have both kern_open() and kern_openat(); change the callers to use
kern_openat().
This removes one (sometimes two) levels of indirection and
consolidates arguments checks.
Reviewed by: mckusick
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
MFC after: 1 week
further refinement is required as some device drivers intended to be
portable over FreeBSD versions rely on __FreeBSD_version to decide whether
to include capability.h.
MFC after: 3 weeks
in the future in a backward compatible (API and ABI) way.
The cap_rights_t represents capability rights. We used to use one bit to
represent one right, but we are running out of spare bits. Currently the new
structure provides place for 114 rights (so 50 more than the previous
cap_rights_t), but it is possible to grow the structure to hold at least 285
rights, although we can make it even larger if 285 rights won't be enough.
The structure definition looks like this:
struct cap_rights {
uint64_t cr_rights[CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION + 2];
};
The initial CAP_RIGHTS_VERSION is 0.
The top two bits in the first element of the cr_rights[] array contain total
number of elements in the array - 2. This means if those two bits are equal to
0, we have 2 array elements.
The top two bits in all remaining array elements should be 0.
The next five bits in all array elements contain array index. Only one bit is
used and bit position in this five-bits range defines array index. This means
there can be at most five array elements in the future.
To define new right the CAPRIGHT() macro must be used. The macro takes two
arguments - an array index and a bit to set, eg.
#define CAP_PDKILL CAPRIGHT(1, 0x0000000000000800ULL)
We still support aliases that combine few rights, but the rights have to belong
to the same array element, eg:
#define CAP_LOOKUP CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000000400ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMOD CAPRIGHT(0, 0x0000000000002000ULL)
#define CAP_FCHMODAT (CAP_FCHMOD | CAP_LOOKUP)
There is new API to manage the new cap_rights_t structure:
cap_rights_t *cap_rights_init(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
void cap_rights_clear(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_set(const cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
bool cap_rights_is_valid(const cap_rights_t *rights);
void cap_rights_merge(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
void cap_rights_remove(cap_rights_t *dst, const cap_rights_t *src);
bool cap_rights_contains(const cap_rights_t *big, const cap_rights_t *little);
Capability rights to the cap_rights_init(), cap_rights_set(),
cap_rights_clear() and cap_rights_is_set() functions are provided by
separating them with commas, eg:
cap_rights_t rights;
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE, CAP_FSTAT);
There is no need to terminate the list of rights, as those functions are
actually macros that take care of the termination, eg:
#define cap_rights_set(rights, ...) \
__cap_rights_set((rights), __VA_ARGS__, 0ULL)
void __cap_rights_set(cap_rights_t *rights, ...);
Thanks to using one bit as an array index we can assert in those functions that
there are no two rights belonging to different array elements provided
together. For example this is illegal and will be detected, because CAP_LOOKUP
belongs to element 0 and CAP_PDKILL to element 1:
cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_LOOKUP | CAP_PDKILL);
Providing several rights that belongs to the same array's element this way is
correct, but is not advised. It should only be used for aliases definition.
This commit also breaks compatibility with some existing Capsicum system calls,
but I see no other way to do that. This should be fine as Capsicum is still
experimental and this change is not going to 9.x.
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
- Capability is no longer separate descriptor type. Now every descriptor
has set of its own capability rights.
- The cap_new(2) system call is left, but it is no longer documented and
should not be used in new code.
- The new syscall cap_rights_limit(2) should be used instead of
cap_new(2), which limits capability rights of the given descriptor
without creating a new one.
- The cap_getrights(2) syscall is renamed to cap_rights_get(2).
- If CAP_IOCTL capability right is present we can further reduce allowed
ioctls list with the new cap_ioctls_limit(2) syscall. List of allowed
ioctls can be retrived with cap_ioctls_get(2) syscall.
- If CAP_FCNTL capability right is present we can further reduce fcntls
that can be used with the new cap_fcntls_limit(2) syscall and retrive
them with cap_fcntls_get(2).
- To support ioctl and fcntl white-listing the filedesc structure was
heavly modified.
- The audit subsystem, kdump and procstat tools were updated to
recognize new syscalls.
