Fix insecure tempfile handling.

Reviewed by:	audit@freebsd.org
This commit is contained in:
Kris Kennaway 2000-01-16 21:19:04 +00:00
parent 0cecd500a4
commit ec23c255e2
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=56128

View File

@ -47,11 +47,9 @@ static const char rcsid[] =
#define SFX_KGZ ".kgz" /* Filename suffix: executable */
#define SFX_MAX 5 /* Size of larger filename suffix */
#define TMP_PREFIX "kgz" /* Temporary file prefix */
const char *loader = "/usr/lib/kgzldr.o"; /* Default loader */
static const char *tname; /* Name of temporary file */
char *tname; /* Name of temporary file */
static void cleanup(void);
static void mk_fn(int, const char *, const char *, char *[]);
@ -68,6 +66,12 @@ main(int argc, char *argv[])
const char *output;
int cflag, vflag, c;
if (getenv("TMPDIR") == NULL)
tname = strdup("/tmp/kgzXXXXXXXXXX");
else
if (asprintf(&tname, "%s/kgzXXXXXXXXXX", getenv("TMPDIR")) == -1)
errx(1, "Out of memory");
output = NULL;
cflag = vflag = 0;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "cvl:o:")) != -1)
@ -122,7 +126,7 @@ mk_fn(int cflag, const char *f1, const char *f2, char *fn[])
{
const char *p, *s;
size_t n;
int i;
int i, fd;
i = 0;
s = strrchr(f1, 0);
@ -133,8 +137,9 @@ mk_fn(int cflag, const char *f1, const char *f2, char *fn[])
}
fn[i++] = (char *)f1;
if (i == FN_OBJ && !cflag) {
if (!(tname = tempnam(NULL, TMP_PREFIX)))
if ((fd = mkstemp(tname)) == -1)
err(1, NULL);
close(fd);
fn[i++] = (char *)tname;
}
if (!(fn[i] = (char *)f2)) {