EKCD: Add Chacha20 encryption mode

Add Chacha20 mode to Encrypted Kernel Crash Dumps.

Chacha20 does not require messages to be multiples of block size, so it is
valid to use the cipher on non-block-sized messages without the explicit
padding AES-CBC would require.  Therefore, allow use with simultaneous dump
compression.  (Continue to disallow use of AES-CBC EKCD with compression.)

dumpon(8) gains a -C cipher flag to select between chacha and aes-cbc.
It defaults to chacha if no -C option is provided.  The man page documents this
behavior.

Relnotes:	sure
Sponsored by:	Dell EMC Isilon
This commit is contained in:
Conrad Meyer 2019-05-23 20:12:24 +00:00
parent 8a2ad0aec8
commit 8298529226
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=348197
5 changed files with 90 additions and 18 deletions

View File

@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ static bool
decrypt(int ofd, const char *privkeyfile, const char *keyfile,
const char *input)
{
uint8_t buf[KERNELDUMP_BUFFER_SIZE], key[KERNELDUMP_KEY_MAX_SIZE];
uint8_t buf[KERNELDUMP_BUFFER_SIZE], key[KERNELDUMP_KEY_MAX_SIZE],
chachaiv[4 * 4];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
FILE *fp;
@ -207,6 +208,9 @@ decrypt(int ofd, const char *privkeyfile, const char *keyfile,
case KERNELDUMP_ENC_AES_256_CBC:
cipher = EVP_aes_256_cbc();
break;
case KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20:
cipher = EVP_chacha20();
break;
default:
pjdlog_error("Invalid encryption algorithm.");
goto failed;
@ -222,7 +226,23 @@ decrypt(int ofd, const char *privkeyfile, const char *keyfile,
RSA_free(privkey);
privkey = NULL;
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, kdk->kdk_iv);
if (kdk->kdk_encryption == KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20) {
/*
* OpenSSL treats the IV as 4 little-endian 32 bit integers.
*
* The first two represent a 64-bit counter, where the low half
* is the first 32-bit word.
*
* Start at counter block zero...
*/
memset(chachaiv, 0, 4 * 2);
/*
* And use the IV specified by the dump.
*/
memcpy(&chachaiv[4 * 2], kdk->kdk_iv, 4 * 2);
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, chachaiv);
} else
EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, kdk->kdk_iv);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx, 0);
explicit_bzero(key, sizeof(key));

View File

@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
.\" From: @(#)swapon.8 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/5/93
.\" $FreeBSD$
.\"
.Dd May 21, 2019
.Dd May 23, 2019
.Dt DUMPON 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
.Op Fl i Ar index
.Op Fl r
.Op Fl v
.Op Fl C Ar cipher
.Op Fl k Ar pubkey
.Op Fl Z
.Op Fl z
@ -47,6 +48,7 @@
.Op Fl i Ar index
.Op Fl r
.Op Fl v
.Op Fl C Ar cipher
.Op Fl k Ar pubkey
.Op Fl Z
.Op Fl z
@ -129,6 +131,14 @@ The goal of the mechanism is to provide confidentiality.
The
.Va pubkey
file should be a PEM-formatted RSA key of at least 1024 bits.
.It Fl C Ar cipher
Select the symmetric algorithm used for encrypted kernel crash dump.
The default is
.Dq chacha20
but
.Dq aes256-cbc
is also available.
(AES256-CBC mode does not work in conjunction with compression.)
.It Fl l
List the currently configured dump device(s), or /dev/null if no devices are
configured.
@ -420,10 +430,6 @@ requires the
.Dv GZIO
option.
.Sh BUGS
It is currently not possible to configure both compression and encryption.
The encrypted dump format assumes that the kernel dump size is a multiple
of the cipher block size, which may not be true when the dump is compressed.
.Pp
Netdump only supports IPv4 at this time.
.Sh SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The current encrypted kernel core dump scheme does not provide integrity nor

