from userland without the need to use sysctls, it allows the old
sysctls to continue to function, but deprecates them at
FreeBSD_version 1200060 (Relnotes for deprecate).
The command line of bhyve is maintained in a backwards compatible way.
The API of libvmmapi is maintained in a backwards compatible way.
The sysctl's are maintained in a backwards compatible way.
Added command option looks like:
bhyve -c [[cpus=]n][,sockets=n][,cores=n][,threads=n][,maxcpus=n]
The optional parts can be specified in any order, but only a single
integer invokes the backwards compatible parse. [,maxcpus=n] is
hidden by #ifdef until kernel support is added, though the api
is put in place.
bhyvectl --get-cpu-topology option added.
Reviewed by: grehan (maintainer, earlier version),
Reviewed by: bcr (manpages)
Approved by: bde (mentor), phk (mentor)
Tested by: Oleg Ginzburg <olevole@olevole.ru> (cbsd)
MFC after: 1 week
Relnotes: Y
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D9930
This is used as part of implementing run control in bhyve's debug
server. The hypervisor now maintains a set of "debugged" CPUs.
Attempting to run a debugged CPU will fail to execute any guest
instructions and will instead report a VM_EXITCODE_DEBUG exit to
the userland hypervisor. Virtual CPUs are placed into the debugged
state via vm_suspend_cpu() (implemented via a new VM_SUSPEND_CPU ioctl).
Virtual CPUs can be resumed via vm_resume_cpu() (VM_RESUME_CPU ioctl).
The debug server suspends virtual CPUs when it wishes them to stop
executing in the guest (for example, when a debugger attaches to the
server). The debug server can choose to resume only a subset of CPUs
(for example, when single stepping) or it can choose to resume all
CPUs. The debug server must explicitly mark a CPU as resumed via
vm_resume_cpu() before the virtual CPU will successfully execute any
guest instructions.
Reviewed by: avg, grehan
Tested on: Intel (jhb), AMD (avg)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14466
So that it doesn't rely on physmap[1] containing an address below
1MiB. Instead scan the full physmap and search for a suitable address
to place the trampoline code (below 1MiB) and the initial memory pages
(below 4GiB).
Sponsored by: Citrix Systems R&D
Reviewed by: kib
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14878
platforms. Original commit message as follows:
Only use CPUs in the domain the device is attached to for default
assignment. Device drivers are able to override the default assignment
if they bind directly. There are severe performance penalties for
handling interrupts on remote CPUs and this should only be done in
very controlled circumstances.
Reviewed by: jhb, kib
Tested by: pho
Sponsored by: Netflix, Dell/EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14838
assignment. Device drivers are able to override the default assignment
if they bind directly. There are severe performance penalties for
handling interrupts on remote CPUs and this should only be done in
very controlled circumstances.
Reviewed by: jhb, kib
Tested by: pho (earlier version)
Sponsored by: Netflix, Dell/EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14838
This is a pure syntax patch to create an interface to enable and later
restore write access to the kernel text and other read-only mapped
regions. It is in line with e.g. vm_fault_disable_pagefaults() by
allowing the nesting.
Discussed with: Peter Lei <peter.lei@ieee.org>
Reviewed by: jtl
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14768
correctly for the data contained on each memory page.
There are several components to this change:
* Add a variable to indicate the start of the R/W portion of the
initial memory.
* Stop detecting NX bit support for each AP. Instead, use the value
from the BSP and, if supported, activate the feature on the other
APs just before loading the correct page table. (Functionally, we
already assume that the BSP and all APs had the same support or
lack of support for the NX bit.)
* Set the RW and NX bits correctly for the kernel text, data, and
BSS (subject to some caveats below).
* Ensure DDB can write to memory when necessary (such as to set a
breakpoint).
* Ensure GDB can write to memory when necessary (such as to set a
breakpoint). For this purpose, add new MD functions gdb_begin_write()
and gdb_end_write() which the GDB support code can call before and
after writing to memory.
This change is not comprehensive:
* It doesn't do anything to protect modules.
* It doesn't do anything for kernel memory allocated after the kernel
starts running.
* In order to avoid excessive memory inefficiency, it may let multiple
types of data share a 2M page, and assigns the most permissions
needed for data on that page.
Reviewed by: jhb, kib
Discussed with: emaste
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Netflix
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14282
Unlike the existing GLA2GPA ioctl, GLA2GPA_NOFAULT does not modify
the guest. In particular, it does not inject any faults or modify
PTEs in the guest when performing an address space translation.
This is used by bhyve's debug server to read and write memory for
the remote debugger.
