sysvmsg, sysvsem, and sysvshm, with the following bahavior:
inherit: allow full access to the IPC primitives. This is the same as
the current setup with allow.sysvipc is on. Jails and the base system
can see (and moduly) each other's objects, which is generally considered
a bad thing (though may be useful in some circumstances).
disable: all no access, same as the current setup with allow.sysvipc off.
new: A jail may see use the IPC objects that it has created. It also
gets its own IPC key namespace, so different jails may have their own
objects using the same key value. The parent jail (or base system) can
see the jail's IPC objects, but not its keys.
PR: 48471
Submitted by: based on work by kikuchan98@gmail.com
MFC after: 5 days
jail's creation parameters. This allows the kernel version to be reliably
spoofed within the jail whether examined directly with sysctl or
indirectly with the uname -r and -K options.
The values can only be set at jail creation time, to eliminate the need
for any locking when accessing the values via sysctl.
The overridden values are inherited by nested jails (unless the config for
the nested jails also overrides the values).
There is no sanity or range checking, other than disallowing an empty
release string or a zero release date, by design. The system
administrator is trusted to set sane values. Setting values that are
newer than the actual running kernel will likely cause compatibility
problems.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D1948
Relnotes: yes
This allows for CARP interfaces to be used in jails e.g.
ip4.addr = "em0|10.10.1.20/32 vhid 1 pass MyPass advskew 100"
Before this change using exec.prestart to configure a CARP address
would result in the wrong MAC being broadcast on startup as jail creates
IP aliases to support ip[4|6].addr before exec.prestart is executed.
PR: 191832
Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 1 week
X-MFC-With: r269340
Phabric: D528
Sponsored by: Multiplay
Replace usage of "prison" with "jail", since that term has mostly dropped
out of use. Note once at the beginning that the "prison" term is equivalent,
but do not use it otherwise. [1]
Some grammar issues.
Some mdoc formatting fixes.
Consistently use \(em for em dashes, with spaces around it.
Avoid contractions.
Prefer ssh to telnet.
PR: docs/176832 [1]
Approved by: hrs (mentor)
r261266:
Add a jail parameter, allow.kmem, which lets jailed processes access
/dev/kmem and related devices (i.e. grants PRIV_IO and PRIV_KMEM_WRITE).
This in conjunction with changing the drm driver's permission check from
PRIV_DRIVER to PRIV_KMEM_WRITE will allow a jailed Xorg server.
/dev/kmem and related devices (i.e. grants PRIV_IO and PRIV_KMEM_WRITE).
This in conjunction with changing the drm driver's permission check from
PRIV_DRIVER to PRIV_KMEM_WRITE will allow a jailed Xorg server.
Submitted by: netchild
MFC after: 1 week
mount.devfs but mounts fdescfs. The mount happens just after
mount.devfs.
- rc.d/jail now displays whole error message from jail(8) when a jail
fails to start.
Approved by: re (gjb)
Document the potential for jail escape.
From r224615:
Always disable mount and unmount for jails with enforce_statfs==2.
From r231267:
A new jail(8) option "devfs_ruleset" defines the ruleset enforcement for
mounting devfs inside jails. A value of -1 disables mounting devfs in
jails, a value of zero means no restrictions. Nested jails can only
have mounting devfs disabled or inherit parent's enforcement as jails are
not allowed to view or manipulate devfs(8) rules.
From r232059:
To improve control over the use of mount(8) inside a jail(8), introduce
a new jail parameter node with the following parameters:
allow.mount.devfs:
allow mounting the devfs filesystem inside a jail
allow.mount.nullfs:
allow mounting the nullfs filesystem inside a jail
From r232186:
allow.mount.zfs:
allow mounting the zfs filesystem inside a jail
allow.mount.zfs:
allow mounting the zfs filesystem inside a jail
This way the permssions for mounting all current VFCF_JAIL filesystems
inside a jail are controlled wia allow.mount.* jail parameters.
Update sysctl descriptions.
Update jail(8) and zfs(8) manpages.
TODO: document the connection of allow.mount.* and VFCF_JAIL for kernel
developers
MFC after: 10 days
a new jail parameter node with the following parameters:
allow.mount.devfs:
allow mounting the devfs filesystem inside a jail
allow.mount.nullfs:
allow mounting the nullfs filesystem inside a jail
Both parameters are disabled by default (equals the behavior before
devfs and nullfs in jails). Administrators have to explicitly allow
mounting devfs and nullfs for each jail. The value "-1" of the
devfs_ruleset parameter is removed in favor of the new allow setting.
Reviewed by: jamie
Suggested by: pjd
MFC after: 2 weeks
A new jail(8) option "devfs_ruleset" defines the ruleset enforcement for
mounting devfs inside jails. A value of -1 disables mounting devfs in
jails, a value of zero means no restrictions. Nested jails can only
have mounting devfs disabled or inherit parent's enforcement as jails are
not allowed to view or manipulate devfs(8) rules.
Utilizes new functions introduced in r231265.
Reviewed by: jamie
MFC after: 1 month
recommended to allow root users in the jail to access the host system.
PR: docs/156853
Submitted by: crees
Patch by: crees
Approved by: re (kib) for BETA1
an attacker with root access to the jail can create a setuid binary for
their own use in the host environment (if they also have this access),
thus breaking root in the host.
This exploit is impossible if the jail's files are not world-readable.
Add instructions to the man page on how to create a jail with the
correct permissions set.
PR: docs/156853
Submitted by: Chris Rees (utisoft at gmail dot com)
Reviewed by: cperciva (security parts)
MFC after: 9 days