The suser_enable sysctl allows to remove a privileged rights from uid 0.
This change introduce per jail setting which allow to make root a
normal user.
Reviewed by: jamie
Previous version reviewed by: kevans, emaste, markj, me_igalic.co
Discussed with: pjd
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D27128
Split the MANAGE privilege into MANAGE, SETMAC and CREATE_VAP.
+ VAP_MANAGE is everything but setting the MAC and creating a VAP.
+ VAP_SETMAC is setting the MAC address of the VAP.
Typically you wouldn't want the jail to be able to modify this.
+ CREATE_VAP is to create a new VAP. Again, you don't want to be doing
this in a jail, but this DOES stop being able to run some corner
cases like Dynamic WDS (DWDS) AP in a jail/vnet. We can figure this
bit out later.
This allows me to run wpa_supplicant in a jail after transferring
a STA VAP into it. I unfortunately can't currently set the wlan
debugging inside the jail; that would be super useful!
Reviewed by: bz
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25630
This commit adds the priv(9) that waters down the sysctl to make it only
allow read(2) of a dirfd by the system root. Jailed root is not allowed, but
jail policy and superuser policy will abstain from allowing/denying it so
that a MAC module can fully control the policy.
Such a MAC module has been written, and can be found at:
https://people.freebsd.org/~kevans/mac_read_dir-0.1.0.tar.gz
It is expected that the MAC module won't be needed by many, as most only
need to do such diagnostics that require this behavior as system root
anyways. Interested parties are welcome to grab the MAC module above and
create a port or locally integrate it, and with enough support it could see
introduction to base. As noted in mac_read_dir.c, it is released under the
BSD 2 clause license and allows the restrictions to be lifted for only
jailed root or for all unprivileged users.
PR: 246412
Reviewed by: mckusick, kib, emaste, jilles, cy, phk, imp (all previous)
Reviewed by: rgrimes (latest version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24596
If we create two (vnet) jails and create a bridge interface in each we end up
with the same mac address on both bridge interfaces.
These very often conflicts, resulting in same mac address in both jails.
Mitigate this problem by including the jail name in the mac address.
Reviewed by: kevans, melifaro
MFC after: 1 week
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24383
prison0's hostuuid will get set by the hostid rc script, either after
generating it and saving it to /etc/hostid or by simply reading /etc/hostid.
Some things (e.g. arbitrary MAC address generation) may use the hostuuid as
a factor in early boot, so providing a way to read /etc/hostid (if it's
available) and using it before userland starts up is desirable. The code is
written such that the preload doesn't *have* to be /etc/hostid, thus not
assuming that there will be newline at the end of the buffer or even the
exact shape of the newline. White trailing whitespace/non-printables
trimmed, the result will be validated as a valid uuid before it's used for
early boot purposes.
The preload can be turned off with hostuuid_load="NO" in /boot/loader.conf,
just as other preloads; it's worth noting that this is a 37-byte file, the
overhead is believed to be generally minimal.
It doesn't seem necessary at this time to be concerned with kern.hostid.
One does wonder if we should consider validating hostuuids coming in
via jail_set(2); some bits seem to care about uuid form and we bother
validating format of smbios-provided uuid and in-fact whatever uuid comes
from /etc/hostid.
Reviewed by: karels, delphij, jamie
MFC after: 1 week (don't preload by default, probably)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24288
If a user spplies a non-\0 terminated osrelease parameter reading it back
may disclose kernel memory.
This is a problem in case of nested jails (children.max > 0, which is not
the default). Otherwise root outside the jail has access to kernel memory
by other means and root inside a jail cannot create a child jail.
Add the proper \0 check at the end of a supplied osrelease parameter and
make sure any copies of the field will be \0-terminated.
Submitted by: Hans Christian Woithe (chwoithe yahoo.com)
MFC after: 3 days
r357614 added CTLFLAG_NEEDGIANT to make it easier to find nodes that are
still not MPSAFE (or already are but aren’t properly marked).
Use it in preparation for a general review of all nodes.
This is non-functional change that adds annotations to SYSCTL_NODE and
SYSCTL_PROC nodes using one of the soon-to-be-required flags.
Mark all obvious cases as MPSAFE. All entries that haven't been marked
as MPSAFE before are by default marked as NEEDGIANT
Approved by: kib (mentor, blanket)
Commented by: kib, gallatin, melifaro
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23718
During buildkernel there are very frequent calls to priv_check and they
all are for PRIV_VFS_GENERATION (coming from stat/fstat).
