the VFS_STATFS call to prevent the mount from disappearing while we're
stating.
- Convert these routines to use MPSAFE namei semantics.
MFC After: 1 week
vnode is from a file system that is not MPSAFE, as vrele() expects
Giant to be held when it is called on a non-MPSAFE vnode.
Spotted by: kris
Tested by: glebius
directory. vrele() may lock the passed vnode, which in these cases would
give an invalid lock order of child -> parent. These situations are
deadlock prone although do not typically deadlock because the vrele
is typically not releasing the last reference to the vnode. Users of
vrele must consider it as a call to vn_lock() and order it appropriately.
MFC After: 1 week
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
Tested by: kkenn
lookup() instead of EPERM when a DELETE or RENAME operation is
attempted on "..".
In kern_unlink(), remap EINVAL errors returned from namei() to EPERM
to match existing (and POSIX required) behaviour.
Discussed with: bde
MFC after: 3 days
that a file's atime and mtime are only set to correct fractional
second values (0-999999000ns with the current interface).
Prior to this change users could create files with values outside
that range. Moreover, on 32-bit machines tv_usec offsets larger than
4.3s would result in an unnormalized AND wrong timestamp value,
due to overflow.
MFC after: 1 week
The purpose of this change is consistency (not performance improvement:)),
as it was hard to tell if fdrop() is MPSAFE or not when I saw it sometimes
under the Giant and sometimes without it.
Glanced at by: ssouhlal, kan
remove the unconditional acquisition of Giant for extended attribute related
operations. If the file system is set as being MP safe and debug.mpsafevfs is
1, do not pickup Giant.
Mark the following system calls as being MP safe so we no longer pickup Giant
in the system call handler:
o extattrctl
o extattr_set_file
o extattr_get_file
o extattr_delete_file
o extattr_set_fd
o extattr_get_fd
o extattr_delete_fd
o extattr_set_link
o extattr_get_link
o extattr_delete_link
o extattr_list_file
o extattr_list_link
o extattr_list_fd
-Pass MPSAFE flags to namei(9) lookup and introduce vfslocked variable which
will keep track of any Giant acquisitions.
-Wrap any fd operations which manipulate vnodes in VFS_{UN}LOCK_GIANT
-Drop VFS_ASSERT_GIANT into function which operate on vnodes to ensure that
we are sufficiently protected.
I've tested these changes with various TrustedBSD MAC policies which use
extended attribute a lot on SMP and UP systems (thanks to Scott Long for
making some SMP hardware available to me for testing).
Discussed with: jeff
Requested by: jhb, rwatson
links and the execution of ELF binaries. Two problems were found:
1) The link path wasn't tagged as being MP safe and thus was not properly
protected.
2) The ELF interpreter vnode wasnt being locked in namei(9) and thus was
insufficiently protected.
This commit makes the following changes:
-Sets the MPSAFE flag in NDINIT for symbolic link paths
-Sets the MPSAFE flag in NDINIT and introduce a vfslocked variable which
will be used to instruct VFS_UNLOCK_GIANT to unlock Giant if it has been
picked up.
-Drop in an assertion into vfs_lookup which ensures that if the MPSAFE
flag is NOT set, that we have picked up giant. If not panic (if WITNESS
compiled into the kernel). This should help us find conditions where vnode
operations are in-sufficiently protected.
This is a RELENG_6 candidate.
Discussed with: jeff
MFC after: 4 days
used to ensure that we weren't exiting the syscall with a lock still
held. This wasn't safe, however, because we'd already executed a vput()
and on a loaded system the vnode may have been free'd by the time we
assert. This functionality is also handled by the td_locks assert in
userret, which doesn't tell you what the syscall was, but will at least
panic before you deadlock.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
Discovred by: Peter Holm
Approved by: re (blanket vfs)
I introduce a very small race here (some file system can be mounted or
unmounted between 'count' calculation and file systems list creation),
but it is harmless.
Found by: FreeBSD Kernel Stress Test Suite: http://www.holm.cc/stress/
Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc>
It can be used to panic the kernel by giving too big value.
Fix it by moving allocation and size verification into kern_getfsstat().
This even simplifies kern_getfsstat() consumers, but destroys symmetry -
memory is allocated inside kern_getfsstat(), but has to be freed by the
caller.
Found by: FreeBSD Kernel Stress Test Suite: http://www.holm.cc/stress/
Reported by: Peter Holm <peter@holm.cc>
and extend its functionality:
value policy
0 show all mount-points without any restrictions
1 show only mount-points below jail's chroot and show only part of the
mount-point's path (if jail's chroot directory is /jails/foo and
mount-point is /jails/foo/usr/home only /usr/home will be shown)
2 show only mount-point where jail's chroot directory is placed.
Default value is 2.
Discussed with: rwatson
so do not duplicate the code in cvtstatfs().
Note, that we now need to clear fsid in freebsd4_getfsstat().
This moves all security related checks from functions like cvtstatfs()
and will allow to add more security related stuff (like statfs(2), etc.
protection for jails) a bit easier.
structure in the struct pointed to by the 3rd argument for IPC_STAT and
get rid of the 4th argument. The old way returned a pointer into the
kernel array that the calling function would then access afterwards
without holding the appropriate locks and doing non-lock-safe things like
copyout() with the data anyways. This change removes that unsafeness and
resulting race conditions as well as simplifying the interface.
- Implement kern_foo wrappers for stat(), lstat(), fstat(), statfs(),
fstatfs(), and fhstatfs(). Use these wrappers to cut out a lot of
code duplication for freebsd4 and netbsd compatability system calls.
- Add a new lookup function kern_alternate_path() that looks up a filename
under an alternate prefix and determines which filename should be used.
This is basically a more general version of linux_emul_convpath() that
can be shared by all the ABIs thus allowing for further reduction of
code duplication.
tond and not fromnd. This could lead us to leak Giant, or unlock it
twice, depending on the filesystems involved. renames within a single
filesystem would not have caused any problems.
Sponsored by: Isilon Systems, Inc.
I'm not sure why a credential was added to these in the first place, it is
not used anywhere and it doesn't make much sense:
The credentials for syncing a file (ability to write to the
file) should be checked at the system call level.
Credentials for syncing one or more filesystems ("none")
should be checked at the system call level as well.
If the filesystem implementation needs a particular credential
to carry out the syncing it would logically have to the
cached mount credential, or a credential cached along with
any delayed write data.
Discussed with: rwatson
