Add lockdestroy() and appropriate invocations, which corresponds to
lockinit() and must be called to clean up after a lockmgr lock is no
longer needed.
been done.
Don't allow multiple mount operations with MNT_UPDATE at the same
time on the same mount point. When the first mount operation
completed, MNT_UPDATE was cleared in the mount structure, causing
the second to complete as if it was a no-update mount operation
with the following bad side effects:
- mount structure inserted multiple times onto the mountlist
- vp->v_mountedhere incorrectly set, causing next namei
operation walking into the mountpoint to crash with
a locking against myself panic.
Plug a vnode leak in case vinvalbuf fails.
with an error condition such as EINTR, EWOULDBLOCK, and ERESTART,
are reported to the application, not silently conceal. This
behavior was copied from the {read,write}v() syscalls, and is
appropriate there but not here.
o Correct a bug in extattr_delete() wherein the LOCKLEAF flag is
passed to the wrong argument in namei(), resulting in some
unexpected errors during name resolution, and passing in an unlocked
vnode.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
allow for that.
o Remember to call NDFREE() if exiting as a result of a failed
vn_start_write() when snapshotting.
Reviewed by: mckusick
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
the gating of system calls that cause modifications to the underlying
filesystem. The gating can be enabled by any filesystem that needs
to consistently suspend operations by adding the vop_stdgetwritemount
to their set of vnops. Once gating is enabled, the function
vfs_write_suspend stops all new write operations to a filesystem,
allows any filesystem modifying system calls already in progress
to complete, then sync's the filesystem to disk and returns. The
function vfs_write_resume allows the suspended write operations to
begin again. Gating is not added by default for all filesystems as
for SMP systems it adds two extra locks to such critical kernel
paths as the write system call. Thus, gating should only be added
as needed.
Details on the use and current status of snapshots in FFS can be
found in /sys/ufs/ffs/README.snapshot so for brevity and timelyness
is not included here. Unless and until you create a snapshot file,
these changes should have no effect on your system (famous last words).
after the acquisition of any advisory locks. This fix corrects a case
in which a process tries to open a file with a non-blocking exclusive
lock. Even if it fails to get the lock it would still truncate the
file even though its open failed. With this change, the truncation
is done only after the lock is successfully acquired.
Obtained from: BSD/OS
instead of requiring every caller of linker_load_file() to perform the
check itself. This avoids netgraph loading KLD's when securelevel > 0,
not to mention any future code that may call linker_load_file().
Reviewed by: dfr
<sys/bio.h>.
<sys/bio.h> is now a prerequisite for <sys/buf.h> but it shall
not be made a nested include according to bdes teachings on the
subject of nested includes.
Diskdrivers and similar stuff below specfs::strategy() should no
longer need to include <sys/buf.> unless they need caching of data.
Still a few bogus uses of struct buf to track down.
Repocopy by: peter
syscall path inward. A system call may select whether it needs the MP
lock or not (the default being that it does need it).
A great deal of conditional SMP code for various deadended experiments
has been removed. 'cil' and 'cml' have been removed entirely, and the
locking around the cpl has been removed. The conditional
separately-locked fast-interrupt code has been removed, meaning that
interrupts must hold the CPL now (but they pretty much had to anyway).
Another reason for doing this is that the original separate-lock for
interrupts just doesn't apply to the interrupt thread mechanism being
contemplated.
Modifications to the cpl may now ONLY occur while holding the MP
lock. For example, if an otherwise MP safe syscall needs to mess with
the cpl, it must hold the MP lock for the duration and must (as usual)
save/restore the cpl in a nested fashion.
This is precursor work for the real meat coming later: avoiding having
to hold the MP lock for common syscalls and I/O's and interrupt threads.
It is expected that the spl mechanisms and new interrupt threading
mechanisms will be able to run in tandem, allowing a slow piecemeal
transition to occur.
This patch should result in a moderate performance improvement due to
the considerable amount of code that has been removed from the critical
path, especially the simplification of the spl*() calls. The real
performance gains will come later.
Approved by: jkh
Reviewed by: current, bde (exception.s)
Some work taken from: luoqi's patch
madvise().
This feature prevents the update daemon from gratuitously flushing
dirty pages associated with a mapped file-backed region of memory. The
system pager will still page the memory as necessary and the VM system
will still be fully coherent with the filesystem. Modifications made
by other means to the same area of memory, for example by write(), are
unaffected. The feature works on a page-granularity basis.
MAP_NOSYNC allows one to use mmap() to share memory between processes
without incuring any significant filesystem overhead, putting it in
the same performance category as SysV Shared memory and anonymous memory.
Reviewed by: julian, alc, dg
returned to user mode in the spare fields of the stat structure.
