From c800238ebb20445e752d61989a1317a79e1f7ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: "Simon L. B. Nielsen" Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2006 20:16:43 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Correct incorrect PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validation in crypto(3). Obtained from: OpenSSL project Security: FreeBSD-SA-06:19.openssl --- crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c index 230ec6d7ea2a..aa757acdec27 100644 --- a/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c +++ b/crypto/openssl/crypto/rsa/rsa_sign.c @@ -185,6 +185,23 @@ int RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, sig=d2i_X509_SIG(NULL,&p,(long)i); if (sig == NULL) goto err; + + /* Excess data can be used to create forgeries */ + if(p != s+i) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + + /* Parameters to the signature algorithm can also be used to + create forgeries */ + if(sig->algor->parameter + && sig->algor->parameter->type != V_ASN1_NULL) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY,RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + sigtype=OBJ_obj2nid(sig->algor->algorithm);