our key-sector, we would end up returning the read without an error,
despite the fact that the data was not correctly decrypted.
This would result in data corruption on read, but intact data still
on the media.
Give up the entire bio as soon as we detect a problem.
When we detect a problem, give up the bio by contributing the
remainder with ENOMEM, rather than kicking the bio back right
away.
If we failed on a non-first iteration we previously could end up
modifying fields in the bio after we delivered it. This could
account for memory corruption (none directly reported) on machines
with GBDE.
Insted of embedding a struct g_stat in consumers and providers, merely
include a pointer.
Remove a couple of <sys/time.h> includes now unneeded.
Add a special allocator for struct g_stat. This allocator will allocate
entire pages and hand out g_stat functions from there. The "id" field
indicates free/used status.
Add "/dev/geom.stats" device driver whic exports the pages from the
allocator to userland with mmap(2) in read-only mode.
This mmap(2) interface should be considered a non-public interface and
the functions in libgeom (not yet committed) should be used to access
the statistics data.
for request sizes larger than the sectorsize or for multi-key setups.
See warning mailed to current@ for details of recovery.
Found by: Marcus Reid <marcus@blazingdot.com>
Replace ARC4 with SHA2-512.
Change lock-structure encoding to use random ordering rather for obscurity.
Encrypt lock-structure with AES/256 instead of AES/128.
Change kkey derivation to be MD5 hash based.
Watch for malloc(M_NOWAIT) failures and ditch our cache when they happen.
Remove clause 3 of the license with NAI Labs consent.
Many thanks to "Lucky Green" <shamrock@cypherpunks.to> and "David
Wagner" <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>, for code reading, inputs and
suggestions.
This code has still not been stared at for 10 years by a gang of
hard-core cryptographers. Discretion advised.
NB: These changes result in the on-disk format changing: dump/restore needed.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
This is an encryption module designed for to secure denial of access
to the contents of "cold disks" with or without destruction activation.
Major features:
* Based on AES, MD5 and ARC4 algorithms.
* Four cryptographic barriers:
1) Pass-phrase encrypts the master key.
2) Pass-phrase + Lock data locates master key.
3) 128 bit key derived from 2048 bit master key protects sector key.
3) 128 bit random single-use sector keys protect data payload.
* Up to four different changeable pass-phrases.
* Blackening feature for provable destruction of master key material.
* Isotropic disk contents offers no information about sector contents.
* Configurable destination sector range allows steganographic deployment.
This commit adds the kernel part, separate commits will follow for the
userland utility and documentation.
This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by Poul-Henning Kamp and
NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. under
DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the DARPA CHATS
research program.
Many thanks to Robert Watson, CBOSS Principal Investigator for making this
possible.
Sponsored by: DARPA & NAI Labs.