PR: kern/14966
Reviewed by: dillon@freebsd.org
Submitted by: Kelly Yancey kbyanc@posi.net
Alot of the code in sys/kern directly accesses the *Q_HEAD and *Q_ENTRY
structures for list operations. This patch makes all list operations
in sys/kern use the queue(3) macros, rather than directly accessing the
*Q_{HEAD,ENTRY} structures.
Reviewed by: phk
Submitted by: Jake Burkholder <jake@checker.org>
PR: 14914
Note: Previous commit to these files (except coda_vnops and devfs_vnops)
that claimed to remove WILLRELE from VOP_RENAME actually removed it from
VOP_MKNOD.
be ignored by default by the df(1) program. This is used mostly to
avoid stat()-ing entries that do not represent "real" disk mount
points (such as those made by an automounter such as amd.) It is
also useful not to have to stat() these entries because it takes
longer to report them that for other file systems, being that these
mount points are served by a user-level file server and resulting in
several context switches. Worse, if the automounter is down
unexpectedly, a causal df(1) will hang in an interruptible way.
PR: kern/9764
Submitted by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.columbia.edu>
Make the alias list a SLIST.
Drop the "fast recycling" optimization of vnodes (including
the returning of a prexisting but stale vnode from checkalias).
It doesn't buy us anything now that we don't hardlimit
vnodes anymore.
Rename checkalias2() and checkalias() to addalias() and
addaliasu() - which takes dev_t and udev_t arg respectively.
Make the revoke syscalls use vcount() instead of VALIASED.
Remove VALIASED flag, we don't need it now and it is faster
to traverse the much shorter lists than to maintain the
flag.
vfs_mountedon() can check the dev_t directly, all the vnodes
point to the same one.
Print the devicename in specfs/vprint().
Remove a couple of stale LFS vnode flags.
Remove unimplemented/unused LK_DRAINED;
NULL) for now. Bruce says I jumped the gun with my change in
revision 1.131, or maybe it should use nanotime(), or maybe it
shouldn't be decided in the VFS layer at all. I'm leaving it with
the old behavior until the Trans-Pacific Internet Vulcan Mind Meld
yields fuller understanding.
by utimes(path, NULL). This gives them the same precision as the
timestamps produced by write operations. Do likewise for lutimes()
and futimes().
Suggested by bde.
now used in f_ops in place of NULL, and modifications to the files
are more carefully ordered. f_ops should also be set to &badfileops
upon "close" of a file.
This does not fix other problems mentioned in this PR than the first
one.
PR: 11629
Reviewed by: peter
o use suser_xxx rather than suser to support JAIL code.
o KNF comment convention
o use vp->type rather than vaddr.type and eliminate call to
VOP_GETATTR. Bruce says that vp->type is valid at this
point.
Submitted by: bde.
Not fixed:
o return (value)
o Comment needs to be longer and more explicit. It will be after
the advisory.
This is a seriously beefed up chroot kind of thing. The process
is jailed along the same lines as a chroot does it, but with
additional tough restrictions imposed on what the superuser can do.
For all I know, it is safe to hand over the root bit inside a
prison to the customer living in that prison, this is what
it was developed for in fact: "real virtual servers".
Each prison has an ip number associated with it, which all IP
communications will be coerced to use and each prison has its own
hostname.
Needless to say, you need more RAM this way, but the advantage is
that each customer can run their own particular version of apache
and not stomp on the toes of their neighbors.
It generally does what one would expect, but setting up a jail
still takes a little knowledge.
A few notes:
I have no scripts for setting up a jail, don't ask me for them.
The IP number should be an alias on one of the interfaces.
mount a /proc in each jail, it will make ps more useable.
/proc/<pid>/status tells the hostname of the prison for
jailed processes.
Quotas are only sensible if you have a mountpoint per prison.
There are no privisions for stopping resource-hogging.
Some "#ifdef INET" and similar may be missing (send patches!)
If somebody wants to take it from here and develop it into
more of a "virtual machine" they should be most welcome!
Tools, comments, patches & documentation most welcome.
Have fun...
Sponsored by: http://www.rndassociates.com/
Run for almost a year by: http://www.servetheweb.com/
1:
s/suser/suser_xxx/
2:
Add new function: suser(struct proc *), prototyped in <sys/proc.h>.
3:
s/suser_xxx(\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)->p_ucred, \&\1->p_acflag)/suser(\1)/
The remaining suser_xxx() calls will be scrutinized and dealt with
later.
There may be some unneeded #include <sys/cred.h>, but they are left
as an exercise for Bruce.
More changes to the suser() API will come along with the "jail" code.
kern.chroot_allow_open_directories = 0
chroot(2) fails if there are open directories.
kern.chroot_allow_open_directories = 1 (default)
chroot(2) fails if there are open directories and the process
is subject of a previous chroot(2).
kern.chroot_allow_open_directories = anything else
filedescriptors are not checked. (old behaviour).
I'm very interested in reports about software which breaks when
running with the default setting.