- Capability rights were revised and eventhough I tried hard to provide
backward API and ABI compatibility there are some incompatible changes
that are described in detail below:
CAP_CREATE old behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
- Allow for linkat(2).
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
CAP_CREATE new behaviour:
- Allow for openat(2)+O_CREAT.
Added CAP_LINKAT:
- Allow for linkat(2). ABI: Reuses CAP_RMDIR bit.
- Allow to be target for renameat(2).
Added CAP_SYMLINKAT:
- Allow for symlinkat(2).
Removed CAP_DELETE. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing non-directory object.
- Allow to be source for renameat(2).
Removed CAP_RMDIR. Old behaviour:
- Allow for unlinkat(2) when removing directory.
Added CAP_RENAMEAT:
- Required for source directory for the renameat(2) syscall.
Added CAP_UNLINKAT (effectively it replaces CAP_DELETE and CAP_RMDIR):
- Allow for unlinkat(2) on any object.
- Required if target of renameat(2) exists and will be removed by this
call.
Removed CAP_MAPEXEC.
CAP_MMAP old behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2) with any combination of PROT_NONE, PROT_READ and
PROT_WRITE.
CAP_MMAP new behaviour:
- Allow for mmap(2)+PROT_NONE.
Added CAP_MMAP_R:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ).
Added CAP_MMAP_W:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_X:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RW:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE).
Added CAP_MMAP_RX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_WX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Added CAP_MMAP_RWX:
- Allow for mmap(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC).
Renamed CAP_MKDIR to CAP_MKDIRAT.
Renamed CAP_MKFIFO to CAP_MKFIFOAT.
Renamed CAP_MKNODE to CAP_MKNODEAT.
CAP_READ old behaviour:
- Allow pread(2).
- Disallow read(2), readv(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_READ new behaviour:
- Allow read(2), readv(2).
- Disallow pread(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
CAP_WRITE old behaviour:
- Allow pwrite(2).
- Disallow write(2), writev(2) (if there is no CAP_SEEK).
CAP_WRITE new behaviour:
- Allow write(2), writev(2).
- Disallow pwrite(2) (CAP_SEEK was also required).
Added convinient defines:
#define CAP_PREAD (CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_PWRITE (CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_R (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_READ)
#define CAP_MMAP_W (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | CAP_WRITE)
#define CAP_MMAP_X (CAP_MMAP | CAP_SEEK | 0x0000000000000008ULL)
#define CAP_MMAP_RW (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W)
#define CAP_MMAP_RX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_WX (CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_MMAP_RWX (CAP_MMAP_R | CAP_MMAP_W | CAP_MMAP_X)
#define CAP_RECV CAP_READ
#define CAP_SEND CAP_WRITE
#define CAP_SOCK_CLIENT \
(CAP_CONNECT | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | CAP_GETSOCKOPT | \
CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
#define CAP_SOCK_SERVER \
(CAP_ACCEPT | CAP_BIND | CAP_GETPEERNAME | CAP_GETSOCKNAME | \
CAP_GETSOCKOPT | CAP_LISTEN | CAP_PEELOFF | CAP_RECV | CAP_SEND | \
CAP_SETSOCKOPT | CAP_SHUTDOWN)
Added defines for backward API compatibility:
#define CAP_MAPEXEC CAP_MMAP_X
#define CAP_DELETE CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKDIR CAP_MKDIRAT
#define CAP_RMDIR CAP_UNLINKAT
#define CAP_MKFIFO CAP_MKFIFOAT
#define CAP_MKNOD CAP_MKNODAT
#define CAP_SOCK_ALL (CAP_SOCK_CLIENT | CAP_SOCK_SERVER)
Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation
Reviewed by: Christoph Mallon <christoph.mallon@gmx.de>
Many aspects discussed with: rwatson, benl, jonathan
ABI compatibility discussed with: kib
patch modifies makesyscalls.sh to prefix all of the non-compatibility
calls (e.g. not linux_, freebsd32_) with sys_ and updates the kernel
entry points and all places in the code that use them. It also
fixes an additional name space collision between the kernel function
psignal and the libc function of the same name by renaming the kernel
psignal kern_psignal(). By introducing this change now we will ease future
MFCs that change syscalls.