Reviewed by: grehan
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14075
No implementation of fpu_kern_enter() can fail, and it was causing needless
error checking boilerplate and confusion. Change the return code to void to
match reality.
(This trivial change took nine days to land because of the commit hook on
sys/dev/random. Please consider removing the hook or otherwise lowering the
bar -- secteam never seems to have free time to review patches.)
Reported by: Lachlan McIlroy <Lachlan.McIlroy AT isilon.com>
Reviewed by: delphij
Approved by: secteam (delphij)
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14380
These are a convenience for bhyve's debug server to use a single
ioctl for 'g' and 'G' rather than a loop of individual get/set
ioctl requests.
Reviewed by: grehan
MFC after: 2 months
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14074
Small global symbols confuse ddb which matches them against small
unrelated displacements and makes the disassembly ugly.
Reported by: bde
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
It is coded according to the Intel document 336996-001, reading of the
patches posted on lkml, and some additional consultations with Intel.
For existing processors, you need a microcode update which adds IBRS
CPU features, and to manually enable it by setting the tunable/sysctl
hw.ibrs_disable to 0. Current status can be checked in sysctl
hw.ibrs_active. The mitigation might be inactive if the CPU feature
is not patched in, or if CPU reports that IBRS use is not required, by
IA32_ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL bit.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D14029
Use PCID to avoid complete TLB shootdown when switching between user
and kernel mode with PTI enabled.
I use the model close to what I read about KAISER, user-mode PCID has
1:1 correspondence to the kernel-mode PCID, by setting bit 11 in PCID.
Full kernel-mode TLB shootdown is performed on context switches, since
KVA TLB invalidation only works in the current pmap. User-mode part of
TLB is flushed on the pmap activations as well.
Similarly, IPI TLB shootdowns must handle both kernel and user address
spaces for each address. Note that machines which implement PCID but
do not have INVPCID instructions, cause the usual complications in the
IPI handlers, due to the need to switch to the target PCID temporary.
This is racy, but because for PCID/no-INVPCID we disable the
interrupts in pmap_activate_sw(), IPI handler cannot see inconsistent
state of CPU PCID vs PCPU pmap/kcr3/ucr3 pointers.
On the other hand, on kernel/user switches, CR3_PCID_SAVE bit is set
and we do not clear TLB.
I can imagine alternative use of PCID, where there is only one PCID
allocated for the kernel pmap. Then, there is no need to shootdown
kernel TLB entries on context switch. But copyout(3) would need to
either use method similar to proc_rwmem() to access the userspace
data, or (in reverse) provide a temporal mapping for the kernel buffer
into user mode PCID and use trampoline for copy.
Reviewed by: markj (previous version)
Tested by: pho
Discussed with: alc (some aspects)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13985
still active.
Map userspace portion of VA in the PTI kernel-mode page table as
non-executable. This way, if we ever miss reloading ucr3 into %cr3 on
the return to usermode, the process traps instead of executing in
potentially vulnerable setup. Catch the condition of such trap and
verify user-mode %cr3, which is saved by page fault handler.
I peek this trick in some article about Linux implementation.
Reviewed by: alc, markj (previous version)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 12 days
DIfferential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13956
kernel by PHYS_TO_DMAP() as previously present on amd64, arm64, riscv, and
powerpc64. This introduces a new MI macro (PMAP_HAS_DMAP) that can be
evaluated at runtime to determine if the architecture has a direct map;
if it does not (or does) unconditionally and PMAP_HAS_DMAP is either 0 or
1, the compiler can remove the conditional logic.
As part of this, implement PHYS_TO_DMAP() on sparc64 and mips64, which had
similar things but spelled differently. 32-bit MIPS has a partial direct-map
that maps poorly to this concept and is unchanged.
Reviewed by: kib
Suggestions from: marius, alc, kib
Runtime tested on: amd64, powerpc64, powerpc, mips64
Similar to NMIs, machine check exceptions can fire at any time and are
not masked by IF. This means that machine checks can fire when the
kstack is too deep to hold a trap frame, or at critical sections in
trap handlers when a user %gs is used with a kernel %cs. Use the same
strategy used for NMIs of using a dedicated per-CPU stack configured
in IST 3. Store the CPU's pcpu pointer at the stop of the stack so
that the machine check handler can reliably find the proper value for
%gs (also borrowed from NMIs).
This should also fix a similar issue with PTI with a MC# occurring
while the CPU is executing on the trampoline stack.
While here, bypass trap() entirely and just call mca_intr(). This
avoids a bogus call to kdb_reenter() (there's no reason to try to
reenter kdb if a MC# is raised).
