audit pipes. If the kernel record was not selected for the trail or the pipe,
any user supplied record attached to it would be tossed away, resulting in
otherwise selected events being lost.
- Introduce two new masks: AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE,
currently we have AR_PRESELECT_TRAIL and AR_PRESELECT_PIPE, which tells
the audit worker that we are interested in the kernel record, with
the additional masks we can determine if either the pipe or trail is
interested in seeing the kernel or user record.
- In audit(2), we unconditionally set the AR_PRESELECT_USER_TRAIL and
AR_PRESELECT_USER_PIPE masks under the assumption that userspace has
done the preselection [1].
Currently, there is work being done that allows the kernel to parse and
preselect user supplied records, so in the future preselection could occur
in either layer. But there is still a few details to work out here.
[1] At some point we need to teach au_preselect(3) about the interests of
all the individual audit pipes.
This is a RELENG_6 candidate.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MFC after: 1 week
exists to allow the mandatory access control policy to properly initialize
mbufs generated by the firewall. An example where this might happen is keep
alive packets, or ICMP error packets in response to other packets.
This takes care of kernel panics associated with un-initialize mbuf labels
when the firewall generates packets.
[1] I modified this patch from it's original version, the initial patch
introduced a number of entry points which were programmatically
equivalent. So I introduced only one. Instead, we should leverage
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer() which is used for similar situations,
an example being icmp_error()
This will minimize the impact associated with the MFC
Submitted by: mlaier [1]
MFC after: 1 week
This is a RELENG_6 candidate
Add the argument auditing functions for argv and env.
Add kernel-specific versions of the tokenizer functions for the
arg and env represented as a char array.
Implement the AUDIT_ARGV and AUDIT_ARGE audit policy commands to
enable/disable argv/env auditing.
Call the argument auditing from the exec system calls.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
is loaded. This problem stems from the fact that the policy is not properly
initializing the mac label associated with the NFS daemon.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Discussed with: rwatson
audit record size at run-time, which can be used by the user
process to size the user space buffer it reads into from the audit
pipe.
Perforce change: 105098
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
progress the kernel audit code in CVS is considered authoritative.
This will ease $P4$-related merging issues during the CVS loopback.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
we will initialize the label to biba/low for files that have been created
through an NFS RPC. This is a safe default given the default nature of our
NFS implementation, there is not a whole lot of data integrity there by
default. This also fixes kernel panics associated with file creation over NFS
while creating files on filesystems which have multilabel enabled with BIBA
enabled.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Discussed with: rwatson
- Correct audit_arg_socketaddr() argument name from so to sa.
- Assert arguments are non-NULL to many argument capture functions
rather than testing them. This may trip some bugs.
- Assert the process lock is held when auditing process
information.
- Test currecord in several more places.
- Test validity of more arguments with kasserts, such as flag
values when auditing vnode information.
Perforce change: 98825
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
whether we have an IPv6 address. Write the term ID as 4 or
16 bytes depending on address type. This change matches the recent
OpenBSM change, and what Solaris does.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Approved by: rwatson (mentor)
get a consistent snapshot, as well as get consistent values (i.e.,
that p_comm is properly nul-terminated).
Perforce CID: 98824
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
process was sucessfully audited. Otherwise, generate the PID
token. This change covers the pid < 0 cases, and pid lookup
failure cases.
Submitted by: wsalamon
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
global audit trail configuration. This allows applications consuming
audit trails to specify parameters for which audit records are of
interest, including selecting records not required by the global trail.
Allowing application interest specification without changing the global
configuration allows intrusion detection systems to run without
interfering with global auditing or each other (if multiple are
present). To implement this:
- Kernel audit records now carry a flag to indicate whether they have
been selected by the global trail or by the audit pipe subsystem,
set during record commit, so that this information is available
after BSM conversion when delivering the BSM to the trail and audit
pipes in the audit worker thread asynchronously. Preselection by
either record target will cause the record to be kept.
- Similar changes to preselection when the audit record is created
when the system call is entering: consult both the global trail and
pipes.
- au_preselect() now accepts the class in order to avoid repeatedly
looking up the mask for each preselection test.
