Do the cast from sockaddr to either IPv4 or IPv6 sockaddr in the
protocol's pr_bind method and from there on go down the call
stack with family specific argument.
Reviewed by: zlei, melifaro, markj
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38601
Do the cast from sockaddr to either IPv4 or IPv6 sockaddr in the
protocol's pr_connect method and from there on go down the call
stack with family specific argument.
Reviewed by: markj
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38356
This removes recursive epoch entry in the syncache case. Fixes
unprotected access to V_in6_ifaddrhead in in6_pcbladdr(), as
well as access to prison IP address lists. It also matches what
IPv4 in_pcbconnect() does.
Reviewed by: markj
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38355
All callers of in_pcbdisconnect() clear the local address, so let's just
do that in the function itself.
Note that the inp's local address is not a parameter to the inp hash
functions. No functional change intended.
Reviewed by: glebius
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: Klara, Inc.
Sponsored by: Modirum MDPay
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D38362
They are shared between UDP over IPv4 and over IPv6. To prevent all
possible kernel build failures wrap them in #ifdef _SYS_PROTOSW_H_.
Prompted by feedback from jhb@ and jrtc27@ on c93db4abf4.
If udp[6]_append() returns non-zero, it is because the inp has gone
away (inpcbrele_rlocked returned 1 after running the tunnel function).
Reviewed by: ae
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D37511
In the original design of the network stack from the protocol control
input method pr_ctlinput was used notify the protocols about two very
different kinds of events: internal system events and receival of an
ICMP messages from outside. These events were coded with PRC_ codes.
Today these methods are removed from the protosw(9) and are isolated
to IPv4 and IPv6 stacks and are called only from icmp*_input(). The
PRC_ codes now just create a shim layer between ICMP codes and errors
or actions taken by protocols.
- Change ipproto_ctlinput_t to pass just pointer to ICMP header. This
allows protocols to not deduct it from the internal IP header.
- Change ip6proto_ctlinput_t to pass just struct ip6ctlparam pointer.
It has all the information needed to the protocols. In the structure,
change ip6c_finaldst fields to sockaddr_in6. The reason is that
icmp6_input() already has this address wrapped in sockaddr, and the
protocols want this address as sockaddr.
- For UDP tunneling control input, as well as for IPSEC control input,
change the prototypes to accept a transparent union of either ICMP
header pointer or struct ip6ctlparam pointer.
- In icmp_input() and icmp6_input() do only validation of ICMP header and
count bad packets. The translation of ICMP codes to errors/actions is
done by protocols.
- Provide icmp_errmap() and icmp6_errmap() as substitute to inetctlerrmap,
inet6ctlerrmap arrays.
- In protocol ctlinput methods either trust what icmp_errmap() recommend,
or do our own logic based on the ICMP header.
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36731
Now these functions are called only from icmp*_input(). The pointer
to the ICMP data is never NULL and cmd has a limited set of values.
In the past the functions were demultiplexing control messages from
ICMP layer, as well as internally generated events. In the latter
case the the pointer to IP would be NULL.
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36729
After decoupling of protosw(9) and IP wire protocols in 78b1fc05b2 for
IPv4 we got vector ip_ctlprotox[] that is executed only and only from
icmp_input() and respectively for IPv6 we got ip6_ctlprotox[] executed
only and only from icmp6_input(). This allows to use protocol specific
argument types in these methods instead of struct sockaddr and void.
Reviewed by: melifaro
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36727
The netinet/ipprotosw.h and netinet6/ip6protosw.h were KAME relics, with
the former removed in f0ffb944d2 in 2001 and the latter survived until
today. It has been reduced down to only one useful declaration that
moves to ip6_var.h
Reviewed by: melifaro
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36726
o Assert that every protosw has pr_attach. Now this structure is
only for socket protocols declarations and nothing else.
o Merge struct pr_usrreqs into struct protosw. This was suggested
in 1996 by wollman@ (see 7b187005d1), and later reiterated
in 2006 by rwatson@ (see 6fbb9cf860).
o Make struct domain hold a variable sized array of protosw pointers.