Reviewed by: kib
Tested by: avg (on AMD without PTI)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13962
Apparently machinde/cpu.h is supposed to contain MD implementations of
MI interfaces. Also, remove kernphys declaration from machdep.c,
since it is already provided by md_var.h.
Requested and reviewed by: bde
MFC after: 13 days
Currently most of the debug registers are not saved and restored
during VM transitions allowing guest and host debug register values to
leak into the opposite context. One result is that hardware
watchpoints do not work reliably within a guest under VT-x.
Due to differences in SVM and VT-x, slightly different approaches are
used.
For VT-x:
- Enable debug register save/restore for VM entry/exit in the VMCS for
DR7 and MSR_DEBUGCTL.
- Explicitly save DR0-3,6 of the guest.
- Explicitly save DR0-3,6-7, MSR_DEBUGCTL, and the trap flag from
%rflags for the host. Note that because DR6 is "software" managed
and not stored in the VMCS a kernel debugger which single steps
through VM entry could corrupt the guest DR6 (since a single step
trap taken after loading the guest DR6 could alter the DR6
register). To avoid this, explicitly disable single-stepping via
the trace flag before loading the guest DR6. A determined debugger
could still defeat this by setting a breakpoint after the guest DR6
was loaded and then single-stepping.
For SVM:
- Enable debug register caching in the VMCB for DR6/DR7.
- Explicitly save DR0-3 of the guest.
- Explicitly save DR0-3,6-7, and MSR_DEBUGCTL for the host. Since SVM
saves the guest DR6 in the VMCB, the race with single-stepping
described for VT-x does not exist.
For both platforms, expose all of the guest DRx values via --get-drX
and --set-drX flags to bhyvectl.
Discussed with: avg, grehan
Tested by: avg (SVM), myself (VT-x)
MFC after: 1 month
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13229
The implementation of the Kernel Page Table Isolation (KPTI) for
amd64, first version. It provides a workaround for the 'meltdown'
vulnerability. PTI is turned off by default for now, enable with the
loader tunable vm.pmap.pti=1.
The pmap page table is split into kernel-mode table and user-mode
table. Kernel-mode table is identical to the non-PTI table, while
usermode table is obtained from kernel table by leaving userspace
mappings intact, but only leaving the following parts of the kernel
mapped:
kernel text (but not modules text)
PCPU
GDT/IDT/user LDT/task structures
IST stacks for NMI and doublefault handlers.
Kernel switches to user page table before returning to usermode, and
restores full kernel page table on the entry. Initial kernel-mode
stack for PTI trampoline is allocated in PCPU, it is only 16
qwords. Kernel entry trampoline switches page tables. then the
hardware trap frame is copied to the normal kstack, and execution
continues.
IST stacks are kept mapped and no trampoline is needed for
NMI/doublefault, but of course page table switch is performed.
On return to usermode, the trampoline is used again, iret frame is
copied to the trampoline stack, page tables are switched and iretq is
executed. The case of iretq faulting due to the invalid usermode
context is tricky, since the frame for fault is appended to the
trampoline frame. Besides copying the fault frame and original
(corrupted) frame to kstack, the fault frame must be patched to make
it look as if the fault occured on the kstack, see the comment in
doret_iret detection code in trap().
Currently kernel pages which are mapped during trampoline operation
are identical for all pmaps. They are registered using
pmap_pti_add_kva(). Besides initial registrations done during boot,
LDT and non-common TSS segments are registered if user requested their
use. In principle, they can be installed into kernel page table per
pmap with some work. Similarly, PCPU can be hidden from userspace
mapping using trampoline PCPU page, but again I do not see much
benefits besides complexity.
PDPE pages for the kernel half of the user page tables are
pre-allocated during boot because we need to know pml4 entries which
are copied to the top-level paging structure page, in advance on a new
pmap creation. I enforce this to avoid iterating over the all
existing pmaps if a new PDPE page is needed for PTI kernel mappings.
The iteration is a known problematic operation on i386.
The need to flush hidden kernel translations on the switch to user
mode make global tables (PG_G) meaningless and even harming, so PG_G
use is disabled for PTI case. Our existing use of PCID is
incompatible with PTI and is automatically disabled if PTI is
enabled. PCID can be forced on only for developer's benefit.
MCE is known to be broken, it requires IST stack to operate completely
correctly even for non-PTI case, and absolutely needs dedicated IST
stack because MCE delivery while trampoline did not switched from PTI
stack is fatal. The fix is pending.
