Merge conflicts with the import of 4.0.99b.
This commit is contained in:
parent
4edd720b8a
commit
b073df1269
Notes:
svn2git
2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=56749
@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static double clock_combine P((struct peer **, int));
|
||||
static void peer_xmit P((struct peer *));
|
||||
static void fast_xmit P((struct recvbuf *, int, u_long));
|
||||
static void clock_update P((void));
|
||||
int default_get_precision P((void));
|
||||
#ifdef MD5
|
||||
static void make_keylist P((struct peer *));
|
||||
#endif /* MD5 */
|
||||
@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ transmit(
|
||||
peer->valid++;
|
||||
if (oreach & 0x80)
|
||||
peer->valid--;
|
||||
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) &&
|
||||
peer->valid > NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) &&
|
||||
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->valid >
|
||||
NTP_SHIFT / 2 && (peer->reach & 0x80) &&
|
||||
peer->status < CTL_PST_SEL_SYNCCAND)
|
||||
peer->reach = 0;
|
||||
peer->reach <<= 1;
|
||||
@ -261,8 +262,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_PRIVATE) {
|
||||
if (restrict_mask & RES_NOQUERY)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask & RES_NOMODIFY) ==
|
||||
0));
|
||||
process_private(rbufp, ((restrict_mask &
|
||||
RES_NOMODIFY) == 0));
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_CONTROL) {
|
||||
@ -291,17 +292,18 @@ receive(
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If we are not a broadcast client, ignore broadcast packets.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST && !sys_bclient))
|
||||
if ((PKT_MODE(pkt->li_vn_mode) == MODE_BROADCAST &&
|
||||
!sys_bclient))
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is really awful ugly. We figure out whether an extension
|
||||
* field is present and then measure the MAC size. If the number
|
||||
* of words following the packet header is less than or equal to
|
||||
* 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute the
|
||||
* MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an extension
|
||||
* field is present and the first word contains the length of
|
||||
* the extension field and the MAC follows that.
|
||||
* 5, no extension field is present and these words constitute
|
||||
* the MAC. If the number of words is greater than 5, an
|
||||
* extension field is present and the first word contains the
|
||||
* length of the extension field and the MAC follows that.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
has_mac = 0;
|
||||
/* pkeyid = 0; */
|
||||
@ -323,7 +325,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
* MAC itself.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
/* pkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid2) & 0xffffffff; */
|
||||
skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) & 0xffffffff;
|
||||
skeyid = tkeyid = (u_long)ntohl(pkt->keyid3) &
|
||||
0xffffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -366,11 +369,12 @@ receive(
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For multicast mode, generate the session key
|
||||
* and install in the key cache. For client mode,
|
||||
* generate the session key for the unicast
|
||||
* address. For server mode, the session key should
|
||||
* already be in the key cache, since it was
|
||||
* generated when the last request was sent.
|
||||
* and install in the key cache. For client
|
||||
* mode, generate the session key for the
|
||||
* unicast address. For server mode, the session
|
||||
* key should already be in the key cache, since
|
||||
* it was generated when the last request was
|
||||
* sent.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (hismode == MODE_BROADCAST) {
|
||||
tkeyid = session_key(
|
||||
@ -391,7 +395,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
* Compute the cryptosum. Note a clogging attack may
|
||||
* succceed in bloating the key cache.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen, has_mac))
|
||||
if (authdecrypt(skeyid, (u_int32 *)pkt, authlen,
|
||||
has_mac))
|
||||
is_authentic = 1;
|
||||
else
|
||||
sys_badauth++;
|
||||
@ -411,137 +416,148 @@ receive(
|
||||
peer = findpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, rbufp->fd,
|
||||
hismode, &retcode);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The new association matching rules are driven by a table specified
|
||||
* in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour of replying
|
||||
* to bogus packets in server mode in this version.
|
||||
* A packet must now match an association in order to be processed.
|
||||
* In the event that no association exists, then an association is
|
||||
* mobilized if need be. Two different associations can be mobilized
|
||||
* a) passive associations
|
||||
* b) client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts.
|
||||
* The new association matching rules are driven by a table
|
||||
* specified in ntp.h. We have replaced the *default* behaviour
|
||||
* of replying to bogus packets in server mode in this version.