This results in branching on several potential privileges checking if
perhaps that's the one which has to be evaluated.
Instead of the kitchen-sink approach provide a way to have commonly used
privs directly evaluated.
Filesystems which want to use it in limited capacity can employ the
VOP_UNLOCK_FLAGS macro.
Reviewed by: kib (previous version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D21427
Amount of changes to the original code has been intentionally minimised
to ease diffing.
The changes are mostly mechanical, with the following exceptions:
* lltable handler is now called directly based of RTF_LLINFO flag presense.
* "report" logic for updating rtm in RTM_GET/RTM_DELETE has been simplified,
fixing several potential use-after-free cases in rt_addrinfo.
* llable asserts has been replaced with error-returning, preventing kernel
crashes when lltable gw af family is invalid (root required).
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22864
node is set, allow setting security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug per-jail.
In part, this is needed to create jails in which the Address Sanitizer
(ASAN) fully works as ASAN utilizes libkvm to inspect the virtual address
space. Instead of having to allow unprivileged process debugging for the
entire system, allow setting it on a per-jail basis.
The sysctl node is still security.bsd.unprivileged_proc_debug and the
jail(8) param is allow.unprivileged_proc_debug. The sysctl code is now a
sysctl proc rather than a sysctl int. This allows us to determine setting
the flag for the corresponding jail (or prison0).
As part of the change, the dynamic allow.* API needed to be modified to
take into account pr_allow flags which may now be disabled in prison0.
This prevents conflicts with new pr_allow flags (like that of vmm(4)) that
are added (and removed) dynamically.
Also teach the jail creation KPI to allow differences for certain pr_allow
flags between the parent and child jail. This can happen when unprivileged
process debugging is disabled in the parent prison, but enabled in the
child.
Submitted by: Shawn Webb <lattera at gmail.com>
Obtained from: HardenedBSD (45b3625edba0f73b3e3890b1ec3d0d1e95fd47e1, deba0b5078cef0faae43cbdafed3035b16587afc, ab21eeb3b4c72f2500987c96ff603ccf3b6e7de8)
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: HardenedBSD and G2, Inc
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D18319
The vlan interfaces can be created from vnet jails, it seems, so it
sounds logical to allow pcp configuration as well.
Reviewed by: bz, hselasky (previous version)
Sponsored by: Mellanox Technologies
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D17777
can see the dmesg buffer (this is the current behavior). When false (the
new default), dmesg will be unavailable to jailed users, whether root or
not.
The security.bsd.unprivileged_read_msgbuf sysctl still works as before,
controlling system-wide whether non-root users can see the buffer.
PR: 211580
Submitted by: bz
Approved by: re@ (kib@)
MFC after: 3 days
It's not supposed to be legal for two jails to contain the same IP address,
unless both jails contain only that one address. This is the behavior
documented in jail(8), and is there to prevent confusion when multiple
jails are listening on IADDR_ANY.
VIMAGE jails (now the default for GENERIC kernels) test this correctly,
but non-VIMAGE jails have been performing an incomplete test when nested
jails are used.
Approved by: re@ (kib@)
MFC after: 5 days
jails since FreeBSD 7.
Along with the system call, put the various security.jail.allow_foo and
security.jail.foo_allowed sysctls partly under COMPAT_FREEBSD11 (or
BURN_BRIDGES). These sysctls had two disparate uses: on the system side,
they were global permissions for jails created via jail(2) which lacked
fine-grained permission controls; inside a jail, they're read-only
descriptions of what the current jail is allowed to do. The first use
is obsolete along with jail(2), but keep them for the second-read-only use.
Differential Revision: D14791
It allows locking or unlocking physical pages in memory within a jail
This allows running elasticsearch with "bootstrap.memory_lock" inside a jail
Reviewed by: jamie@
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D16342
to FOREACH_PROC_IN_SYSTEM() to have a single pattern to look for.
Reviewed by: kib
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: iXsystems, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15916
by doing most of the work in a new function prison_add_vfs in kern_jail.c
Now a jail-enabled filesystem need only mark itself with VFCF_JAIL, and
the rest is taken care of. This includes adding a jail parameter like
allow.mount.foofs, and a sysctl like security.jail.mount_foofs_allowed.
Both of these used to be a static list of known filesystems, with
predefined permission bits.