Reviewed by: markj (partially)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Discussed with: jeff, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 2 weeks
They provide relaxed-ordered atomic access semantic. Due to the
FreeBSD memory model, the operations are syntaxical wrappers around
the volatile accesses. The volatile qualifier is used to ensure that
the access not optimized out and in turn depends on the volatile
semantic as implemented by supported compilers.
The motivation for adding the operation is to help people coming from
other systems or knowing the C11/C++ standards where atomics have
special type and require use of the special access operations. It is
still the case that FreeBSD requires plain load and stores of aligned
integer types to be atomic.
Suggested by: jhb
Reviewed by: alc, jhb
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13534
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 2-Clause license, however the tool I
was using misidentified many licenses so this was mostly a manual - error
prone - task.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
Mainly focus on files that use BSD 3-Clause license.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
Special thanks to Wind River for providing access to "The Duke of
Highlander" tool: an older (2014) run over FreeBSD tree was useful as a
starting point.
The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX) group provides a specification
to make it easier for automated tools to detect and summarize well known
opensource licenses. We are gradually adopting the specification, noting
that the tags are considered only advisory and do not, in any way,
superceed or replace the license texts.
Special thanks to Wind River for providing access to "The Duke of
Highlander" tool: an older (2014) run over FreeBSD tree was useful as a
starting point.
Initially, only tag files that use BSD 4-Clause "Original" license.
RelNotes: yes
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D13133
While here cache-align chains.
This shortens longest found chain during poudriere -j 80 from 32 to 16.
Pushing this higher up will probably require allocation on boot.
For processing, reclaim_pv_chunk() removes the pv_chunk from the lru
list, which makes pc_lru linkage invalid. Then the pmap lock is
released, which allows for other thread to free the last pv entry
allocated from the chunk and call free_pv_chunk(), which tries to
modify the invalid linkage.
Similarly, the chunk is inserted into the private tailq new_tail
temporary. Again, free_pv_chunk() might be run and corrupt the
linkage for the new_tail after the pmap lock is dropped.
This is a consequence of r299788 elimination of pvh_global_lock, which
allowed for reclaim to run in parallel with other pmap calls which
free pv chunks.
As a fix, do not remove the chunk from pc_lru queue, use a marker to
remember the position in the queue iteration. We can safely operate
on the chunks after the chunk's pmap is locked, we fetched the chunk
after the marker, and we checked that chunk pmap is same as we have
locked, because chunk removal from pc_lru requires both pv_chunk_mutex
and the pmap mutex owned.
Note that the fix lost an optimization which was present in the
previous algorithm. Namely, new_tail requeueing rotated the pv chunks
list so that reclaim didn't scan the same pv chunks that couldn't be
freed (because they contained a wired and/or superpage mapping) on
every invocation. An additional change is planned which would improve
this.
Reported and tested by: pho
Reviewed by: alc
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
On i386, the function is used from the context switch code and needs
to be accessible externally. Amd64 MD context switch does not lock an
LDT spinlock and inlines switching in assembly.
Discussed with: bde
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
machine independent parts of the existing code to a new file that can be
shared between amd64 and arm64.
Reviewed by: kib (previous version), imp
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12434
The actual cache line size has always been 64 bytes.
The 128 number arose as an optimization for Core 2 era Intel processors. By
default (configurable in BIOS), these CPUs would prefetch adjacent cache
lines unintelligently. Newer CPUs prefetch more intelligently.
The latest Core 2 era CPU was introduced in September 2008 (Xeon 7400
series, "Dunnington"). If you are still using one of these CPUs, especially
in a multi-socket configuration, consider locating the "adjacent cache line
prefetch" option in BIOS and disabling it.
Reported by: mjg
Reviewed by: np
Discussed with: jhb
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Right now, we enable the CR4.FSGSBASE bit on CPUs which support the
facility (Ivy and later), to allow usermode to read fs and gs bases
without syscalls. This bit also controls the write access to bases
from userspace, but WRFSBASE and WRGSBASE instructions currently
cannot be used, because return path from both exceptions or interrupts
overrides bases with the values from pcb.
Supporting the instructions is useful because this means that usermode
can implement green-threads completely in userspace without issuing
syscalls to change all of the machine context.
Support is implemented by saving the fs base and user gs base when
PCB_FULL_IRET flag is set. The flag is set on the context switch,
which potentially causes clobber of the bases due to activation of
another context, and when explicit modification of the user context by
a syscall or exception handler is performed. In particular, the patch
moves setting of the flag before syscalls change context.
The changes to doreti_exit and PUSH_FRAME to clear PCB_FULL_IRET on
entry from userspace can be considered a bug fixes on its own.