|
||||
* A packet must now match an association in order to be
|
||||
* processed. In the event that no association exists, then an
|
||||
* association is mobilized if need be. Two different
|
||||
* associations can be mobilized a) passive associations b)
|
||||
* client associations due to broadcasts or manycasts.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
is_error = 0;
|
||||
switch (retcode) {
|
||||
case AM_FXMIT:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If the client is configured purely as a broadcast client and
|
||||
* not as an manycast server, it has no business being a server.
|
||||
* Simply go home. Otherwise, send a MODE_SERVER response and go
|
||||
* home. Note that we don't do a authentication check here,
|
||||
* since we can't set the system clock; but, we do set the
|
||||
* key ID to zero to tell the caller about this.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) {
|
||||
if (is_authentic)
|
||||
fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid);
|
||||
else
|
||||
fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so just
|
||||
* toss the key, if appropriate.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
|
||||
authtrust(skeyid, 0);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If the client is configured purely as a broadcast
|
||||
* client and not as an manycast server, it has no
|
||||
* business being a server. Simply go home. Otherwise,
|
||||
* send a MODE_SERVER response and go home. Note that we
|
||||
* don't do a authentication check here, since we can't
|
||||
* set the system clock; but, we do set the key ID to
|
||||
* zero to tell the caller about this.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!sys_bclient || sys_manycastserver) {
|
||||
if (is_authentic)
|
||||
fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, skeyid);
|
||||
else
|
||||
fast_xmit(rbufp, MODE_SERVER, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We can't get here if an association is mobilized, so
|
||||
* just toss the key, if appropriate.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
|
||||
authtrust(skeyid, 0);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
case AM_MANYCAST:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This could be in response to a multicast packet sent by
|
||||
* the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based on the
|
||||
* originate timestamp in the packet. Note that we don't
|
||||
* mobilize a new association, unless the packet is properly
|
||||
* authenticated. The response must be properly authenticated
|
||||
* and it's darn funny of the manycaster isn't around now.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org);
|
||||
if (peer2 == 0) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Create a new association and copy the peer variables to it.
|
||||
* If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new association
|
||||
* away and return its marbles to the candy store.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
|
||||
rbufp->dstadr, MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
||||
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
|
||||
if (peer == 0) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This could be in response to a multicast packet sent
|
||||
* by the "manycast" mode association. Find peer based
|
||||
* on the originate timestamp in the packet. Note that
|
||||
* we don't mobilize a new association, unless the
|
||||
* packet is properly authenticated. The response must
|
||||
* be properly authenticated and it's darn funny of the
|
||||
* manycaster isn't around now.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer2 = (struct peer *)findmanycastpeer(&pkt->org);
|
||||
if (peer2 == 0) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Create a new association and copy the peer variables
|
||||
* to it. If something goes wrong, carefully pry the new
|
||||
* association away and return its marbles to the candy
|
||||
* store.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
|
||||
MODE_CLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
||||
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
|
||||
if (peer == 0) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer_config_manycast(peer2, peer);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case AM_ERR:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by the
|
||||
* code at the end of this adventure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Something bad happened. Dirty floor will be mopped by
|
||||
* the code at the end of this adventure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case AM_NEWPASS:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him some
|
||||
* memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is properly
|
||||
* authenticated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
|
||||
rbufp->dstadr, MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
||||
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Okay, we're going to keep him around. Allocate him
|
||||
* some memory. But, don't do that unless the packet is
|
||||
* properly authenticated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
|
||||
MODE_PASSIVE, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
||||
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case AM_NEWBCL:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if the
|
||||
* packet is properly authenticated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient ||
|
||||
(sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr,
|
||||
rbufp->dstadr, MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
||||
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
|
||||
if (peer == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST;
|
||||
peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Broadcast client being set up now. Do this only if
|
||||
* the packet is properly authenticated.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((restrict_mask & RES_NOPEER) || !sys_bclient ||
|
||||
(sys_authenticate && !is_authentic)) {
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
peer = newpeer(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr,
|
||||
MODE_MCLIENT, PKT_VERSION(pkt->li_vn_mode),
|
||||
NTP_MINDPOLL, NTP_MAXDPOLL, 0, skeyid);
|
||||
if (peer == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
peer->flags |= FLAG_MCAST1 | FLAG_MCAST2 | FLAG_BURST;
|
||||
peer->hmode = MODE_CLIENT;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case AM_POSSBCL:
|
||||
case AM_PROCPKT:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* It seems like it is okay to process the packet now
|
||||
*/
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* It seems like it is okay to process the packet now
|
||||
*/
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway!