Reviewed by: rwatson
Approved by: re (bz)
kernel for FreeBSD 9.0:
Add a new capability mask argument to fget(9) and friends, allowing system
call code to declare what capabilities are required when an integer file
descriptor is converted into an in-kernel struct file *. With options
CAPABILITIES compiled into the kernel, this enforces capability
protection; without, this change is effectively a no-op.
Some cases require special handling, such as mmap(2), which must preserve
information about the maximum rights at the time of mapping in the memory
map so that they can later be enforced in mprotect(2) -- this is done by
narrowing the rights in the existing max_protection field used for similar
purposes with file permissions.
In namei(9), we assert that the code is not reached from within capability
mode, as we're not yet ready to enforce namespace capabilities there.
This will follow in a later commit.
Update two capability names: CAP_EVENT and CAP_KEVENT become
CAP_POST_KEVENT and CAP_POLL_KEVENT to more accurately indicate what they
represent.
Approved by: re (bz)
Submitted by: jonathan
Sponsored by: Google Inc
It seems we only depend on COMPAT_43 to implement the send() and recv()
routines. We can easily implement them using sendto() and recvfrom(),
just like we do inside our very own C library.
I wasn't able to really test it, apart from simple compilation testing.
I've heard rumours that COMPAT_SVR4 is broken inside execve() anyway.
It's still worth to fix this, because I suspect we'll get rid of
COMPAT_43 somewhere in the future...
Reviewed by: rdivacky
Discussed with: jhb
- Introduce a finit() which is used to initailize the fields of struct file
in such a way that the ops vector is only valid after the data, type,
and flags are valid.
- Protect f_flag and f_count with atomic operations.
- Remove the global list of all files and associated accounting.
- Rewrite the unp garbage collection such that it no longer requires
the global list of all files and instead uses a list of all unp sockets.
- Mark sockets in the accept queue so we don't incorrectly gc them.
Tested by: kris, pho
except for s_family (which is read-only once after it is set when the
structure is created).
- Mark svr4_sys_ioctl(), svr4_sys_getmsg(), and svr4_sys_putmsg() MPSAFE.
kern_accept() and accept1(). If another thread closed the new file
descriptor and the first thread later got an error trying to copyout the
socket address, then it would attempt to close the wrong file object. To
fix, add a struct file ** argument to kern_accept(). If it is non-NULL,
then on success kern_accept() will store a pointer to the new file object
there and not release any of the references. It is up to the calling code
to drop the references appropriately (including a call to fdclose() in case
of error to safely handle the aforementioned race). While I'm at it, go
ahead and fix the svr4 streams code to not leak the accept fd if it gets an
error trying to copyout the streams structures.
locked.
- Move all the svr4 socket cache code into svr4_socket.c, specifically
move svr4_delete_socket() over from streams.c. Make the socket cache
entry structure and svr4_head private to svr4_socket.c as a result.
- Add a mutex to protect the svr4 socket cache.
- Change svr4_find_socket() to copy the sockaddr_un struct into a
caller-supplied sockaddr_un rather than giving the caller a pointer to
our internal one. This removes the one case where code outside of
svr4_socket.c could access data in the cache.
- Add an eventhandler for process_exit and process_exec to purge the cache
of any entries for the exiting or execing process.
- Add methods to init and destroy the socket cache and call them from the
svr4 ABI module's event handler.
- Conditionally grab Giant around socreate() in streamsopen().
- Use fdclose() instead of inlining it in streamsopen() when handling
socreate() failure.
- Only allocate a stream structure and attach it to a socket in
streamsopen(). Previously, if a svr4 program performed a stream
operation on an arbitrary socket not opened via the streams device,
we would attach streams state data to it and change f_ops of the
associated struct file while it was in use. The latter was especially
not safe, and if a program wants a stream object it should open it via
the streams device anyway.
- Don't bother locking so_emuldata in the streams code now that we only
touch it right after creating a socket (in streamsopen()) or when
tearing it down when the file is closed.
- Remove D_NEEDGIANT from the streams device as it is no longer needed.
use by ABI emulators.
