Fix spelling errors in comments

This patch simply corrects some spelling / grammar errors in
the QAT and encryption code comments. No functional changes

Reviewed-by: George Melikov <mail@gmelikov.ru>
Reviewed-by: Brian Behlendorf <behlendorf1@llnl.gov>
Reviewed-by: Giuseppe Di Natale <dinatale2@llnl.gov>
Signed-off-by: Tom Caputi <tcaputi@datto.com>
Closes #7319
This commit is contained in:
Tom Caputi 2018-03-21 11:42:13 -04:00 committed by Brian Behlendorf
parent c66e54e9dc
commit 8d9e7c8fbe
4 changed files with 48 additions and 47 deletions

View File

@ -46,96 +46,97 @@ typedef enum qat_encrypt_dir {
#define QAT_TIMEOUT_MS 500
/*
* The minimal and maximal buffer size, which are not restricted
* The minimal and maximal buffer size which are not restricted
* in the QAT hardware, but with the input buffer size between 4KB
* and 128KB, the hardware can provide the optimal performance.
* and 128KB the hardware can provide the optimal performance.
*/
#define QAT_MIN_BUF_SIZE (4*1024)
#define QAT_MAX_BUF_SIZE (128*1024)
/*
* Used for qat kstat.
* Used for QAT kstat.
*/
typedef struct qat_stats {
/*
* Number of jobs submitted to qat compression engine.
* Number of jobs submitted to QAT compression engine.
*/
kstat_named_t comp_requests;
/*
* Total bytes sent to qat compression engine.
* Total bytes sent to QAT compression engine.
*/
kstat_named_t comp_total_in_bytes;
/*
* Total bytes output from qat compression engine.
* Total bytes output from QAT compression engine.
*/
kstat_named_t comp_total_out_bytes;
/*
* Number of jobs submitted to qat de-compression engine.
* Number of jobs submitted to QAT de-compression engine.
*/
kstat_named_t decomp_requests;
/*
* Total bytes sent to qat de-compression engine.
* Total bytes sent to QAT de-compression engine.
*/
kstat_named_t decomp_total_in_bytes;
/*
* Total bytes output from qat de-compression engine.
* Total bytes output from QAT de-compression engine.
*/
kstat_named_t decomp_total_out_bytes;
/*
* Number of fails in the qat compression / decompression engine.
* Note: when qat fail happens, it doesn't mean a critical hardware
* issue. Sometimes it is because the output buffer is not big enough.
* The compression job will be transfered to gzip software
* implementation, so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
* Number of fails in the QAT compression / decompression engine.
* Note: when a QAT error happens, it doesn't necessarily indicate a
* critical hardware issue. Sometimes it is because the output buffer
* is not big enough. The compression job will be transfered to the
* gzip software implementation so the functionality of ZFS is not
* impacted.
*/
kstat_named_t dc_fails;
/*
* Number of jobs submitted to qat encryption engine.
* Number of jobs submitted to QAT encryption engine.
*/
kstat_named_t encrypt_requests;
/*
* Total bytes sent to qat encryption engine.
* Total bytes sent to QAT encryption engine.
*/
kstat_named_t encrypt_total_in_bytes;
/*
* Total bytes output from qat encryption engine.
* Total bytes output from QAT encryption engine.
*/
kstat_named_t encrypt_total_out_bytes;
/*
* Number of jobs submitted to qat decryption engine.
* Number of jobs submitted to QAT decryption engine.
*/
kstat_named_t decrypt_requests;
/*
* Total bytes sent to qat decryption engine.
* Total bytes sent to QAT decryption engine.
*/
kstat_named_t decrypt_total_in_bytes;
/*
* Total bytes output from qat decryption engine.
* Total bytes output from QAT decryption engine.
*/
kstat_named_t decrypt_total_out_bytes;
/*
* Number of fails in the qat encryption / decryption engine.
* Note: when qat fail happens, it doesn't mean a critical hardware
* issue. Sometimes it is because the output buffer is not big enough.
* The encryption job will be transfered to the software implementation,
* so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
* Number of fails in the QAT encryption / decryption engine.
* Note: when a QAT error happens, it doesn't necessarily indicate a
* critical hardware issue. The encryption job will be transfered
* to the software implementation so the functionality of ZFS is
* not impacted.
*/
kstat_named_t crypt_fails;
/*
* Number of jobs submitted to qat checksum engine.
* Number of jobs submitted to QAT checksum engine.
*/
kstat_named_t cksum_requests;
/*
* Total bytes sent to qat checksum engine.
* Total bytes sent to QAT checksum engine.
*/
kstat_named_t cksum_total_in_bytes;
/*
* Number of fails in the qat checksum engine.
* Note: when qat fail happens, it doesn't mean a critical hardware
* issue. The checksum job will be transfered to the software
* implementation, so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
* Number of fails in the QAT checksum engine.
* Note: when a QAT error happens, it doesn't necessarily indicate a
* critical hardware issue. The checksum job will be transfered to the
* software implementation so the functionality of ZFS is not impacted.
*/
kstat_named_t cksum_fails;
} qat_stats_t;