|
||||
*/
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* shouldn't be getting here, but simply return anyway!
|
||||
*/
|
||||
is_error = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (is_error) {
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We scuttle
|
||||
* the autokey if necessary and sink the ship. This can
|
||||
* occur only upon mobilization, so we can throw the
|
||||
* structure away without fear of breaking anything.
|
||||
* Error stub. If we get here, something broke. We
|
||||
* scuttle the autokey if necessary and sink the ship.
|
||||
* This can occur only upon mobilization, so we can
|
||||
* throw the structure away without fear of breaking
|
||||
* anything.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
|
||||
authtrust(skeyid, 0);
|
||||
@ -550,8 +566,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
unpeer(peer);
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
if (debug)
|
||||
printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n", retcode,
|
||||
peer_associations);
|
||||
printf("match error code %d assoc %d\n",
|
||||
retcode, peer_associations);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -574,22 +590,23 @@ receive(
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Determine if this guy is basically trustable. If not, flush
|
||||
* the bugger. If this is the first packet that is authenticated,
|
||||
* flush the clock filter. This is to foil clogging attacks that
|
||||
* might starve the poor dear.
|
||||
* the bugger. If this is the first packet that is
|
||||
* authenticated, flush the clock filter. This is to foil
|
||||
* clogging attacks that might starve the poor dear.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
peer->flash = 0;
|
||||
if (is_authentic)
|
||||
peer->flags |= FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
|
||||
else
|
||||
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_AUTHENTIC;
|
||||
if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask & RES_DONTTRUST))
|
||||
if (peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST && (restrict_mask &
|
||||
RES_DONTTRUST))
|
||||
peer->flash |= TEST10; /* access denied */
|
||||
if (peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE) {
|
||||
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_AUTHENTIC))
|
||||
peer->flash |= TEST5; /* authentication failed */
|
||||
peer->flash |= TEST5; /* auth failed */
|
||||
else if (skeyid == 0)
|
||||
peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not authenticated */
|
||||
peer->flash |= TEST9; /* peer not auth */
|
||||
else if (!(oflags & FLAG_AUTHENABLE)) {
|
||||
peer_clear(peer);
|
||||
report_event(EVNT_PEERAUTH, peer);
|
||||
@ -598,10 +615,10 @@ receive(
|
||||
if ((peer->flash & ~(u_int)TEST9) != 0) {
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before becoming
|
||||
* a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw the current
|
||||
* association away if it is configured or if it has prior
|
||||
* reachable friends.
|
||||
* The packet is bogus, so we throw it away before
|
||||
* becoming a denial-of-service hazard. We don't throw
|
||||
* the current association away if it is configured or
|
||||
* if it has prior reachable friends.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!is_mystic && skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
|
||||
authtrust(skeyid, 0);
|
||||
@ -619,8 +636,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
#ifdef MD5
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The autokey dance. The cha-cha requires that the hash of the
|
||||
* current session key matches the previous key identifier. Heaps
|
||||
* of trouble if the steps falter.
|
||||
* current session key matches the previous key identifier.
|
||||
* Heaps of trouble if the steps falter.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (skeyid > NTP_MAXKEY) {
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
@ -635,7 +652,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
} else if (peer->flags & FLAG_MCAST2) {
|
||||
if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
|
||||
authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid;
|
||||
i++) {
|
||||
tkeyid = session_key(
|
||||
ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
@ -644,7 +662,8 @@ receive(
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (peer->pkeyid > NTP_MAXKEY)
|
||||
authtrust(peer->pkeyid, 0);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid; i++) {
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 4 && tkeyid != peer->pkeyid;
|
||||
i++) {
|
||||
tkeyid = session_key(
|
||||
ntohl((&rbufp->recv_srcadr)->sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
ntohl(rbufp->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
@ -660,9 +679,10 @@ receive(
|
||||
#endif /* MD5 */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If something
|
||||
* breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live, toss it.
|
||||
* Be careful in active mode and return a packet anyway.