Reviewed by: jhb (previous version)
Tested by: pho (previous version)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 3 weeks
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12023
Add an option to dynamically rebalance interrupts across cores
(hw.intrbalance); off by default.
The goal is to minimize preemption. By placing interrupt sources on distinct
CPUs, ithreads get preferentially scheduled on distinct CPUs. Overall
preemption is reduced and latency is reduced. In our workflow it reduced
"fighting" between two high-frequency interrupt sources. Reduced latency
was proven by, e.g., SPEC2008.
Submitted by: jeff@ (earlier version)
Reviewed by: kib@
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D10435
Intel SGX allows to manage isolated compartments "Enclaves" in user VA
space. Enclaves memory is part of processor reserved memory (PRM) and
always encrypted. This allows to protect user application code and data
from upper privilege levels including OS kernel.
This includes SGX driver and optional linux ioctl compatibility layer.
Intel SGX SDK for FreeBSD is also available.
Note this requires support from hardware (available since late Intel
Skylake CPUs).
Many thanks to Robert Watson for support and Konstantin Belousov
for code review.
Project wiki: https://wiki.freebsd.org/Intel_SGX.
Reviewed by: kib
Relnotes: yes
Sponsored by: DARPA, AFRL
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D11113
libefivar expects opening /dev/efi to indicate if the we can make efi
runtime calls. With a null routine, it was always succeeding leading
efi_variables_supported() to return the wrong value. Only succeed if
we have an efi_runtime table. Also, while I'm hear, out of an
abundance of caution, add a likely redundant check to make sure
efi_systbl is not NULL before dereferencing it. I know it can't be
NULL if efi_cfgtbl is non-NULL, but the compiler doesn't.
Some C wrappers for x86 instructions do not touch global memory and only act
on their arguments; they can be marked __pure2, aka __const__. Without this
annotation, Clang 3.9.1 is not intelligent enough on its own to grok that
these functions are __const__.
Submitted by: Anton Rang <anton.rang AT isilon.com>
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
from the top of user memory to one page lower on machines with the
Ryzen (AMD Family 17h) CPU. This pushes ps_strings and the stack
down by one page as well. On Ryzen there is some sort of interaction
between code running at the top of user memory address space and
interrupts that can cause FreeBSD to either hang or silently reset.
This sounds similar to the problem found with DragonFly BSD that
was fixed with this commit:
https://gitweb.dragonflybsd.org/dragonfly.git/commitdiff/b48dd28447fc8ef62fbc963accd301557fd9ac20
but our signal trampoline location was already lower than the address
that DragonFly moved their signal trampoline to. It also does not
appear to be related to SMT as described here:
https://www.phoronix.com/forums/forum/hardware/processors-memory/955368-some-ryzen-linux-users-are-facing-issues-with-heavy-compilation-loads?p=955498#post955498
"Hi, Matt Dillon here. Yes, I did find what I believe to be a
hardware issue with Ryzen related to concurrent operations. In a
nutshell, for any given hyperthread pair, if one hyperthread is
in a cpu-bound loop of any kind (can be in user mode), and the
other hyperthread is returning from an interrupt via IRETQ, the
hyperthread issuing the IRETQ can stall indefinitely until the
other hyperthread with the cpu-bound loop pauses (aka HLT until
next interrupt). After this situation occurs, the system appears
to destabilize. The situation does not occur if the cpu-bound
loop is on a different core than the core doing the IRETQ. The
%rip the IRETQ returns to (e.g. userland %rip address) matters a
*LOT*. The problem occurs more often with high %rip addresses
such as near the top of the user stack, which is where DragonFly's
signal trampoline traditionally resides. So a user program taking
a signal on one thread while another thread is cpu-bound can cause
this behavior. Changing the location of the signal trampoline
makes it more difficult to reproduce the problem. I have not
been because the able to completely mitigate it. When a cpu-thread
stalls in this manner it appears to stall INSIDE the microcode
for IRETQ. It doesn't make it to the return pc, and the cpu thread
cannot take any IPIs or other hardware interrupts while in this
state."
since the system instability has been observed on FreeBSD with SMT
disabled. Interrupts to appear to play a factor since running a
signal-intensive process on the first CPU core, which handles most
of the interrupts on my machine, is far more likely to trigger the
problem than running such a process on any other core.
Also lower sv_maxuser to prevent a malicious user from using mmap()
to load and execute code in the top page of user memory that was made
available when the shared page was moved down.
Make the same changes to the 64-bit Linux emulator.
PR: 219399
Reported by: nbe@renzel.net
Reviewed by: kib
Reviewed by: dchagin (previous version)
Tested by: nbe@renzel.net (earlier version)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D11780