- Define a series of ioctls that allow applications to specify whether
they want to track the global trail, or program their own
preselection parameters: they may specify their own flags and naflags
masks, similar to the global masks of the same name, as well as a set
of per-auid masks. They also set a per-pipe mode specifying whether
they track the global trail, or user their own -- the door is left
open for future additional modes. A new ioctl is defined to allow a
user process to flush the current audit pipe queue, which can be used
after reprogramming pre-selection to make sure that only records of
interest are received in future reads.
- Audit pipe data structures are extended to hold the additional fields
necessary to support preselection. By default, audit pipes track the
global trail, so "praudit /dev/auditpipe" will track the global audit
trail even though praudit doesn't program the audit pipe selection
model.
- Comment about the complexities of potentially adding partial read
support to audit pipes.
By using a set of ioctls, applications can select which records are of
interest, and toggle the preselection mode.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
knowledge of user vs. kernel audit records into
audit_worker_process_record(). This largely confines vnode
knowledge to audit_record_write(), but avoids that logic knowing
about BSM as opposed to byte streams. This will allow us to
improve our ability to support real-time audit stream processing
by audit pipe consumers while auditing is disabled, but this
support is not yet complete.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Break out logic to call audit_record_write() and handle error
conditions into audit_worker_process_record(). This will be the
future home of some logic now present in audit_record_write()
also.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
worker.
Rename audit_commit_cv to audit_watermark_cv, since it is there to
wake up threads waiting on hitting the low watermark. Describe
properly in comment.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
src/sys/security/audit:
- Clarify and clean up AUR_ types to match Solaris.
- Clean up use of host vs. network byte order for IP addresses.
- Remove combined user/kernel implementations of some token creation
calls, such as au_to_file(), header calls, etc.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
pointer prototypes from it into their own typedefs. No functional or
ABI change. This allows policies to declare their own function
prototypes based on a common definition from mac_policy.h rather than
duplicating these definitions.
Obtained from: SEDarwin, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 month
subject: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, jail id
objects: ranges of uid, ranges of gid, filesystem,
object is suid, object is sgid, object matches subject uid/gid
object type
We can also negate individual conditions. The ruleset language is
a superset of the previous language, so old rules should continue
to work.
These changes require a change to the API between libugidfw and the
mac_bsdextended module. Add a version number, so we can tell if
we're running mismatched versions.
Update man pages to reflect changes, add extra test cases to
test_ugidfw.c and add a shell script that checks that the the
module seems to do what we expect.
Suggestions from: rwatson, trhodes
Reviewed by: trhodes
MFC after: 2 months
credential: mac_associate_nfsd_label()
This entry point can be utilized by various Mandatory Access Control policies
so they can properly initialize the label of files which get created
as a result of an NFS operation. This work will be useful for fixing kernel
panics associated with accessing un-initialized or invalid vnode labels.
The implementation of these entry points will come shortly.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD
Requested by: mdodd
MFC after: 3 weeks
branch:
Integrate audit.c to audit_worker.c, so as to migrate the worker
thread implementation to its own .c file.
Populate audit_worker.c using parts now removed from audit.c:
- Move audit rotation global variables.
- Move audit_record_write(), audit_worker_rotate(),
audit_worker_drain(), audit_worker(), audit_rotate_vnode().
- Create audit_worker_init() from relevant parts of audit_init(),
which now calls this routine.
- Recreate audit_free(), which wraps uma_zfree() so that
audit_record_zone can be static to audit.c.
- Unstaticize various types and variables relating to the audit
record queue so that audit_worker can get to them. We may want
to wrap these in accessor methods at some point.
- Move AUDIT_PRINTF() to audit_private.h.
Addition of audit_worker.c to kernel configuration, missed in
earlier submit.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Add ioctls to audit pipes in order to allow querying of the current
record queue state, setting of the queue limit, and querying of pipe
statistics.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Change send_trigger() prototype to return an int, so that user
space callers can tell if the message was successfully placed
in the trigger queue. This isn't quite the same as it being
successfully received, but is close enough that we can generate
a more useful warning message in audit(8).
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
vnode and a mode and checks if a given access mode is permitted.
This centralises the mac_bsdextended_enabled check and the GETATTR
calls and makes the implementation of the mac policy methods simple.