|
||||
* Gawdz, it's come to this. Process the dang packet. If
|
||||
* something breaks and the association doesn't deserve to live,
|
||||
* toss it. Be careful in active mode and return a packet
|
||||
* anyway.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
process_packet(peer, pkt, &(rbufp->recv_time));
|
||||
if (!(peer->flags & FLAG_CONFIG) && peer->reach == 0) {
|
||||
@ -812,15 +832,15 @@ process_packet(
|
||||
p_disp = CLOCK_PHI * (peer->rec.l_ui - p_org.l_ui);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is (t1
|
||||
* - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't measure
|
||||
* that directly; therefore, we start up in client/server mode,
|
||||
* calculate the clock offset, using the engineered refinement
|
||||
* algorithms, while also receiving broadcasts. When a broadcast
|
||||
* is received in client/server mode, we calculate a correction
|
||||
* factor to use after switching back to broadcast mode. We know
|
||||
* NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which accounts for the simplified ei
|
||||
* calculation.
|
||||
* If running in a broadcast association, the clock offset is
|
||||
* (t1 - t0) corrected by the one-way delay, but we can't
|
||||
* measure that directly; therefore, we start up in
|
||||
* client/server mode, calculate the clock offset, using the
|
||||
* engineered refinement algorithms, while also receiving
|
||||
* broadcasts. When a broadcast is received in client/server
|
||||
* mode, we calculate a correction factor to use after switching
|
||||
* back to broadcast mode. We know NTP_SKEWFACTOR == 16, which
|
||||
* accounts for the simplified ei calculation.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If FLAG_MCAST2 is set, we are a broadcast/multicast client.
|
||||
* If FLAG_MCAST1 is set, we haven't calculated the propagation
|
||||
@ -870,7 +890,8 @@ process_packet(
|
||||
clock_filter(peer, p_offset, p_del, fabs(p_disp));
|
||||
clock_select();
|
||||
record_peer_stats(&peer->srcadr, ctlpeerstatus(peer),
|
||||
peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp, SQRT(peer->variance));
|
||||
peer->offset, peer->delay, peer->disp,
|
||||
SQRT(peer->variance));
|
||||
return(1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -943,7 +964,8 @@ clock_update(void)
|
||||
else
|
||||
sys_refid = sys_peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr;
|
||||
sys_reftime = sys_peer->rec;
|
||||
sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay + fabs(sys_peer->delay);
|
||||
sys_rootdelay = sys_peer->rootdelay +
|
||||
fabs(sys_peer->delay);
|
||||
sys_leap = leap_consensus;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (oleap != sys_leap)
|
||||
@ -994,14 +1016,15 @@ poll_update(
|
||||
else
|
||||
peer->nextdate += RANDPOLL(BURST_INTERVAL1);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll), peer->minpoll);
|
||||
update = max(min(peer->ppoll, peer->hpoll),
|
||||
peer->minpoll);
|
||||
peer->nextdate = peer->outdate + RANDPOLL(update);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
if (debug > 1)
|
||||
printf("poll_update: at %lu %s poll %d burst %d last %lu next %lu\n",
|
||||
current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll, peer->burst,
|
||||
peer->outdate, peer->nextdate);
|
||||
current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr), hpoll,
|
||||
peer->burst, peer->outdate, peer->nextdate);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1081,7 +1104,8 @@ clock_filter(
|
||||
*/
|
||||
peer->filter_offset[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_offset;
|
||||
peer->filter_delay[peer->filter_nextpt] = sample_delay;
|
||||
x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) + sample_disp;
|
||||
x = LOGTOD(peer->precision) + LOGTOD(sys_precision) +
|
||||
sample_disp;
|
||||
peer->filter_disp[peer->filter_nextpt] = min(x, MAXDISPERSE);
|
||||
peer->filter_epoch[peer->filter_nextpt] = current_time;
|
||||
distance[0] = min(x + fabs(sample_delay) / 2, MAXDISTANCE);
|
||||
@ -1117,7 +1141,8 @@ clock_filter(
|
||||
x = NTP_FWEIGHT * (x + peer->filter_disp[ord[i]]);
|
||||
if (i < n) {
|
||||
z += 1. / distance[i];
|
||||
off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] / distance[i];
|
||||
off += peer->filter_offset[ord[i]] /
|
||||
distance[i];
|
||||
y += DIFF(peer->filter_offset[ord[i]],
|
||||
peer->filter_offset[ord[0]]);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1241,7 +1266,7 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
peer->flags &= ~FLAG_SYSPEER;
