
xor $Xhi,$C2,$C2
xor $Xhi,$C1,$C1
xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56
xmulxhi $C0,$xE1,$Xlo ! ·0xE1<<1<<56
xor $C0,$C2,$C2
xmulx $C1,$xE1,$C0
xor $C1,$C3,$C3

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86.pl
View File

@ -358,7 +358,7 @@ $S=12; # shift factor for rem_4bit
# effective address calculation and finally merge of value to Z.hi.
# Reference to rem_4bit is scheduled so late that I had to >>4
# rem_4bit elements. This resulted in 20-45% procent improvement
# on contemporary µ-archs.
# on contemporary µ-archs.
{
my $cnt;
my $rem_4bit = "eax";

10
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghash-x86_64.pl
View File

@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /(^clang version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
@ -576,15 +576,15 @@ $code.=<<___ if (0 || (&reduction_alg9($Xhi,$Xi)&&0));
# experimental alternative. special thing about is that there
# no dependency between the two multiplications...
mov \$`0xE1<<1`,%eax
mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10 # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%r10 # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
mov \$0x07,%r11d
movq %rax,$T1
movq %r10,$T2
movq %r11,$T3 # borrow $T3
pand $Xi,$T3
pshufb $T3,$T2 # ($Xi&7)·0xE0
pshufb $T3,$T2 # ($Xi&7)·0xE0
movq %rax,$T3
pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Xi,$T1 # ·(0xE1<<1)
pclmulqdq \$0x00,$Xi,$T1 # ·(0xE1<<1)
pxor $Xi,$T2
pslldq \$15,$T2
paddd $T2,$T2 # <<(64+56+1)
@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
je .Lskip4x
sub \$0x30,$len
mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
mov \$0xA040608020C0E000,%rax # ((7..0)·0xE0)&0xff
movdqu 0x30($Htbl),$Hkey3
movdqu 0x40($Htbl),$Hkey4

12
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashp8-ppc.pl
View File

@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ $code=<<___;
le?vperm $IN,$IN,$IN,$lemask
vxor $zero,$zero,$zero
vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo
vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo
vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st phase
@ -178,11 +178,11 @@ $code=<<___;
.align 5
Loop:
subic $len,$len,16
vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo
vpmsumd $Xl,$IN,$Hl # H.lo·Xi.lo
subfe. r0,r0,r0 # borrow?-1:0
vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $Xm,$IN,$H # H.hi·Xi.lo+H.lo·Xi.hi
and r0,r0,$len
vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmsumd $Xh,$IN,$Hh # H.hi·Xi.hi
add $inp,$inp,r0
vpmsumd $t2,$Xl,$xC2 # 1st phase

22
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/asm/ghashv8-armx.pl
View File

@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ gcm_gmult_v8:
#endif
vext.8 $IN,$t1,$t1,#8
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh
@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
#endif
vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ I[i]^=Xi
vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
veor $t1,$t1,$In @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xhn,$H,$In
b .Loop_mod2x_v8
@ -235,14 +235,14 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop_mod2x_v8:
vext.8 $t2,$IN,$IN,#8
subs $len,$len,#32 @ is there more data?
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.lo·Xi.lo
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H2,$IN @ H^2.lo·Xi.lo
cclr $inc,lo @ is it time to zero $inc?
vpmull.p64 $Xmn,$Hhl,$t1
veor $t2,$t2,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H2,$IN @ H^2.hi·Xi.hi
veor $Xl,$Xl,$Xln @ accumulate
vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vpmull2.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t2 @ (H^2.lo+H^2.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vld1.64 {$t0},[$inp],$inc @ load [rotated] I[i+2]
veor $Xh,$Xh,$Xhn
@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
vext.8 $In,$t1,$t1,#8
vext.8 $IN,$t0,$t0,#8
veor $Xl,$Xm,$t2
vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
vpmull.p64 $Xln,$H,$In @ H·Ii+1
veor $IN,$IN,$Xh @ accumulate $IN early
vext.8 $t2,$Xl,$Xl,#8 @ 2nd phase of reduction
@ -291,10 +291,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
veor $IN,$IN,$Xl @ inp^=Xi
veor $t1,$t0,$t2 @ $t1 is rotated inp^Xi
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
vpmull.p64 $Xl,$H,$IN @ H.lo·Xi.lo
veor $t1,$t1,$IN @ Karatsuba pre-processing
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vpmull2.p64 $Xh,$H,$IN @ H.hi·Xi.hi
vpmull.p64 $Xm,$Hhl,$t1 @ (H.lo+H.hi)·(Xi.lo+Xi.hi)
vext.8 $t1,$Xl,$Xh,#8 @ Karatsuba post-processing
veor $t2,$Xl,$Xh

4
crypto/openssl/crypto/modes/wrap128.c
View File

@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_128_wrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
return 0;
A = B;
t = 1;
memcpy(out + 8, in, inlen);
memmove(out + 8, in, inlen);
if (!iv)
iv = default_iv;
@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ size_t CRYPTO_128_unwrap(void *key, const unsigned char *iv,
A = B;
t = 6 * (inlen >> 3);
memcpy(A, in, 8);
memcpy(out, in + 8, inlen);
memmove(out, in + 8, inlen);
for (j = 0; j < 6; j++) {
R = out + inlen - 8;
for (i = 0; i < inlen; i += 8, t--, R -= 8) {

6
crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_lib.c
View File

@ -246,12 +246,6 @@ int OCSP_parse_url(const char *url, char **phost, char **pport, char **ppath,
if ((p = strchr(p, ':'))) {
*p = 0;
port = p + 1;
} else {
/* Not found: set default port */
if (*pssl)
port = "443";
else
port = "80";
}
*pport = BUF_strdup(port);

3
crypto/openssl/crypto/ocsp/ocsp_prn.c
View File

@ -212,8 +212,7 @@ int OCSP_RESPONSE_print(BIO *bp, OCSP_RESPONSE *o, unsigned long flags)
return 1;
}
i = ASN1_STRING_length(rb->response);
if (!(br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)))
if ((br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(o)) == NULL)
goto err;
rd = br->tbsResponseData;
l = ASN1_INTEGER_get(rd->version);

2
crypto/openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
View File

@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ extern "C" {
optimization options. Older Sparc's work better with only UNROLL, but
there's no way to tell at compile time what it is you're running on */
#if defined( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
#if defined( __sun ) || defined ( sun ) /* Newer Sparc's */
# define DES_PTR
# define DES_RISC1
# define DES_UNROLL

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