This should make it easier for us to match vnodes on more complex
attributes than just uid and gid in the future, but for now there
should be no functional change.
Approved/Reviewed by: rwatson, trhodes
MFC after: 1 month
- Include audit_internal.h to get definition of internal audit record
structures, as it's no longer in audit.h. Forward declare au_record
in audit_private.h as not all audit_private.h consumers care about
it.
- Remove __APPLE__ compatibility bits that are subsumed by configure
for user space.
- Don't expose in6_addr internals (non-portable, but also cleaner
looking).
- Avoid nested include of audit.h in audit_private.h.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
be called without any vnode locks held. Remove calls to vn_start_write() and
vn_finished_write() in vnode_pager_putpages() and add these calls before the
vnode lock is obtained to most of the callers that don't already have them.
In the future, we may want to acquire the lock early in the function and
hold it across calls to vn_rdwr(), etc, to avoid multiple acquires.
Spotted by: kris (bugmagnet)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
applications to insert a "tee" in the live audit event stream. Records
are inserted into a per-clone queue so that user processes can pull
discreet records out of the queue. Unlike delivery to disk, audit pipes
are "lossy", dropping records in low memory conditions or when the
process falls behind real-time events. This mechanism is appropriate
for use by live monitoring systems, host-based intrusion detection, etc,
and avoids applications having to dig through active on-disk trails that
are owned by the audit daemon.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
initialization routines into a ctor, tear-down to a dtor, cleaning
up, etc. This will allow audit records to be allocated from
per-cpu caches.
On recent FreeBSD, dropping the audit_mtx around freeing to UMA is
no longer required (at one point it was possible to acquire Giant
on that path), so a mutex-free thread-local drain is no longer
required.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
This should not happen, but with this assert, brueffer and I would
not have spent 45 minutes trying to figure out why he wasn't
seeing audit records with the audit version in CVS.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
an incompatible conversion from a 64-bit pointer to a 32-bit integer on
64-bit platforms. We will investigate whether Solaris uses a 64-bit
token here, or a new record here, in order to avoid truncating user
pointers that are 64-bit. However, in the mean time, truncation is fine
as these are rarely/never used fields in audit records.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- td_ar to struct thread, which holds the in-progress audit record during
a system call.
- p_au to struct proc, which holds per-process audit state, such as the
audit identifier, audit terminal, and process audit masks.
In the earlier implementation, td_ar was added to the zero'd section of
struct thread. In order to facilitate merging to RELENG_6, it has been
moved to the end of the data structure, requiring explicit
initalization in the thread constructor.
Much help from: wsalamon
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Management of audit state on processes.
- Audit system calls to configure process and system audit state.
- Reliable audit record queue implementation, audit_worker kernel
thread to asynchronously store records on disk.
- Audit event argument.
- Internal audit data structure -> BSM audit trail conversion library.
- Audit event pre-selection.
- Audit pseudo-device permitting kernel->user upcalls to notify auditd
of kernel audit events.
Much work by: wsalamon
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project, Apple Computer, Inc.
security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal
If non-zero, all network interfaces be created with the label:
biba/equal(equal-equal)
This is useful where programs which initialize network interfaces
do not have any labeling support. This includes dhclient and ppp. A
long term solution is to add labeling support into dhclient(8)
and ppp(8), and remove this variable.
It should be noted that this behavior is different then setting the:
security.mac.biba.trust_all_interfaces
sysctl variable, as this will create interfaces with a biba/high label.
Lower integrity processes are not able to write to the interface in this
event. The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal will override
trust_all_interfaces.
The security.mac.biba.interfaces_equal variable will be set to zero
or disabled by default.
MFC after: 2 weeks
- Prefer '_' to ' ', as it results in more easily parsed results in
memory monitoring tools such as vmstat.
- Remove punctuation that is incompatible with using memory type names
as file names, such as '/' characters.
- Disambiguate some collisions by adding subsystem prefixes to some
memory types.
- Generally prefer lower case to upper case.
- If the same type is defined in multiple architecture directories,
attempt to use the same name in additional cases.
Not all instances were caught in this change, so more work is required to
finish this conversion. Similar changes are required for UMA zone names.
framework. This makes Giant protection around MAC operations which inter-
act with VFS conditional, based on the MPSAFE status of the file system.