View File

@ -28,10 +28,10 @@
#include "qat.h"
/*
* Max instances in QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
* jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instance,
* and session arrays, the actual number of instances are defined in
* the QAT driver's configure file.
* Max instances in a QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
* jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instance and
* session arrays; the actual number of instances are defined in the
* QAT driver's configuration file.
*/
#define QAT_DC_MAX_INSTANCES 48
@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ qat_compress(qat_compress_dir_t dir, char *src, int src_len,
/* move to the last page */
flat_buf_dst += (compressed_sz + hdr_sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
/* no space for gzip foot in the last page */
/* no space for gzip footer in the last page */
if (((compressed_sz + hdr_sz) % PAGE_SIZE)
+ ZLIB_FOOT_SZ > PAGE_SIZE)
goto fail;

View File

@ -38,9 +38,9 @@
#include "qat.h"
/*
* Max instances in QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
* jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instance,
* and session arrays, the actual number of instances are defined in
* Max instances in a QAT device, each instance is a channel to submit
* jobs to QAT hardware, this is only for pre-allocating instances
* and session arrays; the actual number of instances are defined in
* the QAT driver's configure file.
*/
#define QAT_CRYPT_MAX_INSTANCES 48

View File

@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
* A secret binary key, generated from an HKDF function used to encrypt and
* decrypt data.
*
* Message Authenication Code (MAC)
* Message Authentication Code (MAC)
* The MAC is an output of authenticated encryption modes such as AES-GCM and
* AES-CCM. Its purpose is to ensure that an attacker cannot modify encrypted
* data on disk and return garbage to the application. Effectively, it is a
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@
* OBJECT SET AUTHENTICATION:
* Up to this point, everything we have encrypted and authenticated has been
* at level 0 (or -2 for the ZIL). If we did not do any further work the
* on-disk format would be susceptible to attacks that deleted or rearrannged
* on-disk format would be susceptible to attacks that deleted or rearranged
* the order of level 0 blocks. Ideally, the cleanest solution would be to
* maintain a tree of authentication MACs going up the bp tree. However, this
* presents a problem for raw sends. Send files do not send information about
@ -131,11 +131,11 @@
* for the indirect levels of the bp tree, we use a regular SHA512 of the MACs
* from the level below. We also include some portable fields from blk_prop such
* as the lsize and compression algorithm to prevent the data from being
* misinterpretted.
* misinterpreted.
*
* At the objset level, we maintain 2 seperate 256 bit MACs in the
* At the objset level, we maintain 2 separate 256 bit MACs in the
* objset_phys_t. The first one is "portable" and is the logical root of the
* MAC tree maintianed in the metadnode's bps. The second, is "local" and is
* MAC tree maintained in the metadnode's bps. The second, is "local" and is
* used as the root MAC for the user accounting objects, which are also not
* transferred via "zfs send". The portable MAC is sent in the DRR_BEGIN payload
* of the send file. The useraccounting code ensures that the useraccounting
@ -148,13 +148,13 @@
* need to use the same IV and encryption key, so that they will have the same
* ciphertext. Normally, one should never reuse an IV with the same encryption
* key or else AES-GCM and AES-CCM can both actually leak the plaintext of both
* blocks. In this case, however, since we are using the same plaindata as
* blocks. In this case, however, since we are using the same plaintext as
* well all that we end up with is a duplicate of the original ciphertext we
* already had. As a result, an attacker with read access to the raw disk will
* be able to tell which blocks are the same but this information is given away
* by dedup anyway. In order to get the same IVs and encryption keys for
* equivalent blocks of data we use an HMAC of the plaindata. We use an HMAC
* here so that a reproducible checksum of the plaindata is never available to
* equivalent blocks of data we use an HMAC of the plaintext. We use an HMAC
* here so that a reproducible checksum of the plaintext is never available to
* the attacker. The HMAC key is kept alongside the master key, encrypted on
* disk. The first 64 bits of the HMAC are used in place of the random salt, and
* the next 96 bits are used as the IV. As a result of this mechanism, dedup