For most protocols these pointers are initialized statically.
Those domains that may have loadable protocols have spacers. IPv4
and IPv6 have 8 spacers each (andre@ dff3237ee5).
o For inetsw and inet6sw leave a comment noting that many protosw
entries very likely are dead code.
o Refactor pf_proto_[un]register() into protosw_[un]register().
o Isolate pr_*_notsupp() methods into uipc_domain.c
Reviewed by: melifaro
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36232
The protosw KPI historically has implemented two quite orthogonal
things: protocols that implement a certain kind of socket, and
protocols that are IPv4/IPv6 protocol. These two things do not
make one-to-one correspondence. The pr_input and pr_ctlinput methods
were utilized only in IP protocols. This strange duality required
IP protocols that doesn't have a socket to declare protosw, e.g.
carp(4). On the other hand developers of socket protocols thought
that they need to define pr_input/pr_ctlinput always, which lead to
strange dead code, e.g. div_input() or sdp_ctlinput().
With this change pr_input and pr_ctlinput as part of protosw disappear
and IPv4/IPv6 get their private single level protocol switch table
ip_protox[] and ip6_protox[] respectively, pointing at array of
ipproto_input_t functions. The pr_ctlinput that was used for
control input coming from the network (ICMP, ICMPv6) is now represented
by ip_ctlprotox[] and ip6_ctlprotox[].
ipproto_register() becomes the only official way to register in the
table. Those protocols that were always static and unlikely anybody
is interested in making them loadable, are now registered by ip_init(),
ip6_init(). An IP protocol that considers itself unloadable shall
register itself within its own private SYSINIT().
Reviewed by: tuexen, melifaro
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36157
Both UDP and UDP Lite use same methods on sockets. Both UDP over IPv4
and over IPv6 use same methods. Don't pretend that methods can switch
and remove this unneeded complexity.
Reviewed by: melifaro
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D36154
Implement the same filter feature we implemented for UDP over IPv6 in
742e7210d. This was missed in that commit.
Pointed out by: markj
Sponsored by: Rubicon Communications, LLC ("Netgate")
This reverts commit 266f97b5e9, reversing
changes made to a10253cffe.
A mismerge of a merge to catch up to main resulted in files being
committed which should not have been.
With introduction of epoch(9) synchronization to network stack the
inpcb database became protected by the network epoch together with
static network data (interfaces, addresses, etc). However, inpcb
aren't static in nature, they are created and destroyed all the
time, which creates some traffic on the epoch(9) garbage collector.
Fairly new feature of uma(9) - Safe Memory Reclamation allows to
safely free memory in page-sized batches, with virtually zero
overhead compared to uma_zfree(). However, unlike epoch(9), it
puts stricter requirement on the access to the protected memory,
needing the critical(9) section to access it. Details:
- The database is already build on CK lists, thanks to epoch(9).
- For write access nothing is changed.
- For a lookup in the database SMR section is now required.
Once the desired inpcb is found we need to transition from SMR
section to r/w lock on the inpcb itself, with a check that inpcb
isn't yet freed. This requires some compexity, since SMR section
itself is a critical(9) section. The complexity is hidden from
KPI users in inp_smr_lock().
- For a inpcb list traversal (a pcblist sysctl, or broadcast
notification) also a new KPI is provided, that hides internals of
the database - inp_next(struct inp_iterator *).
Reviewed by: rrs
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D33022
In most cases blackholing for locally originated packets is undesired,
leads to different kind of lags and delays. Provide sysctls to enforce
it, e.g. for debugging purposes.
Reviewed by: rrs
Differential revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D32718
SO_RERROR indicates that receive buffer overflows should be handled as
errors. Historically receive buffer overflows have been ignored and
programs could not tell if they missed messages or messages had been
truncated because of overflows. Since programs historically do not
expect to get receive overflow errors, this behavior is not the
default.
This is really really important for programs that use route(4) to keep
in sync with the system. If we loose a message then we need to reload
the full system state, otherwise the behaviour from that point is
undefined and can lead to chasing bogus bug reports.