Affected the following syscalls:
o __mac_get_fd
o __mac_get_file
o __mac_get_link
o __mac_set_fd
o __mac_set_file
o __mac_set_link
-Drop Giant all together in __mac_set_proc because the
mac_cred_mmapped_drop_perms_recurse routine no longer requires it.
-Move conditional Giant aquisitions to after label allocation routines.
-Move the conditional release of Giant to before label de-allocation
routines.
Discussed with: rwatson
provided access to the root file system before the start of the
init process. This was used briefly by SEBSD before it knew about
preloading data in the loader, and using that method to gain
access to data earlier results in fewer inconsistencies in the
approach. Policy modules still have access to the root file system
creation event through the mac_create_mount() entry point.
Removed now, and will be removed from RELENG_6, in order to gain
third party policy dependencies on the entry point for the lifetime
of the 6.x branch.
MFC after: 3 days
Submitted by: Chris Vance <Christopher dot Vance at SPARTA dot com>
Sponsored by: SPARTA
entry points that will be inserted over the life-time of the 6.x branch,
including for:
- New struct file labeling (void * already added to struct file), events,
access control checks.
- Additional struct mount access control checks, internalization/
externalization.
- mac_check_cap()
- System call enter/exit check and event.
- Socket and vnode ioctl entry points.
MFC after: 3 days
process that caused the clone event to take place for the device driver
creating the device. This allows cloned device drivers to adapt the
device node based on security aspects of the process, such as the uid,
gid, and MAC label.
- Add a cred reference to struct cdev, so that when a device node is
instantiated as a vnode, the cloning credential can be exposed to
MAC.
- Add make_dev_cred(), a version of make_dev() that additionally
accepts the credential to stick in the struct cdev. Implement it and
make_dev() in terms of a back-end make_dev_credv().
- Add a new event handler, dev_clone_cred, which can be registered to
receive the credential instead of dev_clone, if desired.
- Modify the MAC entry point mac_create_devfs_device() to accept an
optional credential pointer (may be NULL), so that MAC policies can
inspect and act on the label or other elements of the credential
when initializing the skeleton device protections.
- Modify tty_pty.c to register clone_dev_cred and invoke make_dev_cred(),
so that the pty clone credential is exposed to the MAC Framework.
While currently primarily focussed on MAC policies, this change is also
a prerequisite for changes to allow ptys to be instantiated with the UID
of the process looking up the pty. This requires further changes to the
pty driver -- in particular, to immediately recycle pty nodes on last
close so that the credential-related state can be recreated on next
lookup.
Submitted by: Andrew Reisse <andrew.reisse@sparta.com>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
MFC after: 1 week
MFC note: Merge to 6.x, but not 5.x for ABI reasons
redundant with respect to existing mbuf copy label routines. Expose
a new mac_copy_mbuf() routine at the top end of the Framework and
use that; use the existing mpo_copy_mbuf_label() routine on the
bottom end.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
which is invoked from socket() and socketpair(), permitting MAC
policy modules to control the creation of sockets by domain, type, and
protocol.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPARTA, SPAWAR
Approved by: re (scottl)
Requested by: SCC
points to convert _sema() to _sem() for consistency purposes with
respect to the other semaphore-related entry points:
mac_init_sysv_sema() -> mac_init_sysv_sem()
mac_destroy_sysv_sem() -> mac_destroy_sysv_sem()
mac_create_sysv_sema() -> mac_create_sysv_sem()
mac_cleanup_sysv_sema() -> mac_cleanup_sysv_sem()
Congruent changes are made to the policy interface to support this.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
access to POSIX Semaphores:
mac_init_posix_sem() Initialize label for POSIX semaphore
mac_create_posix_sem() Create POSIX semaphore
mac_destroy_posix_sem() Destroy POSIX semaphore
mac_check_posix_sem_destroy() Check whether semaphore may be destroyed
mac_check_posix_sem_getvalue() Check whether semaphore may be queried
mac_check_possix_sem_open() Check whether semaphore may be opened
mac_check_posix_sem_post() Check whether semaphore may be posted to
mac_check_posix_sem_unlink() Check whether semaphore may be unlinked
mac_check_posix_sem_wait() Check whether may wait on semaphore
Update Biba, MLS, Stub, and Test policies to implement these entry points.