Reviewed by: kib
Differential Revision: D14681
The lock is required to ensure that the switch to the new credentials
and the transfer of the process's accounting data from the old
credentials to the new ones is done atomically. Otherwise, some updates
may be applied to the new credentials and then additionally transferred
from the old credentials if the updates happen after proc_set_cred() and
before racct_proc_ucred_changed().
The problem is especially pronounced for RACCT_RSS because
- there is a strict accounting for this resource (it's reclaimable)
- it's updated asynchronously by the vm daemon
- it's updated by setting an absolute value instead of applying a delta
I had to remove a call to rctl_proc_ucred_changed() from
racct_proc_ucred_changed() and make all callers of latter call the
former as well. The reason is that rctl_proc_ucred_changed, as it is
implemented now, cannot be called while holding the proc lock, so the
lock is dropped after calling racct_proc_ucred_changed. Additionally,
I've added calls to crhold / crfree around the rctl call, because
without the proc lock there is no gurantee that the new credentials,
owned by the process, will stay stable. That does not eliminate a
possibility that the credentials passed to the rctl will get stale.
Ideally, rctl_proc_ucred_changed should be able to work under the proc
lock.
Many thanks to kib for pointing out the above problems.
PR: 222027
Discussed with: kib
No comment: trasz
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D15048
opt_compat.h is mentioned in nearly 180 files. In-progress network
driver compabibility improvements may add over 100 more so this is
closer to "just about everywhere" than "only some files" per the
guidance in sys/conf/options.
Keep COMPAT_LINUX32 in opt_compat.h as it is confined to a subset of
sys/compat/linux/*.c. A fake _COMPAT_LINUX option ensure opt_compat.h
is created on all architectures.
Move COMPAT_LINUXKPI to opt_dontuse.h as it is only used to control the
set of compiled files.
Reviewed by: kib, cem, jhb, jtl
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14941
flag and both the regular and "no" names, instead of two different string
arrays whose indices need to match the flag's bit position. This makes
them similar to the say "jailsys" options are represented.
Loop through either kind of option array with a structure pointer rather
then an integer index.
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
You may now optionally specify allow.noreserved_ports to prevent root
inside a jail from using privileged ports (less than 1024)
PR: 217728
Submitted by: Matt Miller <mattm916@pulsar.neomailbox.ch>
Reviewed by: jamie, cem, smh
Relnotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10202
inet_ntoa() cannot be used safely in a multithreaded environment
because it uses a static local buffer. Instead, use inet_ntoa_r()
with a buffer on the caller's stack.
Suggested by: glebius, emaste
Reviewed by: gnn
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Dell EMC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9625
_prison_check_ip4 renamed to prison_check_ip4_locked
Move IPv6-specific jail functions to new file netinet6/in6_jail.c
_prison_check_ip6 renamed to prison_check_ip6_locked
Add appropriate prototypes to sys/sys/jail.h
Adjust kern_jail.c to call prison_check_ip4_locked and
prison_check_ip6_locked accordingly.
Add netinet/in_jail.c and netinet6/in6_jail.c to the list of files that
need to be built when INET and INET6, respectively, are configured in the
kernel configuration file.
Reviewed by: jtl
Approved by: sjg (mentor)
Sponsored by: Juniper Networks, Inc.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D6799
by holding allprison_lock exclusively (even if only for a moment before
downgrading) on all paths that call PR_METHOD_REMOVE. Since they may run
on a downgraded lock, it's still possible for them to run concurrently
with PR_METHOD_GET, which will need to use the prison lock.
put it off into the pr_task. This is similar to prison_free, and in fact
uses the same task even though they do something slightly different.
This resolves a LOR between the process lock and allprison_lock, which
came about in r298565.
PR: 48471
until after the jail is found or created. This requires unlocking the
jail for the call and re-locking it afterward, but that works because
nothing in the jail has been changed yet, and other processes won't
change the important fields as long as allprison_lock remains held.
Keep better track of name vs namelc in kern_jail_set. Name should
always be the hierarchical name (relative to the caller), and namelc
the last component.
PR: 48471
MFC after: 5 days
removed from the user perspective, i.e. when the last pr_uref goes away,
even though the jail mail still exist in the dying state. It will also
be called if either PR_METHOD_CREATE or PR_METHOD_SET fail.
PR: 48471
MFC after: 5 days
a jail that might be seen mid-removal. It hasn't been doing the right
thing since at least the ability to resurrect dying jails, and such
resurrection also makes it unnecessary.
