From e64585bdc269419485641134ed45d329363171e6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ruslan Ermilov Date: Tue, 20 Oct 2009 16:36:51 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Random number generator initialization cleanup: - Introduce new SI_SUB_RANDOM point in boot sequence to make it clear from where one may start using random(9). It should be as early as possible, so place it just after SI_SUB_CPU where we have some randomness on most platforms via get_cyclecount(). - Move stack protector initialization to be after SI_SUB_RANDOM as before this point we have no randomness at all. This fixes stack protector to actually protect stack with some random guard value instead of a well-known one. Note that this patch doesn't try to address arc4random(9) issues. With current code, it will be implicitly seeded by stack protector and hence will get the same entropy as random(9). It will be securely reseeded once /dev/random is feeded by some entropy from userland. Submitted by: Maxim Dounin MFC after: 3 days --- sys/kern/init_main.c | 13 +++++++++++++ sys/kern/stack_protector.c | 3 +-- sys/sys/kernel.h | 1 + 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/sys/kern/init_main.c b/sys/kern/init_main.c index 0af22faa3a5b..f1508c897372 100644 --- a/sys/kern/init_main.c +++ b/sys/kern/init_main.c @@ -570,6 +570,19 @@ proc0_post(void *dummy __unused) } SYSINIT(p0post, SI_SUB_INTRINSIC_POST, SI_ORDER_FIRST, proc0_post, NULL); +static void +random_init(void *dummy __unused) +{ + + /* + * After CPU has been started we have some randomness on most + * platforms via get_cyclecount(). For platforms that don't + * we will reseed random(9) in proc0_post() as well. + */ + srandom(get_cyclecount()); +} +SYSINIT(random, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_FIRST, random_init, NULL); + /* *************************************************************************** **** diff --git a/sys/kern/stack_protector.c b/sys/kern/stack_protector.c index 554d47d0a833..b5f9973e24cf 100644 --- a/sys/kern/stack_protector.c +++ b/sys/kern/stack_protector.c @@ -28,5 +28,4 @@ __stack_chk_init(void *dummy __unused) for (i = 0; i < __arraycount(guard); i++) __stack_chk_guard[i] = guard[i]; } -/* SI_SUB_EVENTHANDLER is right after SI_SUB_LOCK used by arc4rand() init. */ -SYSINIT(stack_chk, SI_SUB_EVENTHANDLER, SI_ORDER_ANY, __stack_chk_init, NULL); +SYSINIT(stack_chk, SI_SUB_RANDOM, SI_ORDER_ANY, __stack_chk_init, NULL); diff --git a/sys/sys/kernel.h b/sys/sys/kernel.h index 5461dfd2b96e..1a9cb5cd003d 100644 --- a/sys/sys/kernel.h +++ b/sys/sys/kernel.h @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ enum sysinit_sub_id { SI_SUB_VNET_PRELINK = 0x1E00000, /* vnet init before modules */ SI_SUB_KLD = 0x2000000, /* KLD and module setup */ SI_SUB_CPU = 0x2100000, /* CPU resource(s)*/ + SI_SUB_RANDOM = 0x2120000, /* random number generator */ SI_SUB_KDTRACE = 0x2140000, /* Kernel dtrace hooks */ SI_SUB_MAC = 0x2180000, /* TrustedBSD MAC subsystem */ SI_SUB_MAC_POLICY = 0x21C0000, /* TrustedBSD MAC policies */