For information flow policies, most semaphore operations are effectively
read/write.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
- Introduce a global mutex, mac_bsdextended_mtx, to protect the rule
array and hold this mutex over use and modification of the rule array
and rules.
- Re-order and clean up sysctl_rule so that copyin/copyout/update happen
in the right order (suggested by: jhb done by rwatson).
mac_check_proc_wait(), which control the ability to wait4() specific
processes. This permits MAC policies to limit information flow from
children that have changed label, although has to be handled carefully
due to common programming expectations regarding the behavior of
wait4(). The cr_seeotheruids() check in p_canwait() is #if 0'd for
this reason.
The mac_stub and mac_test policies are updated to reflect these new
entry points.
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
control socket poll() (select()), fstat(), and accept() operations,
required for some policies:
poll() mac_check_socket_poll()
fstat() mac_check_socket_stat()
accept() mac_check_socket_accept()
Update mac_stub and mac_test policies to be aware of these entry points.
While here, add missing entry point implementations for:
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_receive()
mac_stub.c stub_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_send()
mac_test.c mac_test_check_socket_visible()
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
of the socket label to thread-local storage, and replace it with
conditional acquisition based on debug.mpsafenet. Acquire the socket
lock around the copy operation.
In mac_set_fd(), replace the unconditional acquisition of Giant with
the conditional acquisition of Giant based on debug.mpsafenet. The socket
lock is acquired in mac_socket_label_set() so doesn't have to be
acquired here.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR, SPARTA
of system calls to manipulate elements of the process credential,
including:
setuid() mac_check_proc_setuid()
seteuid() mac_check_proc_seteuid()
setgid() mac_check_proc_setgid()
setegid() mac_check_proc_setegid()
setgroups() mac_check_proc_setgroups()
setreuid() mac_check_proc_setreuid()
setregid() mac_check_proc_setregid()
setresuid() mac_check_proc_setresuid()
setresgid() mac_check_rpoc_setresgid()
MAC checks are performed before other existing security checks; both
current credential and intended modifications are passed as arguments
to the entry points. The mac_test and mac_stub policies are updated.
Submitted by: Samy Al Bahra <samy@kerneled.org>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
MAP_SHARED so that the entry point gets executed un-conditionally.
This may be useful for security policies which want to perform access
control checks around run-time linking.
-add the mmap(2) flags argument to the check_vnode_mmap entry point
so that we can make access control decisions based on the type of
mapped object.
-update any dependent API around this parameter addition such as
function prototype modifications, entry point parameter additions
and the inclusion of sys/mman.h header file.
-Change the MLS, BIBA and LOMAC security policies so that subject
domination routines are not executed unless the type of mapping is
shared. This is done to maintain compatibility between the old
vm_mmap_vnode(9) and these policies.
Reviewed by: rwatson
MFC after: 1 month
security.mac.portacl.autoport_exempt
This sysctl exempts to bind port '0' as long as IP_PORTRANGELOW hasn't
been set on the socket. This is quite useful as it allows applications
to use automatic binding without adding overly broad rules for the
binding of port 0. This sysctl defaults to enabled.
This is a slight variation on the patch submitted by the contributor.
MFC after: 2 weeks
Submitted by: Michal Mertl <mime at traveller dot cz>
the sx lock was used previously because we might sleep allocating
additional memory by using auto-extending sbufs. However, we no longer
do this, instead retaining the user-submitted rule string, so mutexes
can be used instead. Annotate the reason for not using the sbuf-related
rule-to-string code with a comment.
Switch to using TAILQ_CONCAT() instead of manual list copying, as it's
O(1), reducing the rule replacement step under the mutex from O(2N) to
O(2).
Remove now uneeded vnode-related includes.
MFC after: 2 weeks
MAC policies to perform object life cycle operations and access
control checks.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
objects and operations:
- System V IPC message, message queue, semaphore, and shared memory
segment init, destroy, cleanup, create operations.
- System V IPC message, message queue, seamphore, and shared memory
segment access control entry points, including rights to attach,
destroy, and manipulate these IPC objects.
