function takes a struct ifnet pointer followed by the usual printf
arguments and prints "<interfacename>: " before the results of printf.
Since this is the primary form of printf calls in network device drivers
and accounts for most uses of the ifnet menber if_unit, this
significantly simplifies many printf()s.
Removed unused includes.
Removed used includes of <sys/queue.h> and <sys/time.h>, since these are
standard pollution (especially the latter).
Reviewed by: sobomax
I should have committed this ages ago.
The MFC for if_ethersubr.c could be done in the usual few days (only
ipfw2 uses it), the one for bridge.c should probably wait until
after 4.7 because it changes an existing though mostly undocumented
behaviour (on which i hope nobody relies). All in all, i'll wait for
both things unless there is demand.
MFC after: 35 days
packets in addition to IPPROTO_IPV4 and IPPROTO_IPV6, explicitly specify
IPPROTO_IPV4 or IPPROTO_IPV6 instead of -1 when calling encap_attach().
MFC after: 28 days
(along with other if_gre changes)
Also, for all interfaces in this mode pass all ethernet frames to upper layer,
even those not addressed to our own MAC, which allows packets encapsulated
in those frames be processed with packet filters (ipfw(8) et al).
Emphatically requested by: Anton Turygin <pa3op@ukr-link.net>
Valuable suggestions by: fenner
the mbuf contains the ethernet header (eh) as well, which ether_input()
will strip off as needed.
This permits the removal (in a backward compatible way) of the
header removal code which right now is replicated in all drivers,
sometimes in an inconsistent way. Also, because many functions
called after ether_input() require the eh in the mbuf, eventually
we can propagate the interface and handle outdated drivers just
in ether_input().
Individual driver changes to use the new interface will follow as
we have a chance to touch them.
NOTE THAT THIS CHANGE IS FULLY BACKWARD COMPATIBLE AND DOES NOT BREAK
BINARY COMPATIBILITY FOR DRIVERS.
MFC after: 3 days
kernel access control.
Introduce two ioctls, SIOCGIFMAC, SIOCSIFMAC, which permit user
processes to manage the MAC labels on network interfaces. Note
that this is part of the user process API/ABI that will be revised
prior to 5.0-RELEASE.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Add MAC support for if_ppp. Label packets as they are removed from
the raw PPP mbuf queue. Preserve the mbuf MAC label across various
PPP data-munging and reconstitution operations. Perform access
control checks on mbufs to be transmitted via the interface.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label packets generated by the gif virtual interface.
Perform access control on packets delivered to gif virtual interfaces.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label mbufs received via kernel tunnel device interfaces by invoking
appropriate MAC framework entry points.
Perform access control checks on out-going mbufs delivered via tunnel
interfaces by invoking appropriate MAC entry points:
NOTE: Currently the label for a tunnel interface is not derived from
the label of the process that opened the tunnel interface. It
probably should be.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Label mbufs received via ethernet-based interfaces by invoking
appropriate MAC framework entry points.
Perform access control checks on out-going mbufs delivered via
ethernet-based interfaces by invoking appropriate MAC entry
points.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument the interface management code so that MAC labels are
properly maintained on network interfaces (struct ifnet). In
particular, invoke entry points when interfaces are created and
removed. MAC policies may initialized the label interface based
on a variety of factors, including the interface name.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
When decompressing data from one mbuf into another mbuf, preserve the
mbuf label by copying it to the new mbuf.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Invoke a MAC framework entry point to authorize reception of an
incoming mbuf by the BPF descriptor, permitting MAC policies to
limit the visibility of packets delivered to particular BPF
descriptors.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
kernel access control.
Instrument BPF so that MAC labels are properly maintained on BPF
descriptors. MAC framework entry points are invoked at BPF
instantiation and allocation, permitting the MAC framework to
derive the BPF descriptor label from the credential authorizing
the device open. Also enter the MAC framework to label mbufs
created using the BPF device.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