|
||||
peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_REJECT;
|
||||
if (peer->flags & FLAG_NOSELECT)
|
||||
continue; /* noselect (survey only) */
|
||||
continue; /* noselect (survey) */
|
||||
if (peer->reach == 0)
|
||||
continue; /* unreachable */
|
||||
if (peer->stratum > 1 && peer->refid ==
|
||||
@ -1250,7 +1275,7 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
if (root_distance(peer) >= MAXDISTANCE + 2 *
|
||||
CLOCK_PHI * ULOGTOD(sys_poll)) {
|
||||
peer->seldisptoolarge++;
|
||||
continue; /* too noisy or broken */
|
||||
continue; /* noisy or broken */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -1323,7 +1348,7 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
if (debug > 1)
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < nl3; i++)
|
||||
printf("select: endpoint %2d %.6f\n",
|
||||
endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val);
|
||||
endpoint[index[i]].type, endpoint[index[i]].val);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
i = 0;
|
||||
j = nl3 - 1;
|
||||
@ -1369,9 +1394,10 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (sys_peer != 0) {
|
||||
report_event(EVNT_PEERSTCHG,
|
||||
(struct peer *)0);
|
||||
(struct peer *)0);
|
||||
NLOG(NLOG_SYNCSTATUS)
|
||||
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "synchronisation lost");
|
||||
msyslog(LOG_INFO,
|
||||
"synchronisation lost");
|
||||
}
|
||||
sys_peer = 0;
|
||||
return;
|
||||
@ -1418,7 +1444,7 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
if (debug > 1)
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < nlist; i++)
|
||||
printf("select: %s distance %.6f\n",
|
||||
ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]);
|
||||
ntoa(&peer_list[i]->srcadr), synch[i]);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -1508,7 +1534,8 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
typesystem = peer_list[i];
|
||||
if (peer_list[i]->flags & FLAG_PREFER) {
|
||||
typeprefer = peer_list[i];
|
||||
if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) < clock_max)
|
||||
if (fabs(typeprefer->offset) <
|
||||
clock_max)
|
||||
pps_update = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@ -1521,24 +1548,26 @@ clock_select(void)
|
||||
* Mitigation rules of the game. There are several types of
|
||||
* peers that make a difference here: (1) prefer local peers
|
||||
* (type REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK with FLAG_PREFER) or prefer modem
|
||||
* peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps peers
|
||||
* (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers (flag
|
||||
* FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5) the
|
||||
* head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be
|
||||
* peers (type REFCLK_NIST_ATOM etc with FLAG_PREFER), (2) pps
|
||||
* peers (type REFCLK_ATOM_PPS), (3) remaining prefer peers
|
||||
* (flag FLAG_PREFER), (4) the existing system peer, if any, (5)
|
||||
* the head of the survivor list. Note that only one peer can be
|
||||
* declared prefer. The order of preference is in the order
|
||||
* stated. Note that all of these must be at the lowest stratum,
|
||||
* i.e., the stratum of the head of the survivor list.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
osys_peer = sys_peer;
|
||||
if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK ||
|
||||
typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE || !typepps)) {
|
||||
if (typeprefer && (typeprefer->refclktype == REFCLK_LOCALCLOCK
|
||||
|| typeprefer->sstclktype == CTL_SST_TS_TELEPHONE ||
|
||||
!typepps)) {
|
||||
sys_peer = typeprefer;
|
||||
sys_peer->status = CTL_PST_SEL_SYSPEER;
|
||||
sys_offset = sys_peer->offset;
|
||||
sys_epsil = sys_peer->variance;
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
if (debug > 1)
|
||||
printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n", sys_offset);
|
||||
printf("select: prefer offset %.6f\n",
|
||||
sys_offset);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
} else if (typepps && pps_update) {
|
||||
sys_peer = typepps;
|
||||
@ -1652,15 +1681,18 @@ peer_xmit(
|
||||
if (peer->flags & FLAG_SKEY) {
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* In SKEY mode, allocate and initialize a key list if
|
||||
* not already done. Then, use the list in inverse
|
||||
* order, discarding keys once used. Keep the latest
|
||||
* key around until the next one, so clients can use
|
||||
* client/server packets to compute propagation delay.