Submitted by: Dandekar Hrishikesh <rishi_dandekar at sbcglobal dot net>
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, SPAWAR, McAfee Research
changes associated with adding System V IPC support. This will prevent
old modules from being used with the new kernel, and new modules from
being used with the old kernel.
for modules linked into the kernel or loaded very early, panics will
result otherwise, as the CV code it calls will panic due to its use
of a mutex before it is initialized.
as well as document the properties of the mac_policy_conf structure.
Warn about the ABI risks in changing the structure without careful
consideration.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: SPAWAR
right bits rather than piggy-backing on the V* rights defined in
vnode.h. The mac_bsdextended bits are given the same values as the V*
bits to make the new kernel module binary compatible with the old
version of libugidfw that uses V* bits. This avoids leaking kernel
API/ABI to user management tools, and in particular should remove the
need for libugidfw to include vnode.h.
Requested by: phk
rule only in place of all rules match. This is similar to how ipfw(8) works.
Provide a sysctl, mac_bsdextended_firstmatch_enabled, to enable this
feature.
Reviewed by: re (jhb)
Aprroved by: re (jhb)
so that they know whether the allocation is supposed to be able to sleep
or not.
* Allow uma_zone constructors and initialation functions to return either
success or error. Almost all of the ones in the tree currently return
success unconditionally, but mbuf is a notable exception: the packet
zone constructor wants to be able to fail if it cannot suballocate an
mbuf cluster, and the mbuf allocators want to be able to fail in general
in a MAC kernel if the MAC mbuf initializer fails. This fixes the
panics people are seeing when they run out of memory for mbuf clusters.
* Allow debug.nosleepwithlocks on WITNESS to be disabled, without changing
the default.
Both bmilekic and jeff have reviewed the changes made to make failable
zone allocations work.
accurately represents the intention of the 'single' label element in
Biba and MLS labels. It also approximates the use of 'effective' in
traditional UNIX credentials, and avoids confusion with 'singlelabel'
in the context of file systems.
Inspired by: trhodes
for unknown events.
A number of modules return EINVAL in this instance, and I have left
those alone for now and instead taught MOD_QUIESCE to accept this
as "didn't do anything".
network interfaces. This global mutex will protect all ifnet labels.
Acquire the mutex across various MAC activities on interfaces, such
as security checks, propagating interface labels to mbufs generated
from the interface, retrieving and setting the interface label.
Introduce mpo_copy_ifnet_label MAC policy entry point to copy the
value of an interface label from one label to another. Use this
to avoid performing a label externalize while holding mac_ifnet_mtx;
copy the label to a temporary ifnet label and then externalize that.
Implement mpo_copy_ifnet_label for various MAC policies that
implement interface labeling using generic label copying routines.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
SOCK_LOCK(so):
- Hold socket lock over calls to MAC entry points reading or
manipulating socket labels.
- Assert socket lock in MAC entry point implementations.
- When externalizing the socket label, first make a thread-local
copy while holding the socket lock, then release the socket lock
to externalize to userspace.
lookup for the label tag fails, return NULL rather than something close
to NULL. This scenario occurs if mbuf header labeling is optional and
a policy requiring labeling is loaded, resulting in some mbufs having
labels and others not. Previously, 0x14 would be returned because the
NULL from m_tag_find() was not treated specially.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
test the label pointer for NULL before testing the label slot for
permitted values. When loading mac_test dynamically with conditional
mbuf labels, the label pointer may be NULL if the mbuf was
instantiated while labels were not required on mbufs by any policy.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
synchronization protecting against dynamic load and unload of MAC
policies, and instead simply blocks load and unload. In a static
configuration, this allows you to avoid the synchronization costs
associated with introducing dynamicism.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
Assert the BPF descriptor lock in the MAC calls referencing live
BPF descriptors.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
are employed in entry points later in the same include file.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Air Force Research Laboratory, McAfee Research
struct vattr in mac_policy.h. This permits policies not
implementing entry points using these types to compile without
including include files with these types.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Air Force Research Laboratory
to a new mac_inet.c. This code is now conditionally compiled based
on inet support being compiled into the kernel.
Move socket related MAC Framework entry points from mac_net.c to a new
mac_socket.c.
To do this, some additional _enforce MIB variables are now non-static.