- Alter the interface of kern_recvit() somewhat. Specifically, go ahead
and hard code UIO_USERSPACE in the uio as that's what all the callers
specify. In place, add a new uioseg to indicate what type of pointer
is in mp->msg_name. Previously it was always a userland address, but
ABI emulators may pass in kernel-side sockaddrs. Also, remove the
namelenp field and instead require the two places that used it to
explicitly copy mp->msg_namelen out to userland.
- Use the patched kern_recvit() to replace svr4_recvit() and the stock
kern_sendit() to replace svr4_sendit().
- Use kern_bind() instead of stackgap use in ti_bind().
- Use kern_getpeername() and kern_getsockname() instead of stackgap in
svr4_stream_ti_ioctl().
- Use kern_connect() instead of stackgap in svr4_do_putmsg().
- Use kern_getpeername() and kern_accept() instead of stackgap in
svr4_do_getmsg().
- Retire the stackgap from SVR4 compat as it is no longer used.
osf1_signal.c:1.41, amd64/amd64/trap.c:1.291, linux_socket.c:1.60,
svr4_fcntl.c:1.36, svr4_ioctl.c:1.23, svr4_ipc.c:1.18, svr4_misc.c:1.81,
svr4_signal.c:1.34, svr4_stat.c:1.21, svr4_stream.c:1.55,
svr4_termios.c:1.13, svr4_ttold.c:1.15, svr4_util.h:1.10,
ext2_alloc.c:1.43, i386/i386/trap.c:1.279, vm86.c:1.58,
unaligned.c:1.12, imgact_elf.c:1.164, ffs_alloc.c:1.133:
Now that Giant is acquired in uprintf() and tprintf(), the caller no
longer leads to acquire Giant unless it also holds another mutex that
would generate a lock order reversal when calling into these functions.
Specifically not backed out is the acquisition of Giant in nfs_socket.c
and rpcclnt.c, where local mutexes are held and would otherwise violate
the lock order with Giant.
This aligns this code more with the eventual locking of ttys.
Suggested by: bde
as they both interact with the tty code (!MPSAFE) and may sleep if the
tty buffer is full (per comment).
Modify all consumers of uprintf() and tprintf() to hold Giant around
calls into these functions. In most cases, this means adding an
acquisition of Giant immediately around the function. In some cases
(nfs_timer()), it means acquiring Giant higher up in the callout.
With these changes, UFS no longer panics on SMP when either blocks are
exhausted or inodes are exhausted under load due to races in the tty
code when running without Giant.
NB: Some reduction in calls to uprintf() in the svr4 code is probably
desirable.
NB: In the case of nfs_timer(), calling uprintf() while holding a mutex,
or even in a callout at all, is a bad idea, and will generate warnings
and potential upset. This needs to be fixed, but was a problem before
this change.
NB: uprintf()/tprintf() sleeping is generally a bad ideas, as is having
non-MPSAFE tty code.
MFC after: 1 week
svr4_do_getmsg(). In principle this bug could disclose data from
kernel memory, but in practice, the SVR4 emulation layer is probably
not functional enough to cause the relevant code path to be executed.
In any case, the emulator has been disconnected from the build since
5.0-RELEASE.
Found by: Coverity Prevent analysis tool
the semantics in that the returned filename to use is now a kernel
pointer rather than a user space pointer. This required changing the
arguments to the CHECKALT*() macros some and changing the various system
calls that used pathnames to use the kern_foo() functions that can accept
kernel space filename pointers instead of calling the system call
directly.
- Use kern_open(), kern_access(), kern_msgctl(), kern_execve(),
kern_mkfifo(), kern_mknod(), kern_statfs(), kern_fstatfs(),
kern_setitimer(), kern_stat(), kern_lstat(), kern_fstat(), kern_utimes(),
kern_pathconf(), and kern_unlink().
directly. This removes a few more users of the stackgap and also marks
the syscalls using these wrappers MP safe where appropriate.
Tested on: i386 with linux acroread5
Compiled on: i386, alpha LINT
Add copyiniov() which copies a struct iovec array in from userland into
a malloc'ed struct iovec. Caller frees.
Change uiofromiov() to malloc the uio (caller frees) and name it
copyinuio() which is more appropriate.