|
||||
* Note we have to wait until the receive side of the
|
||||
* socket is bound and the server address confirmed.
|
||||
* In autokey mode, allocate and initialize a
|
||||
* key list if not already done. Then, use the
|
||||
* list in inverse order, discarding keys once
|
||||
* used. Keep the latest key around until the
|
||||
* next one, so clients can use client/server
|
||||
* packets to compute propagation delay. Note we
|
||||
* have to wait until the receive side of the
|
||||
* socket is bound and the server address
|
||||
* confirmed.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0 &&
|
||||
if (ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr) ==
|
||||
0 &&
|
||||
ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr) == 0)
|
||||
peer->keyid = 0;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
@ -1688,13 +1720,13 @@ peer_xmit(
|
||||
get_systime(&peer->xmt);
|
||||
L_ADD(&peer->xmt, &sys_authdelay);
|
||||
HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
|
||||
sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
|
||||
sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
|
||||
sendlen);
|
||||
get_systime(&xmt_tx);
|
||||
sendpkt(&peer->srcadr, find_rtt ? any_interface :
|
||||
peer->dstadr,
|
||||
((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
|
||||
((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -7,
|
||||
&xpkt, sendlen);
|
||||
peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
|
||||
!find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 :
|
||||
peer->ttl) : -7, &xpkt, sendlen);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
|
||||
@ -1712,9 +1744,9 @@ peer_xmit(
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
if (debug)
|
||||
printf(
|
||||
"transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n",
|
||||
current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
|
||||
peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber);
|
||||
"transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx index %d\n",
|
||||
current_time, ntoa(&peer->srcadr),
|
||||
peer->hmode, xkeyid, peer->keynumber);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@ -1723,10 +1755,9 @@ peer_xmit(
|
||||
get_systime(&(peer->xmt));
|
||||
HTONL_FP(&peer->xmt, &xpkt.xmt);
|
||||
sendpkt(&(peer->srcadr), find_rtt ? any_interface :
|
||||
peer->dstadr,
|
||||
((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) && !find_rtt) ?
|
||||
((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 : peer->ttl) : -8,
|
||||
&xpkt, sendlen);
|
||||
peer->dstadr, ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_MCAST) &&
|
||||
!find_rtt) ? ((peer->cast_flags & MDF_ACAST) ? -7 :
|
||||
peer->ttl) : -8, &xpkt, sendlen);
|
||||
peer->sent++;
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
if (debug)
|
||||
@ -1785,10 +1816,11 @@ fast_xmit(
|
||||
get_systime(&xmt_ts);
|
||||
L_ADD(&xmt_ts, &sys_authdelay);
|
||||
HTONL_FP(&xmt_ts, &xpkt.xmt);
|
||||
sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt, sendlen);
|
||||
sendlen += authencrypt(xkeyid, (u_int32 *)&xpkt,
|
||||
sendlen);
|
||||
get_systime(&xmt_tx);
|
||||
sendpkt(&rbufp->recv_srcadr, rbufp->dstadr, -9, &xpkt,
|
||||
sendlen);
|
||||
sendlen);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Calculate the encryption delay. Keep the minimum over
|
||||
@ -1805,9 +1837,9 @@ fast_xmit(
|
||||
#ifdef DEBUG
|
||||
if (debug)
|
||||
printf(
|
||||
"transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n",
|
||||
current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
|
||||
xmode, xkeyid);
|
||||
"transmit: at %ld to %s mode %d keyid %08lx\n",
|
||||
current_time, ntoa(&rbufp->recv_srcadr),
|
||||
xmode, xkeyid);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1870,15 +1902,14 @@ make_keylist(
|
||||
peer->keylist[i] = keyid;
|
||||
peer->keynumber = i;
|
||||
keyid = session_key(
|
||||
ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
(peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags &
|
||||
FLAG_MCAST2)) ?
|
||||
ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr):
|
||||
ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
keyid, ltemp);
|
||||
ntohl(peer->dstadr->sin.sin_addr.s_addr),
|
||||
(peer->hmode == MODE_BROADCAST || (peer->flags &
|
||||
FLAG_MCAST2)) ?