In addition, mbuf_to_label() is now mac_mbuf_to_label() and non-static.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, McAfee Research
Now I believe it is done in the right way.
Removed some XXMAC cases, we now assume 'high' integrity level for all
sysctls, except those with CTLFLAG_ANYBODY flag set. No more magic.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: rwatson, scottl (mentor)
Tested with: LINT (compilation), mac_biba(4) (functionality)
to use the "year1-year3" format, as opposed to "year1, year2, year3".
This seems to make lawyers more happy, but also prevents the
lines from getting excessively long as the years start to add up.
Suggested by: imp
would allocate two 'struct pipe's from the pipe zone, and malloc a
mutex.
- Create a new "struct pipepair" object holding the two 'struct
pipe' instances, struct mutex, and struct label reference. Pipe
structures now have a back-pointer to the pipe pair, and a
'pipe_present' flag to indicate whether the half has been
closed.
- Perform mutex init/destroy in zone init/destroy, avoiding
reallocating the mutex for each pipe. Perform most pipe structure
setup in zone constructor.
- VM memory mappings for pageable buffers are still done outside of
the UMA zone.
- Change MAC API to speak 'struct pipepair' instead of 'struct pipe',
update many policies. MAC labels are also handled outside of the
UMA zone for now. Label-only policy modules don't have to be
recompiled, but if a module is recompiled, its pipe entry points
will need to be updated. If a module actually reached into the
pipe structures (unlikely), that would also need to be modified.
These changes substantially simplify failure handling in the pipe
code as there are many fewer possible failure modes.
On half-close, pipes no longer free the 'struct pipe' for the closed
half until a full-close takes place. However, VM mapped buffers
are still released on half-close.
Some code refactoring is now possible to clean up some of the back
references, etc; this patch attempts not to change the structure
of most of the pipe implementation, only allocation/free code
paths, so as to avoid introducing bugs (hopefully).
This cuts about 8%-9% off the cost of sequential pipe allocation
and free in system call tests on UP and SMP in my micro-benchmarks.
May or may not make a difference in macro-benchmarks, but doing
less work is good.
Reviewed by: juli, tjr
Testing help: dwhite, fenestro, scottl, et al
wait, rather than the socket label. This avoids reaching up to
the socket layer during connection close, which requires locking
changes. To do this, introduce MAC Framework entry point
mac_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), which is called from tcp_twrespond()
instead of calling mac_create_mbuf_from_socket() or
mac_create_mbuf_netlayer(). Introduce MAC Policy entry point
mpo_create_mbuf_from_inpcb(), and implementations for various
policies, which generally just copy label data from the inpcb to
the mbuf. Assert the inpcb lock in the entry point since we
require consistency for the inpcb label reference.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
only turned up when running mac_test side by side with a transitioning
policy such as SEBSD. Make the NULL testing match
mac_test_execve_will_transition(), which already tested the vnode
label pointer for NULL.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
and the mpo_create_cred() MAC policy entry point to
mpo_copy_cred_label(). This is more consistent with similar entry
points for creation and label copying, as mac_create_cred() was
called from crdup() as opposed to during process creation. For
a number of policies, this removes the requirement for special
handling when copying credential labels, and improves consistency.
Approved by: re (scottl)
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
the MAC label referenced from 'struct socket' in the IPv4 and
IPv6-based protocols. This permits MAC labels to be checked during
network delivery operations without dereferencing inp->inp_socket
to get to so->so_label, which will eventually avoid our having to
grab the socket lock during delivery at the network layer.
This change introduces 'struct inpcb' as a labeled object to the
MAC Framework, along with the normal circus of entry points:
initialization, creation from socket, destruction, as well as a
delivery access control check.
For most policies, the inpcb label will simply be a cache of the
socket label, so a new protocol switch method is introduced,
pr_sosetlabel() to notify protocols that the socket layer label
has been updated so that the cache can be updated while holding
appropriate locks. Most protocols implement this using
pru_sosetlabel_null(), but IPv4/IPv6 protocols using inpcbs use
the the worker function in_pcbsosetlabel(), which calls into the
MAC Framework to perform a cache update.
Biba, LOMAC, and MLS implement these entry points, as do the stub
policy, and test policy.
Reviewed by: sam, bms
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