Reviewed by: philip (network), kbowling (transport), gbe (manpages)
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26652
ip6_setpktopts() can look up ifnets via ifnet_by_index(), which
is only safe in the net epoch. Ensure that callers are in the net
epoch before calling this function.
Sponsored by: Dell EMC Isilon
MFC after: 4 weeks
Reviewed by: donner, kp
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D30630
Several protocol methods take a sockaddr as input. In some cases the
sockaddr lengths were not being validated, or were validated after some
out-of-bounds accesses could occur. Add requisite checking to various
protocol entry points, and convert some existing checks to assertions
where appropriate.
Reported by: syzkaller+KASAN
Reviewed by: tuexen, melifaro
MFC after: 2 weeks
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D29519
The lookup for a IPv6 multicast addresses corresponding to
the destination address in the datagram is protected by the
NET_EPOCH section. Access to each PCB is protected by INP_RLOCK
during comparing. But access to socket's so_options field is
not protected. And in some cases it is possible, that PCB
pointer is still valid, but inp_socket is not. The patch wides
lock holding to protect access to inp_socket. It copies locking
strategy from IPv4 UDP handling.
PR: 232192
Obtained from: Yandex LLC
MFC after: 3 days
Sponsored by: Yandex LLC
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28232
Historically receive buffer overflows have been ignored and programs
could not tell if they missed messages or messages had been truncated
because of overflows. Since programs historically do not expect to get
receive overflow errors, this behavior is not the default.
This is really really important for programs that use route(4) to keep in sync
with the system. If we loose a message then we need to reload the full system
state, otherwise the behaviour from that point is undefined and can lead
to chasing bogus bug reports.
connections over multiple paths.
Multipath routing relies on mbuf flowid data for both transit
and outbound traffic. Current code fills mbuf flowid from inp_flowid
for connection-oriented sockets. However, inp_flowid is currently
not calculated for outbound connections.
This change creates simple hashing functions and starts calculating hashes
for TCP,UDP/UDP-Lite and raw IP if multipath routes are present in the
system.
Reviewed by: glebius (previous version),ae
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D26523
This will be used by some upcoming changes to if_vxlan(4). RFC 7348 (VXLAN)
says that the UDP checksum "SHOULD be transmitted as zero. When a packet is
received with a UDP checksum of zero, it MUST be accepted for decapsulation."
But the original IPv6 RFCs did not allow zero UDP checksum. RFC 6935 attempts
to resolve this.
Reviewed by: kib@
Sponsored by: Chelsio Communications
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D25873
When using v4-mapped IPv6 sockets with IPV6_PKTINFO we do not
respect the given v4-mapped src address on the IPv4 socket.
Implement the needed functionality. This allows single-socket
UDP applications (such as OpenVPN) to work better on FreeBSD.
Requested by: Gert Doering (gert greenie.net), pfsense
Tested by: Gert Doering (gert greenie.net)
Reviewed by: melifaro
MFC after: 2 weeks
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D24135
r357614 added CTLFLAG_NEEDGIANT to make it easier to find nodes that are
still not MPSAFE (or already are but aren’t properly marked).
Use it in preparation for a general review of all nodes.
This is non-functional change that adds annotations to SYSCTL_NODE and
SYSCTL_PROC nodes using one of the soon-to-be-required flags.
Mark all obvious cases as MPSAFE. All entries that haven't been marked
as MPSAFE before are by default marked as NEEDGIANT
Approved by: kib (mentor, blanket)
Commented by: kib, gallatin, melifaro
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D23718
Virtualise tcp_always_keepalive, TCP and UDP log_in_vain. All three are
set in the netoptions startup script, which we would love to run for VNETs
as well [1].
While virtualising the log_in_vain sysctls seems pointles at first for as
long as the kernel message buffer is not virtualised, it at least allows
an administrator to debug the base system or an individual jail if needed
without turning the logging on for all jails running on a system.
PR: 243193 [1]
MFC after: 2 weeks
Coverity points out that we've already dereferenced m by the time we check, so
there's no reason to keep the check. Moreover, it's safe to pass NULL to
m_freem() anyway.