|
||||
ntohl(peer->dstadr->bcast.sin_addr.s_addr):
|
||||
ntohl(peer->srcadr.sin_addr.s_addr), keyid, ltemp);
|
||||
ltemp -= 1 << peer->hpoll;
|
||||
if (auth_havekey(keyid) || keyid <= NTP_MAXKEY ||
|
||||
ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1)))
|
||||
ltemp <= (1 << (peer->hpoll + 1)))
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@ -1933,17 +1964,15 @@ default_get_precision(void)
|
||||
* which drives our timekeeping
|
||||
*/
|
||||
j = sizeof freq;
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency",
|
||||
&freq, &j , 0, 0);
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("kern.timecounter.frequency", &freq, &j , 0,
|
||||
0);
|
||||
if (i)
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq",
|
||||
&freq, &j , 0, 0);
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("machdep.tsc_freq", &freq, &j , 0, 0);
|
||||
if (i)
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq",
|
||||
&freq, &j , 0, 0);
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i586_freq", &freq, &j , 0, 0);
|
||||
if (i)
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq",
|
||||
&freq, &j , 0, 0);
|
||||
i = sysctlbyname("machdep.i8254_freq", &freq, &j , 0,
|
||||
0);
|
||||
if (!i) {
|
||||
for (i = 1; freq ; i--)
|
||||
freq >>= 1;
|
||||
@ -1979,7 +2008,7 @@ default_get_precision(void)
|
||||
val = diff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO) /* conditional if clause for conditional syslog */
|
||||
NLOG(NLOG_SYSINFO)
|
||||
msyslog(LOG_INFO, "precision = %ld usec", val);
|
||||
if (usec >= HUSECS)
|
||||
val = MINSTEP; /* val <= MINSTEP; fast machine */
|
||||
@ -2044,9 +2073,9 @@ init_proto(void)
|
||||
* Some system clocks should only be adjusted in 10ms increments.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined RELIANTUNIX_CLOCK
|
||||
systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */
|
||||
systime_10ms_ticks = 1; /* Reliant UNIX */
|
||||
#elif defined SCO5_CLOCK
|
||||
if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre- SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */
|
||||
if (sys_precision >= (s_char)-10) /* pre-SCO OpenServer 5.0.6 */
|
||||
systime_10ms_ticks = 1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (systime_10ms_ticks)
|
||||
@ -2068,21 +2097,24 @@ proto_config(
|
||||
* Figure out what he wants to change, then do it
|
||||
*/
|
||||
switch (item) {
|
||||
case PROTO_KERNEL:
|
||||
case PROTO_KERNEL:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Turn on/off kernel discipline
|
||||
*/
|
||||
kern_enable = (int)value;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_NTP:
|
||||
case PROTO_NTP:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Turn on/off clock discipline
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ntp_enable = (int)value;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_MONITOR:
|
||||
case PROTO_MONITOR:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Turn on/off monitoring
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -2092,14 +2124,16 @@ proto_config(
|
||||
mon_stop(MON_ON);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_FILEGEN:
|
||||
case PROTO_FILEGEN:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Turn on/off statistics
|
||||
*/
|
||||
stats_control = (int)value;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_BROADCLIENT:
|
||||
case PROTO_BROADCLIENT:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Turn on/off facility to listen to broadcasts
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@ -2110,39 +2144,45 @@ proto_config(
|
||||
io_unsetbclient();
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD:
|
||||
case PROTO_MULTICAST_ADD:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Add muliticast group address
|
||||
*/
|
||||
io_multicast_add(value);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL:
|
||||
case PROTO_MULTICAST_DEL:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Delete multicast group address
|
||||
*/
|
||||
io_multicast_del(value);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_BROADDELAY:
|
||||
case PROTO_BROADDELAY:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Set default broadcast delay
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sys_bdelay = dvalue;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE:
|
||||
case PROTO_AUTHENTICATE:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Specify the use of authenticated data
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sys_authenticate = (int)value;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
default:
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Log this error
|
||||
*/
|
||||
msyslog(LOG_ERR, "proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
|
||||
msyslog(LOG_ERR,
|
||||
"proto_config: illegal item %d, value %ld",
|
||||
item, value);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user