Add cloneuio() which returns a malloc'ed copy. Caller frees.
Use them throughout.
The big lines are:
NODEV -> NULL
NOUDEV -> NODEV
udev_t -> dev_t
udev2dev() -> findcdev()
Various minor adjustments including handling of userland access to kernel
space struct cdev etc.
SOCK_LOCK(so):
- Hold socket lock over calls to MAC entry points reading or
manipulating socket labels.
- Assert socket lock in MAC entry point implementations.
- When externalizing the socket label, first make a thread-local
copy while holding the socket lock, then release the socket lock
to externalize to userspace.
- Return NULL instead of returning memory outside of the stackgap
in stackgap_alloc() (FreeBSD-SA-00:42.linux)
- Check for stackgap_alloc() returning NULL in svr4_emul_find(),
and clean_pipe().
- Avoid integer overflow on large nfds argument in svr4_sys_poll()
- Reject negative nbytes argument in svr4_sys_getdents()
- Don't copy out past the end of the struct componentname
pathname buffer in svr4_sys_resolvepath()
- Reject out-of-range signal numbers in svr4_sys_sigaction(),
svr4_sys_signal(), and svr4_sys_kill().
- Don't malloc() user-specified lengths in show_ioc() and
show_strbuf(), place arbitrary limits instead.
- Range-check lengths in si_listen(), ti_getinfo(), ti_bind(),
svr4_do_putmsg(), svr4_do_getmsg(), svr4_stream_ti_ioctl().
Some fixes obtain from OpenBSD.
pointer types, and remove a huge number of casts from code using it.
Change struct xfile xf_data to xun_data (ABI is still compatible).
If we need to add a #define for f_data and xf_data we can, but I don't
think it will be necessary. There are no operational changes in this
commit.
checks from the MAC tree: allow policies to perform access control
for the ability of a process to send and receive data via a socket.
At some point, we might also pass in additional address information
if an explicit address is requested on send.
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, Network Associates Laboratories
accept an 'active_cred' argument reflecting the credential of the thread
initiating the ioctl operation.
- Change fo_ioctl() to accept active_cred; change consumers of the
fo_ioctl() interface to generally pass active_cred from td->td_ucred.
- In fifofs, initialize filetmp.f_cred to ap->a_cred so that the
invocations of soo_ioctl() are provided access to the calling f_cred.
Pass ap->a_td->td_ucred as the active_cred, but note that this is
required because we don't yet distinguish file_cred and active_cred
in invoking VOP's.
- Update kqueue_ioctl() for its new argument.
- Update pipe_ioctl() for its new argument, pass active_cred rather
than td_ucred to MAC for authorization.
- Update soo_ioctl() for its new argument.
- Update vn_ioctl() for its new argument, use active_cred rather than
td->td_ucred to authorize VOP_IOCTL() and the associated VOP_GETATTR().
Obtained from: TrustedBSD Project
Sponsored by: DARPA, NAI Labs
Seigo Tanimura (tanimura) posted the initial delta.
I've polished it quite a bit reducing the need for locking and
adapting it for KSE.
Locks:
1 mutex in each filedesc
protects all the fields.
protects "struct file" initialization, while a struct file
is being changed from &badfileops -> &pipeops or something
the filedesc should be locked.
1 mutex in each struct file
protects the refcount fields.
doesn't protect anything else.
the flags used for garbage collection have been moved to
f_gcflag which was the FILLER short, this doesn't need
locking because the garbage collection is a single threaded
container.
could likely be made to use a pool mutex.
1 sx lock for the global filelist.
struct file * fhold(struct file *fp);
/* increments reference count on a file */
struct file * fhold_locked(struct file *fp);
/* like fhold but expects file to locked */
struct file * ffind_hold(struct thread *, int fd);
/* finds the struct file in thread, adds one reference and
returns it unlocked */
struct file * ffind_lock(struct thread *, int fd);
/* ffind_hold, but returns file locked */
I still have to smp-safe the fget cruft, I'll get to that asap.
vnodes. This will hopefully serve as a base from which we can
expand the MP code. We currently do not attempt to obtain any
mutex or SX locks, but the door is open to add them when we nail
down exactly how that part of it is going to work.