CID: 1019092
r354748-354750 replaced the KAME macros with m_pulldown() calls.
Contrary to the rest of the network stack m_len checks before m_pulldown()
were not put in placed (see r354748).
Put these m_len checks in place for now (to go along with the style of the
network stack since the initial commits). These are not put in for
performance but to avoid an error scenario (even though it also will help
performance at the moment as it avoid allocating an extra mbuf; not because
of the unconditional function call).
The observed error case went like this:
(1) an mbuf with M_EXT arrives and we call m_pullup() unconditionally on it.
(2) m_pullup() will call m_get() unless the requested length is larger than
MHLEN (in which case it'll m_freem() the perfectly fine mbuf) and migrate the
requested length of data and pkthdr into the new mbuf.
(3) If m_get() succeeds, a further m_pullup() call going over MHLEN will fail.
This was observed with failing auto-configuration as an RA packet of
200 bytes exceeded MHLEN and the m_pullup() called from nd6_ra_input()
dropped the mbuf.
(Re-)adding the m_len checks before m_pullup() calls avoids this problems
with mbufs using external storage for now.
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: Netflix
Remove the KAME introduced PULLDOWN_TESTs which did not even
have a compile-time option in sys/conf to turn them on for a
custom kernel build. They made the code a lot harder to read
or more complicated in a few cases.
Convert the IP6_EXTHDR_CHECK() calls into FreeBSD looking code.
Rather than throwing the packet away if it would not fit the
KAME mbuf expectations, convert the macros to m_pullup() calls.
Do not do any extra manual conditional checks upfront as to
whether the m_len would suffice (*), simply let m_pullup() do
its work (incl. an early check).
Remove extra m_pullup() calls where earlier in the function or
the only caller has already done the pullup.
Discussed with: rwatson (*)
Reviewed by: ae
MFC after: 8 weeks
Sponsored by: Netflix
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22334
In ip6_[direct_]input() we are looping over the extension headers
to deal with the next header. We pass a pointer to an mbuf pointer
to the handling functions. In certain cases the mbuf can be updated
there and we need to pass the new one back. That missing in
dest6_input() and route6_input(). In tcp6_input() we should also
update it before we call tcp_input().
In addition to that mark the mbuf NULL all the times when we return
that we are done with handling the packet and no next header should
be checked (IPPROTO_DONE). This will eventually allow us to assert
proper behaviour and catch the above kind of errors more easily,
expecting *mp to always be set.
This change is extracted from a larger patch and not an exhaustive
change across the entire stack yet.
PR: 240135
Reported by: prabhakar.lakhera gmail.com
MFC after: 3 weeks
Sponsored by: Netflix
locking in udp_output() and udp6_output().
First, we select if we need read or write lock in PCB itself, we take
the lock and enter network epoch. Then, we proceed for the rest of
the function. In case if we need to modify PCB hash, we would take
write lock on it for a short piece of code.
We could exit the epoch before allocating an mbuf, but with this
patch we are keeping it all the way into ip_output()/ip6_output().
Today this creates an epoch recursion, since ip_output() enters epoch
itself. However, once all protocols are reviewed, ip_output() and
ip6_output() would require epoch instead of entering it.
Note: I'm not 100% sure that in udp6_output() the epoch is required.
We don't do PCB hash lookup for a bound socket. And all branches of
in6_select_src() don't require epoch, at least they lack assertions.
Today inet6 address list is protected by rmlock, although it is CKLIST.
AFAIU, the future plan is to protect it by network epoch. That would
require epoch in in6_select_src(). Anyway, in future ip6_output()
would require epoch, udp6_output() would need to enter it.
we lookup PCBs. Thus, do not enter epoch recursively in
in_pcblookup_hash() and in6_pcblookup_hash(). Same applies to
tcp_ctlinput() and tcp6_ctlinput().
This leaves several sysctl(9) handlers that return PCB credentials
unprotected. Add epoch enter/exit to all of them.
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D22197