View File

@ -276,7 +276,16 @@ genkey(const char *pubkeyfile, struct diocskerneldump_arg *kdap)
if (kdap->kda_encryptedkey == NULL)
err(1, "Unable to allocate encrypted key");
kdap->kda_encryption = KERNELDUMP_ENC_AES_256_CBC;
/*
* If no cipher was specified, choose a reasonable default.
*/
if (kdap->kda_encryption == KERNELDUMP_ENC_NONE)
kdap->kda_encryption = KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20;
else if (kdap->kda_encryption == KERNELDUMP_ENC_AES_256_CBC &&
kdap->kda_compression != KERNELDUMP_COMP_NONE)
errx(EX_USAGE, "Unpadded AES256-CBC mode cannot be used "
"with compression.");
arc4random_buf(kdap->kda_key, sizeof(kdap->kda_key));
if (RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(kdap->kda_key), kdap->kda_key,
kdap->kda_encryptedkey, pubkey,
@ -378,7 +387,7 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
struct diocskerneldump_arg ndconf, *kdap;
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
const char *dev, *pubkeyfile, *server, *client, *gateway;
int ch, error, fd;
int ch, error, fd, cipher;
bool gzip, list, netdump, zstd, insert, rflag;
uint8_t ins_idx;
@ -387,9 +396,21 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
pubkeyfile = NULL;
server = client = gateway = NULL;
ins_idx = KDA_APPEND;
cipher = KERNELDUMP_ENC_NONE;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "c:g:i:k:lrs:vZz")) != -1)
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "C:c:g:i:k:lrs:vZz")) != -1)
switch ((char)ch) {
case 'C':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chacha") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "chacha20") == 0)
cipher = KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20;
else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "aes-cbc") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "aes256-cbc") == 0)
cipher = KERNELDUMP_ENC_AES_256_CBC;
else
errx(EX_USAGE, "Unrecognized cipher algorithm "
"'%s'", optarg);
break;
case 'c':
client = optarg;
break;
@ -451,7 +472,10 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
if (argc != 1)
usage();
#ifndef HAVE_CRYPTO
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO
if (cipher != KERNELDUMP_ENC_NONE && pubkeyfile == NULL)
errx(EX_USAGE, "-C option requires a public key file.");
#else
if (pubkeyfile != NULL)
errx(EX_UNAVAILABLE,"Unable to use the public key."
" Recompile dumpon with OpenSSL support.");
@ -526,8 +550,10 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO
if (pubkeyfile != NULL)
if (pubkeyfile != NULL) {
kdap->kda_encryption = cipher;
genkey(pubkeyfile, kdap);
}
#endif
error = ioctl(fd, DIOCSKERNELDUMP, kdap);
if (error != 0)

View File

@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$");
#include <sys/vnode.h>
#include <sys/watchdog.h>
#include <crypto/chacha20/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/rijndael/rijndael-api-fst.h>
#include <crypto/sha2/sha256.h>
@ -180,8 +181,16 @@ MALLOC_DEFINE(M_EKCD, "ekcd", "Encrypted kernel crash dumps data");
struct kerneldumpcrypto {
uint8_t kdc_encryption;
uint8_t kdc_iv[KERNELDUMP_IV_MAX_SIZE];
keyInstance kdc_ki;
cipherInstance kdc_ci;
union {
struct {
keyInstance aes_ki;
cipherInstance aes_ci;
} u_aes;
struct chacha_ctx u_chacha;
} u;
#define kdc_ki u.u_aes.aes_ki
#define kdc_ci u.u_aes.aes_ci
#define kdc_chacha u.u_chacha
uint32_t kdc_dumpkeysize;
struct kerneldumpkey kdc_dumpkey[];
};
@ -1024,6 +1033,9 @@ kerneldumpcrypto_create(size_t blocksize, uint8_t encryption,
if (rijndael_makeKey(&kdc->kdc_ki, DIR_ENCRYPT, 256, key) <= 0)
goto failed;
break;
case KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20:
chacha_keysetup(&kdc->kdc_chacha, key, 256);
break;
default:
goto failed;
}
@ -1072,6 +1084,9 @@ kerneldumpcrypto_init(struct kerneldumpcrypto *kdc)
goto out;
}
break;
case KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20:
chacha_ivsetup(&kdc->kdc_chacha, kdc->kdc_iv, NULL);
break;
default:
error = EINVAL;
goto out;
@ -1208,11 +1223,12 @@ dumper_insert(const struct dumperinfo *di_template, const char *devname,
}
if (kda->kda_compression != KERNELDUMP_COMP_NONE) {
/*
* We currently can't support simultaneous encryption and
* compression because our only encryption mode is an unpadded
* block cipher, go figure. This is low hanging fruit to fix.
* We can't support simultaneous unpadded block cipher
* encryption and compression because there is no guarantee the
* length of the compressed result is exactly a multiple of the
* cipher block size.
*/
if (kda->kda_encryption != KERNELDUMP_ENC_NONE) {
if (kda->kda_encryption == KERNELDUMP_ENC_AES_256_CBC) {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
goto cleanup;
}
@ -1368,6 +1384,9 @@ dump_encrypt(struct kerneldumpcrypto *kdc, uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
return (EIO);
}
break;
case KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20:
chacha_encrypt_bytes(&kdc->kdc_chacha, buf, buf, size);
break;
default:
return (EINVAL);
}

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@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
#define KERNELDUMP_ENC_NONE 0
#define KERNELDUMP_ENC_AES_256_CBC 1
#define KERNELDUMP_ENC_CHACHA20 2
#define KERNELDUMP_BUFFER_SIZE 4096
#define KERNELDUMP_IV_MAX_SIZE 32